German Classical Philosophy

Philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel

Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences

Although "The Phenomenology of Spirit" was referred to by its author as the first part of the system of sciences, it occupies a distinct place within Hegel's entire body of work. For him, it remained a valuable preparatory endeavor that ultimately did not integrate into the final system. The system took shape in what is known as the "Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences," which consists of three grand, sequentially interconnected works: "The Science of Logic," "Philosophy of Nature," and "Philosophy of Spirit."

The Science of Logic

Hegel defines the subject of logic in a broadly traditional sense: "The subject of logic is thought." However, it is not simple thought, but thought reflecting upon itself, or "thinking thinking itself." Comparing the logic of his contemporaries with the practice of thinking, Hegel notes a striking incongruity between the two, a clear lag of theoretical thought behind practical application. He identifies the primary flaw of traditional logic in the emptiness of its formulas and its indifference to truth. The main concern of traditional formal logic (dating back to Aristotle) is maintaining consistency rather than the veracity of knowledge.

Nonetheless, prior logic posed the task of analyzing the forms of thought and rightly identified some of them. Hegel gives due credit to this science, concluding that it can be accused of emptiness more for its manner of examining and interpreting logical forms. This manner reveals two fundamental shortcomings. First, logical forms were regarded as established, eternal, and unchanging; they were not derived through deduction but merely extracted from the practice of thought. Second, these unchanging forms of thought were placed in merely external, arbitrary relationships to one another, indifferent to their essential connections. Hegel insists that all categories (which he considers logical forms) must be derived from the most fundamental basic categories. This process must occur such that each subsequent category (form of thought) incorporates the previous one in a synthesized form, retaining its positive content.

Hegel envisions the derivation of one category from another as follows: each category must be precisely defined, which is accomplished through abstract or rational activity. Further analysis of the category’s content will reveal that it is itself complex and internally contradictory; what was initially conceived as singular becomes divided into opposing definitions. Hegel refers to this dividing activity of thought as dialectical or negatively rational. The next (third) stage involves investigating the opposing definitions into which the category has divided. We discover a certain unity within the revealed oppositions, striving to solidify this unity in a new category. This new category does not entirely negate the previous one; rather, it retains some aspect of its content. The unifying activity of reason, which grasps oppositions in their unity, Hegel designates as speculative or positively rational.

These three successive steps are termed by Hegel the "negative," that is, dialectical method, and he asserts that only by employing it can one construct a true system of categories, rather than the chaotic accumulation provided by the old logic. Only a coherent system of categories as forms of thought can accurately reflect the genuine content of logic and present “a depiction of the realm of thought philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity, or, what is the same, in its necessary development.”

Now let us take a closer look at the place of "The Science of Logic" within Hegel’s philosophy. In fact, the commencement of "The Science of Logic" is the conclusion of "The Phenomenology of Spirit"—the attainment of pure knowledge. Consciousness, as spirit, gradually liberates itself from its amalgamation with the external and the objectivity, becoming pure knowledge. What remains are only pure thoughts, "thinking its essence, spirit." Previously, the work of spirit consisted in producing various forms of consciousness, which were always bound by the opposition of subject, object, and concept. The historical mission of consciousness as spirit has concluded: pure knowledge has emerged and is now ready for further work, specifically the development of instruments (concepts, categories). In human life, individuals merely employ the forms of thought, that is, categories and concepts, rather than making them subjects of study. This task falls to the science of logic. It is worth noting here that for Hegel, science constitutes a system with a certain direction, a vector of self-motion.

The preparatory work carried out by Hegel in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" allows him to assert that the immediate subject of logic is truth as science. The Phenomenology has fulfilled its role of deducing the concept of science by overcoming the discrepancies between the object and the consciousness's probability, opening the door to "pure science" by liberating the opposition between consciousness and its object. Thus, logic as science is a system of pure reason; it is the "kingdom of pure thought." For this kingdom, truth is the coincidence of concept and object, thought and being, the subjective and the objective. Within the realm of logic, the concept is the leading element. However, there exists an internal contradiction, now of a logical nature, between the concept as being, that is, what exists for itself, and the concept as such. In this regard, Hegel divides logic into the logic of the concept as being and the concept as concept, or, loosely speaking, into objective and subjective logic. The teaching of essence occupies a position between them, although it leans more toward objective logic, as it contains a system of reflexive definitions concerning the relationship among distinctions within the concept, while it has yet to become a concept as concept.

Hegel initiates the movement of the categories in "The Science of Logic" from being, conceived as something wholly indefinite, immediate.

In general, in any science, the problem of the beginning is a serious concern. Any axiomatically constructed and deductively unfolded theory represents a system of definitions. Yet within the framework of such a theory, the starting point (axiom, concept, etc.) is taken as given, without any prior definition. Defining the starting concept within any specific science requires transcending the boundaries of that particular domain and employing material from another. However, this is not the case in logic, which is devoid of any "objectivity" and deals with pure thought, with forms of thinking. Here, the only category that can serve as a starting point is one that does not yet express any thought, but is, so to speak, "empty thinking." Thus, Hegel turns to "being" as a general abstraction that expresses nothing itself but merely captures the fact that the readiness to think exists, yet nothing is yet being thought. In this case, being equals nothing. This is the first paradox that the average reader of "The Science of Logic" encounters. But Hegel encourages them to proceed further and not be deterred by the astonishment of those who feel like novices in philosophy. Let us verify the validity of the identification of being and nothing with at least this example. People tend to imagine being, say, as pure light, and nothing as pure darkness. However, in absolute light, just as in absolute darkness, nothing can be distinguished.

The unity of being and nothing gives rise to a third concept—becoming. Becoming expresses a dynamic, unstable state where things oscillate between their definiteness and indefiniteness, between being and nothing. According to Hegel, becoming is "the precarious unrest that settles into some calm result." This calm result, in the form of something existent, is actual being, that is, something existing, definite being. The definiteness of being is a quality.

Let us pause the movement of categories for a moment to make a few observations. From our very first steps within "The Science of Logic," it is evident that Hegel adheres to the principle of triadic structure: thesis - antithesis - synthesis. Initially, some proposition is posited, then its negation follows, and subsequently comes the turn of the negation of the previous negation. Thus, the transition from being led to nothing, and from nothing to becoming. The transition from one category to another is governed by the principle of sublation. Hegel explains that in the German language, "sublation" (Aufhebung) carries a dual meaning: it signifies preservation, retention, and simultaneously cessation, conclusion. In characterizing negation, Hegel employs the term "sublation" to convey the idea of the unity of two moments: the disappearance and simultaneous preservation, the retention of the positive outcome that forms the basis of the subsequent thesis. Such is the external appearance of the movement of categories from one to another.

Thus far, we have discussed quality. Quality distinguishes one object from another and holds for Hegel the following definition: "Quality is generally identical with being determinateness ... Something exists by virtue of its quality as what it is, and losing its quality, it ceases to be what it is." A person accustomed to tangible examples may find such an explanation of quality unsatisfactory. Indeed, it is highly abstract, as is everything discussed in "The Science of Logic." However, it is more accurate to assert that determining what precisely an object loses when it loses its quality and becomes another is not the concern of logic but rather the responsibility of specific sciences that study concrete objects.

Quality not only defines the actual being of any thing, but it also constitutes its limit, indicating its transition into another, which, in turn, has its own finitude. Finite things "drive themselves forward," beyond their being. Having become other, the object again strives further, beyond its boundary. This series can be extended to infinity.

If anyone focuses on such a conception of infinity, when it is opposed to finitude, they will arrive at what is known as "foolish infinity," a non-true form. The latter contains a contradiction, as it presupposes that there is something finite and something infinite, and both appear as two separate worlds. However, true infinity is intertwined with the finite. A vivid example of such unity is provided by Hegel through the circle, a closed geometric figure that has neither beginning nor end. This image allows us to grasp the essence of the following category—being-for-itself—which reflects both the finitude and infinity of existence. Being-for-itself entails a transcending of its own boundaries, such that it infinitely returns to itself, for instance, relating only to itself in an endless manner.

Hegel then transitions to the category of quantity. Quantity serves as a characteristic of an object that is indifferent to its being. Quantity does not eliminate the existence of the object, but only up to a certain limit, beyond which the object loses its quality. Thus, quantity and quality are intertwined; the category expressing this unity is measure. Measure indicates the quantitative boundaries within which the object preserves its quality, its being as a specific object. It represents a sort of interval of the object's existence as a determinate entity. Quantitative changes, regardless of their extent, are characterized by gradualness only until they reach the limit of measure, the end of the interval. The transition to a new quality occurs as a leap, meaning that gradualness ceases. Here, Hegel notes that purely quantitative gradual movement forward is absolutely halted only on the qualitative side when the leap into a new quality occurs. As for the subsequent quantitative changes themselves, they may continue. Yet this is insufficient. Qualitative changes in the same bearer alternate in such a way that they create a certain "nodal line of relations of measure." What can be termed the bearer of this nodal line of relations of measure leads us to consider the existence of some substrate, an unremovable foundation of all changes, "certain matter." Thus, being transitions into essence.

Knowledge is not limited to the fixation of the diversity of existing being; it implies a further deepening, whereby being is regarded as essence. At the stage of essence, the previous determinations of being seem to vanish, yet not entirely. The determinations in the realm of essence possess a different nature than the process of determinations in the realm of being. Essence appears as the first negation of being on the way to the concept; it lies between being and concept, forming their midpoint. The determination of essence through a series of categories somewhat resembles previous determinations (due to the mechanism of sublation), yet here they take on a reflective character, that is, as reflected in another, secondary.

Hegel examines essence in three dimensions: first as reflection upon itself, then as phenomenon, and finally as reality. In each of these dimensions, thought progresses through numerous important categories, concerning which lively debates have occurred in both natural science and the history of philosophy, leading to serious divergences. Let us highlight a few of them.

The first category Hegel identifies is visibility. Visibility arises when we strive to consider the immediacy of being in relation to essence. The immediate being of things is perceived as a veil concealing essence; and when one says, "all things possess essence," they wish to convey that, in truth, they are not as they appear to us. This form of the given to us by things is what constitutes visibility. The existence of visibility, according to Hegel, gave rise to the development of skepticism, as well as the idealism of Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte. Some utilized the term "phenomenon" in their teachings, others "appearance," yet all refer to "visibility." Visibility arises in a situation where essence is taken as something immediate (by analogy with existing being). The constructive progression of categories continues when we regard the visibility of essence in itself, which constitutes reflection.

Among the concepts that delineate the reflecting essence, Hegel discusses identity, difference, opposition, and contradiction. In the section on ground, Hegel introduces categories such as "form," "content," "matter," and "condition." All these contribute to a comprehensive determination of essence. With the presence of ground and condition, existence is actualized. Essence, in its existence, manifests as a phenomenon. Here, Hegel presents an intriguing statement: "everything that is, exists." This underscores the importance of distinguishing between a thing and its existence, much like differentiating something from its being.

A thing, as a phenomenon, is the manifestation of essence. In the world of phenomena, a significant phenomenon emerges, known as law. The unity of essence and existence gives rise to the subsequent category—reality. Reality is considered in its moments of possibility and necessity. Reality is not only the realized possibility but also the real possibilities for further development. Hegel distinguishes between real possibilities and abstract ones, the latter lacking the conditions for transformation into actual reality. The examination of such a moment of reality as necessity is carried out alongside contingency. The teaching on essence concludes with an analysis of the categories of cause and interaction, after which the transition to concept is made.

The doctrine of concept constitutes the third and final part of "The Science of Logic," which Hegel also refers to as subjective logic. By contrasting this part with the preceding ones, concept can be defined as "the truth of being and essence." Here, "truth" conveys a sense of unity, as being and essence, in relation to one another and to themselves, yield one-sidedness. Essence, in relation to being, was its first negation; concept represents the second negation, or the negation of the previous negation. The concept being discussed here should be distinguished from the concept in ordinary logic. There, it is regarded as the fundamental, simplest form of thought, derived from the activity of thought that abstracts. In the context of "The Science of Logic," the concept can also be termed abstract, if the concrete is understood solely as sensuously concrete, that which is directly perceived. "The concept as such," Hegel reiterates to the understanding of those who enter the realm of philosophy, "cannot be grasped by hands, and we must generally set aside hearing and sight when it comes to the concept." The concreteness of the concept of logic is ensured by the fact that it contains all previous determinations of thought as "sublated." From "being" to "concept," the potential for the concreteness of thought grows as the richness of its determinations expands.

The dialectical process occurring in the realm of concept is termed development by Hegel. It differs from the dialectical process in being and essence. The sphere of being was characterized by a transition to another, while the sphere of essence was marked by visibility in another. Development, however, is characterized by the positing of only what has already been present, that is, its unfolding. For this reason, the concluding section of "The Science of Logic" contains almost no new categories. It is also divided into three sections: subjectivity, objectivity, and idea.

In the section on subjectivity, we encounter elements of thought familiar to us from formal logic—concept, judgment, and inference. However, Hegel ascribes to them a somewhat different significance here. Thus, when speaking of concept, it is typically defined as a general idea. Accordingly, one might speak of the concept of plant, animal, and so forth, assuming that these concepts arise from the abstraction of all that is particular, distinguishing specific animals and plants, while retaining what is common among them. But this is, so to speak, the everyday labor of our thought. Hegel, however, refers to the historical work of human thought, which requires thousands of years for the idea of the general, which underlies concepts, to enter human consciousness. Hence, for Hegel, we are dealing with something akin to meta-concepts, meta-judgments, and meta-inferences. The mentioned elements (forms) of thought also possess another significance. They are all moments in the development of concept. Therefore, expressions such as "concept as concept," "concept as judgment," and "concept as inference" are entirely appropriate.

Finally, what does "subjectivity" mean in the first section? Here, it bears no relation to "subjectivity" in the conventional sense of the term. Hegel merely intends to convey that initially, concept is the truth only for itself (where a distant analogy with "being" in the phase of immediate givenness may be relevant). If we align the historical development of thought with the specified moments of concept, the understanding corresponds to the emergence of the capacity to have concepts in general, while reason corresponds to the capacity for judgment and inference.

The second chapter is titled "Objectivity." Here, we examine phenomena within our thought identified as mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Regarding the first, we can speak of a mechanical mode of representation, mechanical memory, habit, and mechanical actions. In all these instances, objectivity emerges as a mere aggregate of concepts. This initial form of objectivity presents a superficial and impoverished means of considering the objective world, inadequate even concerning nature, let alone for exploring the spiritual realm.

Chemism (a rather arbitrary term) indicates that the objects of thought are not indifferent to one another, and when their relationships are further imbued with a purpose, a transition to teleology as a means of comprehending the world occurs. Within this section, one can find several intriguing observations. For instance, while discussing the relationship between means (one form of the object) and ends, Hegel remarks: “The plough possesses a value beyond the immediate benefits it provides and serves. The tool endures, while the immediate benefits are fleeting and forgotten. Through its instruments, humanity reigns over external nature, even as its objectives remain subordinate to it.” Hegel's reference to the “cunning of reason” is also noteworthy. This “cunning” lies in allowing objects to act in accordance with their nature, granting them the freedom to exhaust one another in their interactions without overt interference, yet reason nonetheless achieves its own aims. This raises the question: does not “history,” “fate,” and so forth act similarly upon individuals, as an unknown plan, “historical project,” or “logic of history” unfolds behind their seemingly free actions?

The final section of the doctrine of concepts and the entirety of the "Science of Logic" is titled "Idea." The term “idea” carries multiple meanings; people use it in everyday life to denote “thought,” “imagination,” and so forth. It has been known since ancient times and in philosophical doctrines. Kant attributed to it the significance of “the concept of the unconditional,” concerning something transcendent to the world of phenomena. For him, “idea” is used in the sense of a goal to which we can only approach asymptotically, serving as the most general guide for actions.

For Hegel, the idea is “the truth in and for itself, the absolute unity of concept and objectivity.” Hegel distinguishes truth in a philosophical context from truth in everyday usage, the latter being better aligned with mere correctness. In a deeper philosophical sense, truth is the identity of objectivity and concept. Thus, when one speaks of a true state, a true work of art, they imply that they are as they ought to be, meaning their reality corresponds to their concept. We can likewise state that a bad person is one who does not act in accordance with their concept and purpose. In such cases, a discrepancy arises between the existence of the object (the person) and its concept, leading to a dissolution of truth, even though the formal correctness of the judgment remains intact.

According to Hegel, the idea is a historical achievement of human thought; it exists within individuals, present here and now in each consciousness, albeit sometimes in a weakened form, but not in the distant, otherworldly sense as with Kant. Hegel emphasizes that the proof that the idea is truth should not be sought solely in the final section of his work; the idea is the culmination of the entire course of thought. All categories presented in the science of logic are merely moments of the idea, each serving as evidence of the idea's truth.

The idea as truth undergoes three stages: life, cognition, and the stage of the absolute idea. In its form of life, the idea manifests as immediacy; in its form of cognition, it takes the shape of theoretical and practical ideas; in its third form—the absolute idea—where all discrepancies are ultimately overcome, all transitions cease, it becomes “the pure form of the concept, contemplating its content as itself.”

Thus, the sacramental “absolute idea” resonates as the final categorical chord of the "Science of Logic." It serves as both the omega of this segment of Hegel's system and the alpha of the next. Therefore, thought continually revolves around one question: what, after all, lies behind the “absolute idea,” what is its content?

You have just read the word “content,” and incidentally, in the "Science of Logic," this term, as a definite category, has its designated place and sequence of appearance. The category of content itself is a moment of the absolute idea and a constituent part of the system of categories in logic. No matter what explanatory categories we employ to articulate our inquiries into the absolute idea, we would always express its various aspects, moments, and nuances, already captured by logic. Thus, the absolute idea encompasses all the richness of categorical means, organized into a system. In terms of “content,” it embodies all that Hegel elucidates in the "Science of Logic." In a narrower sense, it stands as a distinct category, the pinnacle of the system, a point projecting onto each element of the system. One might further assert that the absolute idea is a compactly articulated compilation of the contents of all preceding categories, a unique compendium, the concept of all concepts. It is a holistic fruit formed by closely fitting leaves, where an illustrative example might be a head of cabbage. By peeling it away, separating leaf by leaf, we would be left with a series of categories, down to the very first, most primitive (being), arriving at the initial, nearly empty point.

In creating the "Science of Logic," Hegel undertook a monumental task. Though in his own manner, he managed to organize all the conceptual means of cognition that had been developed throughout the spiritual evolution of European peoples. This was a comprehensive revision of the contents of the conceptual toolkit, followed by the construction of categories in strict subordination and coordination. Hegel recognized that the meanings of words accumulated over time stacked upon one another, creating confusion, as disparate meanings shone through the shell of the same word-concept, intersecting with similar meanings of other words-concepts. He succeeded in establishing a certain order here. “The highest task of logic,” Hegel wrote, “is to purify the categories.” To describe this order, one had to resort to a specialized terminology, to a language of one's own invention, so as not to incur additional overlays of meaning between the words being studied and those employed in the investigation. This specific language adds to the difficulty in comprehending the "Science of Logic." At times, even Hegel himself lacks the requisite terminology, resorting to metaphorical expressions that may utterly bewilder the reader. Nevertheless, a reader accustomed to Hegel's texts quickly acclimatizes to the peculiarities of the great philosopher's style and derives satisfaction from the depth of his thought, from the “discipline of consciousness.”

In the absolute idea, the science of logic has grasped its own concept. However, this idea is still merely a logical idea; it exists in the form of pure thought. In other words, the pure idea of knowledge is confined within subjectivity, and therefore, the investigation remains incomplete. The method of philosophical inquiry adopted by Hegel necessitates the overcoming of this initial form of existence (subjectivity, in this case), its negation; thus, the logical idea strives to transition into the form of objectivity, into nature. If we look at the last page of "The Science of Logic," we read the following regarding this matter: "Thus, the transition should be understood more as the idea freely releasing itself, absolutely confident in itself and remaining within itself." The transition of the absolute idea into nature has always been regarded as the darkest aspect of Hegel's philosophy; many perceived it as pure mysticism or merely “idealist” nonsense. All these accusations can be somewhat dismissed if we clearly distinguish between the essence of the matter and mere metaphorical expressions. In any case, it is not logic that transitions into nature, nor does the “absolute idea” proceed into nature or assume the guise of natural phenomena. One can only speak of an illusory “transition” of the logical idea into nature; it is not so much the idea itself as the science of it (that is, logic) that transitions, and moreover, not to nature, but to the philosophy of nature.

Philosophy of Nature

The "Philosophy of Nature" constitutes the second part of Hegel's "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences." This monumental work has arguably received the most critical remarks, both from natural scientists and philosophers alike. No matter how well-versed Hegel was in the achievements of the natural sciences, he could not encompass all the advancements in the natural sciences, provide them with adequate evaluation, or delineate their developmental directions. Even at that time, the "Philosophy of Nature" could not satisfy such scholars as, say, W. Humboldt and C.-F. Gauss. Later, negative attitudes toward Hegel's natural philosophical constructs were expressed by H. Helmholtz, W. Heisenberg, and B. Russell. The reasons for such attitudes varied, partly due to the discrepancies between some judgments and actual scientific facts, and partly in protest against the philosopher's attempts to systematize scientific knowledge. Today, it would hardly be appropriate to focus on the details of Hegel's various notions about natural processes; they have mostly faded into history and may primarily interest specialists. We will pause only briefly on the philosophical aspect of Hegel's work and clarify its place within the thinker’s system of views.

Let us not forget that Hegel was creating an encyclopedia of philosophical sciences and writing the philosophy of nature, meaning that the realm of his scholarly activity was philosophy itself. The subject of philosophy is thought, for which any direction of human activity can serve as material. Philosophy, as the science of thought, can distill its subject orientation into three directions: thinking about the process of thinking, thinking about nature, and thinking about society. These directions yield three philosophical sciences: logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit. It is assumed that by the time these sciences were forming, “pure knowledge” already existed, and sufficient maturity of thought had been achieved, encompassing the entire conceptual apparatus, condensed into the totality known as the absolute idea. Henceforth, a reasonable question arises: why is the philosophy of nature needed as a distinct science? Some part of the answer to this question has already been provided by Hegel on the last page of "The Science of Logic." Additional explanations are offered in the introduction to "Philosophy of Nature."

Humanity relates to nature in a dual manner: theoretically and practically. The latter signifies the utilization of specific products of nature (rather than the assimilation of nature as a whole) to satisfy its (natural) needs directly or through the production of means. The theoretical relation to nature is termed physics, which strives to understand the universal in nature through the means of thought: laws, certain kinds, classes, etc. The philosophy of nature also has the universal as its subject but differs from physics in its forms, modes of thinking, and the very nature of its approach to the question “What is nature?” The specificity of physics should not be seen exclusively in its empirical foundation. Were physics based solely on perceptions, Hegel argues, and if perceptions were nothing but the testimony of our senses, then the work of physics would consist merely in observing, listening, smelling, and so forth, and animals would thus also be considered physicists. In reality, however, it is "spirit," a thinking being, that sees, hears, and so forth. Therefore, physics is the thinking of nature; more precisely, it is the rational cognition of nature. The distinctions between the philosophy of nature and physics arise from the sequence of their relations to nature. Physics, based on empirical research, accumulates and generalizes material regarding nature, which the philosophy of nature then appropriates and translates into the language of concepts obtained from physics, “the rational universal.” It could also be stated that the philosophy of nature aims to translate the rational physical material into a collection of general definitions of thought, that is, categories, which represent a “diamond lattice” into which we introduce any material, thus making it comprehensible.

Physics is akin to philosophy through the generalizing activity of thought. By thinking about objects, we transform them into something universal, something subjective, and “the living activity of nature falls silent in the silence of thought,” both physical and philosophical. The theoretical relationship to nature, in itself, leads physics to the problems of the essence of human knowledge. Let us take, for example, the concept of nature. Did physics give rise to it? Probably not, for then it would not pose a problem for it. Evidently, the concept of nature arose beyond physics and prior to any physics as a result of the historical development of knowledge and the multifaceted relationship between humanity and the surrounding world. Therefore, to consider the concept of nature as a concept is already the prerogative of philosophy.

The concept of nature, in its entirety, fully encompasses the content of the absolute idea, which represents a singular “diamond lattice” woven from universal categories. Thus, it becomes clear that for Hegel, nature and idea are essentially the same, differing only in form—namely, in the form of objective existence.

Now let us return once more to the question: why is the philosophy of nature necessary within Hegel's system? Firstly, to elucidate and demonstrate that nature represents another mode of being for the idea; and secondly, to clarify “how nature is in itself the process of becoming spirit, the process of overcoming its otherness.”

Philosophy of Nature comprises three chapters: mechanics, physics, and organic physics. In mechanics, the focus is on the problem of space and time, matter and motion, emphasizing purely quantitative processes. The qualitative aspect of matter emerges in physics, where qualitative forms of matter—light and the "body of individuality"—are associated with the four elements: air, fire, water, and earth. Here, Hegel aligns himself with the ancient Greek natural philosopher Empedocles. This position may be entirely forgivable when considering that in the practical realm of daily existence, humanity does not engage with atoms and molecules but breathes air, drinks water, uses fire, and cultivates the earth, thus navigating the world of the elements. Chemical abstractions (elements) arise only when attention is directed toward the decomposition of these elements. Following the exploration of the essence of chemical processes, there is a transition to organic nature, "from the prose to the poetry of nature."

The third chapter discusses three "kingdoms": the mineral, the plant, and the animal (or the geological nature, the nature of plants, and the organism of animals). Life represents the highest form of existence of the concept in nature, ultimately manifesting in the finite individual (species, genus, kind). However, the form of individuality is inadequate to the universality of the idea, necessitating its supersession. Thus arises spirit, consciousness, and the idea finds existence in an autonomous subject that embodies universality. The transition from nature to spirit occurs here. At this juncture, Hegel effectively sidesteps the question of humanity's origins.

Philosophy of Spirit

The third part of Hegel’s system constitutes the Philosophy of Spirit, conceived as the science of the absolute idea in its self-being, or conversely, as the science of the absolute idea that self-consciously becomes aware of itself. In spirit, the idea returns to itself and is now realized not as a logically concrete entity but as a sequential determination of itself through existing knowledge, through the active spirit. Hegel does not wish to be understood as positing nature as something absolutely primal, while spirit is something imposed upon it; rather, he asserts: “spirit posits nature, and spirit is the absolutely first.” Spirit generates itself from the preconditions it establishes: from logical idea and external nature, being equally true in both. If Hegel suggests anywhere that spirit emerges from nature, “this emergence must be understood not corporeally but spiritually—not as an emergence in essence but as the development of the concept.”

What, then, is spirit? Hegel approaches the definition and characterization of this concept from various angles. On one hand, it is the “actual idea that knows itself.” On the other, spirit is characterized by the ideality that arises from the spirit’s activity of transforming the external into the internal. This represents a unique “assimilation” of nature by spirit. Thirdly, the essence of spirit is will, which signifies independence from something other, in contrast to nature, where necessity and chance prevail; thus, all that pertains to nature lies behind spirit. Finally, the thinking spirit is humanity. Formally, the presence of spirit is identified by the emergence of “I,” or human self-consciousness.

The Philosophy of Spirit is also divided into three sections: subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit. The realm of subjective spirit is explored through anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology, with their subjects being the soul, consciousness, and spirit (theoretical, practical, and free). The psychological perspective on spirit pertains solely to its form. The substantive aspect relates to objective spirit, which realizes itself in the forms of law, morality, and ethicality, the latter encompassing the family, civil society, and the state. The transition to absolute spirit represents the search for the most adequate form of spirit’s manifestation. Here, it relates solely to itself, as it contemplates, imagines, and becomes aware of its own essence. The forms of absolute spirit are reflected in art (in contemplation), religion (in imagination), and philosophy (in self-awareness or knowledge of itself).

Since subjective and objective spirit manifest and develop in individual persons, communities, states, and nations—limited forms—Hegel refers to these as “finite spirit,” in contrast to the absolute, infinite spirit. Thus, philosophy represents the most adequate form of spirit; it ultimately embodies the self-thinking idea, the truth that knows itself as such.

What Hegel outlined schematically in the Philosophy of Spirit expanded into extensive research comprising over ten volumes dedicated to the exploration of law, religion, art, and the history of philosophy. Regarding each of these domains of human life and activity, the great German philosopher left numerous reflections, observations, and original judgments. Building upon the methodology he developed, Hegel aimed to construct a comprehensive system of science concerning all manifestations of human spirit. This represented, perhaps, the last attempt by a single individual to provide an encyclopedic account of Knowledge. Although soon the relentless expansion of Knowledge and historical conditions revealed the futility of any attempts to construct closed systems, the titanic work of one thinker remains a source of wonder, and engaging with his thought will prove enlightening for many generations to come.