German Idealism in General - Kant - Philosophy of the Modern Era
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Philosophy of the Modern Era

Kant

German Idealism in General

Eighteenth-century philosophy was dominated by British empiricism, represented by figures such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These thinkers exhibited a conflict—one they seemed not to recognize—between their personal dispositions and the implications of their theoretical work. By nature, they were socially minded citizens: unpretentious, indifferent to power, and committed to a tolerant world where, within the bounds of the law, each person could act as they pleased. They were amiable, peaceful, and courteous. Yet, while their characters were rooted in community, their philosophy led them toward subjectivism. Subjectivism was not a new development; it had existed in late antiquity, occupying a significant place in the works of St. Augustine. It was revived in the modern era by the Cartesian cogito and reached a fleeting culmination in the windowless monads of Leibniz. Leibniz believed that everything in his experience would remain unchanged even if the rest of the world were destroyed. Nevertheless, he dedicated his efforts to the reunification of the Catholic and Protestant churches. This same inconsistency manifests in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Locke’s inconsistency is persistent. As we have seen, he asserts that since the soul contemplates only its own ideas, our knowledge must be confined to them. On the other hand, he maintains that “knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.” Yet, he simultaneously claims that we possess three types of knowledge concerning real existence:

  • intuitive knowledge of our own existence
  • demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God
  • sensitive knowledge of things given to the senses

He argues that simple ideas are products of things acting upon our brain in a natural manner. He does not explain how he reaches this conclusion, which certainly exceeds the mere “agreement and disagreement of two ideas.”

Berkeley takes a significant step toward overcoming this inconsistency. For him, there exist only minds and their ideas; the physical external world is rejected. However, he fails to follow through on the consequences of the epistemological principles he borrows from Locke. Had he been entirely consistent, he would have denied knowledge of God and all minds except his own. His feelings as a clergyman and a social being restrain him from such a denial.

Hume, in his pursuit of theoretical consistency, did not shy away from radical conclusions, yet he felt no need to reconcile his practice with his theory. Hume denied the self and questioned induction and causality. He accepted Berkeley’s denial of matter but rejected the substitute Berkeley offered in the form of the ideas of God. Like Locke, he did not allow for simple ideas without prior impressions, and it is evident that he imagined “impressions” as states of mind directly caused by something external to the mind. However, he could not accept this as a formal definition of “impression,” since the concept of “cause” remained unclear. The exact meaning of his expressions on this issue remains obscure. It is evident that, in his view, an “impression” must be defined as an internal characteristic, distinct from an “idea,” since it cannot be defined causally. He cannot, therefore, assert that impressions provide knowledge of things external to us, as Locke and, in a modified form, Berkeley did. He is forced, then, to believe only in himself, enclosed in a solipsistic world, and to ignore everything except his own mental states and their relations.

Through his rigor, Hume demonstrated that empiricism, when developed to its logical conclusion, leads to results that few can accept and effectively destroys the distinction between rational belief and mere probability across the sciences. Locke foresaw this danger. He had a hypothetical critic present the argument: “If knowledge consists in the agreement of ideas, then the enthusiast and the sane man stand on the same level.” Locke, living at a time when people had grown weary of “enthusiasm,” encountered no difficulty in convincing others of the correctness of his response to this charge. The philosophy of Rousseau, by contrast, emerged when people had grown tired of reason; by reviving “enthusiasm” and embracing the bankruptcy of reason, they allowed the heart to resolve issues that remained doubtful for the head. From 1750 to 1794, the heart spoke ever louder. Finally, Thermidor brought an end, if only temporarily, to its cruel calls, at least in France. Under Napoleon, both heart and mind fell silent.

In Germany, the reaction against Hume’s agnosticism took a form more significant than that presented by Rousseau. Kant, Fichte, and Hegel developed a new type of philosophy aimed at preserving knowledge and virtue from the destructive teachings of the late eighteenth century. In Kant, and even more so in Fichte, the subjectivist tendency that began with the cogito was pushed to new extremes. In the initial phase of German philosophy, there was no reaction against Hume’s subjectivism. The reaction regarding subjectivism began with Hegel, who sought, through his logic, to establish a new method of transitioning from the individual to the world.

Overall, German idealism shares significant similarities with the Romantic movement. This is evident in Fichte, even more so in Schelling, and least of all in Hegel.

Kant, the founder of German idealism, holds little direct political importance, although he wrote several interesting essays on political matters. Fichte and Hegel, by contrast, developed political doctrines that exerted—and continue to exert—substantial influence on the course of history. They cannot be understood without a prior study of Kant, whom we shall examine in this chapter.

German idealism possesses certain defining characteristics that become apparent before one examines its specifics. Kant emphasizes the critique of knowledge as a means of reaching philosophical conclusions, a position his followers adopt. By contrasting reason with matter, these thinkers ultimately assert that only reason exists. They vehemently reject utilitarian ethics, preferring systems they believe can be demonstrated through abstract philosophical argument. A scholastic tone prevails, a quality absent in the work of earlier English and French philosophers. Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were university instructors addressing a learned audience, rather than idle gentlemen whose philosophy was directed at enthusiasts. Although their efforts yielded partially revolutionary results, the philosophers themselves were not conscious destroyers; Fichte and Hegel were distinct defenders of the state. Their way of life was exemplary and academic, and their views on moral issues remained strictly orthodox. While they introduced innovations in theology, they did so in the interest of religion.

Having made these preliminary observations, we turn to the study of Kant.





Über den Autor

Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.

Quellen und Methodik

Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.

Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026