German Classical Philosophy

The Moral-Legal Concept of Immanuel Kant

Kant unified all interests of reason—both theoretical and practical—into three famous questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What must I do?
3. What may I hope for?

The first of these questions was preliminarily answered in the "Critique of Pure Reason." In his philosophical system, morality provides the answer to the second question, while religion addresses the third. Toward the end of his life, Kant added a fourth fundamental question to this list:

4. What is man?

This question is answered by anthropology, a work Kant published in 1798. The last question is the most general: "Essentially, all of this could be reduced to anthropology, as the first three questions pertain to it," notes Kant.

The "Critique of Pure Reason" marked a pivotal moment in the life of the prominent German philosopher for various reasons. It enabled him to reassess the place of philosophy within the totality of human knowledge, to clarify its specificity and structure, to define the role of different cognitive faculties, and to emphasize the activity of the subject of knowledge. Furthermore, it opened the path for Kant to develop his own philosophical system. It is from this foundation, with its methodological principles, that the renewed expansion into traditional areas of philosophy begins: ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology, social philosophy, natural philosophy, and more.

When reason focuses on the study of human actions, it acquires practical significance and becomes practical reason. Human actions differ from other phenomena in that they are grounded in rational will. This will is conceived as the ability to determine oneself to actions arising from concepts of various laws. These laws are laws of freedom, and the science of them is ethics, or the doctrine of morality. Kant dedicated three significant works to this doctrine: "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" (1785), "Critique of Practical Reason" (1788), and "Metaphysics of Morals" (1797). In the first, he establishes the moral law or the supreme principle of morality; in the second, he examines, so to speak, the moral capacity of humanity; in the third, he constructs a systematic doctrine of morality.

The notion of rational will is rich in its content. Like reason, will is inherent to human beings by their very nature. At the same time, reason in its practical, rather than theoretical, aspect influences will. The true purpose of such reason is to affirm will as good will. On the other hand, the expression "rational will" signifies that it pertains to the human capacity for conscious actions, for actions guided by reason rather than by "instinct." Kant firmly believes that only one will is good, which is connected to duty. Duty, in turn, seems to contain the notion of good will. Ideal good will manifests when it coincides with duty. For instance, when a person does good not for the sake of reward but solely out of duty, this is good will "in its pure form," as an end in itself rather than a means to a better arrangement in life. Only in this case do both motive and action align with duty and good will. Yet the thinker prioritizes motive or intention. To elevate humanity into the realm of morality, intention must conform to the universal law. Such a law is not imposed externally, for in such a form it would not align with the essence of the autonomous will of every rational being. Therefore, the highest moral law must be discovered within oneself, as it exists in human beings a priori.

As a rational being, Kant had every right to propose the fundamental law of practical reason to all other rational beings, as well as to guide each of them toward the self-discovery of this same law in its most general form. This law is articulated as a demand directed at us: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." This is given the status of a categorical imperative, which is a binding requirement. In formulating the moral law, Kant appeals to the common sense of people, to moral intuition, where this law seems to resonate eternally, albeit somewhat hidden. To uncover it, one only needs to listen to oneself and reflect on the motives behind one's actions. It is worth noting that Kant's stance on the moral law stands in resolute opposition to those views that see the origins of morality in religion, in the idea of God. On the contrary, he asserts that as a moral being, humanity initially comes to God.

One might claim that the moral law presented is extraordinarily abstract, a mere formula. Kant himself did not deny this. However, the highest moral law must indeed be thus—independent of empirical conditions, of the "matter" of experience. It represents a manifestation of pure will, a direct act of practical reason.

Kant did not expect that in practical life, in their relationships, everyone would truly adhere to this law. Nevertheless, it constantly "resonates" within us, troubling us directly or indirectly. For instance, when I am faced with the question of whether I can make promises in a difficult situation with the intent not to keep them, I ascend to the level of the universal moral law when I contemplate whether I would be content if my maxim—to escape from distress through false promises—were to hold as a universal law for both myself and others. Could I tell myself: let everyone deceive one another by making false promises? Probably not. Even the most hardened thief would not agree to his "practice" becoming a universal rule of conduct for all people, including himself.

The categorical imperative is the sole moral norm upon which human actions must be based. It is the highest moral law, common to all rational beings. Investigating its content necessarily leads us to recognize each other not as means but as ends in themselves. Each human being, in Kant's view, represents two worlds: the intelligible and the sensible, for they are both a thing in itself and an empirical phenomenon. As part of the intelligible world, a person possesses the ideas of freedom, will, and duty, acting as an autonomous moral legislator. However, as part of the world that is perceived sensibly, they behave according to the natural law of desires and inclinations. In the first instance, actions are grounded in the highest principle of morality; in the second, on the principle of happiness, which varies for each individual. Thus, the human person becomes the arena of conflict between duty and base desires, attachments. Only duty, rather than submission to empirical motives, confers a positive moral character upon human actions. To follow the path of morality means to motivate one's actions by duty. Undoubtedly, this path is challenging, but it is the only one that elevates humanity and shapes its dignity. Kant recognized that the human world has not progressed along the path of duty, but he harbored faith in the progress and moral refinement of humanity, as well as in the redemptive power of the moral law. Fortunately, this is aided by that "marvelous capacity within us, which we call conscience," often associated with remorse for injustices committed, for negligence, or worse. The analysis of the relationship between the intelligible and sensible worlds, theoretical and practical reason, leads Kant to the conclusion regarding the primacy of pure practical reason oriented toward action. In essence, this concerns the superiority and primacy of action over knowledge. Where speculative reason falters, entangled in antinomies, practical reason comes to the subject's aid, organizing the soul's powers in pursuit of a higher interest; it determines the will in relation to the ultimate and complete aim. For instance, is there a higher good, an immortal soul, God? Speculative or theoretical reason seeks to resolve this question in terms of affirming or denying their existence, while practical reason asserts: they must exist.

Let us pay attention to the word "must," which resonates with necessity, a demand based on the existence of the moral law. The attainment of the highest good is morally necessary, as the moral law leads us there through virtue and the persistent struggle against the temptations of earthly life. This process is lengthy, and the achievement of the good occurs only in an infinite progression, as the limited time of individual human life is insufficient to fulfill such a task. The resolution is possible only for humanity as a whole, which transitions to eternity. Hence, the realization of the highest good through human will requires infinite time, that is, the immortality of the soul. In turn, the implementation of the highest good in a world not created by us necessitates the acknowledgment of the ultimate cause of the world—God. "It is morally necessary to acknowledge the existence of God," concludes Kant. We possess no knowledge of transcendent objects (freedom, soul, God); however, we do have moral evidence, even conviction. Such moral convictions are nothing other than faith. Religious faith grants the hope that Kant mentioned at the end of the "Critique of Pure Reason."

The sphere of practical reason encompasses the realm of law. To elucidate the specificity of law in relation to morality, it is imperative to mention that human reason functions as a dual legislator: 1) concerning nature, where stringent causality and mechanical necessity reign; 2) concerning the realm of freedom, where compulsion is absent, replaced instead by the persuasion or incitement under the pressure of duty. The laws of freedom, in contrast to the laws of nature, are designated as moral. In instances where they pertain solely to external actions, Kant refers to them as legal; however, when moral laws assert themselves as the foundations of actions, they are labeled as ethical. Thus, ethical and legal legislation are delineated. The former is rooted in the principle of duty, which serves as the profound motivation for actions, while the latter specifically disregards such motivations, allowing for alternative incentives.

The moral-ethical law does not guarantee the unconditional fulfillment of its demands; it remains an internal compulsion, while external human actions may not align with it. Conversely, the moral-legal law is grounded in the possibilities and conditions of external demands and external legislation. Based on these preliminary reflections, Kant defines the essence of law: "Law is the aggregate of conditions under which one will is compatible with the will of another according to a universal law of freedom." It is evident that law directly pertains to the empirical relations among individuals within an advanced society, where the notion of each person’s autonomy as a bearer of the idea of freedom has taken root. Such a society necessitates a universal legal principle to underpin positive (actually existing) law, taking into account the autonomy of personal freedom. Kant formulates this imperative as a general legal law: "Act externally so that the free expression of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a general law."

Through the lens of law, Kant ventures into the realm of interpersonal relationships, which encompass family, civil society, the state, and international relations. Interpersonal relationships based on property, family, and marriage are examined in the section on personal ("private") law, where the central issue is that of property. Civil society and the state fall within the domain of public law, which includes international law as well. The thinker emphatically insists on the principle of the separation of powers, distinguishing its legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The common denominator across all manifestations of legal relations is identified as the primary freedom of the individual; however, Kant does not consistently uphold this principle in all instances. For example, the right to vote is denied to women and servants, as they lack civil status, their existence merely signifying presence. He also demonstrates inconsistency when addressing the relationship between citizens and supreme authority. On one hand, he acknowledges each individual’s freedom not to submit to any law except for that which they have consented to; on the other hand, under threat of capital punishment, he categorically prohibits any protest or revolution against the abuses of supreme authority.

However, when Kant published "The Metaphysics of Morals" in 1797, addressing this matter, the triumph of the French Revolution had already concluded, necessitating some revisions. Thus, he posited that when "a revolution has succeeded and a new order has been established, the illegitimacy of this undertaking and the execution of the revolution cannot absolve the subjects from the obligation to submit—as good citizens—to the new order, and they cannot evade the honorable obedience owed to the government that now possesses power." In discussing international law, Kant touches upon a vital idea for him—the right of nations to peace. He elaborated on this theme in greater detail earlier in his 1794 work "Perpetual Peace." The establishment of a general and enduring peace among nations and states constitutes the ultimate aim of his doctrine of law. According to Kant, war is not a means by which one should strive to attain their rights.