Ontology

The Dialectical Method in Ontology: A Critical Reflection

In conclusion to our brief exploration of ontological issues, it is worth addressing yet another aspect closely related to Ukrainian philosophical thought. This pertains to the so-called "dialectical materialism," the foundations of which have been studied by hundreds of thousands of students as a mandatory discipline. Without delving into historical questions, it should merely be noted that this current still exerts some influence, if only because many people associate philosophy with what they once studied at university.

However, let us attempt to examine the ontological core of this doctrine impartially and critically. Its components largely coincide with the materialist realism that characterizes the prevailing naturalistic stance in the modern scientific worldview, which we initially described as a common-sense perspective. It must be stated that Marxist-Leninists essentially equated the concepts of being, matter, objective reality, and natural existence, thereby radically simplifying ontology to the scheme of "primary (matter) — secondary (reflection or idea)." Yet, dialectical materialism possesses two distinctive features compared to naturalism in a broad historical sense: (1) consistent atheism (the conviction that God does not exist and that belief in His existence contradicts the physical worldview) and (2) the so-called "dialectical method" as the foundation of philosophy (hence the name of this current). (It should be noted that consistent naturalists are predominantly agnostics; they assert that the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven by any rational evidence, leaving the question of belief and personal volition entirely to individual discretion. It is also crucial to emphasize that belief or disbelief in God's existence and trust in the church as an intermediary between Him and humanity are logically independent of each other. From the fact that God exists, nothing can be inferred regarding whether He grants any church the authority to promise people anything on His behalf.)

Thus, let us delve more deeply into what dialectics means in the Marxist-Leninist understanding. But before doing so, two clarifications are necessary.

First. Initially, the term "dialectic," which literally means "through words," referred to the ability to analyze the content of words during a dispute and thereby resolve the subject of contention, reaching a consensus on the matter. The alternative to dialectics, in this understanding, encompasses various arguments wherein opponents strive to impose their beliefs upon one another at any cost or merely argue to draw attention or provoke emotions (arguments for the sake of argument). In this sense, dialectics represents a thoughtful examination of a contentious issue, emphasizing attempts to eliminate contradictions through logical means (rather than through facts). However, in this context, dialectics is neither a method nor a doctrine; it is rather a characteristic of the style and direction of the thinking process. In this understanding, dialectics aligns with philosophy, as philosophers have traditionally sought to build their views through thoughtful analysis of complex questions and paradoxes of thought, where contradictory positions appear equally well-argued. Today, however, the term "dialectic" in its original sense is scarcely used.

In dialectical materialism, this initial meaning of the term "dialectic" has been replaced by another. Dialectics has come to denote a general theory of development, which is in turn interpreted as the foundation of the theoretical apparatus of philosophy. Development refers to any qualitative transformations of an object, sequential changes in something that becomes different while retaining its original basis. Something unique, singular, and distinct from other objects acquires new, non-identical qualitative characteristics (which we refer to as the uniqueness of the integral formation). Since for materialists the world is unified in its foundation — everything that is real is reduced to a material principle — the fundamental problem of understanding the universe lies in clarifying how the vast diversity of phenomena and objects arises and the direction of these changes. It follows logically that a general theory of development underpins such an understanding. However, why do they call this dialectics?

The matter is that Marxists-Leninists sought to construct their theory of development based on G.W.F. Hegel's "dialectical method," which Friedrich Engels reinterpreted in a materialist light. Thus, dialectical materialism is one of the versions of the theory of development grounded in a reinterpretation of Hegelian thought in a materialist spirit, which Marxists simultaneously sought to merge with the achievements of natural scientific thought.

What, then, is the essence of the so-called "dialectical method" of G.W.F. Hegel? For the German thinker, classical logic — the foundation upon which mathematics and the natural sciences rely, and which underlies the analysis of the evidential basis in a fair judicial process — appears suitable only for limited use. In opposition to this limited reason, Hegel posits the so-called "speculative" mind, capable of grasping the infinity of the universe as a unified "absolute" and as an active mind simultaneously. Hegel himself compares this to mystical insight. Thus, dialectical logic serves as both a method of philosophical reflection on reality and the world's "spirit" in action.

To comprehend Hegel's intent, it is essential to briefly describe the essence of "standard" reasoning that he seeks to transcend. Classical logic in reasoning, i.e., in the use of terms, definitions, judgments, and inferences, is distilled into several rules. The law of identity requires that when employing a term in reasoning, it must be used consistently with the same meaning, that is, one must not substitute the meaning of words during the reasoning process. Furthermore, the requirement of non-contradiction considers objects or states to be impossible if a characteristic is simultaneously attributed and denied in the same relation. For instance, if traffic rules state that one must not exceed a speed of 60 km/h and simultaneously allow for exceeding it, it implies that there is no definitive rule; two contradictory prescriptions negate each other. Finally, a particular characteristic (meaning) can either be attributed to a relevant object (i.e., one to which the attribution of this characteristic is meaningful) or not; there is no third option. This requirement also defines the operation of negation: if the absence of a characteristic is asserted, then the negation of that absence implies the presence of the characteristic. For example, centaurs either exist or do not exist. If the statement that centaurs do not exist is denied, this is equivalent to asserting that they do exist.

What limitations does Hegel see in classical logic? Let us consider a fragment of the thinker's reasoning to grasp the essence of dialectical logic in action. Hegel interprets the rational activity of thought as the ability to abstract from individual and concrete sensory images and to introduce general definitions into discourse. In this way, reason generates a diversity of conceived notions. However, the worldview created by the means of reason is static; it is as if it is fragmented into separate compartments and generates contradictions. By thinking in the highest abstract terms, we detach from any definitional certainty of a particular object and are left with only an indeterminate something, fixating solely on existence as such. Yet since this indeterminate something is nothing specific, it is equivalent to nothingness, that is, non-existence. Something and nothing mutually negate one another, but the thought of something always produces a contradiction, which is necessary for the thinking of that something, which remains in thought when we contemplate this most general notion. By removing this contradiction, we simultaneously must preserve it. Here, Hegel employs the term "Aufheben," which carries this dual meaning: preserving something and negating something.

In domestic philosophy, this term is translated as "sublation" of the contradiction. Thus, dialectical logic can be interpreted as a logic that retains contradictions in the transition from one determination to another. Yet it is precisely this negation of negations and the preservation of contradictions in the content of the synthesized notion that eliminates the contradiction, which Hegel perceives in any changes where something becomes something else, and in his view, with logical necessity. Dialectical thinking has its counterpart in the object. Therefore, the sublation of contradictions is the means of thinking movement, but also the very real movement itself consists of such logical transitions. For Hegel, the conceptual reality is rationally ordered, which is equivalent to it being thought. The world spirit generates conceptual reality, in which, in dialectical unity, it has its opposite — the real world of nature, the knowledge of which is the self-knowledge of spirit.

According to Hegel, the initial conceptual contradiction of something (indeterminate existence) and nothing is sublated in the concept of becoming. Becoming encompasses two contradictory aspects of any movement, the sublation of which is now something definite, an actually existing thing in its determination.