Logical-Epistemological Views of the School of Names (Míng Jiā)

The adherents of the School of Names, often referred to as nominalists (from Latin nomen - name), logicians, and sophists (in analogy with the Greeks), were first named by the historian Sima Qian (2nd-1st centuries BCE). The most prominent philosophers of this school were Huì Shì and Guǐ Sūn Lùn, who lived during the 4th-3rd centuries BCE. While Huì Shì’s works have not survived, and only fragments of his views remain, several chapters of Guǐ Sūn Lùn’s treatise "Gūnsūn Lùnzi" are extant. However, not all of them have been translated into Russian, and a comprehensive understanding of the work can be obtained from its review by F. S. Bykov.

Certain sections of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi's treatise (4th century BCE), particularly in a historical-philosophical chapter titled "Under Heaven," discuss Huì Shì and his views. These are presented as individual worldview statements, as indicated in the treatise: "Defining the [general] meaning [of the natural laws] of things, Huì Shì said..."

Huì Shì’s aphorisms suggest that he held views on the absolute flux of existence and the continuous variability of things, leading to conclusions such as the relativity of properties and states, the indistinguishability of opposites, and the foundation of relativism and skepticism in philosophy. For instance, his statement "The sun, just reaching its zenith, is already in decline; a thing just born is already dying" clearly refers to the continuity of natural processes, especially movement, and their inevitable nature.

Another statement, "Just setting out today to Yue [one of the southern states], I have already arrived there long ago," reflects the identification of possibility and reality: what is possible (the journey to Yue) must necessarily be realized. In contrast, the statement "Connected rings can be separated" suggests the opposite: what is possible can be realized even if not immediately apparent. These statements mirror the Megarian philosopher Diodorus Cronus’s position and that of his Stoic opponent Chrysippus. According to F. S. Bykov, Huì Shì’s views that the sky and earth are equally low, and that mountains and lakes are at the same level, imply that all differences are relative.

The Zhuangzi treatise also presents a typically skeptical view of Huì Shì that a person cannot know the pleasure of a fish, expressed during a walk with Zhuangzi by the river. Like Greek skeptics, he highlights the differences among living beings, each perceiving the world in its own way.

In the "History of Chinese Philosophy," to which we previously referred, we find not only conventional logical (philosophical-theoretical) commentary on Huì Shì’s theses but also interesting historical-philological and historical-scientific commentary. For instance, the thesis "What has no thickness cannot be thickened" is discussed from a geometric perspective: a plane has no thickness, but a surface (area) can be infinitely large. The thesis "The southern side of the world has no limit and at the same time has a limit" is examined in the context of the history of geographical knowledge. Initially, it was believed that the southern land had no limit, but later it was discovered that the southern expanse extends into the sea. Thus, the southern direction acquired a limit in the form of the boundless sea.

The Zhuangzi treatise presents Huì Shì as a teacher of sophists (which could be interpreted as philosophers belonging to the School of Names). Their views are presented anonymously, suggesting they are typical for this philosophical school. This material allows us to expand our understanding of the worldview of the School of Names and partially of Huì Shì’s own views, as he is portrayed as a teacher within it.

Among the sayings in the chapter "Under Heaven," we find attempts to understand movement and development, as well as the divisibility of things, which resonate with the Eleatic philosopher Zeno’s arguments. Concerning movement, the philosophers of the School of Names noted its continuity, as evidenced by statements like "The wheel does not touch the ground," indicating that at no moment can we fix the point of contact of a rotating wheel with the surface; and "In the swift flight of an arrow’s tip, there is a moment when it is neither moving nor standing still," meaning it is both in a specific point (segment) of space and moving out of it. The understanding of the relativity of movement, i.e., considering the reference point of the movement, is illustrated by the saying "The shadow of a flying bird never moves."

The statement "There are feathers in eggs" suggests the process of development as the actualization of what is potentially contained in the preceding state. Finally, the judgment "If from a stick one chi [about one third of a meter] long, half is cut off every day, [then even after] ten thousand generations it will not be exhausted" indicates the School of Names’ concept of infinite divisibility and infinitely small magnitudes.

Overall, the considerations of Huì Shì and his followers address real issues of understanding reality. However, due to the divergence between the multifaceted reality and their one-sided solutions expressed in paradoxical statements, they were perceived by contemporaries as "incomprehensible musings," contrary to reality, akin to word games and empty debates. In this regard, the Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s opinion is noteworthy: "Huì Shì was biased, seeing only words and not understanding facts." Indeed, paradoxes may astonish, but they cannot convince if one is grounded in facts. This is echoed in the Zhuangzi treatise: "However, they [the sophists] could only defeat people’s mouths, but could not conquer their hearts." Later, Sima Qian wrote: "They make decisions based on names and ignore concepts expressing human feelings." Another translation of this passage from Sima Qian’s "Records of the Grand Historian" states: "As long as everything is decided based on names, the concept of human feelings is lost." It is clear that no one agreed with Huì Shì’s assertions that "the sky and earth are equally low" and "mountains and marshes are equally level," or his other similar statements.

Next, we turn to another prominent philosopher of the School of Names, Guǐ Sūn Lùn. His treatise more clearly and substantively expresses the logical-epistemological orientation of the School of Names than the fragments of Huì Shì’s and the sophists’ views, although the available data is quite sparse and fragmentary. We will begin with some general or methodological positions concerning the analysis of the process of cognition and the meaning of statements (names).

In this regard, it is important to note Guǐ Sūn Lùn’s teaching on zhì, which is sometimes considered a fundamental aspect of his philosophical system, with the term zhì being a central category of his philosophy. Since the relevant chapter of "Gūnsūn Lùnzi" has not yet been translated into Russian and is thus inaccessible, we will rely on materials from "The History of Chinese Philosophy" and F. S. Bykov’s monograph for a summarized presentation.

The term zhì translates as "finger" (its literal meaning) and "indicator"; it can also be translated as "concept," "sign," "property." In its practical usage by Guǐ Sūn Lùn, the term zhì has a logical-ontological significance, representing a substantivized general (or abstract) concept of quality (property) in the spirit of medieval realism or objective idealism. For example, "hard (hardness)" and "white (whiteness)." Thus, concepts (or name-signs) - properties turned into distinct, independent entities - are separated from things. Consequently, Guǐ Sūn Lùn’s teaching on zhì represents the central issue of the School of Names: the relationship between names (concepts of properties) and the things themselves: "There are no objects that are not composed of fingers, but fingers are not objects."

Logically, fingers-indicators as names-concepts refer to objects: "If there were no fingers in Under Heaven, objects could not be called fingers." Ontologically, fingers-indicators as general properties of things are the source of the formation of individual objects and their properties. Thus, according to Guǐ Sūn Lùn, objects are formed and revealed through corresponding combinations of zhì: "Without fingers, there are no objects that are not composed of fingers." Once established in specific things, fingers-indicators become "object fingers," i.e., the properties of individual things, and lose their quality as a general (abstract) property. "In a 'hard white stone,'" writes F. S. Bykov, "the qualities 'hard' and 'white' are not 'zhì,' since 'hardness' and 'whiteness' are present in many things."

A second general principle in Guǐ Sūn Lùn’s teaching is represented by the principle of "groping for essence," a method described by him in various situations. In proving the thesis "a ram combined with an ox will not be a horse," he compares the characteristics of these animals and then presents a methodological position: "I tried to get to the truth by groping for the essence through similarity." It seems that Guǐ Sūn Lùn considered the method of groping for essence through substantive analysis of characteristics to be correct, as he contrasts and condemns the formal method of comparing characteristics (and thus concepts, names) alone.

Thus, the logic of names in the School of Names often reflects the struggle to clarify the fundamental principles of cognition and the essence of things in the context of relativism and the paradoxical nature of their statements. The logical-epistemological views of this school represent an early stage in the development of Chinese logic and epistemology, contributing to the broader discourse on the nature of reality, knowledge, and language in ancient Chinese philosophy.