Humanity. Society. Power

Power

The social division of labor, the necessity for certain social institutions to ensure the management processes within the societal system, and the objective need of this system to perform functions for its preservation and the optimization of its development, collectively determine the emergence of a specific type of social relations in human society, namely, relations of domination and subordination.

These factors form the foundation of power and power relations, constituting the primary substantial structural aspect of the phenomenon under investigation—subordinating force. This essential aspect of the phenomenon of power was conceptualized within the framework of kratological thought during the Ancient World. However, as an elemental "cell" of power, the subordinating force was only examined in the works of L. Bairachna and O. Ledyayeva. Let us delve deeper into the analysis of the concept of "subordinating force," beginning with the examination of the term "force," particularly since this term corresponds to the semantic sphere of the word "power."

It is worth noting that the philosophical concept of "force," despite its widespread use, lacks a clear and precise meaning. For example, in the contemporary "Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary," force is defined in physical terms as "...the ability to change the shape of material masses, cause their movement, change the direction and speed of movement, or bring a body to a state of rest." However, this definition leaves unclear what specifically causes this ability, rendering the concept somewhat lacking in substance. A more accurate approach would position the concept of force within the framework of "interaction," which reflects the processes of mutual influence between various objects (phenomena) and the changes in their states. This is entirely justified, considering that interaction possesses an objective and universal nature. This manifestation of force is directly linked to interaction, specifically the presence of opposition resulting from changes in the states of the interacting objects (phenomena). Within this framework, force in the "Philosophical Encyclopedia" (edited by F. Konstantinov) is defined as a characteristic (one of the measures) of the intensity (degree) of interaction among material objects. In the spirit of this approach, L. Bairachna also defines the concept of force. Drawing from the positive analysis of the concept of force conducted by G. Hegel and F. Engels, she asserts that "...force is primarily the interaction of the parties involved in a relationship, which mutually impose themselves on one another." V. Mulyar arrives at a similar interpretation of the concept of force in his reflections. Considering that relationships express one of the forms or moments of interconnection among all objects and phenomena, this interpretation of "force" is entirely valid. Furthermore, Bairachna notes that the specific, characteristic properties of force manifest in the following ways:

1. Force represents a moment (measure) of the interrelationship of objects (things), reflecting the capacity of one object to influence the movement of another object (to set it in motion or alter the degree of its motion), overcoming the action of the latter. This merely restates the fact that force serves as a measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties in the relationship—objects—which is expressed in the causal connection between these objects, that is, in the ability of one object (the cause) to elicit or induce change in another object (the effect).
2. In its qualitative definition, force also represents the means of its own realization.

Based on the aforementioned, force can be operationally defined as the measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties in a relationship, which mutually impose themselves on one another. As a universal phenomenon of objective reality, force possesses its qualitative determination in each form of the movement of matter.

In a society, the foundation of which comprises social relations, individuals and their groups engage in various forms of interaction and mutual influence, resulting in situations of dependency and subordination, which "...always imply a relationship where the parties are unequal and asymmetrical, with one side dominating over the other." This is partially facilitated by natural and social (property-based) inequality. However, to a far greater extent, the emergence of subordination relations is driven by the overall objective needs of human society as a social system: the necessity for the existence and operation of a specialized management subsystem within the social system. The subordination of some individuals and groups to others must be viewed as a result of the phenomenon of force acting within the social environment, that is, a certain measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties involved in the social relationship. In this context, the focus is not on the change of the parties involved in their interaction but rather on the predominance of one party, leading to the dependency of the other. Thus, within society, the phenomenon of force can attain qualitative determination in the form of a subordinating force.

Contemporary works addressing the problem of power lack a clear definition of the subordinating force. Authors merely acknowledge that the subordinating force implies the predominance of one side of the social relationship and the dependency of the other. Therefore, based on an operational definition of the concept of force, considering the qualitative specificity of this phenomenon in the social form of the movement of matter, we can formulate both "broad" and "narrow" definitions of the concept of "subordinating force." In its "broad" sense, "subordinating force" refers to the measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties in a social relationship, which mutually anticipate one another in the form of one party's predominance and the other's dependency. In its "narrow" sense, the term "subordinating force" will denote a social relationship in which one party is dependent on the predominance of the other.

It is pertinent to highlight the following primary characteristic properties of the subordinating force:

1. The subordinating force represents a measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties in the social relationship, expressed in the causal connection between those parties, specifically in the capacity of the dominating party (the cause) to induce the dependency and subordination of the other party (the effect).
2. In its qualitative determination, the subordinating force also represents the means of its own realization.
3. The subordinating force introduces asymmetry into the social relationship, wherein one party dominates the other within that relationship.
4. As a measure of the intensity of interaction between the parties in the social relationship, the subordinating force exists in two forms of its being: a) in a state of potency, which arises from the practical fixation of the interrelationship between the parties in that relationship; b) in the process of realization, which serves as a direct reflection of the interrelationship between the parties in that relationship or the actualization of the aforementioned state of potency.

The identification of the subordinating force as the elemental "cell" of power and its incorporation into the very concept of power bears significant methodological importance, as it allows us to:

First, view power as an asymmetrical subject-object social relationship (a power relationship), wherein one side—subject—dominates the other side—object.

Second, understand power as a causal social relationship, the parties of which are connected by a causal bond expressed in the capacity of the dominating party—subject—to induce the dependency and subordination of the other party—object.

Third, consider power as a social relationship, the parties—subject and object—of which mutually anticipate one another, existing in a relationship of interconnection. From this, it follows that power depends on the condition of both parties in this relationship and cannot be the exclusive possession of one party (subject): "...it is equally objective as it is subjective."

Fourth, regard power as a relationship of subordination, which encompasses the means of its own realization.

Fifth, study power as a dialectical unity of state and process (the state of potency and the process of its realization). This, in turn, allows for the examination of power and its institutionalized forms in a state of constant change and development.

In examining power as an asymmetrical social relationship between subject and object, we uphold the view shared by most researchers, positing that the subject of power and its object should be understood as various social groups and individuals within them. However, we do not concur with some contemporary scholars who assert that inanimate objects and non-social living organisms may serve as objects of power, as this contradicts the generally accepted understanding of power in a cratological context as a purely social phenomenon arising within a social milieu in the form of a specific kind of social relations, fundamentally significant for the vitality of the social whole.

The principal distinction between the subject of a power relationship and its object, in our view, manifests in two fundamental aspects. First, unlike the object, the subject possesses a sufficient array of power resources that ensure the subordination of the object and various subsystems within the societal system, thereby fulfilling the core functions of this system and managing it. Power resources are typically defined as diverse means through which the subject can exert influence on the object of the power relationship. Notably, many researchers differentiate between the subject and object of power based on their resource base: the subject has more resources and means of influence than the object, which ensures the latter's subordination. Second, the subject of power, unlike its object, has a universally recognized right to enact subordination (a power mandate), and this right is conditioned by the general needs of society as a social system and is normatively regulated. In this regard, we share the perspective of representatives of the non-classical paradigm, particularly S. Ryabov, who contends that the power relationship embodies legal subordination based on inherent imperative authority. Furthermore, when considering society as a holistic system, the subject and object of power coincide.

From the aforementioned considerations, it follows that the subject of the power relationship (the power subject) comprises various social groups and individuals included within them, who, in light of their social position, possess power resources and have a universally recognized right to subordinate other social groups and individuals included within them; the object of the power relationship (the power object) consists of various social groups and individuals included within them, who, in accordance with social norms, are obligated to comply with the demands of the power subject.

Thus, the general needs of society as a social system dictate the emergence and formation of the primary essential structural aspect of the phenomenon of power—the subordinating force. Power as a subordinating force is, above all, a social relationship characterized by the predominance of one party (the subject) and the dependence and subordination of the other party (the object).

Since the emergence of power as a subordinating force is driven by the general needs of human society, the subsequent elucidation of the concept of power will be intertwined with the exploration of the purposeful essential structural aspect of the phenomenon under investigation. This aspect reveals the orientation and purpose of the functioning of power within the social environment, helping us comprehend the motivations behind the realization of power as a subordinating force and the enactment of subordination within a power relationship.

Contemporary cratological literature fails to provide a precise formulation of the concept of “the purpose of power” from a social-philosophical perspective. For instance, the cratological dictionary “Power” defines the aims of power as “...that which authorities strive for, what they seek to achieve.” Hence, there arises a necessity to clarify the content of this concept. If we take the philosophical notion of purpose as a projection in consciousness (either societal or individual) of the result towards which the activities of society or individuals are directed, then the concept of “the purpose of power” should be understood as a projection in consciousness of the outcome towards which the functioning of power in the social environment is aimed. Given that the emergence of power as a subordinating force is driven by the general needs of society as a social system, primarily aimed at achieving a state of stability and improvement of this system, the overarching purpose of power—as a social phenomenon—can be distilled to ensuring such a state. In other words, the general purpose of power as a social phenomenon lies in securing a stable condition for society, its enhancement and optimization. It is noteworthy that the general purpose of power, its designation, was conceived by ancient thinkers in the form of a concise abstract formulation: “the common good.” This formulation (“the common good” or “the public good”) has traversed the centuries and is embraced by many contemporary researchers, particularly those representing the non-classical paradigm of power. Without breaking from established tradition, it is entirely plausible to define the general purpose of power as ensuring the public good, interpreting the latter as the preservation and enhancement of society.

However, society, as an exceedingly complex social system, comprises numerous individuals, each of whom possesses individual interests that shape their life goals. In domestic philosophical thought, interest is typically understood as the actual cause of an individual's (or a social community's) actions that determines their social behavior. This cannot be disputed, for interest serves as the driving force behind every individual’s actions. Being a multidimensional being with a multifaceted essence (vital, social, spiritual), a person is bound to possess a multitude of diverse needs that give rise to a web of interests, which, in turn, propel them towards specific actions, influencing the social character of their deeds. Based on shared interests, individuals unite into social groups. Each social group has its individual-group, corporate interests that shape the individual-group purpose of that group.

Moreover, society as a singular social entity of individuals engenders common social interests linked to the overarching needs of the social collective—a highly intricate system. Common social interests (public interests) formulate the general purpose of society, which fundamentally revolves around the attainment of the public good.

In the real-life functioning of society, individual-group interests of various social groups interact with the common social interests of the entire society as a cohesive whole. This interaction, reflected in the social realm, inevitably engenders contradictions, which serve as the source of development for the entirety of society and the complex global social phenomena, including the phenomenon of power. Thus, different individual-group interests that form various individual-group goals, alongside public interests that shape the general purpose of society, find their reflection in power, in its targeted aspect, through their interaction, which is inherently contradictory. In this context, the general purpose of the phenomenon of power, which aligns with the overall purpose of society, inevitably encounters contradictions with diverse individual-group goals that manifest within this overarching phenomenon (power).

Since the power subject must possess a legal, universally recognized right to enact subordination, determined by the general needs of human society as a system, the functioning of power must be predicated on a balance and compromise between the various individual-group interests that constitute individual-group goals and the social interests that form the general purpose of society. In this manner, power acts as a mechanism for resolving the contradictions between individual-group and social interests. It is exercised in accordance with specifically defined interests that reflect both public interests and individual-group interests. These specifically defined interests always form particular goals that embody elements of both the general purpose of power and the individual-group goals of specific social groups and elites. Consequently, power as a social relationship is enacted in accordance with certain objectives.

As the targeted aspect of the phenomenon of power that we have explored constitutes an essential structural aspect of this phenomenon, it can be included alongside the subordinating force within the content of the concept of power. The concept of power, encompassing both the subordinating force and the targeted aspect, can be defined as follows: power is a social relationship in which the prevailing party—the subject—subordinates the other party—the object—according to specific objectives.

This formulation of the concept of power, grounded in two essential structural aspects of the phenomenon under investigation, only partially illuminates the essence of this concept. The internal “mechanism” of the power relationship, which enables subordination and the realization of specific goals, remains unexplored. This “spring mechanism” is elucidated through the examination of the volitional essential structural aspect of power and its immediate element—will. The contemplation of this aspect was initiated by thinkers from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Modern Era, and it continues within domestic cratological thought (A. Anikevych et al.).

In contemporary philosophical literature, two approaches can be identified regarding the definition of the concept of "will." The first approach defines will in general terms as the conscious and purposeful regulation by an individual of their own activities. This notion emphasizes two defining characteristics of will: first, that will is inherent to humans as beings endowed with consciousness; and second, that will consists of the conscious regulation of one's activities in accordance with set goals. While not denying the legitimacy of this definition or the characteristics it entails, we shall present an example of an alternative approach to defining this concept. In this perspective, will is broadly defined as the ability of a person to act purposefully, stemming from their conscious choice. In our view, this approach to defining will is more appropriate than the first, as it underscores that the very ability of an individual to engage in activities aimed at achieving their set goals—despite subjective and objective obstacles—constitutes the essence of human will. This is a sentiment that cannot be dismissed, for it is precisely the capacity to overcome obstacles in the pursuit of one’s goals that distinguishes will from other manifestations of human psychology. Therefore, based on the above, it is reasonable to define will as the ability of an individual to engage in activities aimed at achieving their set objectives.

Some thinkers, including I. Kant, K. Marx, S. Ryabov, and others, when considering humans as social beings endowed with will, highlight the social aspect of the latter. This is entirely justifiable, given that individuals are part of a unified social whole, which, reflected in the psyche and consciousness of each person, shapes the social component of their will, along with the corresponding social needs and goal-oriented activities. This is crucial for us because, in light of its social component, will can relate in certain ways to such a social phenomenon as the concept of power, wherein it finds its essential expression.

Thus, when examining the social aspect of will, V. Pazenok identifies a phenomenon known as social will, which he posits as “…the social aspect of a person's ability to purposefully direct their activities toward achieving a socially significant goal, regulating their own mental and cognitive faculties.” It is particularly emphasized that the subject of social will is the human individual, endowed with the requisite mental and psychological abilities that enable the attainment of socially significant goals.

The individual acts as a social manifestation of each person, evident in their specific individual characteristics. One can assert that social will is, to some degree, characteristic of all humans. At the core of social will lie social needs and interests, along with “…socially significant goals that, in the form of motives, drive masses toward creative endeavors, guiding and regulating the process of their collective willing.” Therefore, social will, in its general sense, is the ability of individuals to engage in activities aimed at achieving socially significant goals.

The power relationship is enacted according to specific objectives, wherein the overarching goal of society is expressed through the collective aim of the phenomenon of power. Hence, the exercise of power is realized to achieve socially significant objectives. From this, it follows that the subject implementing the power relationship conducts their activities while possessing social will. Since the activity of the subject in the power relationship involves subordinating the object in accordance with certain goals, the power subject, endowed with social will, possesses the capacity to enforce this subordination to ensure the attainment of specified goals. Thus, power, as a social relationship in which the subject possesses social will, appears as the ability of that subject to subordinate the object to ensure the achievement of specific aims.

Consequently, the concept of power, which encompasses three essential structural aspects of the phenomenon we are studying (the subjugating force, the goal-oriented aspect, and the volitional aspect), can be defined as follows: power is a social relationship manifested in the ability of the dominant party—the subject—to subordinate the other party—the object—to ensure the attainment of specified goals.

We concur with the views of certain domestic researchers, notably L. Bayarachna, O. Plakhotny, and O. Chernysh, who contend that power, as a social relationship, should be exercised based on social responsibility. Therefore, to fully elucidate the essence of the concept of power, we shall proceed to examine the fourth essential structural aspect of the phenomenon in question—social responsibility.

First and foremost, it is necessary to note that society exists as a complex of social ties and relationships based on a specific mode of production, manifested through the active interaction of individuals endowed with will and consciousness. The relationships and connections that arise from the social division of labor and develop alongside it create, on an objective basis, conditions of mutual dependence among individuals, whereby the actions of each person acquire a socially significant character.

According to O. Plakhotny, mutual dependence among individuals exists necessarily in human society as “relationships of corresponding dependence.” The interaction of individuals, on one hand, and the possibility of freely choosing actions, on the other, define the issue of social responsibility. When freely choosing a particular action or course of action within society, an individual relies not only on their own goals but is also compelled to consider objective arguments of a socially significant nature that shape the necessity of social behavior or action. In this respect, freedom of action becomes a recognized necessity.

When an individual, existing within the framework of general dependence on objective conditions, makes a decision and outlines the means for achieving set goals, the question immediately arises regarding the extent to which this decision and the corresponding behavior align with the demands of objective reality and social interests. Thus, responsibility towards individuals and society emerges. The issue of responsibility becomes particularly acute in relation to those individuals who possess the right and capability to exert prevailing influence over others. In this case, power, as a social relationship expressed in the ability of the subject to subordinate the object for the attainment of socially significant goals, must be exercised based on social responsibility, which, as an essential structural aspect of the phenomenon under investigation, determines the presence of a special connection between the parties in the power relationship. This connection necessitates and obligates the power subject, based on social norms, to account for their actions (both active and passive).

In general terms, social responsibility is understood as the degree of conformity of the actions of social subjects (individuals, social groups, the state) to mutual requirements, prevailing norms, and shared interests. In our view, O. Plakhotny offers a more comprehensive elucidation of the concept of social responsibility, asserting that “social responsibility is a category denoting the measure of a social subject’s free manifestation of their duty and right to choose, in specific conditions, the optimal variant of relation to reality, based on the progressive interests of society.” If we take this definition as foundational and consider that the rights and obligations of the power subject are enshrined in the social norms of the respective society, while the progressive interests of society—reflected in the goal-oriented aspect of the phenomenon of power—are embodied in specific goals toward which the power relationship is directed, it is appropriate in the context of this work to provide the following “narrow” interpretation of the concept of social responsibility: social responsibility denotes the measure of a subject’s free expression of rights and obligations, enshrined in social norms, to choose, under specific conditions, the optimal relation to reality, based on the necessity of achieving specific goals that lie before them.

Thus, if we include, in addition to the subjugating force, the purposeful and volitional aspects, a fourth essential structural aspect—social responsibility—into the essence of the concept of power, we can define it as follows: power is a social relation expressed in the capacity of a dominant party—the subject—to subordinate another party—the object—to ensure the achievement of specific goals based on social responsibility.

It is quite evident that the formulation of the concept of power presented above is cumbersome and requires some adjustment. From our perspective, it is advisable not to explicitly state that power is a social relation; it is sufficient to indicate the ability of the subject (one party in the social relation) to subordinate the object (the other party in the social relation), which will serve as an indication of power as a social relation. By beginning the definition of power with the emphasis on the ability of the subject to subordinate the object, we consequently categorize this concept as belonging to a class of dispositional constructs, defined in terms of ability and potential. This not only aligns with prevailing trends in understanding the being of power but also resonates with the semantic sphere of "power," understood as the "capacity, right, and ability to manage anyone" or as "the right and ability to govern or control someone."

Furthermore, we believe that in formulating the concept of power, it is unnecessary to place particular emphasis on the subject as the dominant side of the social relation, as the very term "subject" implies the actively functioning side of the prevailing relation, and consequently, the term "object" presupposes the side of the relation towards which the subject's activity is directed.

In light of the above, it is appropriate to define the construct of the concept of power in this manner: power is a socio-philosophical category denoting the ability of the subject to subordinate the object to achieve specific goals based on social responsibility.

In unveiling the essence of the concept of "power," we utilized the fundamental essential characteristics and structural aspects of the analyzed phenomenon—subjugating force, the purposeful aspect, the volitional aspect, and social responsibility—which together form a unified, complex, multi-level essence of power. The essence of the phenomenon of power is characterized by the presence of an internal, profound, hidden, and relatively stable side of this phenomenon, which defines its nature, a set of traits, and other characteristics. The essence of power manifests itself in phenomena that serve as its expression. Typically, the phenomenon of power reflects only a certain facet of its essence, one of its aspects and modes of organization.

From the perspective of materialistic dialectics, phenomena and essence are different levels of objective reality, dialectically connected oppositions. They do not coincide but mutually imply, complement, and condition one another, anticipating each other.

The possibility of cognition, its movement from external, superficial observations to the unveiling of their causes and laws, is ensured by the dialectical connection between essence and phenomenon. Essence reveals itself in phenomena, while a phenomenon is the manifestation of essence. The understanding of the essence of power is achieved through the exploration of the phenomena of power.

The phenomena of power are the diverse events, instances, facts, and all that which exists in social and political life, in reality, through which the essence of power is manifested and marked. Power phenomena reflect life in the sphere of power in all its multifacetedness and richness of content. The task of social science, and in our case, the socio-philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of power, is to uncover the essence amid the multitude of phenomena. It is important to note that during any specific historical period, not all of the essence is revealed. Over time, new facets and angles of essence emerge, giving rise to a wealth of manifestations and forms both in the social world and in its theoretical models. Human cognition, moving deeper into the studied phenomenon, continually discovers new levels of essence, progressing from first-order essence to second, third, and so forth.

Thus, ancient dialectical thought identified two essential aspects of power—subjugating force and the purposeful aspect. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the volitional aspect of the essence of power was conceptualized, and only in modern times, at the end of the twentieth century, did discussions on social responsibility begin to emerge as a significant characteristic of the phenomenon of power. Since the consideration of social responsibility as an essential structural aspect of power began much later in the history of dialectical thought than all other essential structural aspects we are examining, it is quite possible to outline the following primary direction for the further development of dialectical knowledge: the understanding and theoretical development of social responsibility in the sphere of power relations and power being. Thus, social responsibility, in our opinion, emerges as one of the principal determinants in optimizing the development of the phenomenon of power as an aspect of human consciousness.

If we view the phenomenon we are studying within the framework of the categories of "universal, singular, particular," the construct of the concept of power as a socio-philosophical category denoting the ability of the subject to subordinate the object to achieve specific goals based on social responsibility will serve as a general theoretical model of the phenomenon of power for all levels of objective reality, as it reflects the objectively existing identity between phenomena and processes, characteristic of many phenomena and processes within a specific qualitative determination.

Given that the singular denotes an individual phenomenon (or event) characterized by corresponding spatial and temporal boundaries and specific determination, we will understand the singular theoretical model of the phenomenon of power as the theoretical construct of an individual, specific instance of power at a particular moment in time and in a specific place. The singular phenomenon of power is that which we can consistently observe, omnipresently, in the realm of power.

The particular is what is general concerning the singular and singular concerning the general. Since power appears in various forms and in diverse spheres of social life at different levels, possessing unique manifestations and characteristics, the theoretical constructs of these forms constitute particular theoretical models of the phenomenon of power. It is pertinent to delve deeper into the examination of the main types of power and their classification.

In the literature on power, numerous classifications of types of power can be found. Commonly used bases for such classifications include: 1) the sphere of power execution (social power, political power, spiritual-ideological power, etc.); 2) the formative type of social relations (slave power, feudal power, etc.); 3) the specificity of the subject and object of power (individual and collective power, state and non-state power, etc.); 4) the motives and sources of the subordination of the object to its subject (coercion, encouragement, persuasion, etc.). Soviet researchers in their works paid the most attention to the first and second types of classification, as they comprehended power in a broad socio-political context. Conversely, foreign researchers tended to favor the third and fourth types of classifications, as they primarily examined power relations at the individual level.

We believe that the differences between classifications of types of power are determined, on the one hand, by divergences in conceptual understandings of the problem of power, with various concepts of this phenomenon present, and on the other, by the selection of bases for classification.

Thus, some researchers (e.g., Harold Lasswell, Vladimir Khalipov, and others) strive to reflect the full nuance of power relations, and their classifications are characterized by a significant number of positions. Others (e.g., M. Kayzerov, D. Rong, and others) rightfully capture only the most general distinctions among these relations, identifying relatively few types of power in their classifications.

In developing our own classification of power, we—considering the phenomenon of power within broad socio-political frameworks—have relied on the works of domestic researchers, striving to offer an original solution to this question wherever possible.

In our view, the classification of the main types of power must account for two fundamental aspects. First, it should align with the proposed concept of power and the interpretation of this phenomenon; second, it should reflect the most significant differences between the primary types of power relations.

In this regard, it is appropriate to propose a classification of the main types of power based on two distinct criteria:

1. According to the complexity of the organization of socio-political life within society (social power, political power, state power, and inter-state power);
2. By the scale of functioning and influence within the social system (micro power, meso power, macro power, and mega power).

Firstly, we note that as society evolves, the spectrum of the manifestations of the phenomenon of power expands. At the dawn of human civilization—in the primitive communal society—the primary form of power was social power. This power was exercised based on customs, traditions, and morality, ensuring the integrity and stability of the primitive communal society. Subsequently, with the increasing complexity of socio-political life, the emergence of private property, social inequality, and class differentiation gave rise to a qualitatively new type—political power. This type allows a particular social group to expand its sphere of influence and realize its interests and needs within the entire social community without violating societal norms. As the political form of organization known as the state emerged, so too did state power, which grants the state and its institutional bodies (the administrative apparatus) the right and ability to manage societal life, applying specific coercive measures regulated by legal norms in instances of social disobedience. Finally, with the advent of an era marked by global integration and international collaboration, the role of legitimate international and inter-state institutions (such as the UN, the Council of Europe, etc.) has grown, tasked with addressing issues of global order or realizing the interests of groups of states within specific regions of the world. Gradually, the establishment and development of a special type—inter-state power—has occurred, whereby its bearers, grounded in international law, possess the capacity to subordinate a part of the global community to achieve certain objectives related to resolving global issues. Thus, the primary criterion for the classification of the main types of power will be the complexity of the organization of socio-political life within society. In accordance with this criterion, we will identify the following types of power: social, political, state, and inter-state.

Among the aforementioned main types of power, political power occupies a special place in the life of society as a social system. It is advisable to define political power as a socio-philosophical category denoting the capacity of a political subject to subordinate political objects to achieve specific political objectives based on political responsibility.

The phenomenon of power, functioning within the highly complex social system of human society, exhibits varying scales of influence. We can delineate four primary levels of the social system: micro level, meso level, macro level, and mega level. Thus, depending on the scale of functioning and influence within the social system, we can distinguish the following types of power: micro power (which manifests at the grassroots level, characterized by a limited scope of authority, and centered around small social groups), meso power (which extends to the intermediate level of the social system, characterized by a moderate scope of authority, and focused on small and medium social groups), macro power (which operates at the upper level of the social system, characterized by a substantial scope of authority, and concentrated around medium and large social groups), and mega power (which operates at the highest level of the social system, characterized by an extremely large scope of authority, and focused around large social groups). Each of these types of power exists at a specific level of the social system, is characterized by a defined scope of authority, and concentrates around particular social groups, thus possessing a clearly delineated scale of functioning and influence within the social system. Therefore, another basis for the classification of the main types of power should consider the scale of functioning and influence within the social system. In accordance with this criterion, we can identify the following types of power: micro power, meso power, macro power, and mega power.

It seems that the classification of the main types of power outlined above, on one hand, aligns with the explanation of power presented in this work—interpreting power as the ability of a subject to subordinate an object to achieve specific goals based on social responsibility—while on the other, it reflects the most significant distinctions between the primary types of power relations.

It is worth noting that with the evolution of society, the establishment and development of other (non-primary) types of power also occur, particularly those characterized primarily by their influence on the individual, the inner world, and the spirituality of individuals and their groups. Thus, with the emergence of a micro-social system—such as the family—familial (parental) power begins to take shape. At various times and among different peoples, this type of power has exhibited its own specific characteristics and unique traits, yet its role has consistently revolved around the formation and development of the individual’s personality and inner world. The distinct feature of familial power is that it primarily operates at the everyday, life level, relying predominantly on material means of influence (coercion, direct physical force, etc.) to shape and develop the personality of each family member and their inner world.

Moreover, in a socially heterogeneous society, another type of power gradually takes shape—spiritual (religious) power. Its role, in general, is to foster and develop the individuality and inner world of individuals, as well as the spirituality of both small and large social groups. Spiritual power fulfills its functional role through the application of a religious worldview, a specific aspect of human mentality linked to the spiritual essence of humanity, relying predominantly on spiritual means of influence (religious norms, ideas, etc.) to shape and develop the personality of individuals, their inner world, and the spirituality of both small and large groups. While familial power operates at the micro level of society and primarily affects the individual member of the family, spiritual power, as a rule, is realized at all four fundamental levels of the social system (micro level, meso level, macro level, and mega level) and influences both the individual and the spirituality of social groups as a whole. In its development, spiritual power undergoes several stages, evolving from the simplest forms associated with specific religious movements to global forms integrated into the spiritual realm of all humanity.

Thus, power, as a social phenomenon born from the depths of human civilization, transforms and develops alongside it, giving rise to various forms.

In characterizing the process of power development and power relations, important dialectical categories come into play, such as cause and effect, possibility and reality.

When considering power as a subordinating force—that is, a causal social relation in which the parties—subject and object—are connected by a causal link—it is essential first to address the definition of the category of causality. In domestic philosophical thought, a clear understanding of this concept has emerged. Researchers unanimously agree that, first, the category of causality reflects a type of objective, general, universal connection between phenomena (processes) in the surrounding reality; and second, a key feature of this connection is that one phenomenon—the cause—determines another phenomenon—the effect. Thus, causality can be defined in a general sense as a category that reflects one of the types of objective connections between phenomena, in which one phenomenon (the cause) determines another phenomenon (the effect). A cause is generally understood as a phenomenon that, under certain conditions, necessarily evokes or determines another phenomenon or causes changes within it. The effect is interpreted as a phenomenon that is induced or altered under the influence of the corresponding cause.

It is important to note that the relationship between cause and conditions is interpreted differently within philosophical thought. Most domestic authors distinguish between cause and conditions based on the nature of the actions of the factors that comprise them: the cause has an active character, its change leads to changes in the nature of the consequence, it is directly aimed at the consequence, whereas conditions exert their influence on the consequence only indirectly, through the cause.

Based on the aforementioned concepts of cause and consequence, as well as the understanding of the fundamental essential structural aspects of the phenomenon of power presented in this work—subjugating force, intentional aspect—it is logical to assert the following: in a power relation, the cause is the deliberate action of a subject (carried out under specific conditions—resources of power) aimed at subjugating an object to ensure the achievement of certain goals, which necessarily results in the subjugation of the object, thereby enabling the realization of specific goals of the power relation. The consequence, therefore, is the subjugation of the object, which is determined by the corresponding action of the subject and leads to ultimate outcomes: the realization of specific goals of the power relation.

In terms of “possibility” and “actuality,” the power relation is characterized primarily in terms of its formation, development, and movement from cause to consequence.

Generally, the concept of actuality is used in two senses: “broad” and “narrow.” In the “narrow” sense, actuality refers to the specific existence of an individual object at a certain time, under certain conditions. In this sense, actuality has as its opposite the concept of possibility (the potential existence of the given object). It is in this “narrow” sense that the use of the concept of actuality is most appropriate, as it can be related to the concept of possibility. With this approach, the category of “actuality” is defined as realized possibility. Since, firstly, possibility and actuality are closely interrelated, and secondly, the very category of “actuality” is defined through the term “possibility,” the viewpoint of those authors who define the category of “possibility” in close accordance with the category of “actuality,” through the very term “actuality,” appears to be justified. From this perspective, possibility can be defined as a category that denotes a certain precondition for the new, that which arises and becomes actuality under specific conditions.

Drawing from the proposed explanation of the phenomenon of power and the understanding of the categories of “possibility” and “actuality,” it is appropriate to outline the contours of the understanding of possibility and actuality in a power relation. The possibility of a power relation (power as a state of potentiality) means that a subject endowed with authoritative powers will be able, under certain conditions—availability of power resources, the subject's relevant intention, etc.—to subjugate an object to ensure the achievement of certain goals based on social responsibility. The actuality of a power relation (power as a process of realization) is an actualized causal power relationship, in which the subject performs an action aimed at subjugating the object to ensure the achievement of certain goals, and as a result of this action, the subjugation of the object occurs, leading to the further realization of specific goals.