German Classical Philosophy

The Philosophy of J.G. Fichte

Fichte's “Scientific Teaching”

"Having 'pushed off' from Kant, Fichte eventually took a different direction, although he believed he was further developing the ideational intentions of Kantianism. When Kant criticized Fichte's innovative steps, Fichte had the audacity to declare with disdain that the elder philosopher no longer understood his own philosophy.

Like Kant, Fichte begins with the question of the scientific nature of philosophy. However, it is first necessary to clarify the characteristics of science as such and its essence. An essential characteristic of science, as it was then understood, is knowledge that is deduced from a certain absolutely certain foundational principle; otherwise, a perfect scientific system cannot be formed. Such a foundational principle must be justified separately, beyond the confines of the given scientific system. Fichte believed that only philosophy could undertake this task, as concrete sciences merely utilize established principles without proving them. This philosophical endeavor, which proves foundational principles and serves as the bedrock for other sciences, he termed “scientific teaching.”

We recall that Kant limited the possibilities of the explanatory mind. Not everything in science can be explained; there are certain aspects we must accept on faith for practical reasons, and this would constitute a foundational principle of science that is accepted without proof (for instance, the existence of "things in themselves"). Fichte intended to go further, to cross the imagined boundaries of justification, and to explain everything. For him, going further meant delving into the depths of consciousness to discover the unconditional foundational principle. He employs Kant’s “transcendental unity of apperception” and seeks to examine consciousness initially as “pure,” which he reduces to the “I.”

First and foremost, Fichte asserts that even after Kant, philosophy has not yet been elevated to the level of science. Yet “philosophy is science!” Science has a systematic form, in which all propositions converge into a single foundational principle, unifying them into a whole. The ascending foundational principle must be credible; the remaining propositions of science derive their credibility from it, although it itself must attain independent credibility, free from any connection to other scientific propositions. The proof of the credibility of the foundational principle of the scientific system is carried out beyond this system; however, this proof is precisely what constitutes science, or the science of science (or sciences) in general, the scientific teaching. This is what is meant by philosophy, which is also science and serves as the foundation for constructing any other science that aspires to such a title. Essentially, we are discussing philosophy as a science prior to any other science or as a science within science.

The subject of scientific teaching is the system of human knowledge as a whole. When Fichte speaks of “knowledge in general,” he does not refer to the quantitative exhaustiveness of human knowledge. Only in terms of quality can human knowledge be fully exhausted. A correctly identified foundational principle connects the remainder of knowledge, and when there is only a singular foundational principle, it necessitates acknowledging the existence of a single system of all human knowledge. This system is precisely what scientific teaching represents.

Thus, the concepts and subject of scientific teaching are clarified. Next, on the path to elucidating scientific teaching, Fichte deems it crucial to establish the correct methodological approaches. He notes that the true task of philosophy is to seek the foundations of those representations accompanied by a sense of necessity. “Philosophy,” Fichte remarks, “is nothing other than the science that addresses this task.” Here, only two systems of scientific teaching are possible: idealism and dogmatism.

These two systems are mutually exclusive, each excluding the other, and neither can refute the other. Thus, only two possible philosophical systems can coexist in parallel. However, Fichte must be convinced that the system of idealism is the more acceptable one.

In addressing this task, he initially notes that the choice of one philosophical system over another largely depends on the type of person, with two primary types corresponding to two stages of human development. People of the first type have not yet risen to a full awareness of their own freedom and absolute autonomy; they are tethered to external objects: “If they are deprived of things, their own ’I’ is lost along with them... All that they are, they have truly become through the external world. The principle of the dogmatists is a belief in things for their own sake; thus, this is an indirect belief in their own dispersed and object-centered ’I.’” Conversely, one who does not require external objects as support for their ’I,’ who does not believe in things but believes in their own autonomy through natural inclination and fervently fights for it, will come to idealism.

Philosophers are also human, and the philosophical choice of any individual solely depends on the person they are. “After all,” Fichte emphasizes, “a philosophical system is not a lifeless shell that can be taken or set aside at will; it is ignited by the soul of the person who possesses it. A naturally lethargic or slack individual, or one distorted by spiritual servitude, learned luxury, or arrogance, will never ascend to idealism. One must be born a philosopher, must be educated for it, and must cultivate oneself; however, no human craft can make someone a philosopher.” Thus, the preference for idealism is based on the propensity of certain types of people toward freedom, ultimately concluding that idealism is the only possible philosophy, identical to science.

The preliminary disposition discussed here gives Fichte the basis to begin his exposition of scientific teaching, which he undertook in his work “Foundations of General Scientific Teaching.” The task of scientific teaching is clear: “We must discover the absolutely first, entirely unconditional foundational principle of all human knowledge.” It must be credible enough for the remaining propositions of science to derive credibility from it, thereby providing a solid foundation for all of science.

To derive the foundational principle, one must start from something, preferably through reasoning by advancing propositions that any person would acknowledge. There may be several such initial propositions, but Fichte selects one that is most likely to lead to the goal. An example of such a proposition could be the statement “A is A” or, equivalently, “A=A.”

The assertion A=A does not yet imply that A truly exists. We only wish to convey that if A is, then it is, and we do not require A to actually be. The aforementioned assertion establishes the main focus of attention, namely the form of the proposition, the necessary connection between a certain ’if’ and a certain ’then.’ This necessary connection between them is what is posited unconditionally and without any further justification.

Thus, whether A truly exists or not, we have said nothing definitive about it with our assertion. However, we immediately raise the question: under what conditions does A exist? The answer can only be one: in the judgment “if A is, then A is,” the necessary connection between the left and right sides is posited in the I, for it is the I that judges, and it judges according to some law provided by the I itself. A, as something contingent (since the name A can refer to anything from a substantive perspective), will be posited in the I and through the mediation of the I, as it is in it that the source of the necessary connection is laid. Fichte then concludes: “A is given for the I that judges, unconditionally and through its positing in the I, that is, it is posited by it... And the unconditionally posited [necessary connection] can also be expressed in the following way: I = I; I am I.”

To posit something, for instance, that A=A, requires a prior capacity for positing. We cannot derive it from outside. Moreover, for this, an equally important ability to “take” is necessary. We possess this within ourselves, in our ability for reflection.

Let us pause on the concept of I. It signifies self-consciousness. The preceding proposition by Fichte is not merely a statement of some fact; it is a demand: “Raise your I! Become aware of yourself!” The first proposition of philosophy is a demand, not an assertion. Everything articulated concerning the proposition “I am” has led us to the establishment of the first foundational principle of scientific teaching: I am I. To avoid complicating the general understanding of Fichte’s philosophy, we will merely name the remaining foundational principles here.

The second foundational principle is “I posit the not-I.”

The third foundational principle of scientific teaching is articulated as follows: “I oppose in the I the divisible I to the divisible not-I.”

These first three foundational principles of scientific teaching form the foundation for all other derived propositions, which can be categorized into those pertaining to theoretical and practical scientific teaching.