German Classical Philosophy

The Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling

Philosophy of Identity

Early on, Schelling came to the conviction that for philosophy to evolve into a system of knowledge, it must substantiate and harmonize all its components around a particular principle. This principle became "identity," and the philosophy itself was termed the "philosophy of identity." Schelling comprehensively addresses the task of translating his philosophical position into the framework of the philosophy of identity in his work System of Transcendental Idealism (1800).

In the preface to this work, the author declares that he has long understood the parallelism between nature and intellect; however, he has come to realize that neither transcendental philosophy nor the philosophy of nature can reveal this parallelism in isolation, and only together can they address this challenge. The philosophy of nature posits that intellect emerges from nature and that nature itself embodies a developing intellect, with the intellectuality of nature discernible even in the unconscious. Transcendental idealism demonstrates how the necessary representation of the world is derived from intellect. “For purely theoretical vision, it matters little,” notes Schelling, “whether one accepts the objective or subjective as primary, since this can only be resolved in favor of the subjective by practical philosophy.” Given that the philosophy of nature, which took the objective as primary, has already been articulated, it is now the turn of transcendental idealism to answer the question of how the objective is joined to the subjective and coincides with it.

Transcendental philosophy divides into a system of theoretical philosophy and a system of practical philosophy. When we ground knowledge in the assumption that things are as we conceive them, the inquiry into the possibility of experience becomes the task of theoretical philosophy. Conversely, when we consider that something objective can be altered through initially free activity, clarifying all questions surrounding this matter falls to practical philosophy.

However, this is not all. The problems addressed by both theoretical and practical philosophy draw us into contradiction. On one hand, there is a demand for the supremacy of thought over the sensory world (arising from the initial conviction that representations serve as templates for the things we create), while on the other hand, we must reconcile this with the understanding that our representations ought to correspond to the actual world that exists independently of us (rooted in our habit of considering representations as copies of things). In achieving theoretical certainty, we forfeit practicality; in achieving practical certainty, we lose theoretical validity. This contradiction necessitates resolution, and thus the supreme task of transcendental philosophy is to respond to the question, "how can we simultaneously conceive of representations as corresponding to objects, and objects as corresponding to representations?"

The identified problem cannot be resolved by either theoretical or practical philosophy, but only by a higher philosophy—the philosophy of art—which explores the aesthetic activity that creates both the ideal world of art and the real world of objects, uniting both the unconscious-creative principle (when the actual world is formed) and the conscious-creative principle (when the aesthetic world is fashioned). In art, the identity of the ideal and the real exists, revealing to us how intellect creates nature. Ultimately, the system of transcendental idealism divides into a system of theoretical philosophy, a system of practical philosophy, and a system of the philosophy of art, illustrating how theoretical intellect knows the world, practical intellect organizes it, and artistic intellect creates it.

Next, we will limit ourselves to outlining the main theses of Schelling's practical philosophy, which is associated with the presence of desire as a volitional attribute in humans. First and foremost, the author demonstrates that the origin of desire does not reside in the isolated individual but in a world of interconnected individuals, that is, in society and history. The influence exerted on the individual by others is not a one-time act but a constant action known as education.

In constructing the system of practical philosophy, Schelling maintains that the individual is initially embedded in a web of interactions with other rational beings, and without such interconnection, neither the practical self nor its true consciousness can exist. The world that presents itself to the individual as a bearer of consciousness is, first and foremost, the world of people, society, and history. Schelling aims to elevate practical (desiring) consciousness to the level of a social universe and to resolve here the problems surrounding the deduction of morality and law. The moral imperative of the Kantian type is formulated as follows: “You should want only that which all intelligences can want.”

Schelling transitions to the realm of law through a specific interpretation of the existence of the moral law, that is, the moral imperative. It can only be realized when two oppositions struggle within the individual—arbitrariness and duty, both of which express freedom. In one case, this is expressed as “I want,” which is driven by a simple desire for individual good or happiness; in the other, “I want because I am obligated.” The imposition of a “legal order,” which Schelling also refers to as “second nature,” stands in the way of arbitrariness encroaching on the sphere of communal life. He attributes the emergence of legal order among humans to contingency and contract, arising when, in order to halt widespread violence, people were compelled to establish it. The creation of a state was also necessary to secure this established legal order.

The transition of practical philosophy to the concept of history is achieved through the necessity of considering the paths to attaining such a legal order in which there is no place for despotism, arbitrary power, or external danger to the people. Such a state can only be realized throughout universal history. The philosophy of history serves practical philosophy in the same manner that nature serves theoretical philosophy. The first question that philosophy of history addresses is: how is history even conceivable? The answer is implied in the preceding inquiry regarding the general legal order, and this problem can only be resolved through species, that is, history. Thus, it follows that the sole object of history can only be the gradual formation of a universal civil order, which serves as the sole foundation of history.

The essence of history is freedom, and the condition of freedom is a general legal order. Schelling perceives the main feature of history as the need to reflect freedom and necessity in their conjunction. The paradox lies in the conditions of implementing the legal order of society: freedom must be guaranteed by an order that expresses necessity, while the freedom itself is also necessary. Freedom and necessity can only be reconciled when necessity exists within freedom itself. The dialectic is expressed in the assertion that “freedom must be necessity, necessity must be freedom.” However, necessity in opposition to freedom, as the author immediately notes, is nothing but the unconscious.

The summary may be as follows: Human actions are free (conscious) in every segment of existence; however, the cumulative result emerges unconsciously, spontaneously, and unpredictably, and this result appears as the “objective world,” which becomes apparent to me only through observation. This latter means only that neither I nor any individual is the conscious creator of historical reality as an “objective world”; it presents itself to each of us as ready, as an object of observation. The universal moral order and the legal system—this “second nature”—progress along a path of formation, as if there is some “absolute synthesis of all actions,” which is a hidden necessity. Through freedom, this objective necessity (also known as lawfulness) cannot be created; it self-generates “entirely mechanically and as if by itself.” However, gradually the basis of identity between the absolutely subjective and the absolutely objective grows and expands; that which matures beyond cannot be either subject or object, nor both simultaneously, but exists only as absolute identity. This last concept underlies the evolution of the world and can never be an object of knowledge, but only of faith. Ultimately, Schelling introduces God into history. The history of humanity is the sphere in which the existence of God is continually proven, and the gradual revelation of the absolute unfolds. In history, as the progressive revelation of God, three periods can be established. Schelling bases this periodization on two oppositions—fate and providence—between which lies nature, facilitating the transition from one to the other.

The first period is tragic, dominated solely by fate. It encompasses the splendor and ruin of ancient empires. In the second period, what manifested as fate reveals itself as nature. What was the prevailing grim law in the first period transforms into an open law of nature and service to the design of nature. This period evidently begins with the expansion of the Roman Republic. In the third period of history, that which was initially fate, and then nature, will be disclosed as providence. When this period will arrive is uncertain, but Schelling emphasizes, “when it does, then God will come.”