Ontology
Understanding Being
Essence and Existence: Two Aspects of Being
When one asserts that something exists, it is essential to distinguish between two aspects of the verb "to be." The first aspect pertains to the identification of something (an object) as a certain exemplar that we recognize: a table, an apple, a book, a cat, a person. Here, "to be" signifies belonging to a specific essence or type of thing. Conversely, we may also speak of centaurs, a woman, the President of Ukraine, fairies studying at a university, or a perpetual motion machine. All these entities are mentally defined without any inherent contradiction. However, they do not exist; there is no such entity with these properties present in our world. The first aspect of being is commonly referred to as essence, or being-in-itself, or simply being, while the second is known as existence, or ek-sistence, or being-there. Existence indicates the mode of a thing's given presence (here it is), while its essential being indicates what it is (such-and-such).
How are the certainty of thought and the existence of the imagined object related? Can the mental essence of something lead to its existence? For instance, can one derive the real existence of God from the concept of God as a perfect being? (This is the basis of the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God). Conversely, is there anything completely unimaginable that cannot be categorized under any definition? Does the logical necessity of logical-mathematical constructions imply a necessary correspondence with reality? (This was the foundation of the epistemological theory of the so-called "rationalists.")
Another question, which has initiated an enduring debate that remains unresolved today, pertains directly to the relationship between thought and being: the question of the mode of existence of universals. This question essentially seeks to clarify the existence of objective ideas or the existence of essences as such. In what sense can we speak of the existence of objects such as a triangle, a point, or a number? (We are not referring to digits, nor to a point drawn with a pencil on paper, nor to a chalk-drawn triangle—these are merely signs). Or, if we speak specifically of universals (general names), does such an essence as "human" or "mountain" truly exist? From the perspective of common sense, only individual things exist: individuals. General terms like "people" or "mountains" are merely pointers indicating that these conceivable objects share similarities in their defining characteristics. People resemble one another, just as mountains resemble other mountains.
But how do we reconcile this with triangles? After all, we are dealing with a pure definition. No triangle exists as an individual object; it is merely conceived as a complex attribute that can be utilized to describe actual objects, and even then only indirectly, as a conditional limiting characteristic. We may assert that a piece of land resembles the shape of a triangle, but we do not mean that it is indeed an ideal triangle.
Plato held that true being is inherent in such ideas, and they exist in reality. Alongside these, there exist numerous material copies, but they do not exist in perfect form; they only approximate it, serving as imitations or resemblances. Moreover, Plato regarded idealized forms as encompassing "objects" such as beauty, goodness, and justice, considering them not as evaluations but as actual beings that serve as objectively existing measures or criteria of value. A beautiful woman resembles the idea of beauty just as Napoleon's tricorne hat resembles a triangle as such. Is this indeed the case, and how are we to understand this ideal being?
Finally, the third difficulty concerns the understanding of the relationship between reality and the sensory data of consciousness. How can we know that something exists? If the answer aligns with common sense, it is based on the experience of the presence of something given. When you have 200 hryvnias in your pocket, you can present and feel them. This is fundamentally different from merely thinking or stating that you possess that banknote.
The distinction between these two situations is abundantly clear. Nevertheless, those 200 hryvnias, which might have settled somewhere deep in the lining of your jacket, still exist, even if no one is aware of them. Thus, we firmly believe in the existence of unperceived beings (and this is precisely why a person searches their pockets for that 200 hryvnias if they are confident they are there). However, if someone clearly sees hallucinations, what, then, is this illusory object? How does the existence of subjective images (often referred to as ideas) relate to the ideas of objective and real things? After all, imaginary objects and hallucinations also possess their own mode of existence. One cannot simply dismiss them as mere fabrications, products of language, devoid of reality. What about the sensations of a bird in flight? The thought of them does not in itself evoke those sensations, nor is it clear what they are, if they exist at all. Finally, what about God, the soul, and matter? Do they exist, and if so, in what sense?
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
Quellen und Methodik
Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.
Zuletzt geändert: 12/01/2025