Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is one of the most significant philosophical movements of the 20th century, founded by German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). According to Husserl, contemporary science suffers from several major problems. The primary flaw, he argues, is naive objectivism: science treats the world as a stable totality that exists independently of the human subject, governed by necessary causal connections that leave no room for personal freedom. Another shortcoming is the excessive mathematization of knowledge: science disregards all subjective (secondary) qualities of the world and only examines quantitative characteristics, fitting into precise and defined forms, thus neglecting human values, interests, and feelings. A third defect is the naivety of traditional rationalism, which is limited to an unexamined belief in science, reason, and the almost fatalistic nature of scientific progress.

According to Husserl’s phenomenological approach, we can only have direct awareness of objects as phenomena that appear in our consciousness. However, in everyday life and in science, people rely on naive realist assumptions that lead them to believe that these phenomena correspond to externally independent objects. Husserl contends that this situation is unjustified. Therefore, he proposes a special method—phenomenological reduction—through which we abandon this assumption and focus on the phenomena present in the world of our consciousness. That is, I can doubt whether there are objects outside my consciousness (the tree outside the window might just be an illusion); regardless of whether the tree exists or not, there is a phenomenon in my consciousness—my perception of the tree—and I cannot doubt the existence of this phenomenon. I can form a true understanding (meaning) of it. Phenomena arise in consciousness either as products of sensory perception or as products of imagination, but in both cases, they can be objects of knowledge. Thus, the object of knowledge is not things existing outside consciousness, but phenomena within consciousness. I can grasp the meaning and essence of these phenomena directly, intuitively, and with maximal accuracy, without needing to speculate about the existence of things outside consciousness, which is associated with the "natural" attitude. Thinking about the "essence" is simultaneously constructing these phenomena as ideal objects. Noticing that among the phenomena I observe in my consciousness, there are those similar to myself (other objects), I begin to interact with them, revealing many similarities between the phenomena of my consciousness and those of another subject. This allows for the creation of intersubjective knowledge about the phenomena and ideal objects that constitute their essence. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the object of cognition is initially the phenomenon of consciousness, regardless of how they are created: through perception or imagination. From them, we move to the direct grasping of their ideal essences. By uncovering the essence of phenomena, we form ideal objects that are the subject of our knowledge, and simultaneously build knowledge about them. Husserl considers such knowledge as an inviolable absolute truth. He believes that his phenomenological method provides the key to understanding the real world, whereas empirical sciences, which study being outside us, represent only a "collection of abstractions and conjectures."

Husserl’s philosophical teachings led to a series of phenomenological, anthropological, and existential-hermeneutic investigations of social progress as a key idea in modern Europe. Many of these studies addressed the issue of technology as an integral part of the phenomenon of progress. Husserl’s student, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), in his quest for the meaning of being, developed his unique technique known as "analysis of presence" (Dasein). This analysis relies on hermeneutic procedures for interpreting texts or other works of art to uncover the author’s intention—the meaning. This involves a special ontological scheme where all world events and forces are transformed into linguistic constructs, or facts. Language in this ontology is understood as the "house of being," since it becomes the primary measure not only of external perception of reality but also of internal experiences of what is happening. Language is not a mere expression of thought, feelings, or will; it opens a specific space within which humans can respond to being and its demands, its call. This initial responsiveness is thought.

Heidegger distinguishes between "speaking" and "saying." We can speak much and say nothing. We can be silent and say a lot. To say means to reveal, to declare. Alongside this dilemma arises the issue of "listening" and "hearing." From Heidegger’s perspective, speaking and listening are a simultaneous process. In language, we hear the "voice of being." This voice makes the entire world around it a field of infinite resonance. The voice of things, the voice of love, the voice of God—all these are voices of transcendence, something primary relative to our usual everyday language. Through this voice of transcendence, we are present in the world.

To acknowledge the essence of technological arguments, Heidegger introduces the concept of "enframing" (Gestell). Its specificity lies in the fact that, being constantly engaged in production, humans cannot step outside the enframing and view it from the outside. Thus, he believes that the threat to humanity comes not so much from technological catastrophes as from the mode of activity driven by modern technologies. However, Heidegger did not see inherent evil in technological images; he suggests that the existence of technology contains an element of salvation. This can be manifested in the combination of technology and art, potentially leading to the former synthesis of embodied phenomena.