Philosophy of the Modern Era

Kant

German Idealism in General

In the realm of philosophy during the eighteenth century, English empiricism prevailed, represented by figures such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These thinkers exhibited a conflict, seemingly unrecognized by themselves, between their mental disposition and the tendencies of their theoretical teachings. By nature, they were socially minded citizens—unpretentious, unconcerned about power, and inclined toward a tolerant world where, within the bounds of law, each person could act as they pleased. They were amiable and peaceful individuals, courteous and kind. However, while their character was communal, their theoretical philosophy led them toward subjectivism. Subjectivism was not a new direction; it existed in late antiquity, occupying a significant place in the works of St. Augustine. It was revived in the modern era by Descartes’ cogito and reached a fleeting culmination in Leibniz’s monads without windows. Leibniz believed that everything in his experience would remain unchanged if the rest of the world were destroyed. Nevertheless, he dedicated himself to the reunification of the Catholic and Protestant churches. Such inconsistency also manifests in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

In Locke's case, inconsistency persists in his theory. As we have seen in the relevant chapter, Locke asserts that since the soul, in all its thoughts and reflections, has no immediate object apart from its own ideas—those alone it contemplates and can contemplate—it is evident that our knowledge pertains only to them. On the other hand, “knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.” Yet, he claims that we possess three types of knowledge concerning real existence: intuitive—about our own, demonstrative—about the existence of God, and sensitive—about things given to the senses. He argues that simple ideas are products of things acting upon our brain in a natural manner. How he arrives at this conclusion, he does not explain. This certainly exceeds the “agreement and disagreement of two ideas.”

Berkeley takes a significant step toward overcoming this inconsistency. For him, there exist only minds and their ideas; the physical external world is rejected. However, he still fails to encompass all the consequences of the epistemological principles he borrows from Locke. If he were entirely consistent, he would deny knowledge of God and all minds except his own. His feelings as a clergyman and social being restrain him from such denial.

Hume, in his pursuit of theoretical consistency, did not shy away from anything, but he felt no need to reconcile practice with his theory. Hume denied the self and questioned induction and causality. He accepted Berkeley's denial of matter but did not accept the replacement Berkeley offered in the form of the ideas of God. Like Locke, he did not allow for simple ideas without prior impressions, and it is evident that he imagined “impressions” as states of mind directly caused by something external to the mind. However, he could not accept this as a definition of “impression,” since the concept of “cause” was unclear. I doubt whether he or his followers had clarity on the expressions concerning this issue. It is evident that, according to his view, “impression” must be defined as some internal characteristic, distinct from “idea,” since it cannot be defined causally. He cannot, therefore, assert that impressions provide knowledge of things external to us, as was done by Locke and, in modified form, by Berkeley. He must, therefore, believe in himself, enclosed in a solipsistic world, and ignore everything except his own mental states and their relations.

Through his consistency, Hume demonstrated that empiricism, developed logically to its conclusion, leads to results that few can accept and rejects the distinction between rational belief and probability throughout the realm of science. Locke foresaw this danger. He had a hypothetical critic present the argument: “If knowledge consists in the agreement of ideas, then the enthusiast and the sane man stand on the same level.” Locke, living at a time when people had grown weary of “enthusiasm,” encountered no difficulties in convincing someone of the correctness of his response to this critical remark. The philosophy of Rousseau emerged at a moment when people, in contrast, were tired of reason and, reviving “enthusiasm” and embracing the bankruptcy of reason, allowed the heart to resolve issues that remained doubtful for the head. From 1750 to 1794, the heart spoke ever louder. Finally, Thermidor brought an end, if only temporarily, to its cruel calls, at least as far as France was concerned. Under Napoleon, both heart and mind fell silent.

In Germany, the reaction against Hume's agnosticism took a deeper and more nuanced form than that presented by Rousseau. Kant, Fichte, and Hegel developed a new type of philosophy aimed at preserving knowledge and virtue from the destructive teachings of the late eighteenth century. In Kant and even more so in Fichte, the subjectivist tendency that began with Descartes was pushed to new extremes. In the initial phase of German philosophy, there was no reaction against Hume's subjectivism. With regard to subjectivism, the reaction began with Hegel, who sought, through his logic, to establish a new method of transitioning from the individual to the world.

Overall, German idealism shares similarities with the Romantic movement. This is evident in Fichte and even more so in Schelling, and least of all in Hegel.

Kant, the founder of German idealism, himself does not hold significant political importance, although he did write some interesting essays on political matters. Fichte and Hegel, on the other hand, both developed political doctrines that wielded and continue to wield substantial influence on the course of history. They cannot be understood without prior study of Kant, whom we shall examine in this chapter.

Certain common characteristics of German idealism can be identified before delving into specifics. The critique of knowledge as a means of achieving philosophical conclusions is emphasized by Kant and accepted by his followers. Reason is contrasted with matter, leading ultimately to the assertion that only reason exists. Utilitarian ethics is vehemently rejected in favor of systems believed to be demonstrable through abstract philosophical arguments. A scholastic tone prevails, which is absent in the earlier English and French philosophers; Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were university instructors addressing a learning audience, rather than idle gentlemen whose philosophy was directed at enthusiasts. Although the results of their endeavors were partially revolutionary, they themselves were not conscious destroyers; Fichte and Hegel distinctly defended the state. Their way of life was exemplary and academic. Their views on moral issues were strictly orthodox. They made innovations in theology, but did so in the interest of religion.

Having made these preliminary observations, let us turn to the study of Kant.