Philosophy as Metaphysics

Being

Fundamental Ontological Concepts

By subsuming all that exists into the singular category of "being," we cannot overlook the profound synthesis we have achieved, grounded in the prior conviction of the manifold nature of existence. Now, let us unfold this thought in reverse, delineating the stages of such unfolding through distinct concepts.

Reality (from the Latin realis - actual). It is challenging to provide a clear and satisfactory definition of reality due to its extraordinary abstraction. Nevertheless, attempts have been made. The American philosopher Charles Peirce arrived at a general definition of reality by clarifying the distinctions between reality and its antithesis—fiction (from the Latin fictio - fabrication): “The real is that whose properties do not depend on what anyone may think about it as existing.” However, if we refrain from fixating too much on the logical difficulties inherent in defining such abstract concepts, we can settle on an intuitively understood meaning: the term "reality" underscores actual being, existence that is present and tangible, in contrast to, say, potential or already lost being. Since the Middle Ages, this concept has firmly taken root not only in philosophy but also in the natural sciences, where it is widely employed alongside the word "real." We speak of the real world and the imaginary, of physical and virtual realities, of objective and subjective realities, and so on. As long as we do not attach the term "reality" to any qualifier, we are ready to accept it unconditionally, as it serves as a synonym for the very notion of "being." The situation becomes problematic the moment we begin to discuss a specific reality: the reality of the surrounding world, the reality of elementary particles, subjective reality, the reality of visions, and much more. Personal life experiences convince each individual of the reality of the objects around them. The exchange of similar experiences with others leads to the conclusion that the world exists in this manner, regardless of whether we ourselves exist. However, confidence may waver with simple reflections.

The reality perceived by one may not coincide with another's perception of reality. Doubt about the adequacy of one’s perception of reality can envelop anyone. Let us recall ancient skepticism and its fifteen tropes (modes of refutation) against the possibility of reliable thinking in accordance with reality, some of which are cited by Diogenes Laertius (1st half of the 3rd century) and presented in a more complete and systematic manner by Sextus Empiricus (2nd half of the 2nd century - early 3rd century). For example, consider an argument from one of the tropes: “Depending on courage and fear, the same matter appears dangerous and terrifying to the coward and is not frightening at all to the brave. Likewise, depending on joy and sorrow, the same things seem unpleasant to the sad and pleasant to the joyful. Thus, if there is such confusion depending on states and different times when people in such states become different, it may be easy to state how each object appears to each person, but it is not so easy to assert how it truly is, as resolving this confusion is impossible.”

We may also recall George Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of things outside our sensations: “Everyone agrees that neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas created by imagination exist outside our soul. And it is no less evident to me that various sensations or ideas, inscribed in sensibility, however mixed or combined, cannot exist otherwise than in the mind that perceives them. I believe that anyone can be directly convinced of this if they pay attention to what is meant by the term ’exists’ in its application to perceived things. When I say that the table on which I write exists, it means that I see and feel it... This is all I can understand under such or similar expressions. For what is said about the unconditional existence of unthinking things without any relation to their perception is entirely incomprehensible to me. Their esse (being) is percipi (being perceived), and it is impossible for them to have any existence outside of minds or outside of thinking things that perceive them.” Such a system of views was termed extravagant and the most absurd of all by the French Enlightenment thinker Denis Diderot.

The examples provided do not indicate our absolute helplessness before the force of the arguments presented by skeptics and subjective idealists; there are just as many counterarguments in the history of philosophy. This is not the issue at hand. Rather, it concerns a careful and responsible engagement with the meanings and significances of concepts related to the classification or substantive characterization of types of reality. It often occurs that one must navigate through the linguistic thickets to reach reality, so much confusion arises in the usage of terms not only among the common folk but also within scholarly circles. What, for instance, do people mean when they speak and write about “metaphysical reality” or “invisible ontology”? Such metaphorical expressions contribute nothing but confusion.

Ontological conceptions of reality have developed and continue to evolve in parallel with scientific knowledge, under mutual influence. The worldview shaped by classical physics since the early modern period was mechanistic, relying on a clear distinction between the objective and the subjective and the development of a methodology aimed at minimizing the influence of the subjective on the results of knowledge. This was the case until physics dealt with the study of the motion of bodies that were its material carriers and were visible. With the complete exhaustion of Newtonian mechanics, physicists sought to impose order in the last bastions of nature—thermodynamics, electricity, and magnetism. The formation of electric theory brought about conceptual challenges. “The true reality in this theory,” noted the eminent German physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), “had to be recognized as a certain field of forces, rather than matter... An element of abstraction was introduced into the worldview, which until then had seemed so transparent, and its clarity disappeared.”

In the 20th century, physics was enriched by even more radical advancements: a quantum-mechanical picture of the world was created. The vanguard of physicists turned to the study of processes at the microscopic level, an area never directly visible to the scientist. Moreover, typical quantum-mechanical magnitudes are random variables associated with probability distributions. Among many distinctions of quantum mechanics, perhaps the most striking is that, as noted by Argentine-Canadian specialist in the philosophical problems of natural science Mario Bunge (b. 1919), none of its fundamental symbols can be empirically interpreted, leading to the conclusion that quantum-mechanical theory, in general, lacks empirical content. Physicists today primarily work with theoretical models of possible worlds and seem less preoccupied with interpretative procedures regarding the search for empirical correlates to their concepts. In fact, the experimental physicist deals with reality (in the ordinary sense of the word) in a very mediated form: through complex technical equipment designed to capture indirect traces of interactions among elementary particles and through theoretical models that explain probabilistic interactions. So, what “reality” is being discussed here? It must always be clearly understood that the depiction of reality provided by a physicist is merely a conceptual model of a possible manifestation of objective reality.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the necessity of preserving (regardless of the justifiability of interpretative maneuvers in particular sciences) established philosophical conceptual forms such as “subjective reality” and “objective reality,” as their distinction serves a significant heuristic function in a broader cultural space than merely the realm of a specific science.

The term "substance" derives from the Latin substantia—that which lies at the foundation; its ancient Greek equivalents include σύνολος (sýnolos) and particularly ούσία (ousía). The history of the category of substance is intimately linked to the notion of essence, tracing its roots back to the philosophy of Ancient Greece. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies four meanings of "essence," among which he employs at least two related terms—sýnolos and ousía—often rendered as "essence" in translations. Notably, he distinguishes their meanings, one of which aligns more closely with what would later be translated into Latin as "substance." To ascertain which term more accurately reflects today’s understanding of substance, we must first turn to Plato, as Aristotle elaborates his ontological concepts in response to him.

As is well known, Plato regarded the "truly existent" as the idea (εϊδος - eidos) of a thing, apprehended solely through intellectual observation (the intelligible), as opposed to the form of a specific object. Ideas are not mere thoughts about things; rather, they constitute the "real" archetype of the object, that which renders them what they are. But where do the eide—ideas—reside? Plato referred to the place where all ideas gather as Hyperuranion (the Beyond), and in his dialogue Phaedrus, he wrote: "No poet here has sung of the region Beyond, nor will ever do so fittingly. This is it (for one must finally dare to speak the truth, especially when discussing truth): this realm is occupied by essence (here 'ousía'), which is colorless, formless, and imperceptible, truly existent, seen only by the guide of the soul—reason; it is this to which true knowledge is directed." Here, Plato designates this "truly existent" (either the idea or the form of a thing) as "first substance" (πρώτή ούσία), while each individual object, caused by it, is termed "second substance" (δεύτερα ούσία).

Aristotle rejects Plato's dualism of the world (ideas and things): "All else cannot arise from eide in any ordinary sense of 'from.' To speak of them as models and claim that all else participates in them is to engage in meaningless rhetoric and poetic allegory." For him, reality comprises a multitude of fully concrete things, interconnected through specific relations. At the same time, he emphasizes that within things exists some foundational aspect, something enduring, which, in contrast to transient properties, characterizes the thing as such. Aristotle retains the Platonic term "ousía" (substance) for this foundation. However, whereas for Plato ousía signifies merely a pure form isolated from the real world, for Aristotle, ousía is burdened by "matter," that is, it represents a concrete synthesis of matter and form, with ideas merely framing the sensory, which is comprehended by reason and represented in our consciousness by general concepts.

Building upon the notion of matter as "potential" (the capacity to assume form) and form as "act" (the actualization of that capacity), Aristotle constructs a hierarchy of being, moving from a degree of fusion of form and matter to its complete liberation from the material. He posits that there are forms which can exist as substances even without matter. At the apex of this hierarchy is God, conceived as pure form, a supersensible substance, and the eternal mover of all that exists. Medieval scholasticism appropriated the concept of substance and Aristotle's thoughts on the hierarchical scale of being to address theological dilemmas. In the subsequent development of philosophy, substance came to signify a certain foundation, a substrate, the bearer of properties.

We neither possess the means nor the urgent need to recount all the vicissitudes that the concept of "substance" has endured throughout the history of philosophy and science. It has been employed by Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant, while some, for various reasons, have critiqued it, such as Berkeley and Hume. Although this category is not specially developed in contemporary philosophical thought, it remains quite in use, as do derivative terms. It is for this reason that the topic of substance is broached here.

In what circumstances, then, might it be deemed appropriate and justified to invoke "substantial" terminology? In a broader, worldview-oriented context, the recourse to the category of substance may be prompted by a quest for the ultimate foundation (essence, basis, cause, substrate) of the myriad existing phenomena. In well-developed worldview systems, this could be God, some other spiritual "force," or a singular foundation of the material order. The worldview crises that have punctuated both ancient and recent history have invariably compelled humanity to return to foundational concepts in order to systematize their understanding of the cosmos, leading human thought repeatedly to rely on the carefully considered spiritual achievements of past epochs. Thus, the worldview aspect of the category of substance remains ever vigilant for its moment, surfacing prominently in times of crisis.

In a less expansive sense, "substance" serves as an operative, quite utilized concept in the development of science, within its integrative and differentiating currents. The emergence of distinct sciences attests to phases in which certain bearers, bases (substances) of the processes and properties under investigation by specialized sciences are isolated. The gradual recognition of the distinctiveness of a scientific domain parallels the search for an initially implicit "substantial," substrate basis, which is hypothetically posited (e.g., ether, caloric, the atom of antiquity and modern times), and later acquires specific substantive traits. The establishment of chemistry as a science is linked to the affirmation of the concept of elements—as bearers of properties that facilitate the transformation of substances. In the emergence of genetics as a branch of modern biology, the idea of the gene as a bearer of heredity plays a crucial role. Therefore, in such cases, the use of the notion of substance may be entirely appropriate, not as a universal foundation for all that exists, but as a bearer of fundamental properties of a particular kind of existence.

In philosophy, it was Aristotle who elevated matter to the status of a category. In his texts, the term he employs is ϋλη, which literally translates to timber or raw material for construction, but philosophically denotes that from which things are made. When matter is considered apart from its relationship with form, through extreme abstraction, the concept of "prime matter" emerges as something indeterminate, which can be envisioned as a certain general substrate (from the Latin substratus, meaning foundation), that is, the basis of the entire multitude of concrete things. The Latin word materia is a direct translation of the Greek ϋλη, and it also signified building materials as well as substance, the primary principle. Earlier, we demonstrated how Aristotle correlated the concepts of matter and substance: the substantiality of each thing is defined by the fusion of matter and form. At least in Aristotle's view, the semantic realms of these concepts do not intersect. In the subsequent development of philosophy, both notions were used in parallel, often conflated, especially in instances where substance was reduced to substrate, to primal materiality. From the seventeenth century onward, the concept of matter became widely adopted in the natural sciences, where the notion of atoms (or, more generally, particles) emerged, from which things are composed and whose fundamental characteristics dictate the properties of physical bodies. Thus, Isaac Newton (1643-1727) derived the extension, solidity, mobility, and inertia of bodies from similar characteristics of their minute constituent particles (corpuscles), which were also characterized by their impenetrability. Regarding the question of the further divisibility of the particles that constitute the world of physical bodies, Newton was quite cautious in his conclusions. From a mathematical standpoint, he posited that they might be divisible to infinity; however, the ultimate conclusions depend on experimental confirmation. Up until the late nineteenth century, the physical worldview was constructed on the hypothesis of an atomic (corpuscular) structure of bodies, which (that is, the bodies) were the direct subjects of classical mechanics' investigations.

Concurrently (and simultaneously in relation) with the knowledge of the natural sciences, purely philosophical perspectives on matter developed. In fact, philosophical thought somewhat outpaced mechanistic notions of matter here. A representative of the French Enlightenment, Paul Holbach, exemplifies a more generalized approach, which we have already outlined above, wherein he stated that "matter is generally everything that influences our sensations in some manner," although among the properties of "all this," designated as "matter," he named the same attributes as Newton: extension, mobility, solidity, weight, inertia, and so forth. Nonetheless, it is important to note a new turn in the philosophical understanding of matter—a clear trend towards comparing and contrasting matter and consciousness (including sensation). Within the realm of philosophy, the category of matter began to acquire meaning and usage in the need to differentiate objective reality from subjective existence, that is, from the existence of thoughts and sensory images. Everything that exists objectively, beyond human consciousness, may be collectively referred to as matter. Here, it is apt to recall Friedrich Engels' observation: "Such words as 'matter' and 'motion' are nothing more than abbreviations by which we comprehend the multitude of various things that are sensibly perceived, according to their general properties."

As long as physicists dealt with the investigation of objects solely in the form of visible bodies, they, along with philosophers, interpreted materiality as corporeality. Eventually, with the expansion of the empirical research domain through the study of invisible elementary particles, plasma phenomena, and fields in physics, cellular and subcellular processes in biology, interatomic and molecular interactions in chemistry, and so forth, the conception of matter no longer aligned with the notion of a collection of objectively existing bodies, and today this concept merely indicates the existence of phenomena, properties, processes, and objects as components of objective reality, wherein different interrelated structural levels and systems can be distinguished. Each element of such structures and systems, along with its properties and relations, may be termed material only in the sense that it exists (if it exists!) objectively, that is, as a given independent of our thoughts and knowledge about it, while, overall, the concept of matter pertains to the entire aggregate of objectively existing things.

The term "world" belongs to the categories of metaphysics, as it is used to denote a certain sphere of existence. The simplest contemplation of "being" immediately leads to the question, "What exists?" In response to this natural inquiry, one can point to individual objects and phenomena, or provide a generalized answer: "The world exists." The word "world" has been widely utilized in human discourse since ancient times and derives from "light," that which is visible. As V.V. Kolesov points out, in ancient Rus', the term for "world" denoted everything surrounding us that is visible and therefore knowable (note the sequence: visible - to see - to know). It was only after the twelfth century that the borrowed term from Byzantium, contrasting "this world" with "that world," entered Rus'. To depart into nothingness from the perspective of earthly life means to transition to "that world." There is an abundance of everyday expressions utilizing the word "world": "world out of sight," "to cast out into the world," "not for anything in the world," "the world is not dear," "to go into the world." The concept of the world enters folk consciousness not through conceptual frameworks but as a societal and natural environment, always perceived by humans through the vicissitudes of their own fate, which is reflected in proverbs, songs, paintings, and poetry. Let us recall just a few lines from Shevchenko's "Kobzar," rich in themes of the world:

Bright world! Quiet world!
Free world, unbound!
...Oh woe! Bitter is my grief!
And where shall I hide in this world?
...It is not joyful to live in the world,
When there is no one to love.
...How should I be troubled,
Annoying people,
I shall go into the world out of sight -
What will be, will be.
...Do not weep, do not wail, do not gnash teeth -
Bring eternal, profound love
To that quiet world.

Thus, when considering the genesis of "world perception" and the very word "world," one must seek their roots in the primal aspirations of humanity to comprehend its relationships with both human and natural environments. Philosophy has undoubtedly always taken into account human life's worldview in its generalizations, since it has been preoccupied from the very beginning with the problem of "human - world" as central.

It is well known that the first European philosophers of the Milesian school concentrated on the abstract "search" for the primary principle of all existence, but almost concurrently, their compatriot and younger contemporary Hecataeus (circa 546-480 BCE) noted another aspect: before seeking the mysterious principle, it is necessary to understand and describe that which directly surrounds us. From the subsequent history of philosophy and science, we know that there was no unilateral study of the world; some described the world primarily through travel and fact-gathering, while others endeavored to reach its profound structure through speculative or scientifically theoretical thought.

Since the times of classical Western philosophy, an entirely acceptable, albeit profoundly abstract, definition of the world has been established by Immanuel Kant: “The word ’world’ in a transcendental sense means the absolute totality of all existing things.” In Hegel’s categorical system of the "Science of Logic," the term "world" occupies a prominent position and likewise embodies a totality of elements. However, Hegel differentiates between the suprasensible, essential world, which he refers to as the “world-in-itself and for-itself,” and the existing world of sensibility, which serves as an observable reality, referred to as the world of phenomena or the world of “the other-being of the essential.” In the works of numerous philosophers from the 18th to the 20th century, the category of “world” is quite commonly used and retains, in general terms, its Kantian meaning as the totality of either all that exists or a specific kind of being.

This latter aspect opens the possibility to discuss (either literally or allegorically) the multiplicity of worlds, their interactions, and even their unity. Let us recall the domestic philosopher H. S. Skovoroda (1722-1794), who wrote about three worlds: the great world (the universe), the microcosm (man), and the symbolic world (the Bible). Another example can be found in the work of the renowned English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). In one of his works, he conditionally named two worlds those aspects of the universe that are anticipated in every experience we undergo: the world that enhances the diversity of finite things is termed the “World of Activity”; while the one that prolongs existence is referred to as the “World of Value.” Finally, we can point to the fairly popular yet simultaneously critiqued notion of worlds put forth by another English philosopher of Austrian descent, Karl Popper (1902-1994). He deemed it useful and heuristic to distinguish three worlds: 1) the physical world, 2) the world of states of consciousness, and the third world, into which the author “inhabited” theoretical systems, problems and problematic situations, critical arguments, states of discussions, or conditions of critical disputes, as well as, naturally, the content of journals, books, and libraries. Popper explained the independence of the existence of the third world through various arguments, including thought experiments. For instance, if all our current technical knowledge were to suddenly vanish, professional knowledge would remain in libraries, from which we could relearn how to build machines.

As we can see, the concept of the world is multifaceted and is used in meanings closely related to all that concerns humanity. Thus, in a preliminary approach to our notion, we can say that the world is a certain totality of the reality revealed to us. However, since the world is given to us as a measure of our cognition and understanding, which, in turn, is determined by the degree of the social and cultural-historical development of humanity, we can discern two forms of the representation of the world: the scientific picture of the world and worldview. The former is a comprehensive collection of specific scientific knowledge about the entire world, sometimes referred to by the Latin term universum, or its particular slices, leading to discussions of the physical, biological, geographical, and so forth pictures of the world. The scientific picture of the world is periodically refined, and scientists strive to minimize the role of subjective elements in the system of knowledge. The latter form of world representation—worldview—on the contrary, always presents the world centered around the human being, its values, the meaning of existence, purpose, and experiences. “I (we) in the world,” “I (we) and the world,” “my (another’s) world”—these phrases delineate the edges of this centration. In the social dimension, worldview aspects address the relationships between individuals and those external “worlds,” such as society as a whole (the social, analogous to the universe), the worlds of culture, power, norms, language, knowledge, and so forth. In the subsequent exposition, we have chosen precisely this direction for presenting the course: to illustrate, in a manner inherent to philosophy, the human being in its relation to the world (“worlds”).