German Classical Philosophy

The Critical Philosophy of I. Kant

From Hume to Kant

The skepticism of Hume signified a critical phase in the evolution of modern European philosophy. Although Hume's primary focus was on epistemological issues, it is essential to consider their significance within the broader context of the spiritual life of Western Europe during that period. By the time Hume penned his provocative works, classical philosophy had already amassed a substantial history of over a century. New cultural standards and values had developed and spread, shaping the era's self-awareness. Beginning with F. Bacon, the central concept of this philosophy was reason. This does not imply that philosophy had not utilized reason before; however, the long-standing tradition established during the medieval centuries presumed that the purpose of reason was to connect humanity with God, in whom one was to believe, and whose existence transcended the realm of rational activity.

The dissolution of the medieval world initially led to the re-centering of the worldview on humanity as a whole (the Renaissance), followed by a renewed emphasis on reason derived from human attributes. Reason, now identified with the individual subject, was primarily related to nature, and more precisely, to reality. Reality encompasses both nature and social life.

Science emerged as the hallmark of modern European spirituality. Its advancement was demanded by production, particularly in its applied, practical aspects. Science evolved into a productive force, with mechanics gradually ascending to a position of prominence. The practical orientation of science, chiefly supported by the bourgeoisie and its state officials in England, either marginalized other forms of spirituality or necessitated their reconstruction in the likeness of natural sciences. Thus, the system of knowledge underwent fundamental changes. Alongside philosophy, specific sciences concerning nature and society, each with their own unique methods of understanding, began to develop independently, leading to shifts in philosophy's status, subject matter, and role. Researchers increasingly focused on methodology and theories of knowledge. Questions arose concerning the origin of cognitive capabilities, the sources and effectiveness of knowledge, the relationship between sensory, experiential, and rational aspects, and inquiries about truth, among others. A generation of philosophers emerged who primarily explored these epistemological issues.

By the time Hume wrote his "An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding," classical Newtonian mechanics had already taken shape, characterized by an empirically oriented methodology. "I do not invent hypotheses," Newton stated. "Anything not derived from phenomena should be called a hypothesis; metaphysical, physical, mechanical hypotheses concerning hidden properties have no place in experimental philosophy." He referred to hypotheses as assumptions lacking sufficient experimental validation.

Newton's critique was directed primarily against the "natural philosophy" that was cluttered with natural philosophical and metaphysical inventions in the spirit of Cartesian physics, as well as Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, which were prevalent on the continent, particularly in France and Germany. These philosophical systems aspired to claim the title of science in its traditional conception, which had originated from the Middle Ages. Scientific legitimacy was defined by rationalist—deductive—methods and the "nobility" of the subjects under investigation, which were confined to God, substance, and the soul. Newton effectively solidified the final separation of natural science from philosophy in terms of both subject matter and method. Moreover, the practical effectiveness and heuristic quality of Newtonian science, bolstered by the undeniable authority of mathematics, became a paragon of scientific rigor.

Thus, the path for the development of science was clearly marked. But what of philosophy? What is its nature? What is its unique subject matter? What is its relationship to science? Can it be considered or can it become a science? These questions became particularly acute in the mid-18th century, indicating a crisis in philosophical thought.

Such dilemmas did not exist in the 17th century. For Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes, philosophy symbolized science, and discourse could only concern the classification of its subdivisions, the individual sciences within its maternal embrace, or the demarcation of boundaries between philosophy and theology. The resolution of new issues could be found through a careful examination of the essence and nature of the knowledge we deem scientific, through investigating the intellectual labor that produces scientific understanding. Hence, Hume focused on the central matter: revealing the mechanism of forming general concepts, without which science cannot exist at all.

Hume's assertion regarding the impossibility of deriving the existence of objects in the surrounding world from reason and rationally substantiating them extended to such obvious entities for traditional philosophy as substance, God, and matter. While skepticism broadly addressed our capacity for genuine knowledge, its primary critical thrust pertained to philosophy's claims (what Hume termed "metaphysical philosophy") to the status of science. Consequently, the critical fervor of the English thinker resonated most profoundly on the continent, particularly in Germany, where Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy predominated.

Christian Wolff was a popularizer and systematizer of Leibniz's teachings. Even the title of one of his major works, "Rational Thoughts on God, the World, the Human Soul, and All Things in General," clearly indicates the subject of this metaphysics, ultimately leading to God. This was a rationalist, highly formalized philosophy primarily employing a deductive method of exposition. It spread not only in Germany but also reached the Russian Empire, where it was proposed for study at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy by the Synod from the mid-18th century onward.

It is evident that, in light of the successes of empirical natural science, particularly Newtonian physics, and the critiques of rationalism by English philosophers, German thought demanded its reformers. They emerged as representatives of what is known as German classical philosophy, chiefly I. Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831).

In the history of global philosophy, the development of German classical philosophy occupies a relatively brief span of time—approximately 70-80 years, essentially the lifespan of a single individual. Yet, despite this short period, this philosophical branch exerted immense influence on the entire spiritual climate of Europe. It represents, first and foremost, a certain culmination of modern European philosophy. Reason, as its central concept, was initially regarded as a critical force intrinsically linked to humanity. It appeared that no absolute authorities existed for it; anything could become an object of scrutiny, all of reality, since reason was neither externally constrained nor limited within itself. It is entirely sovereign. Furthermore, the internal activity of this force was emphasized. The activity of reason was argued to extend to dominion over reality, to the transformation of the established world order based on rational foundations. The latter was particularly characteristic of the Enlightenment strand of modern European philosophy. From the perspective of Enlightenment, the rational foundations for reconstructing reality are those emerging from the very nature of things. Everything that does not conform to nature must be eradicated, as it is false and erroneous; thus, it is unreasonable.

Since the time of Bacon, it has been held that the truth of thought is determined by the subject of thought. As for erroneous knowledge, it alone depends on the characteristics of the thinker. The differences between empiricism and rationalism here do not concern the authority of reason; they operate in a different plane. Empiricism requires that thoughts depend on experience, while rationalism insists on the importance of clear ideas residing within reason itself for knowledge.

What, then, constitutes the principal novelty introduced by German classical philosophy into these central questions? To summarize succinctly, the answer is this: it is not so much the characteristics of what is known but rather the properties of the subject that serve as the primary factor determining the cognitive process and even "shape" the object of knowledge itself. This thesis, first proclaimed by Kant, can be regarded as the essence of the "Copernican revolution" in philosophy.

Kant himself articulated this as follows: "It has hitherto been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects; however, all attempts to ascertain something about them a priori through concepts, thereby expanding our knowledge, have been unsuccessful under this presumption. Therefore, let us see if we might tackle the tasks of metaphysics better if we assume that objects must conform to our knowledge..."

Even without delving into a substantive analysis of the provided fragment, it is evident that it pertains to a radical change in the perspective from which the relationship between subject and object in the process of cognition is viewed. The analogy with Copernicus, which Kant himself invoked, is not coincidental. In both cases, the consequences of this rearrangement were profound.