Philosophical Anthropology

The Uniqueness of Humans

What does it mean to be human? It is not difficult to observe that the term "human" is used in two distinct senses. In the first sense, humans are one of the species of living beings, distinguished from others by a specific type of bodily structure and characteristics of vital activity, including behavior. As living beings, humans come into the world born of other humans; therefore, anyone born of a woman becomes a human (in this first sense) solely by virtue of their birth. Occasionally, beings are born with atypical, anomalous traits, meaning that their bodily structure and psychological organization deviate from biological norms. Nevertheless, the "abnormal" human still remains a human in the biological sense, merely an atypical variant of humanity. (Here, we set aside how such a "deviant" might be perceived within their social environment. It is worth noting, however, that society can interpret any atypical traits in various ways. See further on xenophobia.)

At the same time, when we refer to someone as a human, we imply something else, as in the call, "Come on, be a human!" In this understanding, a human is not simply a being that resembles me externally but a person imbued with certain expectations, through which I identify with them based on specific "internal" criteria. These criteria allow me to ascribe to this individual shared properties of motives, understanding the meaning of actions, and to accept them as one of my own, who likewise perceives me as one of theirs. To be human, in this sense, means to share a common identity as humans and the mutual expectations that arise from it. In this understanding, someone who physically appears to be human may be considered subhuman if their actions do not conform to the expected image of humane behavior and attitudes. Moreover, humans do not merely "play" certain roles; each of us perceives ourselves as a person, aware of our own self. As a person, a human is a self-subject. The first and second understandings of humanity are interconnected, reflecting a dual interpretation of life. A living being in the first sense is a complex of chemical processes, a structured flow of material transformation, a body. In the second sense, to live means to experience the sensibly manifest reality of the world and oneself within it as a self-subject.

To better grasp the distinction between these two meanings, let us conduct a thought experiment. Imagine that someone, due to a tragic twist of fate, has lost limbs, eyes, a heart, and so on. However, fortunately for them, technology has made it possible to replace these with highly effective "prosthetics." They have received limbs that move the same way (or almost the same way) as the ones they had before, perhaps even in some ways better, such as being stronger or more durable. Likewise, their eyes have been replaced with very successful lenses, and their heart with a perfect pump that circulates liquid with nutrients, supplying it to the devices that require energy. Perhaps there is no longer a single "detail" that they have received from birth. They were born of a woman, but now nothing remains of that initial "prototype." What connects them to their previous embodiment is the continuity of self-perception, self-awareness, and memory of themselves as themselves. Each time they wake up after another "upgrade," they "recognize" themselves in themselves—much like when you wake up from sleep, you are confident that you are the same "I" who went to bed. Ultimately, to be oneself signifies continuity in the perception of one's self.

This artificially recreated "someone" certainly knows that their appearance has somewhat changed (just as an elderly person notices that they are different from when they were young). If you are well acquainted with them, you would also perceive this "object" as someone you know as a human. Now, let us imagine something else: while restoring life functions, these engineer-doctors did not closely resemble the limbs to those that existed before, and this applies to everything. Ultimately, something quite atypical emerged concerning human appearance. Suddenly, someone thought that it is not so crucial whether there is an analogue of a heart or not (or any other bodily part). What matters is that this being remains a "human" to other people who know it precisely as a human. But what is required for that?

Imagine another, now more realistic situation, where you are communicating with someone you have never seen in your life. You have become quite close friends, although this friendship lacks physical contact. You are not merely chatting; your relationship includes participation in shared professional activities, mutual financial obligations, and so forth. Clearly, you perceive each other as humans. Typically, in such communication, you receive at least some hints about each other's physical being: photos, videos, and voice connections can provide very detailed insights. But is the absence of all this mandatory for you to identify someone specifically as a human? Let us expand our imagination. Imagine that "somewhere out there," the person with whom you have been communicating has died. However, in their place, someone else, who is very well acquainted with all the details of your interactions, continues to communicate with you in a way that you do not notice the substitution.

Someone might argue that the distinction between a human in the first and second understandings is contrived, for any person is always embodied, and it is impossible to "transplant" their personality onto another bodily substrate. However, even if we set aside fantasies, as in our first thought experiment, and the unclear connections between the psyche and the body, in social interactions, a human is indeed a player of roles, not a holistic individual with their own individuality. It is also essential to recognize that these roles are internalized within society; it almost programs the individual and cultivates expected role behaviors within them. Although the individual typically has some choice regarding which roles to play, and various options for performing them are permissible, a person cannot be "themselves" in the sense that their role is not inscribed in the social game, or they do not play any roles at all. If such a case does occur, it is merely as a profound developmental pathology rooted in cognitive deficiency. Despite many individuals in today's world being dissatisfied with themselves and the social games they are compelled to play in imposed roles, dissatisfied with other people and the relationships they have formed, they cannot remain "in the game," entirely ignoring it. In successful societies, much like in successful football teams, effective means of removing "misfits" have been developed. Previously, exclusion from the community meant inevitable death for the individual. Today, there exists a niche for those who have "fallen out of circulation," but the expansion of this niche will inevitably affect societal harmony and effectiveness.

Now it is worth clarifying the meaning of some important concepts. The term "individual" will denote a single representative of the species—Homo sapiens L. (This is the name of our species in biological nomenclature). A human as an individual coincides with their body and is biologically identical to it.

The term "species" here refers to all individuals that are conditionally similar based on their bodily structures and functional characteristics. However, the main defining property of belonging to a single species lies in the fact that under such a morphological-functional norm, individuals are capable of self-reproduction, meaning they produce fertile offspring. Note that this does not mean that any individual of one species can mate with another and produce offspring. It only means that, under natural conditions, only such variants of bodily organization are capable of reproducing themselves through the sexual process. Abnormal individuals may arise from this process; some individuals may lose their reproductive capacity, or the likelihood that two individuals will leave joint offspring may be zero (which often happens). The fact that all humans belong to one biological species merely indicates that if we take a woman and a man, who differ sharply in certain bodily traits—for example, a typical Bushman from the Kalahari Desert and a typical blonde from Sweden—there are no physiological barriers for successful reproduction. Although geographical distance and social barriers make such mating extremely unlikely.

An individual, then, is identified as a separate, whole role of a human in their social interactions with others, corresponding to their own self-identity. The physical individual coincides with the person. However, as a certain integrated system of signal processing, which interacts with others as a subject with its own identity, a person may even be represented by multiple characters. In some anomalous cases, the same individual may switch from one personal role to another so that they do not remember their behavior and experiences in other roles. This resembles an actor who plays various characters in different plays and, while now in this role, completely forgets about all their others. Here, we call personality the characteristic traits and their subjective integration into a whole that distinguishes one individual from others. Personality is a characteristic of the individual, whereas their role is always contextualized within social relationships. If a role is a person in a particular capacity, then the individual as a personality is the bearer of the role repertoire they have mastered. However, personal traits are not exhaustively unique. Most often, people play template roles in which, indeed, there is a specific, individual uniqueness. Thus, the individuality of a person encompasses all their traits, both similar to others and distinctive and irreplaceable, that set them apart from other people. Individuality characterizes all humans without exception; however, in some, the spectrum of unique characteristics is significantly broader than in others. Such individuals stand out among the mass of similar people, and the wider the scope of such rare traits, the more "abnormal" the person will seem. "Abnormality" here can carry a positive connotation, recognizing outstanding qualities of personality, which are also called "Personalities" (with a capital "P"), as well as condemnation up to the point of recognizing their bearer as subhuman. Nevertheless, both are usually intertwined: geniuses can also be viewed as deviants!

However, the most interesting and informative characteristics for understanding humanity are not tied to the unique traits of the individual—traits that matter little precisely because they are unique and do not fit into any template, making them difficult to predict—but rather to typical manifestations, specific characteristic individual variations that can be grouped into three categories (based on the mode of manifestation and data registration): morphotype, psychotype, and sociotype. The morphotype denotes the characteristic pattern of bodily structure; the psychotype refers to the mental organization, and the sociotype signifies a particular social persona cultivated by the community. For example, humans are sexually dimorphic; each individual possesses either female or male reproductive organs, and moreover, the bodies of females and males exhibit specific structural differences not directly related to reproduction. Thus, we can distinguish between the morphotypes of males and females. Correspondingly, there are associated features of behavioral regulation mechanisms and their psychological correlates that are characteristic of women and men (the conventionally termed feminine and masculine psychotypes). Various communities cultivate gender roles, which encompass the socially role-specific characteristics of “normal” men and “normal” women: the types of occupations deemed acceptable for each gender, the attire they are expected to wear, the functions they perform in the family, public life, and sexual behavior, among others. It is noteworthy that the content of these gender roles varies across different communities, and the number of such roles can exceed two. (This last point may seem strange, but one might cite eunuchs—castrated men—whose gender role differed from that of men or women, such as hetairai in Ancient Greece, whose sexual-role characteristics sharply diverged from the role of the mother-woman.) It is also important to note that feminists not only advocate for the emancipation of women, that is, the right of individuals of the female sex to assume male roles in society, but many also aspire to diminish gender distinctions, that is, to eliminate any socially typical association of societal roles with biological sex, or in other words, they call for the cultivation of unisex roles. We will return to the question of the diversity of human manifestations later, but at this juncture, let us engage in yet another thought experiment that will clarify the distinctions in understanding humanity as both a biological entity and a social being.

Imagine, by some miracle, a newborn child grew up all alone on a deserted island. (The mention of a miracle here is due to the fact that humans are born in a state that precludes their autonomous survival. To survive, a human infant must necessarily receive care from a mother and other individuals who will protect and feed it.) This creature is a human in the first sense, yet it will not become a human in the second. But how do we know this, and what precisely do we mean? What will be absent in this individual? Since such an experiment cannot ethically be conducted, the question of the relationship between innate, individually experienced, and socially inherited, cultivated qualities in a human remains a matter of prolonged discussion. The most significant problem here lies in our inability to extricate the individual from their social environment to test what they would become if completely deprived of it. Fragmentary information about so-called “Mowgli children,” which we have, pertains mostly not to the pure survival of a child in complete social isolation, but rather to a markedly different socialization experience under the influence of most aspects characteristic of life in society. However, even from this, it seems clear that such a "human" would be incapable of speech and, correspondingly, of using language in thought, as well as lacking behavioral control at the level of higher mental functions. Such children might resemble individuals with damaged frontal lobes, even though physiologically their frontal lobes could function. This situation somewhat resembles a computer that lacks essential software, rendering it unable to perform functions like text input, despite having all the necessary hardware. However, there is a significant difference here: for a human, at a certain point, it becomes impossible to install this software. In other words, from birth, humans possess functionally ready access ports to their memory resources and programming inputs, which will later determine their social behavior and self-control as members of society, but the capacity to load information into these ports lasts only for a specific sensitive period, subject to specific influences. Rewriting this information later is impossible; supplementation is only feasible through integration with what has been previously established. Some of this software in humans may be prepared but not activated or integrated, akin to software libraries. However, a human becomes functionally viable as a member of society through the assimilation of behavior patterns characteristic of that society. In this process, their personal psychotype is also formed.

We could expand our imaginary experiment by envisioning not just one infant but rather a dozen or two. In other words, let us model a situation where individuals of the human species exist in the company of their kind. What would happen if such a condition occurred with more or less mature individuals who had previously undergone initial socialization in society and were then removed from it at a fairly early stage or mixed with individuals from different social environments? We know quite well what happens in these scenarios. This group of children will astonishingly resemble a troop of chimpanzees, displaying social characteristics typical of them, but also somewhat more. If the children have acquired basic speech skills, then in this new social situation, they will develop their own language peculiar to this group, along with certain characteristic behaviors specific to this group. However, the uniqueness of these formations will be limited: they will exhibit a few typical structures that differ only in minor details (such as how a particular sound is pronounced, softer or harder, and so on). Nevertheless, these structural peculiarities are such that they form several types of constructions. In other words, this is reminiscent of a construction set, where the set of components is defined and limited, allowing only a specific set of structures to be built (but not just one!). However, this pertains to children who are already socially initialized. What would happen if these children grew up in such isolation from adults from infancy? We do not know.

At this point, it is essential to address the question of what distinguishes humans from other animals, what is peculiar or even unique about them? In terms of bodily structure, humans belong to the order of Primates, sharing several characteristic features in skeletal structure and overall functioning of most internal organs with others in this order (along with lemurs, tarsiers, and monkeys). By virtue of this set of traits, particularly the absence of a tail, humans closely resemble the great apes: orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos. However, humans possess a unique trait among primates and indeed among mammals: the predominant mode of locomotion is on two lower limbs (bipedalism), which has its morphological correlates. It is noteworthy that all monkeys can walk on two legs, and some do so quite frequently, but in humans, this has become so functionally significant that our bodily structure appears to be tailored for this mode of movement. We observe a similar model in birds, and there, it is evident why: the front limbs have become specialized for flight, while the hind limbs remain for terrestrial locomotion. Where this terrestrial locomotion becomes dominant, in many birds, the wings have become vestigial. Accordingly, in humans, the upper limbs are more specialized than in other primates and are adapted for fine manipulation of objects. Notably, the human opposable thumb allows for a more dexterous grip and secure holding of small objects using only the fingers. There is also another distinctive trait in human bodily structure that has long been identified by morphologists. An adult human is far more proportionately similar to a baby ape than to adult apes. Overall, compared to our closest animal relatives, humans have a more delicate (gracile) skeletal structure, less massive and less protruding jaws, underdeveloped canine teeth, and a relatively large head that houses a much larger brain (3 to 3.5 times larger than that of a chimpanzee). In terms of the ratio of brain mass to body mass, humans are indeed leaders among all animals. Furthermore, the human brain is the most intricately organized, with a very large cortical area folded into numerous convolutions (allowing for greater surface area within a smaller volume). The frontal lobes of the cerebral hemispheres (the frontal cortex) are particularly well developed in humans. Externally, humans appear as large-headed, brainy, hairless infants. The absence of a developed body hair (fur) is connected to this and is a contingency that holds no adaptive functional significance. This phenomenon, whereby the sexual maturity of adults occurs against the backdrop of retaining juvenile traits, is known as neoteny and characterizes not only humans but also many other species. Considering that the adaptations for bipedalism and the restructuring of pelvic bones have rendered childbirth more challenging—especially for offspring with large heads—human infants are born when their heads can fit through the narrow birth canal. At this stage of development, the child is still unable to move or feed independently; they require constant care from the mother, who in turn needs assistance from her relatives. Thus, the features of bodily structure and another characteristic of humans—their social lifestyle—are intricately intertwined.

Living in social groups, animals exploit the effect of cooperation: interactions among themselves to acquire valuable resources or create favorable conditions that would be impossible to obtain alone. In most animals, the benefits created through social interactions primarily enhance their protection against predators (but not only that). However, in humans, social cooperation is based on collective tool-making activities involving the distribution and inheritance of social roles. Moreover, this inheritance occurs through a mechanism of heredity that is fundamentally different from that of other living beings, which we shall denote as cultural-genetic.

Let us consider in greater detail all these peculiarities, although a complete analysis falls beyond the limited scope of this subject. An instrument is defined as an object employed as a mediator between the organs of the body and their interaction with other objects. Initially, instruments replace a specific part of the body, modifying its influence upon a target object. For instance, a stone may be used to deliver a blow, whether by throwing it or wielding it in a strike. The relative advantage achieved in this manner is either the ability to strike from a greater distance or with greater force and penetrating capacity compared to a blow delivered by hand alone. Over time, an increasing portion of actions becomes such that one instrument is employed to manipulate another, thereby taking on a more mediated character. The world thus created supplants the originally natural material environment, becoming manufactured and artificial. This processing, the creation of an artificial world, as well as the very world of crafted objects, is referred to as culture (from the Latin verb colere—to cultivate, to care for). Culture encompasses the totality of products arising from such processing; everything that is nurtured, preserved, and created. This constitutes the precise and most profound essence of the term, which, it must be noted, is employed in various meanings within discourse, often without sufficient justification. For example, in the Ukrainian language, the term culture is widely used to denote "the care of the arts and the organization of leisure activities." In this context, one might mistakenly believe that, say, conducting a singing competition or organizing a theater group belongs to the realm of culture, while cultivating wheat or managing waste does not (which, of course, is not the case). Here and elsewhere, let us bear in mind that culture signifies only that something is produced and becomes the object of care for its preservation and reproduction. This contextual usage is essential for emphasizing a characteristic feature of the human way of life: the creation by human communities of their own distinctive lifeworld of manufactured objects, among which is the human being itself, as a bearer of social roles. An individual within a community is cultivated, nurtured, and processed, absorbing the accumulated experience of the community and immersing themselves in the artificial world. In other terms, the individual is educated, socialized, acquires their status and identity within society, and ultimately becomes a person (in the second sense of the word). By internalizing these roles, they simultaneously adopt certain social norms (models of permissible and encouraged behavior, while refraining from actions deemed undesirable for society). Here, "undesirability" indicates a deviation from cultural tradition. This mechanism of social control, which includes a distinctive process of internalizing behavioral models at the level of self-control, acknowledgment, and a desire to demand all of this from others, is termed social morality. The morality of the community defines who belongs, under whose protection the community extends, and whose status is recognized, while those who are cast out become devalued, rendered subhuman, and alien. The approach to outsiders is different: they are feared, avoided, or persecuted if they threaten interference or engage in aggressive conflict, or, if they lose, they flee. Morality erects a barrier of social isolation, which is also referred to as xenophobia. It is noteworthy that this term (xenophobia) is often used today with a negative connotation, implying that a prejudiced attitude toward representatives of another ethnicity, race, etc., hinders social contact and integration, constituting an unacceptable manifestation of discrimination. However, xenophobia is a coin with two sides. Its absence entirely precludes the integration of the community; tolerance for "inhuman" behavior ultimately leads to the dehumanization of individuals. Nonetheless, morality, as the primary integrator of the community and the core of individual conscience, does not, in itself, determine whether a particular model of behavior is beneficial or not, whether it should be preserved and reproduced or discarded. Moral norms are as much instruments as any others, with the behavior of the individual being the processed object and the cultivated model serving as the tool, the efficacy of which is tested by practice. And this practice encompasses generations of experiences within specific life conditions. Thus, the same norm may be beneficial for the survival and prosperity of the community or hinder it, depending on the particular circumstances of life. Some of these norms possess a fundamental, universal character, as they define the very basic conditions for integration into the community. For instance, norms that protect individual life ("thou shalt not kill") or justified mutual aid ("assist those who ask for help or clearly need it, if the one requesting it is worthy," "share your food with your own," etc.) belong to this category. Conversely, other moral norms may have significant influence at one time and then lose their weight due to changing conditions. An example of this would be the veneration of female chastity, which is a rigid norm in some communities while being disregarded in others. It is also crucial to understand that there exists no "moral law" in any sense other than the established behavioral patterns in the community that are cultivated and upheld through social control. The question of evaluating the justification of such norms and principles falls outside the realm of anthropology and pertains to the issues of ethics, which we do not address here.

Thus, culture encompasses both the material world surrounding humanity and the human being itself as part of this "processed" world. How, then, does the cultural-genetic process unfold? How is information transmitted from generation to generation? The first component we have already outlined: a mechanism of social isolation for a particular group of people is necessary, which includes morality and xenophobia. This mechanism has played a decisive role in the very emergence of humanity and is linked to a specific form of selection that can be termed eugenic (from the Greek word meaning noble birth). The essence of this form of selection lies in the fact that reproductive success and an individual's status within the group depend on adherence to group norms. Consequently, those who do not conform are cast out of the group, left without social support.

Strangely enough, morality arose prior to the existence of modern humans; moreover, it was indeed the presence of such a mechanism that facilitated the emergence of human beings. The birth and survival of offspring largely depended on the social cohesion of primitive communities and their ability to eliminate from their midst those who could not adapt to social life and fulfill prosocial roles. Thus, an individual's reproductive success hinged upon their inclusion within the social unit, resulting in the accumulation of hereditary programs that fostered such social integration and consolidation.

Among these mechanisms, which have a genetic basis, is the reflex of imitating the behavior of one’s surroundings, or, alternatively, the imatogenic reflex. This mechanism enables the rapid spread and entrenchment of certain behavioral models within the community. Its essence is simple: when someone repeatedly engages in a particular action, through imitation and reproduction, you internalize it in its ready-made form, without your own trials and errors, without inventing this method independently. Imitation serves as the foundation of social learning (do as I do!), and it does not require conscious control or specific motivation: this ability is innate. Alongside the mechanism of social isolation, the imatogenic reflex establishes the community’s specific social memory—the primary function of culture—and the conservative reproduction of culturally determined individual behavior. However, in the absence of such ready-made models, which evidently occurs more readily when a community confronts unforeseen circumstances or novel life situations, a new pattern of action emerges through individual trials and errors (many of which may be fatal, but among them are also fortunate discoveries) and is swiftly assimilated by the community, albeit with a certain delay from the time of its initial appearance by the innovator. Thus, the conservatism and herd mentality of the community, its traditionalism, serve as a buffer that protects it from hasty innovations. Simultaneously, against the backdrop of the conformity of the majority within the group, that is, the orientation of individuals toward group behavioral norms and the high herd instinct of conformists, there always exists a marginal portion of nonconformists—those who are "abnormal," yet are partially accepted by the group. Nonconformists typically hold a low social status or play special "foolish" roles but are not expelled from the group (thus distinguishing them from outcasts). More often than not, they constitute the "testing ground" that provides society with a reserve of variability in social behavior. Concurrently, in contemporary society, there is a shift in tradition toward higher status for individuals exhibiting nontraditional behavior. As a result, there has been a marked decrease in xenophobia, a more tolerant attitude toward dissenting opinions, and, overall, a higher degree of individualism and coexistence among culturally diverse communities. At the same time, the role of purposeful exploratory and innovative activity is increasing, leading to the establishment of institutional scientific research endeavors, upon which the production and social governance significantly depend.

The cultural-genetic process is further sustained by social control over individual behavior, particularly during childhood, which involves the educational influence of one's surroundings on the individual. At the core of this influence lies the well-known method of the carrot and the stick, wherein desired actions are emotionally reinforced, approved, and encouraged with rewards, while undesirable ones are punished. However, unlike immediate emotional reactions or parental concern, this form of upbringing is founded on a cultivated, reproducible model. Clearly, for this to occur, a mechanism of initial acquisition of this model is necessary, which at a certain stage not only becomes reproducible but also forms the motivation to demand adherence to it from others, establishing dominance over them by compelling them to replicate the action-demand. Associated with this mechanism is another characteristic feature of social interactions: their suggestive (influenced) and autosuggestive (self-influenced) impact. Autosuggestion and autonomous self-control are otherwise known as conscience—the irresistible desire to follow a particular behavioral model without external compulsion, accompanied by feelings of shame and guilt when such adherence is breached. Unlike instinct (to which conscience bears, in a certain sense, a similar action-oriented character), conscientious behavior possesses an intrapsychic conflict of motivation: one, primary motive is suppressed by another, secondary, socially determined motive. As psychoanalysts since Freud have shown, such conflict often leads to neuroses, but also to the displacement of energy from the suppressed motive into prosocial avenues (the so-called sublimation). Thus, in the activities of a priest, artist, scientist, or politician, displaced sexual or aggressive drives may play a significant role. Beneath the declared motives lies an additional motive that often remains unrecognized by the individual, though it occasionally assumes a dominant role in shaping the direction and intensity of their efforts.

Finally, complementing imitation and education, during the process of socialization and the assimilation of cultural tradition, the individual directly adapts to the material environment, which is, in essence, natural for them (even though it has been created by generations of predecessors). The objects around us inherently convey information about their use; merely to utilize them necessitates interaction in a certain manner. Even if one does not know how to ride a bicycle or paddle a boat, or how to use a hammer or a fork, their construction limits the possible ways of utilization. It is easier to deduce how to wield a paddle or strike with a hammer than to invent and manufacture these tools. The world of objects, in a sense, already serves as an instruction manual for their use (albeit not a perfect one). However, utilizing this "manual" depends on the experiences one has acquired and the presence of analogies within them.

A "savage" will not be able to intuitively use a smartphone, just as you would likely find it challenging to assess a hunting tool, even though the purposes of more archaic items are generally easier to discern than those of contemporary inventions. Nevertheless, as one immerses oneself in the material world amidst examples of its use, one inadvertently internalizes its meaning. Thus, modern children instinctively learn how to use mobile communication, just as their distant ancestors easily grasped the differences between animal tracks and the properties of plants (knowledge that neither modern children nor most adults possess).

Social ways of life, instrumental activities, and their integration within culture have laid the foundations for perhaps the most pronounced distinctions between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom: the use of language for communication and effective decision-making, thinking as a means of problem-solving through a developed system of signs, and a sophisticated mental culture based on symbolic practices alongside their individual counterpart—higher mental functions. It is this complex of traits that encapsulates what we denote as "reason."

In discussing culture, we have thus far considered two aspects: (1) the artifacts produced by humans (in a broad sense, including structures and devices), known as objectified culture; and (2) the culture of human behavior, comprising any reproducible patterns of action specific to a community, including various customs, ritualized models of interaction, and moral norms. However, culture also encompasses a third realm of created objects that synthesize the first two. Among manufactured items are those that serve as signals regulating behavior and conveying information about other objects, their interactions, and properties. Such items—also referred to as signs—simultaneously function as a form of behavior and as their objectified instrumental counterpart. A sign is, on one side, a tool, while on the other, it represents a psychic (psychomotor and psychosensory) process. Furthermore, signs are simultaneously engaged in the communicative process, involved in social interactions, and serve as a means of regulating the behavior of another individual. They form a mediating world between material realities and psychic states.

The system of signs is otherwise known as language. Based on the mastery of it, higher mental functions have developed, which facilitate the realization of language in communication and behavior management, including consciousness itself. Language creates something akin to collective intelligence, arising from a cooperative effect, wherein information accumulates, independent of its storage in the memory of individual persons, thereby forming a unique environment for selecting patterns of behavior. Without language, science itself is impossible.

Let us delve deeper into how a sign differs from the communicative signals inherent in other animals, not just humans, and what is absent in such communicative systems compared to communication utilizing language. A signal is any physical influence that serves as a triggering mechanism. In other words, the energy required for generating and recognizing a signal is used to modify some other process that possesses its own energetic characteristics. Signal interaction is interwoven into the fabric of life, realized at all levels of biological organization—from fundamental biochemical processes to social communications. Direct signal communication between organisms entails responding to specific changes with characteristic responses. For instance, changes in skin or feather coloration, acoustic parameters (the characteristics of waves propagating through the air), volatile chemical compounds, etc., function as signals that prompt specific action complexes in the perceiving individuals. The physical (energetic) characteristics of signal transmission and the medium through which it propagates are referred to as the channel of communication (connection). The generation of a signal can be entirely spontaneous, just as signals are recognized not only from other animals. Reactions to changes in light or air temperature, as well as sensitivity to certain secretions accompanying the ovarian cycle, exemplify signal interactions. In many cases, animals establish a specialized mechanism for generating signals, linked to a specific state of their own, including in relation to the perception of other signals. For instance, alarm calls or characteristic signals of sexual arousal. In general, expression—namely, the expression of emotions—is a trait shared by many animals.

These signals can even be differentiated in relation to the object. For instance, vervet monkeys emit distinct signals upon sighting a snake or a leopard, respectively. However, a common feature unites all these signals: they merely initiate a specific state and behavior, even if that state is highly specific and adaptive, orchestrating interactions among individuals, even collective ones. A prime example of direct signaling communication is the cry of a child; it captures the adult’s attention, prompting a behavior aimed at alleviating the cry—namely, assisting the child. Yet this signal conveys no object-specific information. All information is already encoded within two systems: the one generating the signal and the one responding to it. Language, however, introduces a fundamentally new quality: through signs, situations are modeled, and the recipient of linguistic signals transports this situation, so to speak, into their own "mind." Language serves as a means of encoding data, thereby generating knowledge about initially unknown characteristics of objects and individuals who do not directly interact with what is being communicated to them. Language governs the imagination and shapes perceptions. A sign is a signal that points to a specific object (designating it), and the perception of this signal in the imagination evokes an image of that object, associated with a complex of actions previously performed upon it, its properties, and so forth. Moreover, both entire objects and the ways in which they are connected to others, actions performed upon them, and their comparative properties can be designated. The object immerses into the imagination, where actions are performed upon it under the guidance of corresponding signals. Essentially, language consists of controlled and directed quasi-hallucinations that can be utilized to convey information about non-existent entities or circumstances unknown to the individual. A sign, just like any other signal, initiates a specific process; but this process involves imaginative reproduction and subsequent designation. A linguistic message always generates new anticipations in response. Hence, another significant distinction from direct signaling communication arises: just as a sign serves as an intermediary between the object and its image in the imagination, the object itself acts as an intermediary between one sign and another. Thus, it is possible to generate an infinite number of signs to denote the same object. The signs of language can (like signals) be encoded through various channels of communication, ultimately rendering such signals mere conventional designations and allowing the concealment of the content of information from those who are not initiated into this cipher. Furthermore, in this manner, individuals can create linguistic games that have become the foundation of symbolic mental culture in all its diversity and richness of expression. The playful nature of language use permits its conversion into thought, that is, into problem-solving through intermediary signs, the fixation of intermediate results, their transmission to other participants, and collective participation in problem-solving, including the efforts of even several generations of people separated by extended intervals of time. Language games become a means of representation, modeling specific situations and the actors within them. Although such games may be detached from reality, as seen in myths and other cultivated forms of fantasy—in art, in religion, etc.—these models can, in turn, serve as instruments for seeking effective solutions. A key factor in this secondary transformation of the "fairy tale" world into the real one is, indeed, science, which acts as a specialized tool for aligning the linguistic model with the objective properties of the world. For this purpose, such models are deliberately modified and selected based on the criterion of the accuracy of predictions derived from them: the correspondence of logical implications in the linguistic model and expectations based on it with the actual state of affairs.

The initial playful character of this activity is not mentioned here in a metaphorical sense but rather in a literal one. This is yet another characteristic trait of humans as living beings: our playful activity is predominant, expanding and permeating all spheres of life, becoming the most potent motivator. The loss of this "meaning" is often experienced as a loss of life’s purpose. A person immersed in games that hold significance for them, along with their respective goals, feels exhilaration and delight in life. The most challenging work for an individual arises when the goals extend beyond their physiological needs and simultaneously lack a meaning tied to their cherished games. People remain adult children not only morphologically but also psychophysiologically. This "infantilism" has its positive aspects: playful freedom and living "as if..." provide a unique psychological plasticity, enabling individuals to recode their behavioral programs in a short span of time. However, this comes at a price: a high percentage of anomalies—social, mental, and personal—many of which are unviable and even dangerous. A human can rightly be described not only as a rational being but also as a mad one. Ultimately, reason and madness shadow one another closely. For instance, decades of research into schizophrenia suggest that the underlying mechanisms of this disorder may be the same as those that enable theoretical creativity (or at the very least, they are closely intertwined).

To complete this brief outline of human uniqueness, it is essential to add the aspect of human reproduction. It is evident that reproduction encompasses two facets: the physiological—conception and birth—and the sociocultural—the formation of an individual as a member of a community, who plays social roles and, in this capacity, reproduces themselves in other individuals (not necessarily related to them "by blood"). However, the dominant form of such reproduction remains the institution of primary socialization—the family, based on marriage. It is predominantly within the family that birth and upbringing occur, although the state and its associated societal institutions (primarily educational) have encroached upon the latter in the last two centuries. Long before that, the church, as a paternal substitute, played this role (its influence has since significantly diminished, although it remains palpable). Nevertheless, the foundation of this structure—the marital union—exists as a cultivated societal norm across all known communities, to which a substantial portion of moral regulations is also tied. The regulation of sexual life and the socially cultivated rules for the selection of sexual partners appear rather peculiar and are unique among living beings.

From the perspective of sexual behavior, several noteworthy traits characterize humans. Primarily, there is an absence of seasonality in mating (though this is not unique; among primates, there are also many species where female sexual desire is not tied to a specific time of year). However, in humans, a woman’s readiness for sexual intercourse is weakly linked to her ovarian cycle, meaning that women are willing to mate even during periods when conception is impossible. Moreover, ovulation (the release of a mature egg) is marked by very few external signs. For comparison, consider female chimpanzees, whose external genital area darkens to a burgundy-pink hue during ovulation, alongside a significant release of mucus with a distinct odor. This entire complex of signs simultaneously attracts the male and indicates a female ready for mating. In contrast, the vast array of means for beautification and sexual allure in humans is virtually unrelated to conception. All this suggests that human sexual behavior possesses a secondary function, shifted away from reproduction, regulating social relationships, particularly status within the societal hierarchy. Much of this behavior is culturally specific and varies across different communities (one need only mention the diverse traditional canons of physical attractiveness among different peoples). The most characteristic detail of this regulation is the taboo on incest—the moral prohibition against sexual contact between close relatives, which in turn contains the very institution of kinship as a social construct. Archaic, pre-civilizational social relations were exclusively founded on blood kinship and the institution of marriage, which regulates: (a) who may mate with whom; (b) the responsibilities of the parties in caring for children; (c) the secondary rights of both clans associated with the formation of a sexual union. Moreover, marriage norms and the calculation of kinship vary across communities (although they can be reduced to a few types). Consequently, in human sexual behavior, ancient instinctual drives and forms of activity intertwine intricately with cultural determinants, which include both sexually provocative and sexually repressive elements. Humans are among the most sexualized living beings, with sex permeating nearly all aspects of their activity. For humans, sex is undoubtedly a serious game, with greater existential significance than the struggle for influence, power, and social status.

Thus, to draw an interim conclusion, let us consolidate all these traits of humanity into a coherent picture. Humans stand out among primates due to their bipedalism, modified upper limbs equipped with a developed manipulative apparatus, a large, intricately organized brain, a relatively fragile skeletal structure, minimal muscular strength, and the absence of fur.

Humans are social beings, within whose social structures collective tool use predominates. Closely tied to this is the culturally genetic mechanism of inheritance and the altered adaptive strategy of the species, which shifts towards modifying the living environment to meet their needs. These two aspects represent the primary functions of culture, marking a distinctly human way of life.

Culture underlies the reproduction of like individuals and expands in the forms of symbolic activity, associated with the higher mental functions of individuals—phenomena of language, thought, and social control over individual behavior (morality and conscience). This defines humanity's status as rational beings.

Humans are beings with an extended childhood, "premature" creators of meaningful life games—beings that play. Both mental culture and sex are infused with play.