Introduction

Division and Fundamental Problems of Philosophy

All possible scientific inquiries can be categorized under three perspectives: they pertain either to the nature of reality, or to the forms of knowledge, or to the tasks set forth in human activity. Thus, we arrive at the age-old division found in later Greek philosophy, which categorizes the sciences into physics, logic, and ethics: physics is the science of the nature of things, logic concerns the study of knowledge itself from the perspective of its form, and ethics is the science of goods and values, of the objectives of human activity, and of the principles of judgment.

This classification indeed delineates the boundaries of scientific reflection. The terms have, of course, undergone some shifts in their meanings. The word "ethics" retains its original connotation even now. In contrast, the other two have acquired narrower definitions. The term logic now typically refers only to the investigation of the formal relations of abstract thought. The most general considerations regarding the nature, significance, and origin of knowledge are usually discussed under the title of epistemology (theory of knowledge).

The concept of physics has been further narrowed. For the Greeks, physics encompassed the study of the nature of things in general; it also included knowledge of the organic world and the life of the soul. From the concept of nature, we have primarily excluded the spiritual realm; physics, or the doctrine of nature, now deals exclusively with the corporeal world. Adjacent to it lies psychology, the science of the nature of mental life. Subsequently, the concept was further restricted; physics now refers only to a specific branch of the study of bodies, concerned with the most general modes of interaction among all material elements, while chemistry, mineralogy, biology, etc., investigate particular modes of relationships between bodies. In our language, the Greek concept of physics is somewhat matched by the term metaphysics. By the latter, we usually denote the most comprehensive inquiries into the nature of things in general, encompassing both corporeal and spiritual realms—investigations that seek, based on all the particular studies conducted by physics and psychology, to achieve a unified and comprehensive understanding of the nature of reality. Thus, from the etymology of the term "metaphysics," we now hear of a science that goes beyond physics and its perspectives on nature. Initially, however, such meaning was not contained within this word; it originated as the title of one of Aristotle's works, which the author himself designated as "first philosophy"; it was later termed metaphysics due to its placement in the compilation of Aristotle’s writings—positioned behind physics. In our further discourse, we shall therefore use this term in the sense of encompassing attempts to grasp the sum of our knowledge of things through the most general perspectives on the nature of reality. Its intrinsic task may be defined as the synthesis of the physical and spiritual worlds—or, what ultimately amounts to the same, the unification of causal and teleological contemplations of reality.

After all that has been said regarding the potential of philosophy, I will not delve further into whether such a science is at all possible. The positivist orientation of the theory of knowledge denies the feasibility of metaphysics, regarding it as a significant historical delusion of the human spirit; positive sciences and the theory of knowledge are thought to encompass the entire realm of the knowable. In truth, if we define metaphysics as the science of things beyond any possible experience, or as an a priori construction of reality within a system of concepts, then its time has indeed passed. On the contrary, metaphysics in the aforementioned sense shall never perish; the endeavor to respond to the ultimate questions posed by reality to the spirit will continue as long as theoretical interest drives us to contemplate such matters. Whether we call these endeavors a science or not seems rather indifferent; it must be conceded that the subjectivity of the thinker plays and will continue to play a far greater role here than in mathematics or physics, just as it is also acknowledged that the history of metaphysics does not exhibit the same continuous progression of knowledge as the history of the exact sciences. However, this does not preclude recognizing that the questions commonly referred to as metaphysical are presented to us, thereby providing a foundation for such inquiry. One can certainly discuss these questions within the theory of knowledge; it could be posited that they find their place in psychology or physics as well; any division of the sciences is ultimately arbitrary. However, I find it wholly impractical to deprive these inquiries of their relative autonomy and to engage with them in some other context. For example, if these questions are treated within the theory of knowledge, the consequence is merely that they are presented from an inconvenient and inaccurate perspective.

In each of the three main branches of philosophy, inquiry leads to a few fundamental problems. I will briefly articulate them here, as they simultaneously signify the subject of the forthcoming discussions. The examination of reality, or metaphysics, reduces to two primary questions, which I shall refer to as the ontological and cosmological or theological problems.

The ontological problem is expressed in the question: what is the nature of reality as such? A simple answer to this question seems, at first glance, impossible; reality presents itself to us not as something homogeneous. Different sciences reveal a completely heterogeneous reality. Physics presents it as bodies occupying space and moving within it; all its efforts are directed towards reducing all natural phenomena to the lawful motions of particles that fill space. Reality appears in a completely different light in the spiritual sciences; here it manifests as sensing, representing, thinking, feeling, striving, and wanting; psychology addresses the phenomena of consciousness—those occurrences that cannot be seen, grasped, measured, or constructed as spatial changes.

How do these two forms of reality relate to one another? Does reality consist of two entirely different kinds of being, or can both forms—the physical and the mental—be unified? The divergence in responses to these questions ultimately results in various metaphysical viewpoints, designated by names such as dualism, materialism, spiritualism, or idealism.

Dualism refers to the viewpoint that posits the existence of two disparate kinds of reality, two types of substance: corporeal and spiritual, extended and thinking. Ordinary human reasoning is most easily satisfied by this resolution of the ontological problem.

Philosophy consistently reveals a tendency to transcend dualism and arrive at monism. The motivations for this are entirely clear: the unity of reality is so profound and palpable that it seems to inherently dissuade the thought of its composition from two wholly heterogeneous elements. Additionally, there is a cognitive inclination towards simplifying reality; to explain things means to reduce diverse phenomena to simple beginnings.

This aspiration for unity can be achieved in two ways: either spiritual phenomena are reduced to corporeal ones, whereby it is stated that bodies and motion are reality in and of themselves, and that phenomena of consciousness are merely a manifestation of changes that, in themselves, are of physical nature; in this case, we have materialism. Alternatively, physical phenomena are reduced to phenomena of consciousness, whereby it is stated that mental occurrences constitute reality in and of themselves; the physical world is merely a simple form of the manifestation of that which is truly real; in this case, we have spiritualism or idealism.

Alongside this, a fourth possibility remains; one might say that we are altogether incapable of comprehending the nature of the actual as it exists in itself. We are primarily presented with two forms—physical and spiritual; however, we may permit ourselves to consider that these are merely different manifestations of one inaccessible reality. This perspective could be termed agnostic monism.

The second major issue in metaphysics is the cosmological or theological problem. It manifests in the question: what conception ought we to form regarding the interconnection of all things? What form does reality take as a whole? Atomism, theism, and pantheism represent various responses to this inquiry.

At first glance, reality appears as a multitude of independent entities, each of which, while relating to others, exists independently in its own being. This view is fully articulated in atomism: reality is an aggregate of numerous self-sufficient, neither originated nor transient, fundamental elements; through various combinations of these elements, what we might call second-order “things” arise—“things” as understood in common parlance. Atomism or pluralism is not necessarily materialistic. In Leibniz's monadology, we encounter its spiritualistic form.

At this juncture, philosophy has long exhibited a tendency to transition from plurality to unity. The unity and harmony of the world are so profound that it cannot be comprehended as the result of a random encounter between entirely foreign elements. Monistic worldviews present themselves in two forms: either they derive the unity and harmony of things from the influence of a creative intellect acting according to a uniform plan—resulting in theism; or they assert an even deeper unity within things, positing that reality is fundamentally a singular, unique essence or substance; multiplicity, then, constitutes merely a fragmentation within the unity of this essence, leading us to pantheism. From these two perspectives, philosophy arrives at this view. From the concept of God, theological reasoning leads to this conclusion; if God, as stated by monotheistic doctrine, is the creator of all things from nothing, then He is indeed the singular being, and the things are through Him and in Him; they cannot detach themselves from Him or attain an independent existence in relation to Him. Conversely, starting from the concept of nature, physical contemplation reaches the same notion of the unity of essence. If all things are in general and constant interaction, then all phenomena converge into a single all-encompassing event, a unified world process, thus providing the concept of the unity of what is mutable—the concept of the unity of substance.

Likewise, epistemology arrives at two final problems: we may refer to them as the problem of essence and the problem of the origin of knowledge.

The first is expressed in the question: what is knowledge? Realism and idealism, or phenomenalism, provide differing answers to this. Realism perceives it as an adequate reflection of reality: in true knowledge, things are represented precisely as they are in reality, albeit without the reality itself. Idealism considers such an understanding entirely impossible: how can knowledge be a mere imprint or repetition of things? Knowledge is an internal psychological phenomenon; how can there be a resemblance between it and external objects? And even if such a resemblance existed, we could not know of it—we cannot step outside ourselves to compare our representations with things.

The second question is: how does knowledge arise at all? This question gives rise to a dichotomy that runs through the history of philosophy—the opposition between empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism derives all knowledge from perception: experience is the sole source of knowledge, which consists of the combination of perceptions. Rationalism, on the contrary, asserts that any true scientific knowledge presupposes another principle that cannot originate from perception. Universality and necessity—as mathematics presents them in their strictest form, and as all sciences strive towards—can never arise from experience, which only demonstrates what occurs in a given instance, not what occurs in every instance. Science, in the truest sense, emerges from reason, which forms concepts and pursues their relationships according to an inherent logic that is characteristic of it from the outset.

The inquiries of ethics converge upon one final question: on what ultimately rest all distinctions of values, particularly the distinctions of values between human actions and sentiments? Two viewpoints stand in opposition here. One asserts that the goodness of an action lies in its beneficial consequences for the wellbeing of the individual and the community to which he belongs. This is the teleological perspective. The other perspective, which could be termed formalistic (also known as intuitionist, in contrast to utilitarian, as the teleological ethics is called in England), asserts that goodness and badness are absolute qualities of modes of action and volitional directions; they can only be perceived and acknowledged, but cannot be derived or substantiated in themselves. If the first viewpoint is correct, then a new question arises: what is the essence of life that distinguishes beneficial actions from detrimental ones? What constitutes the ultimate and final goal of human striving? If the answer is sensory experiences of pleasure or happiness, then we encounter hedonism. Conversely, if the goal is set in some objective structure of life and in life’s activities, we confront a perspective that lacks a traditional expression; recalling that the roots of this view lie in Aristotle’s philosophy, it might be referred to as energism: the active manifestation of all virtues and abilities, particularly the highest ones, is, according to this perspective, the highest good.