The Historical Development of Philosophy

Christian Philosophy

Scholastic Philosophy

The relationship between scholastic philosophy and patristic thought can be best illustrated through the comparison of expressions used by key figures from both traditions. Tertullian, a prominent Church Father from the end of the second century, famously expressed the essence of early Christian philosophy with the phrase "Credo, quia absurdum est" — "I believe because it is absurd." By contrast, Anselm of Canterbury, the great scholastic philosopher of the 11th century, declared "Credo ut intelligam" — "I believe in order to understand." For the scholastic theologian, faith comes first, but knowledge must follow. The aim of scholastic philosophy, therefore, was not merely to accept the revealed religious truths but also to demonstrate their rational necessity. Since the dogmatic content of faith had already been established, scholastic philosophy devoted itself to proving these truths as logically and necessarily valid.

In its early flourishing during the 11th century, scholasticism was entirely theological in its focus. Its intellectual efforts revolved around transcendent and supersensory problems, continually exercising the mind on these matters. Scholasticism thus became the inventor of a method that would later play a significant role in the development of modern philosophy—the ontological method, which sought to prove the truth of an object through its concept alone. The transcendent nature of the objects of faith, inaccessible to any other form of argument but pure concepts, naturally directed the philosophy of this period toward such a method.

However, from the late 12th century onward, secular interests gradually began to exert a greater influence on philosophy. By the 13th century, alongside theology, natural philosophy had emerged as a distinct science. This shift was aided by the increasing acquaintance with the physical and metaphysical works of Aristotle, beginning in the early 13th century. As a result, there was a gradual change in philosophical outlook. Thought became more realistic and empirical, leading to growing skepticism toward ontological proofs of religious dogmas. This new direction eventually culminated in the skepticism of the 14th century, which favored experience in matters of secular knowledge while maintaining that religious truths retained the same mystical and incomprehensible nature they had held in early Church philosophy. This division of the domains of faith and knowledge laid the groundwork for the eventual decline of scholasticism and the independent development of secular sciences, marking the beginning of the modern era.

Thus, the development of scholasticism can be divided into three periods: the first, or Platonic scholasticism, which reached its height in the 11th century; the second, or Aristotelian scholasticism, primarily associated with the 13th century; and the third, the period of scholastic decline, covering the 14th and 15th centuries.

Later scholastics characterized the relationship between these three periods through precise expressions that reflected the evolving significance attributed to universal concepts. In the first period, the prevailing tendency was encapsulated by the principle "universalia sunt realia"—the universal concept represents the essence of a thing and, therefore, is the actual source of its existence. This position mirrors the central idea of Plato's theory of forms and underpins the ontological method, which attempted to derive the reality of faith objects, such as the existence of God, from mere concepts. This period’s thought is more accurately defined by the phrase "universalia sunt ante rem", meaning that concepts exist before things, as they are the conditions for the existence and intelligibility of things.

In the second period, although the conviction that concepts constitute the essence of things still dominated, and the proposition "universalia sunt realia" retained its importance, there was a recognition of the immanence of concepts within the material existence of things, in line with Aristotle's philosophy. Consequently, the first principle was more precisely defined by the second: "universalia sunt in re"—universals exist within things. This period also sometimes employed a threefold distinction of universals: "universalia sunt ante rem", referring to God's thoughts before the creation of the world; "universalia in re", concerning the things themselves, composed of matter and form; and "universalia post rem", referring to the concepts formed by the human mind as a result of sensory perception.

In the third period of scholasticism, only the last of these propositions held sway: "universalia sunt post rem". Concepts exist solely within our minds; they have no existence in things themselves, and even less so outside of them. They are merely products of our comparison of things, to which we then attach general names or terms. Accordingly, this last position is equivalent to the statement "universalia sunt nomina". Thus, the dominant view of the first period is usually called "extreme realism," that of the second period "moderate realism," and that of the third "nominalism." These terms acquire a specific meaning within scholastic philosophy through their exclusive focus on concepts. Therefore, extreme scholastic realism corresponds to "idealism" in another sense of the word, moderate realism aligns with contemporary "realism," and nominalism with skeptical empiricism.

In the first scholastic period, the age of extreme realism, thought was closely aligned with Platonic ideas, and there was a subtle inclination toward Neoplatonism. It is noteworthy that, in the West, much of what was inherited from ancient philosophy in this early time was drawn primarily from Neoplatonists, such as Porphyry, or later eclectic philosophers like Boethius, who built upon Neoplatonic doctrines. The prominent representatives of this period were Anselm of Canterbury, who pioneered the ontological method to prove not only the existence of God but also specific Christian dogmas like the Trinity and redemption, and William of Champeaux, who defended realism against the nominalism of Roscellinus, which revived earlier patristic tendencies opposed to the Athanasian understanding of the Trinity. This first period of scholastic philosophy was entirely theological, with only logic being developed alongside the continued study of Aristotle’s logical works.

The second period, represented in the 12th century by Abelard and in the 13th century by Albert the Great, as well as Thomas Aquinas, one of the most influential scholastic writers, is characterized by a growing interest in secular science and the emerging desire to supplement theology with philosophy, which aims to unify all branches of knowledge. This broadening of interest arose from the general cultural conditions of the time and was significantly aided by the rediscovery of Aristotle. Various parts of his philosophy became known through Latin translations, facilitated by Arab philosophers of previous centuries (such as Avicenna and Averroes), as well as their commentaries on Aristotle’s works. Among the secular sciences, natural science occupies the largest space in the works of the above-mentioned scholastics.

The obstacles to the free expression of this reawakened interest in scientific inquiry—stemming from the dominant literary focus on authority—meant that the natural scientific works of the scholastics were limited to the elaboration and commentary on Aristotle's physical treatises. None of these scholars ventured into independent research. Rather, if any isolated individual referred to personal investigations, they were often dismissed by simply citing Aristotle’s authority, who was regarded as the "precursor of Christ in natural matters." Disagreement with him was as forbidden in natural sciences as dissent from orthodoxy was in matters of faith.

For a full characterization of these key representatives of what was, in essence, a compilatory and eclectic philosophy, a good example is found in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. As in Plato’s system, worldly virtues are divided into four cardinal virtues, to which the Aristotelian doctrine of the "golden mean" is applied. However, above the worldly virtues, three "theological" virtues—faith, love, and hope—stand exalted, following the teachings of the Apostle Paul. In his political doctrine, Thomas adopts Augustine's theory of the "City of God." However, he seeks to adapt it to the relationship between the medieval kingdom and the church: the state, like the church, holds universal significance. It is partially subordinate to the church, but also, in some respects, equal to it, a relationship often compared to that between the Sun and the Moon. Yet, more decisively than Augustine, Thomas emphasizes the temporal and conditional nature of the secular state, in contrast to the eternal City of God, by applying the concept of a covenant to worldly governance.

By the end of the 13th century, in the conflict between the followers of Thomas Aquinas and the school of Duns Scotus, the first harbingers of the gradually emerging nominalist movement made their appearance. This debate closely resembled the earlier controversy over the significance of human deeds. However, the changing motives of the dispute reflected a shift in the times. Augustine had regarded salvation as solely the work of divine grace, while Pelagius had sought to preserve the role of human works as contributing to salvation. The Thomists leaned toward acknowledging the latter, only rejecting Scotus's further claim that grace and condemnation depend entirely on human freedom. Thus, while Thomas defended a moderate determinism in contrast to Augustine’s doctrine of predestination, Scotus emerged as a proponent of absolute indeterminism.

In essence, the debate between the followers of Thomas and Scotus shifted to the question of free will. Here, the deterministic view gradually faded, while the indeterministic view developed to its extreme, eventually contradicting the church’s traditional teachings on grace. Furthermore, in this new dispute, the roles concerning the foundations of faith were reversed. Whereas Pelagius had opposed Augustine's mystical perspective with a rationalist approach, now Thomas defended a rationalist viewpoint, while Scotus upheld a mystical one. The indeterminist doctrine of salvation through the holiness of one's own will became a requirement of faith—signifying that the faithful soul now sought solace not in a sense of absolute dependence, as before, but rather in the hope of its own strength.

Since in Scotus's teaching the individual act of will is understood as a free, independent action of man, it already hints at the elevated value placed on the concrete and particular. When applied to the broader worldview, this perspective no longer harmonizes with the moderate realism defended by the great teachers of the 13th century. As human nature is extended to the external world, a particular act of will corresponds to a concrete event, a particular thing. If, in human life, only the individual is real, then in nature only the particular has significance. Thus, from scholastic indeterminism in this third period emerges nominalism, which, beginning in the early 14th century, gradually became the dominant trend and found its chief advocate in the prominent scholastic of the time, William of Ockham.

The fact that in the persons of Scotus and Ockham, Scottish and English scholars opposed the Thomistic doctrine, still prevalent in Italy and other European countries, alongside the philosophical differences between the Franciscan and Dominican orders, brought to the fore national distinctions that foreshadowed the emergence of a new era. In this new age, the unique characteristics of individual nations played a much larger role than in the medieval period, when spiritual unity reigned in the sciences. In this sense, English nominalism foreshadowed the English empirical philosophy, which laid the foundation for the philosophy of modern times. The nominalist focus on the individual and the empirical, characteristic of its position in the universal scholastic debate, also marked a shift in the understanding of faith’s truths and the possibility of their comprehension by human reason.

Here, the classical scholasticism of the 13th century made a significant retreat compared to the earlier period of scholastic philosophy, with its unwavering application of the ontological method. True, general religious truths, as expressed in the religions of all peoples, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, were proven by Thomas Aquinas through the nature of things. Yet, characteristic of the natural-scientific interests of his time, he preferred the cosmological argument to the ontological one. However, specifically Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, the union of two natures in Christ, the incarnation of the Son of God, and redemption, drew their certainty not from concepts but from revealed truths, which conferred high significance upon Christian religion.

Thus, it was only a small step from here to the nominalist perspective, as defended by Ockham, who held that the entirety of faith, including belief in God and immortality, was altogether beyond human understanding. Consequently, in key respects, the view of the patristic period was restored, attributing a purely mystical character to the truths of faith, albeit in a modified form. The shift in perspective on faith was expressed in the indeterminism of the nominalists and their elevation of subjective grounds for faith. In the realm of knowledge, it manifested in the recognition that secular science had the right to an independent existence, distinct from faith. To be a mystic in faith, an empiricist in science, and, where necessary, a skeptic—this was the slogan of scholastic nominalism. At the same time, the complete separation of the realms of faith and knowledge was finalized, a division even more starkly evidenced by their opposing principles: for faith, blind trust, untroubled by the incomprehensibility of religious truths, which instead served as confirmation of their veracity; for knowledge, cautious doubt, which recognized only that which could be confirmed by experience and critical inquiry.

With the separation of the realms of faith and knowledge, nominalism dismantles the premise that had been the vital principle of Scholasticism until that point. By deeming religious truths incomprehensible, it declares the Scholastic task of creating a scientific system for the content of Christian faith unsolvable. On the contrary, nominalism opens a free path for secular sciences, even pointing them in a particular direction. In this way, nominalism, while concluding the medieval period of philosophy, also serves as a starting link in the development of modern philosophy. Certainly, Scholastic philosophy did not vanish entirely; however, whenever it reemerges in subsequent centuries, it stands in opposition to nominalism rather than in conjunction with it. The foundation of these later attempts at restoration is typically the system of Thomas Aquinas, largely due to its continuing recognition as the officially accepted orthodox philosophy of the Catholic Church.