Ancient Philosophy After Aristotle
Stoicism
Stoicism, while emerging alongside Epicureanism, boasts a longer history and a less consistent body of doctrine. The teachings of its founder, Zeno of Citium, dating to the early third century BCE, bear little resemblance to those of Marcus Aurelius, who wrote in the latter half of the second century CE. Zeno was a materialist whose philosophy primarily blended Cynic and Heraclitean ideas; yet, influenced by Platonism, the Stoics gradually distanced themselves from materialism, leaving behind only faint traces of its former influence. Their ethics, conversely, changed very little, as most Stoics deemed this the most significant aspect of their system. Even here, however, the emphasis shifted. As time progressed, discussions of other philosophical branches diminished, leading to an increasingly exclusive focus on ethics and those theological elements most closely related to it. The teachings of the early Stoics remain somewhat obscured by the fact that only fragments of their work survive. It is primarily the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius from the first and second centuries CE that have come down to us in their entirety.
Stoicism is less “Greek” than any of the philosophical schools we have considered thus far. The early Stoics were predominantly Syrians, while the later ones were largely Romans. In his work Hellenistic Culture, Tarn suggests the possibility of Chaldean influences on Stoicism. Ueberweg rightly observes that as the Greeks “Hellenized” the barbarian world, they discarded what they deemed unnecessary. In contrast to earlier, purely Greek philosophical teachings, Stoicism is emotionally narrow and, in some respects, fanatical; yet it also contained religious elements that the world required and which the Greeks could not provide. In particular, it appealed to rulers. “Almost all the heirs of Alexander, we might say, all the major kings for generations, declared themselves followers of Zeno—calling themselves Stoics,” says Professor Gilbert Murray.
Zeno of Citium was a Phoenician, born in Cyprus in the latter half of the fourth century BCE. It seems likely that his family was engaged in trade and that business interests initially brought him to Athens. During his time there, however, he developed a desire to study philosophy. The views of the Cynics resonated with him more than the teachings of any other school, though he remained an eclectic thinker in certain respects. Followers of Plato accused him of plagiarizing ideas from the Academy. Throughout the history of Stoicism, Socrates served as the school’s chief deity. His behavior during his trial, his refusal to flee, his calmness in the face of death, and his assertion that injustice harms the perpetrator more than the victim—these all aligned perfectly with Stoic teachings. Similarly, his indifference to heat and cold, his simplicity regarding food and clothing, and his complete disregard for physical comforts left a lasting impression. Yet the Stoics never accepted Plato’s doctrine of ideas, and most rejected his arguments regarding immortality. Only later Stoics agreed with him that the soul is immaterial; early Stoics shared Heraclitus’s view that the soul is composed of material fire. A similar doctrine appears in Epicurus and Marcus Aurelius, although in their case, fire should not literally be considered one of the four elements that constitute the physical world.
Zeno abhorred metaphysical subtleties. He believed that virtue held immense importance, and he regarded physics and metaphysics only insofar as they contributed to that end. He endeavored to combat the metaphysical tendencies of his time using common sense, which in Greece meant materialism. Irritated by doubts regarding the reliability of the senses, he went to extremes in promoting opposing ideas.
“Zeno began with an assertion of the existence of a real world. ‘What do you mean by saying “real?”’ asked the skeptic. ‘I mean that it is solid and material. I mean that this table is solid matter.’ ‘And God,’ asked the Skeptic, ‘what of the Soul?’ ‘Absolutely solid. More solid than anything, than the table.’ ‘And virtue, or justice, or the triple rule—are they also solid matter?’ ‘Of course,’ said Zeno, ‘entirely solid.’”
Clearly, in this, Zeno—like many others—fell into his own metaphysics in his zeal against metaphysics.
The fundamental doctrines to which the Stoic school remained faithful pertain to cosmic determinism and human freedom. Zeno believed that chance does not exist and that the course of natural processes is strictly determined by natural laws. Initially, only fire existed. Gradually, other elements—air, water, and earth—emerged. But sooner or later, an ekpyrosis will occur, and everything will once again become fire. According to the majority of Stoics, this is not a final death akin to the end of the world in Christian doctrine, but merely the conclusion of a cycle. The entire process will repeat infinitely. Everything that happens has happened before and will happen again, not just once, but countless times.
As presented here, this doctrine may seem bleak and, in no way, more consoling than ordinary materialism—such as that of Democritus. Yet this is only one aspect of it. The development of nature, according to Stoicism, like that of eighteenth-century theology, is predetermined by a Lawgiver who is also a benevolent Providence. Everything, right down to the minutest details, is planned to achieve certain ends through natural means. These ends, except when they pertain to gods and demons, must be found in human life. Everything has a purpose connected to human beings. Some animals are suited for food, others for testing courage; even bedbugs are useful, as they help us wake up in the morning and not lie too long in bed. Sometimes the supreme authority is referred to as God, and at other times as Zeus. Seneca distinguished this Zeus from the object of popular belief, which was equally real but subordinate.
God is not separate from the world; He is the soul of the world, and within each of us resides a spark of the Divine Fire. All things are parts of a unified system called Nature. Individual life is good when it is in harmony with Nature. In a certain sense, every life is in harmony with Nature, as it is what the laws of Nature have made it to be. In another sense, however, human life is in harmony with Nature only when the individual’s will is directed toward goals that are also the goals of Nature. Virtue is the will in accordance with Nature. Wicked people, although they involuntarily obey the laws of God, do so begrudgingly; Cleanthes compares them to a dog tied to a cart and forced to go where the cart goes.
In the life of the individual, virtue is the only good; health, happiness, wealth, and similar things are disregarded. Since virtue resides in the will, all that is truly good or bad in a person’s life depends solely on them. They may become impoverished, but what of it? They can still be virtuous. A tyrant may imprison them, but they can still persist in living in harmony with Nature. They may be sentenced to death, but it is within their will to die nobly, like Socrates. Others may have power only over the external; virtue, which alone is the true good, completely depends on the individual. Therefore, every person possesses perfect freedom, provided they free themselves from worldly desires. Such desires prevail only through false judgment. The sage, whose judgments are true, is the master of their fate in all that they value, since no external force can deprive them of virtue.
This doctrine presents evident logical difficulties. If virtue truly is the only good, then benevolent Providence must be concerned solely with promoting virtue; however, the laws of Nature have produced an abundance of sinners. Arguments against cruelty and injustice are difficult to sustain if virtue is the only good, for, as the Stoics tirelessly reiterate, cruelty and injustice offer the suffering individual the best opportunity to practice virtue. Finally, if the world is entirely determined, the laws of Nature themselves will decide whether I am virtuous or not. If I am immoral, Nature compels me to be so, and the freedom that is supposedly granted by virtue becomes impossible for me.
The modern mind finds it difficult to embrace a virtuous life if it yields no tangible good. We admire a medical worker who risks their life during an epidemic because we view disease as an evil and hope to reduce its frequency. But if disease is not an evil, the medical worker might just as well remain at home with complete peace of mind. For the Stoic, virtue is an end in itself, not a means to an end that brings about good. But if we look forward, what is the ultimate outcome? The destruction of the entire existing world by fire, followed by the repetition of the entire process. Can anything be more utterly pointless? Progress may occasionally occur, yet it is merely a prelude to repetition. When we encounter something unbearable, we hope that such things will not recur; but the Stoic assures us that everything happening now will happen again and again. One might think that Providence, which sees everything as a whole, must eventually tire to the point of despair.
In the Stoic conception of virtue, there exists a certain indifference. All passions are condemned, not merely the negative ones. The sage does not know compassion: when his wife or children die, he believes this event does not obstruct his own virtue and therefore does not suffer deeply. Friendship, so highly valued by Epicurus, is commendable, but it should not be such that the misfortunes of your friend could disturb your sacred tranquility. As for public life, participation in it may be your duty, as it offers an opportunity to enact justice and demonstrate strength of spirit. However, you should not be driven by the desire to benefit humankind. The acts of kindness you might offer—such as peace or a more equitable distribution of food—are not true acts of beneficence, and nothing matters to you except your own virtue. The Stoic is virtuous not to do good, but does good in order to be virtuous. It does not occur to him to love his neighbor as himself; love, except in its external sense, is absent from his concept of virtue.
When I speak of love, I consider it an emotion rather than a principle. The Stoics, however, preached universal love as a principle. This doctrine appears in the works of Seneca and his followers, likely borrowed from the early Stoics. The logic of the school led to doctrines softened by the humanity of its adherents, who were far better individuals than they would have been had they remained consistent. Kant, who resembles them, asserts that one must be kind to one’s brother not out of love, but because the laws of morality encompass kindness. I doubt, however, whether his private life truly accorded with this preaching.
Setting aside these generalities, let us turn to the history of Stoicism.
Only a few fragments remain of the works of Zeno of Citium. From these, it is evident that he defined God as the fiery reason of the world, a corporeal substance that permeates the entire universe, which itself constitutes the substance of God. Tertullian remarks that, according to Zeno of Citium, God fills the material world much as honey fills a beehive. Diogenes Laërtius records that Zeno of Citium equated the Universal Law—the True Reason that informs all things—with Zeus, the Supreme Head of the cosmic administration: God, Mind, Fate, and Zeus are one and the same. Fate is the power that animates matter; “Providence” and “Nature” are merely alternative names for this force. Zeno of Citium rejected the need for temples, arguing that “there will be no need to build temples, as a temple should not contain valuable things or anything holy. Nothing created by the hands of builders or mechanics can be very valuable or sacred.” Like later Stoics, he appears to have embraced astrology and divination. Cicero notes that Zeno of Citium attributed divine power to the stars, and Diogenes Laërtius states that “the Stoics consider all kinds of predictions to be sound. They say that if there is such a thing as Providence, then there must also be predictions. Citing a series of cases where predictions were fulfilled, they prove the reality of the art of divination, as Zeno of Citium claimed.” Chrysippus is quite definitive on this matter.
The Stoic doctrine regarding virtue is not explicitly detailed in the surviving fragments of Zeno of Citium’s works, though he evidently championed it.
Cleanthes of Assos, the immediate successor to Zeno of Citium, is remembered primarily for two reasons. First, as we have noted, he argued that Aristarchus of Samos should be held accountable for impiety for placing the Sun, rather than the Earth, at the center of the universe. Second, he authored the “Hymn to Zeus,” a work that could easily have been written by a pope or an educated Christian in the century following Newton. This brief prayer is deeply imbued with a spirit that resonates with Christianity:
Lead me, O Zeus, and you, Fate, lead me!
Lead me onward.
To whatever you decree for me,
Lead me onward.
Fearlessly I go—though I may lag behind,
Veiled in disbelief and fear—
I must still go.
Chrysippus (280—207 BCE), who succeeded Cleanthes, was a prolific author said to have written seven hundred books. He transformed Stoicism into a systematic and pedantic discipline. He asserted that only Zeus, the Supreme Fire, is immortal. Other gods, including the Sun and the Moon, are subject to birth and decay. Although it is said he believed God does not participate in the causation of evil, it remains unclear how he reconciled this with his commitment to determinism. Following a line of reasoning akin to Heraclitus, he interpreted evil as a necessary component of the whole. He asserted that extremes contain one another and that good cannot logically exist without evil: “Nothing could be more foolish than those who suppose that good could exist without the existence of evil. Since good and evil are antithetical, both must necessarily exist in opposition.” To support this doctrine, he looked not to Heraclitus, but to Plato.
Chrysippus maintained that a good person is always happy, while a bad person is unhappy, and that the happiness of the virtuous is indistinguishable from the happiness of God. Opinions diverge regarding the fate of the soul after death. Cleanthes argued that all souls persist until the next ekpyrosis, when all is consumed by God. Chrysippus, however, claimed this survival applies only to the souls of the wise. Less strictly ethical in his convictions than the later Stoics, he effectively established logic as the foundation of the school. Conditional and disjunctive syllogisms, as well as the term “disjunctive,” originate with the Stoics, as do the study of grammar and the invention of “cases” in declension. Chrysippus and his followers developed a theory of knowledge that was largely empirical and rooted in perception, though they allowed for certain principles to be established by consensus gentium—a universal agreement. Yet Zeno of Citium, like the Roman Stoics, considered all theoretical pursuits subordinate to ethics. He likened philosophy to a fruit orchard, where logic serves as the walls, physics as the trees, and ethics as the fruits. He also compared it to an egg, in which logic is the shell, physics the white, and ethics the yolk. Chrysippus, by contrast, seems to have attributed greater independent value to theoretical pursuits. Perhaps his influence explains why so many Stoics advanced the fields of mathematics and the sciences.
After Chrysippus, two remarkable figures—Panaetius and Posidonius—effected significant transformations within Stoicism. Panaetius introduced substantial elements of Platonism and discarded the school’s earlier materialism. A friend of Scipio Aemilianus, he influenced Cicero, through whom Stoicism primarily reached the Roman world. Posidonius, who studied under Cicero on Rhodes, exerted an even greater impact on him. Panaetius, who died around 110 BCE, had been the teacher of Posidonius.
Posidonius (circa 135—51 BCE), a Syrian Greek, was a child when the Seleucid Empire collapsed. Perhaps the anarchy he witnessed in Syria compelled him to travel westward, first to Athens to study Stoic philosophy, and then into the Roman Empire.
He was a keen observer of the world. As he wrote: “He witnessed the sunset over the Atlantic Ocean at the edge of the known world, and the shores of Africa opposite Spain—the land where trees teemed with monkeys and the villages of barbarous peoples lived deep in the country beyond Marseilles, where human heads hung like trophies on the doors of houses, were common sights.”
He was a prolific writer on scientific subjects; indeed, one motive for his travels was to study tides and currents, phenomena that could not be observed in the Mediterranean. He excelled in astronomy, and as noted in Chapter XXII, his calculation of the distance from Earth to the Sun was the most accurate in the ancient world. He was also a renowned historian who continued the work of Polybius. Yet, he was primarily recognized as an eclectic philosopher who synthesized Stoicism with much of Plato’s teaching, which the Academy seemed to have forgotten during its skeptical period.
This affinity for Plato manifested in his teachings on the soul and the afterlife. While Panaetius, like most Stoics, taught that the soul perishes with the body, Posidonius argued that it persists in the air, often remaining unchanged until the next ekpyrosis. He posited no hell; instead, he held that the wicked are less fortunate after death than the virtuous, as their sins taint the vapors of their souls and prevent them from ascending to the heights reached by the good. The most heinous sinners remain in the atmosphere just above the earth, where they undergo reincarnation, while the truly virtuous ascend to the stellar spheres to observe the celestial bodies in their orbits. Because he believed these elevated souls might assist those still living, he found a basis for the validity of astrology. Biven suggests that by reviving this Orphic concept and incorporating Neopythagorean beliefs, Posidonius may have paved the way for Gnosticism. He rightly adds that it was not Christianity but the Copernican theory that proved fatal to these philosophical systems. Cleanthes was correct in deeming Aristarchus of Samos a formidable foe.
From a historical perspective—though not necessarily a philosophical one—the earlier Stoics pale in significance compared to three figures closely linked with Rome: Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Each represents a distinct social position: a prominent court official, a slave, and an emperor.
Seneca (c. 3 BCE – 65 CE) was a Spaniard whose father, a man of high education, resided in Rome. Seneca pursued a successful political career until 41 CE, when Emperor Claudius exiled him to Corsica after he incurred the wrath of Empress Messalina. In 48 CE, Claudius’s second wife, Agrippina, recalled Seneca to serve as tutor to her eleven-year-old son. Seneca was less fortunate than Aristotle in his choice of pupil; that boy was Emperor Nero. Although Seneca publicly scorned wealth as a Stoic, he amassed a fortune said to total three hundred million sesterces—roughly twelve million dollars. Much of this wealth derived from loans made to Britain. According to Dio, the exorbitant interest rates he charged helped incite the uprising in that region. In truth, the heroic Queen Boudica led a revolt against the very capitalism represented by this philosophical apostle of asceticism.
As Nero’s behavior grew increasingly unrestrained, Seneca gradually fell from favor. Eventually, he was accused—whether justly or not—of conspiring to assassinate Nero and replace him with another emperor; some claimed the intended successor was Seneca himself. In recognition of his past merits, he was graciously permitted to end his life by suicide in 65 CE.
The manner of his death was instructive. Upon being informed of the emperor’s decree, he initially set about drafting a will. When told he had no time for such a task, he addressed his grieving family: “It matters not; I shall leave you something of far greater value than earthly wealth—a life exemplifying virtue,” or words to that effect. He then opened his veins and summoned his secretaries to record his final thoughts; according to Tacitus, his eloquence did not falter until his last moment. His nephew, the poet Lucan, met a similar fate at the same time, breathing his last while reciting his own verses. In subsequent centuries, Seneca was judged more for his delightful teachings than for his somewhat dubious conduct. Some Church Fathers attempted to portray him as a Christian, and the supposed correspondence between him and St. Paul was accepted as authentic by figures such as St. Jerome.
Epictetus (c. 60–100 CE) was of an entirely different nature, though he bore a strong resemblance to Seneca as a philosopher. A Greek by birth, he was a slave to Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, and later served as his attendant. Epictetus was said to have been left lame by the severe punishment he endured during his enslavement. He lived and taught in Rome until 90 CE, when Emperor Domitian, having no need for intellectuals, expelled all philosophers from the city. Epictetus then withdrew to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he spent his remaining years devoted to teaching and literary pursuits.
Marcus Aurelius (121—180 CE) occupied a position at the other end of the social spectrum. The adopted son of the benevolent Emperor Antoninus Pius, who was both his uncle and father-in-law, Marcus Aurelius succeeded him in 161 and honored his memory. As emperor, he dedicated himself to Stoic virtue. He required immense willpower, as his reign was fraught with calamities—earthquakes, epidemics, and prolonged, arduous wars and military insurrections. His work, Meditations, directed toward himself and seemingly never intended for publication, reveals the weary fatigue he felt from his public duties and his great exhaustion. His only son, Commodus, who inherited the throne, proved to be one of the worst among many poor emperors; however, while his father lived, he successfully concealed his vices. The emperor-philosopher’s wife, Faustina, was perhaps unjustly accused of vile debauchery, yet he never suspected her and, after her death, endeavored to deify her. Marcus Aurelius persecuted Christians because they rejected the state religion, which he regarded as politically essential. Conscientious in all his actions, he was nonetheless ill-fated in many instances. Marcus Aurelius is a tragic figure: among his earthly desires to resist, he found the longing for rural solitude the most alluring, yet he was never afforded that opportunity. Some of the writings that comprise Meditations were penned in camp during distant military campaigns, the hardships of which ultimately led him to his grave.
It is notable that Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius converge entirely in their examination of all philosophical questions. This suggests that while social circumstances do reflect the philosophy of an era, personal circumstances exert less influence than is often assumed on an individual’s thought. Philosophers are typically individuals of considerable breadth of mind, largely capable of disregarding the misfortunes of their personal lives; yet even they cannot rise above the good or evil of their time. In bleak times, they conceive of consolations; in favorable ones, their interests tend to be purely intellectual.
Gibbon, who begins his detailed history with the vices of Commodus, concurs with most eighteenth-century writers in declaring that the period of the Antonines was a ‘golden age.’ “If anyone were to ask,” wrote Gibbon, “during which period of universal history the condition of humankind was the happiest and most flourishing, he would have to name, without any hesitation, that period which stretched from the death of Domitian to the ascension of Commodus.” One cannot fully agree with this judgment. The evil of slavery caused immense suffering and undermined the strength of the ancient world. The spectacles of gladiators and fights with wild beasts, unbearably cruel, must have degraded the dignity of the populace that reveled in them. It is true that Marcus Aurelius ordered that gladiators fight with dull swords, but this reform lasted only a short time; moreover, he did nothing regarding the fights with wild animals. The economic system was in dire straits; agriculture was declining in Italy, and the population of Rome relied on the free distribution of grain from the provinces. All initiative was concentrated in the hands of the emperor and his ministers. Throughout the vast expanse of the empire, all, save for the occasional rebellious general, could do little but submit. People yearned for the better days of the past; the future, they felt, promised at best only fatigue and, at worst, horror.
Comparing the tone in which Marcus Aurelius speaks to that of Bacon, Locke, or Condorcet, we perceive a stark contrast between a weary age and one filled with hope. In an age of hope, great contemporary evils and misfortunes are bearable, for consciousness assures us that they shall pass; yet in an age of fatigue, even genuine goods lose their allure. The ethics of the Stoics were suited to the times of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, as they called for patience rather than hope.
Undoubtedly, the era of the Antonines was far superior to any other period before the Renaissance in terms of general welfare. However, a careful examination reveals that it was not as prosperous as the ruins of architectural marvels might suggest. Greco-Roman civilization had very little impact on agricultural regions; it was largely confined to cities. Even in these cities, there existed a proletariat suffering extreme hardship, alongside vast numbers of slaves. Rostovtsev summarizes the discussion of the social and economic conditions of city life:
“The picture of their social standing is less appealing than that of the external conditions,” as the sources suggest. The existing records convey an impression that the splendor of the cities was created by a very small minority of the population, and for that minority itself. Even this group’s prosperity rested on a relatively weak foundation. Because the large masses of the urban population either had very modest incomes or lived in extreme poverty, we must not exaggerate the wealth of the cities: their appearance is deceptive.
On Earth, Epictetus asserts, we are prisoners, and our bodies are dust. According to Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus would say: “You are a small soul, bearing a body.” Zeus could not liberate the body, but he bestowed upon us a spark of his divinity. God is the father of mankind, and we are all brothers. We ought not to declare, “I am an Athenian” or “I am a Roman,” but rather, “I am a citizen of the universe.” If you were a relative of Caesar, you would feel secure. How much more should you feel secure as a relative of God? If we conclude that virtue is the only true good, we will see that no actual evil befalls us.
I must die. But must I die lamenting? I must be imprisoned. But should I grieve over this? I must face exile. Can anyone prevent me from going forth with a smile, filled with courage and serenity? “Reveal the secret.” “I refuse to do so, for it lies within my power.” “But I will shackle you!” “What do you say to me, man? Shackling me? You may shackle my legs—yes—but my will, no. Even Zeus cannot conquer it.” “I will imprison you.” “You refer to my body.” “I will behead you.” “And so what? Did I ever tell you that I am the only person in the world who cannot be beheaded?”
Such are the thoughts of those who follow philosophy. These are the lessons they must record day by day, and in which they must exercise themselves.
Slaves are equal to other men, for all are equally children of God. We must submit to God as good citizens—we must submit to the law.
“A soldier takes an oath to honor Caesar above all men, and we—above all—must honor ourselves.” “When you stand before the powerful of this world, remember that another looks down upon what transpires, and that you must please him rather than that man.”
“Show me a person created according to the measure of the judgments he pronounces, just as we refer to the statue of Phidias, which is carved according to the rules of his art. Show me a person stricken with disease—and yet happy; in danger—and yet happy; dying—and yet happy; in exile—and happy; in disgrace—and happy. Show me him. I swear by the gods, I shall see a Stoic. No, you cannot show me a perfected Stoic; but then show me one who is in formation, one who has embarked on this path. Grant me this kindness; do not deprive me, old man, of the spectacle that I have yet to behold. What! Do you think you will show me the Zeus of Phidias or his Athena—those statues of ivory and gold? I wish to see the soul. Let any one of you show me the soul of a person yearning to be one with God, longing not to accuse either God or man, never suffering failure, not experiencing misfortune, free from anger, envy, and jealousy—one who (why hide my thought?) desires to transform his humanity into divinity and who has set his goal, in this wretched body, to reunite with God. Show him to me! No, you cannot.”
Epictetus tirelessly instructs his followers on how to regard what is deemed misfortune, often employing simple dialogues to do so. Like Christians, he asserts that we must love our enemies. In general, like other Stoics, he scorns pleasure, yet there exists a kind of bliss that cannot be despised. “Athens is beautiful. Yes. But happiness is far more beautiful when it entails freedom from passions and anxieties, the feeling that your actions depend on no one else.” Every person is an actor in a play for which God has assigned the roles; our duty is to perform our part with dignity, whatever it may be.
The records conveying the teachings of Epictetus possess great sincerity and simplicity, as they were composed from notes taken by his student, Arrian. His morality is lofty and transcends worldly concerns. In a state where the highest duty of man is to resist titanic power, it would be hard to find a philosophy more capable of assisting this endeavor.
In some respects, such as the recognition of human brotherhood and the doctrine of the equality of slaves, his thought surpasses all that can be found in Plato or Aristotle. It transcends any philosopher whose ideas were inspired by the city-state. The real world during the time of Epictetus was far inferior to the Athens of Pericles. Yet, the existing evil provided ample scope for his inspiration; his ideal world surpasses that of Plato just as his actual world is inferior to that of fifth-century Athens.
The “Meditations” of Marcus Aurelius commence with an acknowledgment of those to whom he owes gratitude: his grandfather, father, adoptive father, various teachers, and the gods. Some of the acknowledgments he expresses are amusing. By his own account, he learned from Diogenes not to listen to charlatans, from Rusticus not to compose poetry, and from Sextus to conduct himself seriously without affectation.
He learned from Alexander the Grammarian not to correct others’ grammatical mistakes, but to use the correct expression immediately. From Alexander the Platonist, he learned not to excuse tardiness in responding to letters due to busyness, and from his adoptive father, not to fall in love with boys. He owes the gods—he continues—for not being reared too long with his grandfather’s concubine and for not proving his manhood too early. He is grateful that his children are neither foolish nor physically ugly, that his wife is obedient, and that, while engaging in philosophy, he has not wasted time studying history, syllogisms, or astronomy.
What is devoid of the personal in the “Meditations” closely aligns with Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius doubts the immortality of the soul, yet speaks as a Christian might: “If it is possible that you may part from life this very moment, accordingly, arrange every action and thought.” Life in harmony with the universe is the good; and harmony with the universe is the same as obedience to the will of God.
World! Everything that harmonizes with you befits me, and nothing that is timely for you comes too early or too late for me. Nature! Everything ripening in the change of your seasons serves my needs. All things emanate from you, all things abide in you, and all things return to you. The hero of the play proclaims: “Oh beloved city of Kekrops!” Will you not say: “Oh beloved city of Zeus!”?
From this, it is evident that the City of God, as described by St. Augustine, is partially borrowed from the pagan emperor.
Marcus Aurelius believed that God assigns each person a special ‘good genius’ as a guide, a conviction that would later be reborn in the image of the Christian guardian angel. He found solace in the vision of the Universe as a tightly knit whole, describing it as a singular, living being possessed of a unified substance and a single soul.
He wrote: “Reflect more often on the connection of all things in the world and on their interrelations.” He also observed: “Whatever happens to you was preordained from eternity. The interweaving of causes has from the very beginning tied your existence to this given event.” In this, he reconciled—however contradictorily—the Stoic belief in humanity as a single community with his position in the Roman state: “For me, a man of the Antonine line, the city and homeland is Rome, but for a mere man—the world.”
Here lies the difficulty inherent in all Stoic thought: the struggle to reconcile cosmic determinism with individual free will. “Humans exist for one another,” he remarked when reflecting on his duty as a ruler. Yet, in the same passage, he asserted that “the vice of one person does not harm another,” adhering to the doctrine that only virtue is good. He never concluded that one person’s virtue cannot benefit another. Nor did he acknowledge that he himself would cause harm to anyone but himself were he as poor an emperor as Nero; nevertheless, that conclusion seems almost inevitable.
“It is human nature to love even those who err,” he stated. “You will achieve this if you realize that they are akin to you, that they sin out of ignorance and against their will, and that soon enough, both you and they will meet death.” He added that the most important point is that none of them has caused you harm, “for they have not made your hegemonikon any worse than it was before.”
And again: “Love humanity. Follow God… And this is enough to remember that the Law governs all.”
These assertions highlight the innate contradictions within Stoic ethics and theology. On one hand, the Universe is a rigidly determined whole, in which every occurrence is the result of preceding causes. On the other, individual will is held to be entirely autonomous. No one, therefore, can be compelled to sin by external forces. This is the first contradiction. A second, closely related one follows: if the will is autonomous and only a virtuous will is good, then one person cannot cause either good or evil to another. Consequently, the concept of benevolence becomes an illusion. Each of these contradictions requires examination.
The tension between free will and determinism is a recurring theme that has traversed philosophy from antiquity to the present, assuming different forms in different eras. Here, we are concerned specifically with how this contradiction manifests in Stoicism.
If we were to engage a Stoic in a Socratic dialogue, he would likely defend his position as follows: The Universe is a single, animated Being, possessed of a soul and capable of being called God or Reason. As a whole, this Being is free. God decided from the beginning to act according to established universal laws, choosing those that would yield the best outcomes. While the results in individual cases may not always be desirable, this inconvenience is a price worth paying for the sake of universal legality, much like the compromises found in human codes of law. A human being is composed of fire and base matter; because the human contains this fire—at least when it is of the highest quality—it is a particle of God. When the divine part of a person manifests a virtuous will, this will is a fragment of God’s will, which is free; therefore, under these conditions, human will is also free.
This argument is compelling to a point, but it collapses when we consider the causes of our volitional acts. We know from practical experience that factors such as dyspepsia can have a deleterious effect on a person’s virtue, and that the forcible administration of remedies can undermine willpower. Consider Epictetus’s favorite example: a person unjustly imprisoned by a tyrant, a scenario that has occurred more frequently in recent history than at any other time. Some individuals have endured such trials with Stoic heroism, while others, for reasons unknown, have not. It has become evident that sufficiently agonizing torture can break the will of almost any person, just as substances like morphine or cocaine can lead to submission. The will is independent of the tyrant only as long as the tyrant acts irrationally. This is an extreme example, yet the same arguments supporting determinism in the physical world apply equally to human volition. I do not claim these arguments are decisive, but they possess equal weight in both domains; there are no sufficient grounds to accept them in one while rejecting them in another.
A Stoic, while insisting on a tolerant attitude toward sinners, must also admit that a sinful will is the result of previous causes; only a virtuous will appears free to him. This remains inconsistent. Marcus Aurelius believed he owed his own virtue to the influence of his parents, grandparents, and teachers; a good will is as much the product of preceding causes as a bad one. A Stoic may sincerely claim that his philosophy fosters virtue, but it seems unlikely to produce this effect without an element of intellectual delusion. Indeed, acknowledging that both virtue and sin are equally inevitable results of preceding causes—as the Stoics ought to assert—would likely paralyze moral effort.
I now turn to the second contradiction. The Stoic, when preaching benevolence, asserts in theory that no one can cause either evil or good to another, since only a virtuous will is good and remains independent of external causes. This contradiction is more evident than the first and is more specific to Stoics, including some Christian moralists. They likely failed to notice it because they maintained two ethical systems: one refined for themselves and another, subordinate system for the ‘less educated and lawless.’
When the Stoic philosopher thinks of himself, he is certain that happiness and all other worldly goods are worthless; he even asserts that desiring happiness is contrary to nature, implying that it leads to disobedience to the will of God. Yet, as a practical man governing the Roman Empire, Marcus Aurelius knows very well that such things do not happen in a vacuum. His duty is to ensure that grain ships from Africa safely reach Rome, to alleviate the suffering caused by epidemics, and to prevent barbarian enemies from crossing the borders. In other words, when dealing with subjects whom he did not regard as Stoic philosophers, he adopts the ordinary, worldly standards of what is good or bad. It is precisely by accepting these standards that he fulfills his administrative duties. Strangely, this function itself resides in a higher sphere than what the Stoic sage ought to occupy, even though it is derived from the very ethics that the sage regards as fundamentally flawed.
The only resolution to this difficulty that I can imagine may be logically invulnerable, yet it remains highly improbable. It is the sort of argument Kant might have provided, as his ethical system closely resembles that of the Stoics. Kant might say there is nothing good except a good will, but a will is good when directed toward certain ends that are indifferent in themselves. It does not matter whether Mr. A is happy or unhappy. However, if I am virtuous, I will act in such a way as to facilitate his happiness because that is what the moral law prescribes. I cannot make A virtuous, for his virtue depends solely on himself. I can, however, do something to make him happy, wealthy, learned, or healthy. The ethics of the Stoics may perhaps be reduced to this: some things are regarded as goods in the ordinary sense, but this is an error. What is truly good is the will directed toward achieving these false goods for others. This doctrine contains no logical contradictions. Yet, it loses all plausibility if we genuinely believe that what is considered good in the ordinary sense has no value, for in that case, a virtuous will could be directed toward entirely different ends with equal success.
There is indeed an element of ‘sour grapes’ in Stoicism. We cannot be happy, but we can be good; let us then imagine that, as long as we are kind, it does not matter that we are unhappy. This doctrine is heroic and, in a flawed world, useful, but it is not entirely true and, in its primary sense, not entirely sincere.
Although ethics was paramount to the Stoics, their teachings bore fruit in other areas as well. Among these were their theory of knowledge and their doctrine of natural law and natural rights.
In their theory of knowledge, the Stoics—contrary to Plato—acknowledged the validity of sensation. They argued that the fallibility of sense perception is actually a product of false judgment and can be avoided with a modicum of effort. The philosopher Sphaerus, a close disciple of Zeno of Citium, was once invited to dinner by King Ptolemy, who, having heard of this doctrine, presented him with a pomegranate made of wax. When the philosopher attempted to eat it, the king laughed at him. Sphaerus replied that while he felt no certainty that it was a real pomegranate, he did not consider it unlikely that anything in the king’s presence would be inedible. In this response, he appealed to the accepted Stoic distinction between things that can be known with certainty through sensation and those that are merely probable. Overall, this was a sound and scientific doctrine.
Another of their doctrines in the theory of knowledge was more influential, though also more dubious: the belief in innate ideas and principles. Greek logic was entirely deductive, which raised the question of initial premises. These premises had to be at least partially shared, yet there was no way to prove them. The Stoics believed that there are certain principles that are absolutely evident and recognized by all; these could serve, as in Euclid’s Elements, as the foundation for deduction. Innate ideas, in a similar manner, could be used as a starting point for definitions. This viewpoint was adopted throughout the Middle Ages and was even shared by Descartes.
The doctrine of natural law, as it manifested in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, is a revival of Stoic thought, albeit with significant modifications. It was the Stoics who distinguished between jus naturale and jus gentium. Natural law flowed from the fundamental principles employed to justify any common knowledge. The Stoics taught that by nature, all human beings are equal.
Marcus Aurelius, in his Meditations, praises “a polity in which there is the same law for all—a polity governed with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech—and a royal rule that respects most of all the freedom of the governed.” This was an ideal that could not be realized in the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, it influenced legislation, particularly in terms of improving the status of women and slaves. Christianity inherited this aspect of Stoic teaching along with much else. When the time came in the seventeenth century to effectively combat despotism, the Stoic doctrine of natural law and natural equality acquired a practical force. Clothed in Christian garb, it possessed a power that even the emperor could not confer upon it in antiquity.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
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