Human Being

The Particularities of the Philosophical Approach to the Problem of Humanity

The earlier reflections on society and its history cannot lead us to forget that all structures and spheres of society exist only as long as there are human beings. Living, acting human creatures are the architects of complex social institutions and all historical realities. Without the presence of people, there is nothing to discuss, for there exists neither society nor history. Ultimately, everyone understands the rather banal truth: upon looking around, we see that we are surrounded by people, not structures; individuals appear to us as an undeniably greater reality than abstract intellectual constructions concerning the arrangement of society, however plausible they may be. We respond directly to the actions and deeds of living individuals, not to some generalized circumstances encapsulated in theoretical frameworks. The surrounding social world initially presents itself to each of us as a world of people. Sooner or later, a simple yet profoundly complex question arises before a small child: what is a human being, who are these people? The complexity of this question is evidenced by the work of the French writer Vercors (pseudonym of Jean Bruller, 1902-1991), titled "Humans or Animals?" written over half a century ago. It discusses a fictional situation in which a commission of the British Parliament was tasked with defining the concept of humanity in relation to the death of a creature resembling a human. If this being ("tropi") is a human, those responsible for its death would bear criminal liability; if it is an animal, their culpability may range from moral condemnation to administrative sanction, as in cases of harming nature. The parliamentary commission devised a definition of humanity consisting of three articles:

Article I. A human is distinguished from an animal by the presence of a religious spirit.
Article II. The primary characteristics of the religious spirit are (in descending order): Faith in God, Science, Art in all its manifestations; various religions, philosophical schools in all their expressions; fetishism, totems and taboos, magic, witchcraft in all its forms; ritual cannibalism in its manifestations.
Article III. Any being possessing at least one characteristic listed in Article II is recognized as a member of human society, and their personhood is guaranteed throughout the territory of the United Kingdom by all laws inscribed in the latest declaration of human rights.

Vercors' book, according to the author, is written as "a not very serious novel," yet it raises an important philosophical problem whose relevance has become increasingly manifest, and may continue to do so in rather unexpected ways. For instance, in ancient times, only members of one's own tribe were considered human beings. In the languages of many peoples worldwide, their ethnic self-designation translates simply to "people." This suggests that they regarded other beings resembling them as "non-people" or "false humans." Ancient Udmurts, Nenets, and American Eskimos referred to themselves similarly, each time translating these names into a single language. They are simply "people." The Germans call themselves Deutsch, a term derived from an ancient word meaning "people, nation"; "Turk" comes from a word in Old Turkic that meant "human"; "Nivkh" means "human" in the Nivkh language. Some scholars believe that the suffix "-ar" in the names of many nations (think of Bulgarians, Tatars, Khazars, Avars) signifies "human." From history, we know the arduous journey culture has taken for people to come to recognize women, children, subordinates, the poor, and residents of other continents as humans as well. One of the progressive influences of Christianity on societal consciousness, particularly morality, was the establishment of the idea of human unity, regardless of kinship, social and material status, or physical appearance. Thus, in one of the letters of St. Paul, it is stated: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus!" (Galatians 3:28). Turning to modernity, we can still find in the psychology of uncultivated individuals traces of a disdainful attitude towards others that borders on a primitive division of humanity into "people" and "non-people." It should also be noted that today, creators of computer technologies are seriously contemplating the possibility of developing artificial intelligence and robots capable of emotional experiences akin to human feelings. In such cases, how should we regard such creations? Or what should we do in the event of a possible (albeit highly hypothetical) contact with representatives of extraterrestrial civilizations? Who are we in relation to them, and vice versa?

Defining the essence of humanity is crucial beyond such exotic forecasts. The evident elevation of the human factor in all natural processes accentuates the responsibility of humans for all living beings, placing humanity at the forefront of this process, which necessitates a reevaluation of the essence of humanity and its purpose in the world. We must also consider the increasing number of sciences studying humanity: anthropology, physiology of higher nervous activity, psychology, medicine, sociology, pedagogy, etc. Each has achieved undeniable successes; however, as they advance, the need for a higher synthesis of the sciences concerning humanity becomes more pronounced. Claude Adrien Helvétius once remarked: "Man is a model on display for various artists to observe; each considers certain aspects of it, yet none has encompassed it as a whole." Under such circumstances, as in the past, the role of philosophy as an integrating force is growing, one that produces general guidelines for further scientific inquiry. These guidelines include eternal questions regarding the essence and purpose of humanity, its origins and future, life, death, and immortality, and the relationship between the natural and the social within human beings. In contemporary conditions, this very issue elevates philosophy to a prominent position within the entire complex of human knowledge, granting philosophy the ability to impart a sense of comprehensiveness to the entire field of human studies.

Among the wide array of questions raised by philosophy, one of the oldest persists: "What is the essence of humanity?" The answer to this question is formulated in the form of a definition of humanity. What, then, are the philosophical achievements regarding this today? If we understand productivity as something universally acknowledged, the results appear rather disheartening: there are countless definitions of human essence. Let us cite a few examples.
"We are the soul, an immortal being imprisoned in a prison doomed to perish" (Plato).
"What is a human? A weak soul with a body—a mobile corpse" (Epictetus).
"I am a thinking thing" (R. Descartes), resonating with the definition by B. Pascal: "Man is a thinking reed."
"A human is a being that transcends both itself and the world" (M. Scheler).

One could provide hundreds of vivid, witty, aphoristic expressions regarding the essence of humanity. Many of them reflect humanity's ability to either ironically mock itself or lament its experiences in dealing with fellow humans. Therefore, might it not be more constructive for us to initially compare (or contrast) humans and animals, as one would do concerning society and nature?

Experiential evidence and scientific findings indicate that humans, from a biological standpoint, belong to a single species within the primate order. Contemporary science classifies humanity from a zoological perspective as follows: it belongs to the primate order, the family Hominidae, the genus Homo, the species Homo sapiens, and the subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens, denoting a being that understands and comprehends—namely, recognizes the very fact of its understanding—unlike the Neanderthal (one of the extinct beings that was supplanted or absorbed by modern humans), who also belonged to Homo sapiens.

As a living organism, humanity adheres to the universal laws governing the existence of animals, which require sustenance, appropriate external conditions, and the reproduction of similar beings—essentially the natural continuation of the species. Yet, simultaneously, humanity markedly diverges from even the most advanced representatives of the animal kingdom. Unlike them, human behavior is predominantly influenced not by instincts, but by culture. What distinguishes humanity is the presence of culture, which is not inherited genetically but transmitted and developed through language, education, and imitation rooted in transformative activity. Hence, many contemporary philosophers are inclined to define the essence of humanity through the concept of culture.

Human actions are characterized by their intentionality and cultural or "value-oriented" nature. No animal is aware of the goals behind its behavior, nor does it evaluate its actions and their outcomes in terms of appropriateness. It is crucial to emphasize that all these distinctive qualities of human nature are formed and sustained through social life—the existence of a human being within the realm of fellow humans.

In philosophically contemplating the human condition, two parallel terms are frequently employed: nature and essence. At times, these are delineated, suggesting that by its nature, humanity is a biosocial being, while in essence, it is social. Conversely, these concepts may be brought closer in meaning, distinguished only by their emphases. Thus, one can discuss the nature of humanity in a dual sense: referring to its inherent biological texture, while also understanding this as the essence of humanity—something fundamental that defines this nature. Such a dual interpretation of "nature" has been present in philosophy since the time of Aristotle. Clearly, there are occasions when it makes sense to preserve both closely related meanings, for when we speak of human nature, we imply a certain constant that derives from its essence and simultaneously expresses the profound depth of humanity in its natural dimension. What is this constant, and what are its parameters? Such concrete questions pertain more to specialized sciences than to philosophy, which today may not wish to burden itself with potentially superfluous yet largely speculative musings about the specific components of what one might label, using cybernetic terminology, a "black box." Nevertheless, such caution cannot entirely deter philosophers, and indeed others, from expressing conjectures about the existence of some constant, as they have persistently noted certain established forms of manifestations of the "continental" constructions of human nature over the centuries. In certain periods, societal consciousness becomes particularly sensitive to the negative manifestations of human nature. Today, thanks to mass media, advancements in transportation, and other dimensions of an interconnected world, such manifestations quickly become widely known, creating an impression of a plague—not of sensationalism, but rather a banal, commonplace, and quite prevalent barbarism. The contemporary "televised portrayal" of human nature often bears a distinctly criminological hue (terrorism, violence, vandalism, uncontrolled wild behavior, emotional dullness). Some researchers predict a total criminalization of humanity.

What does this signify? Is it a manifestation of the true nature of people and the frailty of culture? Could it indicate a permanent crisis of contemporary humanity? And perhaps it is not without reason that the term "anthropological crisis" is currently employed, prompting some to ponder the likelihood of an "anthropological catastrophe" manifested in cultural degradation, "secondary wildness," and the disappearance of the cultural stratum, after which the terrifying nature of a peculiar primate may become starkly evident. The empirical grounding of such assumptions is a matter for time and research, yet they suffice to provoke the issue: if we concede that there exists a relatively stable nature of humanity, how does it behave within a shifting cultural milieu? In which direction does the sociocultural environment lean: toward the oppression of human nature followed by rebellion, or toward its affirmation?

There are grounds to lean towards the view that the human nature and the general sociocultural advancement of humanity are not contradictory, and that there exists a connection between the new layers in the realm of culture and the ascent along the dimensions of what we term the nature of humanity, bringing this concept closer to the notion of the sociocultural essence of humanity, even to the point of their meaningful interconnection. In other words, it is essential to avoid severing the concepts of "nature" and "essence" in relation to humanity, so that the former pertains solely to human biology and the latter only to its social dimension. This principled notion may be expanded into a hypothesis.

In a strictly anthropological sense, the nature of each individual is culturally formed from the very beginning, for outside the bounds of culture, an infant cannot even thrive. That is to say, zoologically, Homo sapiens sapiens can only be realized within the realm of culture; outside of culture, a newborn not only fails to become sapiens but even ceases to be homo. Thus, throughout the prolonged process of bringing the human person to its anthropological completeness (in both ontogenesis and phylogenesis), culture organically intertwines with the natural corporeality of humanity, manifesting within it and integrating into its essence. Here, the individual primarily serves as an object of creation and transformation. In pure form, nothing in a human remains uncultured, from corporeality to the mental-emotional content, and the formed individual presents themselves ready for societal life.

The subsequent cultural layer functions as a kind of "super-ego" of humanity, encompassing a world of cultural forms (art, various kinds of knowledge, social norms, values, means of communication, and societal activity) in which the individual is both a subject of creation and consumption. This layer uniquely interacts with the first: the culturally refined achievements of the second layer transition into the educational mechanisms of the anthropological development of individuals, while other cultural attainments support the established level of sociality. Together, they to some extent characterize human nature (now also as a "social essence"). In times of social crisis, the second cultural layer becomes the most vulnerable and least protected, thereby exposing the manifestations of the human nature from the first, lower tier, which, however, does not represent something entirely primitive, "innocently" natural, and necessarily "evil." If anyone leans toward the idea of an eternally pure natural "evil principle" within humanity, should they not first reflect: perhaps there is no need to prejudge and excessively lament the "miserable" nature of humanity, and should we not seek the roots of its flaws, if they are so evident, primarily in the "twists" of culture and the state of contemporary civilization? It is also noteworthy that in defining social policy, one should avoid the risk of testing the resilience of the cultural layers of human nature by subjecting masses of people to extreme trials.

If we agree with this hypothesis, we should conclude that references to the existence of some pure, isolated nature of humanity, akin to an absolutely primordial biological instance that merely coincidentally interacts with culture, are inappropriate. Should philosophical inquiry (whether philosophical anthropology or some new form of "scientific" philosophy) continue to be preoccupied with the search for such a singularly adequate essence of humanity (nature) independent of cultural development, this endeavor will increasingly appear anachronistic, and any philosophical definitions of humanity in this direction are doomed to be limited in both substantive and historical aspects. Philosophy will find its place and role in studying humanity by combining its rational-critical free thought with specialized scientific research. As for the scientific search for the "nature of humanity" in its relation to culture, the works of the French author Edgar Morin serve as an example. He firmly believes that the emergence of culture is conditioned by human biology, and that culture is the key to understanding human nature; conversely, the existence of culture presupposes not only a developed brain but an entire "evolutionarily advanced biological being." This same direction is echoed in the thoughts of the contemporary English historian of science Roger Smith, who points out: "It seems that the debates between biology (or heredity) and culture (or environment) are fundamentally misguided. Our specific 'nature' is formed as a result of human development within a specific historical culture."

Turning once again to the possible question, “What is the nature (or essence) of humanity?” we emphasize: a person is a socio-cultural manifestation of the biological entity of the species Homo sapiens.

The previously highlighted unity of the biological and the social within humanity does not eliminate the need to discuss the relationship between these aspects of a singular complex. This relationship can be explored from various perspectives, such as the biological reserves available to humans to foster the tendencies of social development and the demands placed on individuals in this regard. There is a prevailing notion that significant biological obstacles do not hinder the social enhancement of humanity; rather, there are merely biological parameters (thresholds) of the possible, which are associated with risks to life and health, and which are only partially mitigated by technical means aimed at preventing the loss of life or health. The other facet of this issue pertains to the genetically inherited aspects of norm and pathology within humanity, and their relation to the socio-cultural conditions of human existence.

Through the collective efforts of scientists from various countries, the decoding of the human genome has finally been completed, revealing the entirety of the genetic apparatus of human cells, which is responsible for protein synthesis and largely determines human biological traits. It has been discovered that the human genome comprises approximately 32,000 genes, a number comparable even to that of distant organisms such as flies or worms. Genetic information is primarily stored in the chromosomes of cell nuclei. Within chromosomal DNA, functional units or cistrons, composed of nucleotides, are distinguished by their length. When reducing the genetic structure to the totality of nucleotides that ultimately compose the genes, the human genome counts hundreds of millions of units. Among the gene set, there are dominant and recessive genes, active and suppressed ones, including those that lead to hereditary diseases or defects, rendering individuals either completely or partially unviable, or significantly impacting their social capacities. Medical genetics identifies numerous genetically inherited diseases, such as anonychia, achondroplasia, established chicken blindness, elliptocytosis, Huntington's chorea, brachydactyly, albinism, alkaptonuria, phenylketonuria, congenital deafness, and a host of others, each with equally astonishing names for the uninitiated. The number of hereditary diseases ranges from 4 to 7 per 100 live births, with over 2,000 known, a figure that continues to grow as further research progresses. Approximately half of hereditary diseases arise from chromosomal number or structural abnormalities, while slightly less than half stem from damage to one or more genes. Some genetic pathologies are compensated by the fact that societal progress gradually removes natural barriers to the functioning of individuals with genetic defects, allowing them a place in the collective life. There also lies the prospect of correcting genetic deficiencies through methods of genetic engineering.

Among the natural factors at the genetic level, mutations in genes have significant consequences (especially for offspring). Gene mutations can be triggered by various forms of radiation (X-rays, ultraviolet, gamma rays), as well as the influence of other natural and sociogenic factors present in the external environment (free radicals, chemically active metabolic products, temperature fluctuations, and the same types of radiation of technogenic origin). According to some estimates, the overall frequency of mutations in humans is one mutation per individual in every generation.

The interplay between the natural and the social can be illustrated through examples of genetically inherited and acquired traits in humanity. For instance, some believe that the species lifespan of humans ranges between 100 to 130 years; however, we know how rare it is for individuals to reach such an age, as the overall natural and social environment profoundly affects actual lifespan. Ideally, the human life journey should culminate in death due to programmed old age, yet only two out of every 100 die from purely physiological aging. The age of parents also influences the viability of offspring, for with age, genetic structures in germ cells suffer damage from the external environment. We may also consider examples involving psychological phenomena. As previously mentioned, culture is not genetically inherited; however, the ability to acquire language and humanity’s cultural legacy depends on the characteristics of the brain, although much remains unknown about the neurological foundations of learning and memory. Genes determine the development and functional activity of brain structures, as evidenced by instances of intellectual disability. Among the factors that increase the frequency of genetically inherited mental illnesses can be social aspects, such as marriages between close relatives due to religious mandates or dynastic considerations, as well as marital connections within closed human populations.

The question of the effectiveness of so-called natural instincts (from the Latin instinctus - impulse) also pertains to the relationship between the natural and the societal. In contemporary scientific literature, the term “instinct” is seldom used, as there exists a more differentiated terminological apparatus for defining behavioral mechanisms that were once collectively referred to as “instinct.” Instead, one speaks of behavioral programs embedded within the very organization of the nervous system, for which specific stimuli serve merely as trigger signals to activate these programs. Nevertheless, in instances where the term instinct is employed, it typically denotes an innate, non-learned model of behavior inherent to all representatives of a particular species.

Humans are regarded as beings lacking a powerful array of instincts, with this deficiency compensated by culture. Among the instincts most frequently noted by philosophers and scientists is aggression. Konrad Lorenz indicated, “It is more than likely that the destructive aggression, which today resides in our blood as a malevolent legacy, is the result of intraspecies selection that influenced our ancestors for tens of thousands of years throughout the Paleolithic.” The detrimental impact of aggression was mitigated through the development of rituals that replaced animalistic forms of aggression with cultural expressions. Some scholars assert that the notion of aggression as an instinct has collapsed, as it was incorporated into a list of potential human instincts encompassing virtually all conceivable human behavior. A review in 1924 of literature on social sciences recorded approximately 6,000 possible instincts, illustrating the weakness of explanations for human behavior through the ambiguity of the concept of “instinct,” thereby rendering its explanatory role rather ineffective. The same can be said regarding Sigmund Freud's theory of natural drives.

In the quest for the essence of humanity through juxtaposing the natural and the social, one occasionally encounters extremes: an exaggeration of the role of one component over another. Some lean towards “biologization,” while others indulge in excessive “sociologization.” An example of the latter can be found in the tradition of domestic literature stemming from an overly linear interpretation of one of Karl Marx's statements. In his “Theses on Feuerbach,” he wrote: “Feuerbach reduces the essence of religion to human essence. However, the essence of humanity is not an abstraction inherent to an isolated individual. In its reality, it is the sum of all social relations.” Marx’s brief thesis opens a wide avenue for arbitrary interpretations, including extreme sociologization, suggesting that in humanity everything is socially conditioned, determined solely by the conditions of social life and upbringing.

However, one could adopt a less radical interpretation of Marx's famous assertion. At the very least, it implies that Marx shifts the conversation about “human essence” from the individual to the “human essence” of the species, which is historical and linked to the evolution of the system of social relations, thus encompassing the entirety of social reality. Considering other works by Marx, it cannot be said that he overlooked the natural (biological) prerequisites for human existence. One need only refer to the “German Ideology”: “The first premise of any human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Therefore, the first concrete fact that must be acknowledged is the bodily organization of these individuals and the relationships determined by it with all of nature.”

In summary, we may assert that the contemporary philosophical approach to the problem of humanity retains the tradition of complexity, while simultaneously incorporating significant current scientific achievements and resorting less to speculative reasoning, including in defining the essence of humanity, which we propose to regard as the socio-cultural form of existence of the species Homo sapiens.