The Historical Development of Philosophy

New Philosophy

Empirical Philosophy of Locke

In contrast to the absolutely speculative and transcendental system of Spinoza, the philosophy of John Locke (1632—1704) presents a worldview grounded in an entirely different line of thought. In his endeavor to reshape Baconian postulates of inductive empirical inquiry within the framework of experiential knowledge, Locke necessarily arrives at the conclusion that his system can only be a theory of knowledge, with one of the main tasks of this empirical epistemology being to demonstrate the unfounded nature of speculative assumptions in opposing systems and, simultaneously, the impossibility of metaphysics directed toward transcendental issues. In this respect, Locke thoroughly refutes the foundation of all speculative systems of his time, particularly Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas. In his critique of the opposing direction, his own empirical understanding manifests in that he entirely sidesteps the speculative justification of the refuted doctrine and instead strives to prove that each of the supposedly innate ideas could easily arise from psychological experience, and that the manner and mode in which such ideas exist in children, primitive peoples, and others at various stages of development entirely support this assumption. Consequently, the outcome of this polemic is the acknowledgment that all ideas are of empirical origin. In this process, the term "idea" loses its last connection to Platonic forms, becoming an expression for any subjective sensation or representation—a meaning that has persisted in the philosophical language of the English and, under their influence, partially in the everyday speech of other nations up to the present day. After reducing all the content of knowledge to empirically arising "ideas," Locke articulates the central philosophical problem in two questions: How do our ideas form? What is their relation to objects?

From these two questions, the first is resolved in the sense that complex ideas must be formed from simple ones; these simple ideas arise, in turn, from two sources: external and internal experiences—what Locke terms sensations and reflections. Both relate to each other in such a way that ideas whose source is sensation, such as tactile, visual, and thermal sensations, must emerge before ideas of reflection, such as feelings and inclinations of the will, can be formed. The resolution of the second question is less straightforward. It pertains only to ideas of sensation, as our internal experience does not relate to objects but is merely a subjective state from the outset. However, for ideas arising from external sensory perception, this question has direct significance only for simple ideas, since complex ideas are formed through the synthetic activity of our understanding and, thus, cannot be a direct reflection of external objects. Regarding simple impressions, Locke considers it undeniable that those presenting the most general properties of the physical world—impenetrability, space, motion, number—must derive from the things themselves, meaning we subjectively represent them as they exist objectively. In contrast, other ideas, where we ascribe certain qualities to bodies that even vary depending on the sensory organ, such as light, color, warmth, and tone, arise from the effects impressions have on our senses. They are, therefore, merely subjective signs indicating some external process of motion as their cause. Consequently, adopting an ancient scholastic expression, Locke designates the sensory qualities he views as direct imprints of objective properties as "primary" qualities, while those determined primarily by the characteristics of our senses are termed "secondary."

By establishing such a distinction between qualities, Locke believes he has found a scale for measuring the cognitive value of complex ideas. Such complex ideas include ideas of substances, various modes of existence of the same thing, and ideas of relations between different objects. Since space and time pertain to primary qualities, Locke asserts that complex ideas participate in objective reality to the extent that the understanding perceives in them the connections of the simple ideas forming them, just as the impressions themselves are related. Thus, if certain simple impressions are consistently repeated in the same spatial coexistence, we may ascribe this connection to substance; yet, it remains entirely concealed, as we only deal with individual impressions termed properties. Alternatively, if two impressions always follow one another in a consistent sequence, we must ascribe this to the connecting force, the notion of relation, and so forth. When simple ideas are entirely arbitrarily combined, as in the products of our imagination, such products naturally lack objective truth.

In this teaching, a strictly empirical system of philosophy is presented for the first time—not merely occupying a negative and skeptical position, like ancient sophistry, but establishing positively defined and easily accessible criteria for objective truth. Alongside this, when Locke viewed revelation as a particular source of knowledge about truth in the realm of religion, it was not inconsistency on his part, at least in so far as he clearly separated the domains of faith and knowledge in the sense of scholastic nominalism, which also prepared the empirical orientation of the new philosophy. However, this empirical perspective also reflected in Locke's religious views, as he sought, as much as possible, to limit the domain of religious faith to easily understandable content, aligning it with the most universal religious dogmas that harmonize completely with natural reason. Hence, from this founder of empirical theory, a religious movement received impetus, characterized by the term "rational Christianity," which Locke attributed to one of his works, and which long continued in the pursuits of the so-called "deism" or free thought. In religious terms, deism fully acknowledges the existence of God, primarily deducing it from nature as His creation, and the immortality of the soul, owing to the consensus among people regarding this point. It disputes specifically Christian dogmas, such as the Trinity and redemption, or, like Locke himself, adopts a more moderate stance, viewing them as revealed truths whose content is inaccessible to human reason. Locke's ethical stance and that of his school correspond with this religious viewpoint. His morality is practical, measuring the value of an action by the benefit it brings to the agent and others, primarily rooted in the contemplation of how one's own well-being can most reliably be secured over time through a prudent relationship with others. Yet alongside this, Locke posits that religious and moral commandments actively support ethical principles that are abstracted from the relationships of practical wisdom. Ultimately, Locke's political views also reflect this ethical worldview: in contrast to Hobbes' absolutism, he finds the only just form of governance to be a constitutionally limited monarchy based on his recognized doctrine of the social contract. In all this, and especially in the practical aspects of his philosophy, Locke stands as one of the most influential spiritual guides of the forthcoming Enlightenment era.

The scientific perspective of Locke, with which he undertook his most significant work, the empirical doctrine of knowledge, was evidently influenced profoundly by the natural scientific views that had firmly established themselves since the time of Galileo. At its core, Locke's doctrine represents nothing less than a systematic natural philosophy. Thus, his great significance and merit lie in the fact that he was the first to clearly articulate the fundamental laws that had gained prominence in the natural sciences of his day, along with the criteria for objective knowledge.

To safeguard this doctrine from philosophical critiques, Locke would have had to epistemologically prove the necessity of these fundamental laws of natural science. However, he did not accomplish this. He failed to demonstrate why his primary qualities possess immediate objective significance while secondary qualities do not; he also neglected to provide the necessary justification for the criteria of objectivity that he applied to complex ideas. Consequently, Locke's system, no matter how critically it regarded the speculative systems of his time, remains dogmatic in itself. It accepts the prevailing assumptions of natural science as dogmatic premises without justifying them.

This system is equally dogmatic in its practical aspects. In ethics and politics, as well as in his approach to religious issues, Locke expresses views that were prevalent among the educated and enlightened people of his time, providing no substantial justification beyond the conventional wisdom of the day; he merely elaborated on widely held arguments regarding such matters. However, it could not remain obscured for long that Locke often stopped short of a complete analysis or adhered to traditional opinions that contradicted other components of his system. As a result, the English deism that followed him transcended his teachings, particularly in practical domains.