German Classical Philosophy

The Philosophy of J.G. Fichte

Philosophy of Law and Morality

The principal work in which Fichte articulated his doctrine of law is "Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of Scientific Teaching." Fichte contended that law is not a mere arbitrary construct; rather, it is inherent to human nature from the outset. Prior theories of natural law, preceding Fichte, were typically based on the premise that law is contingent upon morality or that both law and morality derive from a syncretic sphere of customs. However, if one considers law as intrinsic to humanity from the beginning—having its own foundation—then it becomes imperative to discover or indicate this foundation. According to Fichte's reasoning, if law is a necessary positing, this necessity arises from self-consciousness, that is, from the "I."

Why is the question posed in this manner? The essence lies in the fact that the "I," as self-consciousness, is characterized by free activity. The formula of the practical "I" can be expressed as follows: "the non-I is determined through the I in the I." Here, we should focus on the term "determined." The determination of the non-I in the I and through the I must be executed freely, without any coercion; otherwise, the following principle formulated by Fichte would be violated: "A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself free activity."

While there should be no coercive inclination towards self-determination, there must exist some impetus (challenge, call) to it that comes from the outside. Such a condition may correspond to a situation where the impetus comes from a being that is not a non-I, defined by my I, but rather is itself an I: an I beyond us, that is, an intelligent being like ourselves, possessing will and the desire to act upon our will. Through this impetus directed towards me, I come to realize that there are other rational and free beings besides myself, and this constitutes the basis of my knowledge of another’s freedom. I can recognize a being as free only if it affirms my freedom and restricts its own freedom by the concept of my freedom. The reciprocity in that each of us acknowledges our freedom along with the recognition of the other's freedom forms the foundation of legal relations.

Thus, the legal relation is deduced. However, this does not imply that it is actualized, that is, applied. We must also clarify the conditions under which the legal relation becomes possible. One such condition is the exclusion of spheres of freedom occupied by the bodies of each individual I. Persons engaged in legal communication must influence each other as free beings, as equals relative to one another.

Legal communication conditions the legal law, which requires that individuals recognize one another as equally free and relate to one another based on this premise. The violation of another’s freedom constitutes coercion. Hence, the legal law grants me the right to act arbitrarily towards the person who has violated my freedom. The application of law necessitates the right to coercion. Without the right to coercion, there is no legal law and no legal communication. But why is the violation of my freedom by another expected so inevitably? And how can the coexistence of two equal yet opposite notions—recognition of another's freedom and refusal to recognize such (coercive law)—be reconciled in the understanding of law?

The answers to such questions may be as follows: Humans possess the ability to infringe upon the primordial rights upon which legal communication is based due to a potential inclination towards arbitrariness, and in this regard, the legal law permits coercive rights. The compatibility of recognizing freedom and coercive law is possible only in the presence of a third party—the court—since the reinforcement and protection of primordial rights cannot be entrusted to those directly involved in the matter. Furthermore, to instill confidence in all regarding the just application of coercive rights (through the court), it is essential that law becomes power; it must prevail. The supremacy of law is feasible only in the presence of society and the state.

Fichte expounds his doctrine of morality (morality) in the work "System of the Doctrine of Customs According to the Principles of Scientific Teaching." Just as in the case of law, Fichte sets out to derive the moral principle (moral law) from the I, which is endowed with self-activity and freedom. Our self-activity manifests in our capacity to act or refrain from acting based on our own desires. Initially, this capacity pertains only to the internal structure of the I. This structure has two aspects: the thinking I and the thinkable I; it is both subject and object simultaneously. Fichte refers to self-determination through oneself in the context of the doctrine of morality as desire. Desire must result from free self-activity. Hence, the assertion follows: "I find myself as myself only as a desiring being." By perceiving my freedom as necessity, I am compelled to conceptualize it as law, which is nothing other than moral law. Therefore, the very desire to be free constitutes a necessary law, a demand directed towards myself. The initial realization of this law is a fact of our internal experience.

Subsequently, Fichte must demonstrate the applicability of the derived moral law to the world. If one regards the world as entirely independent from the I, as a "thing-in-itself," then the reality of the moral law is impossible. However, if one presumes that the world exists for me and without me does not exist for me, then the question of the reality of the moral law can be resolved. Fichte further examines concepts of drive, need, passion, primal drive, higher and lower drives, and ultimately, moral drive. The demand of moral drive can be articulated as follows: always fulfill your purpose, which does not consist of being free but of becoming free. Act in such a way that your actions never contradict your becoming free!

Fichte then introduces the concepts of duty and conscience, which from different perspectives help express the essence of the moral demand. For instance, "Act according to your conscience!" This implies—never act without conviction, do not act against your conviction, and only then will you act out of duty and for the sake of duty, as your conscience demands.

Regarding the specific content of our actions that align with moral conviction, Fichte posits that the content of the moral law can consist of actions oriented in three directions according to the three hypostases of the I: 1) I as natural drive, that is, the body; 2) I as the capacity for reflection, that is, the intellect; 3) I as will, which possesses freedom, that is, the person engaging in free communication with other persons. To act morally means to fulfill obligations towards these three objects, keeping in mind the common denominator: to serve the cause of freedom.

Thus, obligations concerning the body are determined by the fact that the body is our nature, which allows us to impact the nature beyond us; it is the means of our action and knowledge, ultimately serving as the instrument of our freedom. Consequently, the body is an object of moral behavior. The moral law regarding the body states: never make the body a goal, an object of pleasure for the sake of pleasure; develop the body as a means to achieve freedom; care for the body only insofar as it is necessary for it as a means to the ultimate moral end.

Obligations concerning the intellect arise from the necessity of its development, which occurs through knowledge, and the ultimate goal of knowledge is the grasping of duty. Therefore, the moral law regarding the intellect proclaims: 1) "In the development of your intellect, you must not bind yourself to anything; regarding its content, you must not submit it to any external considerations"; 2) "Investigate freely to the fullest! Learn, think, explore as much as possible"; 3) "Investigate out of duty, investigate for the sake of your freedom."

Obligations towards society are based on the understanding that for my self-activity, the I requires another I, as it only feels free when acknowledged as such. In turn, another I needs my recognition of its freedom. From this, an order must arise in which no one remains indifferent to how another acts. Each must wish for all to act according to their own moral conviction, and since such a conviction can only be one for all, we would desire it to indeed become one common conviction. However, there is no universal moral conviction already established in reality; thus, it must be achieved. This goal can be attained through free mutual communication and participation in social life. Therefore, Fichte grounds the necessity of communication in morality. He considers the affirmation of a common ultimate goal of humanity in achieving a unified moral conviction to be the essence of the church and state.

Naturally, living in society, we may encounter contradictions with societal interests, and in order to maintain public order while remaining free, we must have the ability to express our opinions publicly and have limitations in this regard. Here, Fichte addresses the necessity of separating official functions from civic functions. As a public official, I must adhere to the legally sanctioned prevailing conviction, whereas as a member of the "republic of scholars," I must present my beliefs in the public sphere according to my own conscience. The institution of scholars, which should possess such freedom, is the university.