Philosophy as Metaphysics

The Potential of Metaphysics

A brief excursion into the history of metaphysics may create the impression of a tendency to perceive it as something antiquated, a relic destined for the waste heap of philosophical history. Yet, we must tread carefully in forming final conclusions! Caution in our assessments is also warranted for those who assert an exaggerated distinctiveness of metaphysics. While acknowledging the largely justified critique of the independence of metaphysics as a "science," one might be inclined to conclude that it is most rational and justified to discuss the inevitability of a metaphysical "prologue" to every philosophy—those aspects of philosophical knowledge that pertain to foundational positions and methodological orientations inherent to any philosophical discourse. Let us consider several arguments in this regard, the first of which will be the argument from language.

The instrument and simultaneously the material of the philosopher's work is language. It conceals within it a certain knowledge that the philosopher seeks to "extricate" and comprehend. While paying homage to the boundlessness and inexhaustibility of the linguistic theme, we will merely emphasize that language is polyfunctional: it conveys information, serves as a means of communication, and articulates and materializes thought, among other roles. Language and thought are inextricably linked. When a person thinks, they articulate their thoughts, as if engaging in a dialogue between themselves as speaker and as listener. The initial acquisition of language by a child occurs largely unconsciously and spontaneously, and even an adult, in their practical use of language, is least burdened by reflection on word usage. However, the language of science and philosophical discourse differs from everyday language through its conceptual precision and the clearly defined correlation of the semantic content of words to the empirical material to which those words refer. Each individual engaged in scientific pursuits is required to adeptly utilize fairly abstract concepts, the meanings of which may not have direct associations with the familiar world of objects. Yet, without concepts of such a level of generalization, no science can develop, as they capture essential (albeit unfortunately non-tangible) qualities of things and processes. Scientific terminological dictionaries serve multilayered strata of knowledge, from those reflecting the external characteristics of the material world to realms significantly distanced from analogies with sensory forms. For instance, we can compare such pairs of words from different fields of knowledge: "iron" and "valence" (chemistry); "body" and "spin" (physics); "human" and "meaning of life" (philosophy).

Words and thoughts, language and thinking, while interconnected, do not signify the same thing. In the process of contemplating anything, we naturally operate with words, but the ultimate goal of thought will be an entirely new word (or words) that most adequately embodies the exploratory direction of the thought process. In the subsequent interpretation of the discovered word, aimed at conveying its meaning to another, we present the knowledge obtained and expressed in words, utilizing a condensed path of our own contemplation. We invite the Other to share in our understanding, to convey the results of our inquiries, and thus share in the joy of discovering new meanings. Systematic philosophy indeed began with the desire to clarify what has long been known in words, to unveil something new and unknown within them. The early European philosophers conferred entirely new dimensions upon familiar words (such as "water," "air," "fire"), positing them as the principles of all existence. This emerged from their reflections on the relationship between the "one" and the "many," "change" and "stability." As noted by the contemporary Austrian philosopher Emmerich Coreth (1919-2006), "Metaphysics, unlike empirical sciences, does not strive to convey or prove something entirely new that we did not already know beforehand. It must reveal what was already 'known' but not yet explicitly 'understood.'" Thus, metaphysics as philosophy—or, in other terms, the metaphysical aspect of philosophy—is the elucidation of the meanings of the fundamental, foundational words inherent in any coherent philosophical discourse.

The fundamental words of the system of philosophical knowledge can further be presented through the lens of the problem of beginnings, in a dual sense: 1) Which key term initiates the exposition of a philosophical position? 2) What key term prompts the philosopher to engage in reflections that lead to a revolutionary shift in thought? Regarding the first, this task is predominantly didactic; the author seeks optimal paths for coherent exposition, so that the reader (or listener) may gradually be convinced of the strength of the arguments. The second aspect pertains to the crucial link in the philosopher's own creative process. For them, the beginning represents a problematic situation, realized in the form of a question. Metaphysics, according to M. Heidegger, is an ultimate inquiry, an inquiry into ultimate concepts, such as the nature of the world, finitude, and so forth. It is clear that an answer follows a question. However, it is equally evident that the posing of a question presupposes the existence of some horizon of knowledge. Even in simple life situations, when someone inquires about the day of the week, it is evident that the questioner possesses knowledge of the calendar, its divisions into months and weeks, and is aware of the names of the days in their order. A simple response, such as "Tuesday," will suffice. A metaphysical-philosophical question implicitly also contains knowledge of the unknown. By asking about the world, its essence, and structure, the philosopher anticipates what to expect in response. This implicit knowledge might be described as unilluminated, not fully contemplated. Contemplating the initial, foundational concepts of the most general type is precisely what constitutes metaphysical philosophy.

The need for metaphysics arises from the emergence in humanity's spiritual life of transcendental ideas and concepts (from the Latin transcendo—to transcend, to go beyond, to break through). As is well known, in the philosophy of I. Kant, transcendental ideas pertain to objects beyond experience (e.g., God, the soul) and are inaccessible to theoretical knowledge. In a broader sense, the concept of the transcendental relates to that which always remains beyond the horizon of known existence as something due. The intense comparison (and opposition) of the transcendental as due and the existent (as human) began in the interval between 800-200 BCE (the so-called "Axial Age"). During this period, the mythological worldview, with its absolute determinism, was dismantled in favor of the parallel emergence of systems of knowledge based on the concepts of rationalist (philosophical) thought. In these concepts, what is due—the transcendental—is fixed as an alternative to what exists in the human realm. Consider, for instance, the concepts of justice, goodness, benevolence, and so forth. The ancient Greek of the mythological era knew Dike (the deity of justice) as the daughter of Zeus and Themis. She administers justice among souls, following wrongdoers with a sword in hand to punish the wicked. For the bearer of a mythological consciousness, the criminal was always unequivocally known—a transgressor of the time-honored order, and human order was entrenched within the interrelated images of the mythological system. The transformation of "justice" into a transcendental concept led to its (the concept's) incomplete determination and variability of its content. Now, every sage had the right and opportunity to creatively elucidate the concept, to infuse its content with their own ideals, and to oppose them to the prevailing order. Instead of a unanimous collective consciousness, numerous centers of worldview (philosophical schools) emerged, each interpreting transcendental concepts in its own way. Since those ancient times, humanity remains captivated by the need for metaphysical clarification of such concepts. Thus, from this perspective, the potential of metaphysics is not only unexhausted but also shows no sign of an end to the work of interpreting the meanings of ultimate transcendental concepts, particularly those pertaining to social life.

The prolonged historical experience of the existence of metaphysics allows for an exploration of the periods of its crises, the post-crisis renewals, and a forecast of its further development. A constructive variant of such an approach is presented by the contemporary German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel (b. 1922). In his view, it is more appropriate to speak not of the evolution of metaphysics as such towards its gradual disappearance, but rather of paradigm shifts (from the Greek παράδειγμα, meaning pattern or model) within first philosophy, that is, metaphysics itself. Historically, the first was ontological metaphysics, the second was the transcendental philosophy of consciousness, and in our times, it is justified to speak of metaphysics in the form of transcendental semiotics.

To assert it sharply, one could say that metaphysics is no longer the study of the "nature" or "essence of things," or "being" (ontology), nor is it a reflection on "representation," the concept of "consciousness," or "mind" (theory of knowledge). Rather, it is a reflection on the "meaning" or "sense" of linguistic expressions (analysis of language). To illustrate his idea, Apel employs a schema depicting the structure of mediated sign cognition, wherein a sign is that which substitutes for something in a certain relation; within the sign, there is a fusion of the relationship to the signified object and the thought represented by the subject.

From the triad of sign relations, three historical paradigms of metaphysics can be derived:

1. If we abstract from the second and third sign relations and consider only the first, we arrive at the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics as ontology. According to this conception, not only external objects but also knowledge and truth are presented as something substantial in the world, as a physical process.
2. If we abstract only from the second and select the first and third, we obtain the Kantian conception of metaphysics, that is, the transcendental philosophy of consciousness or subject. According to this conception, it is no longer possible to question the possibility of true knowledge through natural scientific investigation; however, this conception still does not take into account the functions of language and intersubjective communication and considers the cognitive process from the perspective of an isolated, ahistorical subject. Here, the "I" does not presuppose the existence of a language shared with other "I"s, so all philosophers, from René Descartes to Edmund Husserl, essentially stand on the ground of methodological solipsism. Language and all subjects of communication are regarded as objects of a particular type for my consciousness, rather than as transcendental conditions for the possibility of intersubjectively true knowledge.
3. If, however, we consider all three aspects of sign relations within the foundations of metaphysics as conditions for knowledge, we arrive at the concept of transcendental semiotics as a new paradigm of metaphysics. From the standpoint of this conception, the previous paradigms can be represented as progressive stages in overcoming the transcendental naivety of philosophical thought. In the first paradigm, natural naivety dominated the ontological relation, which simultaneously enabled the concurrent emergence of philosophy and the special sciences. The second paradigm overcame the naivety of the theory of truth, according to which truth is a relation between things within the world. In this paradigm, the first question of critical philosophy is: how is it possible to achieve true knowledge based on the subject-object relation? The third paradigm overcomes the naivety of the assumption that each individual subject can independently, that is, without mediation by language or communication, learn something about the world or about themselves as thinking beings. Today, the first question of philosophy should be: how is meaningful, significant thought—arguing in the intersubjective sense of the term—possible at all, within the framework of public language? Thus, in the third paradigm, the critique of language, and consequently the critique of meaning, occupies the place of metaphysics instead of the Kantian variant of metaphysics as a critique of knowledge.

Apel emphasizes that each transition to a new paradigm was associated with a crisis of philosophy as a whole. Thus, skepticism already emerged in antiquity as a reaction to the imperfection of the foundational principles of ontological metaphysics, until the first paradigm ultimately faced defeat in its confrontation with Christianity. The Middle Ages only slightly adjusted it in their own way towards mutual complementarity (rather than opposition) of faith and reason. The second paradigm was initiated by Descartes and ultimately established by Kant. Yet even this paradigm encountered new problems: how to reconcile the so-called "sciences of culture" (humanitarian knowledge) with the idea of the subject-object relation, since in those sciences, the subject and object of cognition coincide, and how to reconcile transcendental and transcendent knowledge. These two issues led, over a long time, to the destruction of Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

What, then, according to Apel, are the foundations of the new paradigm—transcendental semiotics? The author believes they must be foundational arguments that possess a transcendental status and pertain to the revelation of certain "preliminary structures," the "pre-understanding" of our being in the world. These are foundational arguments whose negation leads to the negation and rejection of the very value of the act of argumentation itself.

Apel aimed solely to indicate the possibilities and prospects for the existence of metaphysics based on the new paradigm and did not engage in the development of its foundations. However, the promising trajectory of philosophy in this direction can be illustrated by the thoughts of another contemporary German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Adhering to ideas somewhat similar to those of Apel, he presents in his works certain foundational principles or universal rules governing linguistic practice, which can be termed acts of intersubjective communication. People spontaneously employ a rational model of communication ("communicative reason"), characterized by such features as impartiality, the responsibility of interlocutors, the meaningful nature of language, persuasiveness, expressiveness, sincerity, and so forth.

"I will give just one example," Habermas writes in one of his works. "When you say something not entirely clear or behave in a way that is mysterious to me, I have every right to ask: 'What are you doing?' or: 'What did you say?', presupposing that you are capable of providing me with a truthful explanation, which I may or may not believe. That is, I presume that you are not a liar, not crazy, not drunk, and you cannot disregard this attitude of mine [...]. Of course, I can change it, approach you with greater suspicion, with some strategic intent, concealed or directly expressed. But the initial attitude is more fundamental; it corresponds to a typical situation of language use." Thus, a "communicative rational reason" emerges in society, which can be investigated from the perspective of its foundational principles, certain invariants of its functioning. This would no longer be, of course, the second variant of metaphysics (the Kantian one), but rather elements, if not of a new metaphysics, then at least of metaphysical reflection on the conditions of knowledge arising from the fact of intersubjective communication.