Philosophy of Being and Knowledge

Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Ordinary Language

The ideas established by Russell, early Wittgenstein, and the neopositivists became leading themes in 20th-century philosophical discourse, gathering a vast number of followers worldwide. However, logical atomism was not the sole direction of analytical philosophy. Another significant branch emerged as the philosophy of ordinary language, founded by G.E. Moore and the later Wittgenstein. George Edward Moore (1873-1958), a professor at Cambridge University and a specialist in moral philosophy, made his mark by challenging the idealism of Francis Herbert Bradley and developing one of the most important positions in 20th-century moral philosophy. He applied the methods of analytical philosophy of language to ethics, seeking to analyze key ethical issues based on the language of ethics. To achieve this, he turned to the analysis of ordinary language—the language people use to justify their moral behavior—rather than an ideal language free from problems.

Alongside Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein also laid the foundations of the philosophy of ordinary language. After the publication of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," Wittgenstein continued to analyze language and came to believe that logical atomism, of which he had been a proponent during his early period, failed to capture the full range of language. Within logical atomism, atomic propositions—those that describe something—were thoroughly analyzed, but many other expressions, while meaningful, did not pertain to any atomic fact. These insights became central to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, developed during his Cambridge period after his move from Vienna.

Wittgenstein observed that human language consists not only of descriptive propositions but also of many other types. For instance, when someone prays, they do not describe anything, yet their utterances have meaning. Similarly, questions and exclamations, though they do not describe, also convey meaning. For example, an exclamation like "Oh!" can carry significant information despite not being descriptive. In his early work, Wittgenstein had argued that the content of an atomic proposition is derived from the atomic fact it expresses. However, the existence of non-descriptive utterances with meaning led to the conclusion that the source of content is not the atomic fact but something else. Wittgenstein then sought to understand the source of meaning through the functions that utterances serve. People speak to be heard and understood by others; thus, the function of language is to facilitate communication. If one person says something and another understands it, the utterances have meaning, regardless of their connection to reality.

Building on these foundations, Wittgenstein developed his theory of language games. According to this theory, the meaning of a word can be likened to the meaning of a chess piece: outside the game, the piece has no meaning, but within the game, it gains significance. It acquires meaning based on the rules agreed upon by the players. This implies that the meaning of the piece is not grounded in any objective reality but in the rules established by all participants in the game. Similarly, in language, words and expressions have the meaning assigned to them by participants in the communicative process. Wittgenstein compared language use to playing chess, where meaning is based on the rules governing the use of expressions. He referred to the set of rules governing a language game as a paradigm.

The study of ordinary language led to the significant development of speech act theory, pioneered by the British philosopher J.L. Austin (1911-1960) and furthered by the American philosopher John Searle (born 1932). They identified three distinct speech acts present in any utterance:

• Locutionary Act: The physical aspect of the speech act, such as sound. The locution is not connected to the information conveyed or to any expected response. It has physical characteristics and is not related to the content of the speech act.
• Illocutionary Act: The information conveyed by the speech act. For instance, when someone says "The room is cold," they intend to inform someone that the room is cold.
• Perlocutionary Act: The act of expecting a response from the listener. For example, when someone says "The room is cold," they likely expect the listener to close a window. Each speech act involves an expectation of some action in response, making mutual communication between dialog participants possible.

Since every speech act is perlocutionary, it is also performative. The term "performative" derives from the Latin "performo" (to act). By recognizing speech acts as performative, theorists showed that they not only convey information but also create new realities. When a dignitary cuts a ceremonial ribbon, they create something that did not exist before. When a president signs a decree, they bring something into existence. When someone says "The room is cold," they cause some action. Thus, speech acts create new realities. Austin emphasized that for a performative act to occur, several conditions must be met: there must be an institution based on convention within which the speech acts take place; the individuals performing the act must be authorized to do so; and the speech acts must be executed correctly.