Epistemology

The Problem of Truth: Fundamental Theories of Truth

The primary aim of knowledge is the attainment of truth. Truth is the adequate reflection of objective reality within the consciousness of the subject. When the results of cognitive activity provide an accurate description of reality, they are deemed true. However, not all results meet this criterion, as the process of cognition is constantly beset by the threat of errors, which may be interpreted as either delusion or fallacy. Delusion is an inadequate reflection of reality perceived as true. A glance at the history of scientific development reveals that knowledge is continually reassessed and refined; many assertions once considered true have since been disproven. The cause of delusion lies in the limitations of cognitive abilities, shaped by historical and social circumstances. Delusion is often the result of biases inherent in all subjects of cognition during a given historical period. Nevertheless, at times, an error may be of an individual nature, in which case it is termed a fallacy—an opinion established as being inconsistent with reality. Individual subjects may hold a fallacious belief, but its falsehood has already been demonstrated to others.

As cognition is a process, it is constantly evolving. Accordingly, truth emerges not as an immutable fact but as a continuous refinement, detailing, and reevaluation of acquired knowledge. This is reflected in the concepts of relative and absolute truth.

Relative truth is an incomplete, imprecise, and approximate representation of an object that changes, deepens, and is supplemented over time. In contrast, absolute truth signifies complete and exhaustive knowledge that accurately reflects an object and is not refuted by subsequent developments in cognition. Absolute truths, also known as eternal truths, include verifiable facts, such as historical dates. However, the cognitive value of absolute truth is quite limited. The relationship between relative and absolute truth is that relative truth can be considered absolute within certain boundaries, but beyond those boundaries, its relativity becomes apparent. For instance, Newton's laws remain true within classical mechanics; however, when dealing with cosmic velocities or interactions at the atomic level, these laws do not hold. The distinction between relative and absolute truth is a crucial aspect in approaching the problem of the world’s knowability: within a given system of knowledge, one can achieve reliable truth, thus the “eternal truths” support the argument for epistemological optimism. Yet, beyond the limits of this knowledge system, its limitations may become evident.

The complexity and multifaceted nature of the concept of truth, alongside the existence of various criteria for truthfulness, are reflected in the diversity of truth theories.

The correspondence theory of truth (from the Latin correspondentia—correspondence, congruence) posits that truth is the correspondence to reality, specifically the actual state of affairs. Theoretical constructs must rely on factual data, with facts serving as the means of verifying theories. The roots of the correspondence theory can be traced back to the works of Aristotle. This theory encapsulates an understanding of truth that appears convincing from a common-sense perspective—true explanations must describe objects as they genuinely are. A critical criterion of truth is the practical verification of theoretical knowledge—an accurate theory must be supported by facts; if a theory is contradicted by factual data, it does not align with reality, and therefore, it is false. However, despite its intuitive clarity, the correspondence theory encounters difficulties. At its core lies the assumption that cognition can adequately reflect the world. Yet, this ability can be questioned—consider Kant's distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and the "thing-for-us." In other words, even during empirical verification, knowledge is compared not to reality but to human perception. Another aspect pertains to the theoretical burden of facts (which was particularly evident in the works of positivist thinkers): facts do not constitute a wholly objective description of the world, as a single fact may have several different theoretical explanations. This undermines the idea that a description of the world "as it truly exists" is possible, and consequently, the key idea of the correspondence theory— the correspondence between cognition and reality.

The coherent theory of truth (from the English coherent) asserts that a statement is true if it belongs to a system of interrelated statements. This emphasizes the important characteristic of truth as consistency; if a body of knowledge contains statements that contradict one another, an error has crept in. Furthermore, in the coherent theory, knowledge is perceived as a system rather than a collection of isolated statements, thereby reflecting another characteristic of knowledge: wholeness and systematicity. A pertinent example illustrating the foundational principles of the coherent theory is mathematics. Nevertheless, while consistency and systematization are vital attributes of truth, they are not exhaustive. A limitation of the coherent theory is that theoretical constructs can be consistent, but this alone is insufficient for them to be deemed true. For example, a science fiction novel may depict life on a planet in a distant galaxy without containing any contradictions, yet this alone does not mean we would consider the novel a true description of that planet. Another issue arises in situations where two knowledge systems contradict one another, but neither contains internal contradictions. Relying solely on the principle of coherence makes it impossible to determine which of the two is more truthful.

The pragmatic theory of truth regards usefulness as the primary criterion of truth. Proponents of pragmatism argue that preference should be given to explanations that enable successful action and the achievement of goals. This pragmatic theory aligns with the intuitively graspable conviction that inadequate or erroneous notions lead to actions that are misaligned with circumstances; thus, if one acts based on false beliefs, their efforts will not be fruitful. Pragmatism implies that knowledge must be tested in practice; however, unlike the correspondence theory, knowledge is viewed not as a reflection of the world but as a means of adapting to it. The question of the correspondence of ideas to reality is not paramount, allowing for the avoidance of one of the core problems of the correspondence theory—the lack of guarantee that our theories represent an authentic description of the world. In the pragmatic theory of truth, it is acknowledged that experience is always somewhat subjective; however, this does not imply the arbitrariness of the subject. If among several theories one provides more accurate predictions and allows for more effective action, there are objective grounds to prefer it; however, it should not be assumed that the more effective theory is an objective reflection of reality. Although this approach seems quite convincing, the pragmatic theory of truth also faces challenges. The primary criticism lies in the relativization of truth—since notions of usefulness always depend on the subject, what one may regard as useful, another may consider harmful. For example, on a practical level, one can effectively utilize the geocentric theory, thus adherents of pragmatism should acknowledge that geocentrism can be considered true under certain conditions.

Based on the pragmatic theory, operationalism and instrumentalism have developed. Operationalism emphasizes the interaction between the subject and the object in the process of cognition. In examining an object, the researcher performs a series of operations—measuring, recording with instruments, and so on. Thus, knowledge emerges not as a reflection of the essence of the object but as a collection of operations conducted upon it. While operationalism draws attention to the empirical level, it somewhat underestimates the theoretical level. Similar to pragmatism in general, it concerns not the essence of phenomena but the methods of manipulating them.

In instrumentalism, theoretical explanations (hypotheses, theories) are viewed not as descriptions of reality but as tools that facilitate adaptation to the world. For instance, if one theory allows for more accurate predictions than another, according to instrumentalism, the former is seen not as a more precise reflection of the world but as a more convenient tool for formulating predictions. The conventionalist theory bears similarities to pragmatism.

The conventionalist theory of truth emphasizes the role of conventions (agreements) among scholars. Its most notable representative is Henri Poincaré. The significance of conventions is evident in mathematical axioms, which are accepted rather than proven. Another illustration is the concept of paradigms as articulated by Thomas Kuhn. Conventions play a crucial role at the level of formulating the principles of a particular science and understanding its key terms. The conventionalist theory reflects the characteristic of universality in truth, as the subjective biases of individual scholars can be overcome within the scientific community. However, a problem remains concerning the biases of entire scientific communities—what constituted a general consensus in one era or society may be viewed as an error in another era or society. Over time, conventions can change, implying the relativity of knowledge. The danger of understanding truth as a product of general consensus is especially pronounced in social and humanitarian sciences, where the risk of politicization arises. For instance, in defining norms and pathologies in psychology, researchers may implicitly draw upon the biases of their era. A few decades ago, homosexuality was regarded as a mental deviation, whereas, for example, in the current classification of mental disorders adopted by the American Psychological Association, it has been excluded from the list of disorders. Nevertheless, consensus within the scientific community is not entirely arbitrary. Conventionalism does not deny the necessity of empirical verification of theories, as scholars cannot dismiss empirical data. However, they may choose different theoretical means to describe this data. For example, if the length of a table is 100 cm, scholars cannot arbitrarily agree that the length of that table is actually 75 cm. Yet, the units in which to measure that length—centimeters or inches—could very well be the result of convention.

Overall, each of the theories of truth highlights one or more characteristics to which an explanation claiming truthfulness must adhere.