Society: Fundamental Concepts of Social Philosophy

The Structure of Society

The understanding of society as a holistic, systemic object is complemented by its characterization in terms of structure. Structure (from the Latin structura - construction; arrangement, order) can be presented as a constellation of established connections within the object that ensure its coherence as a distinct entity. When adapting the concept of structure to a systemic approach, it becomes the aspect of the system that emphasizes its architecture and constructive features: the defining elements, blocks of elements, and the relationships among them. In a broader, non-specialized context, structuring can be undertaken according to a more arbitrary principle, essentially allowing for a multitude of intersections depending on the research objectives.

From antiquity to the present, numerous analytical approaches to the structure of society can be found within social philosophy and its adjacent general social theory. To avoid complicating the task by presenting numerous variants of structural analysis while simultaneously illustrating it substantively, we will focus on the variant proposed by contemporary German social theorist Niklas Luhmann (1927—1999), along with what emerges from the aforementioned substantial characterization of society in terms of activity and relations.

Luhmann views society as a whole and its functional subdivisions as social systems. In developed (non-primitive) societies, as a result of their differentiation, all subdivisions gradually become closed systems, preserving their functional purpose relative to society as a whole while remaining subsystems in relation to the primary system of society. Such systems include politics, law, science, economics, religion, art, education, healthcare, family, and so forth. All these systems (subsystems) are relevant to the entire society, meaning that the functions they perform pertain to all subdivisions of society.

To characterize the closed nature of systems, Luhmann employs the concept of "autopoiesis" (or "autopoesis," meaning "self-reproduction"), borrowed from theoretical biology. An autopoietic system reproduces all the elements from which it is composed through those same elements, organized in a particular manner, thus distinguishing itself from its environment and becoming closed (not absolutely, but relatively) to it. A closed system establishes its relationships with the surrounding environment in such a way as to always strive to reduce the complexity of reality by filtering information. Anything that does not contribute to the self-reproduction and preservation of the system is either disregarded or assimilated only for the beneficial alteration of its state. Thus, such systems are islands of lesser complexity compared to their surroundings.

Luhmann argues that the concept of autopoiesis can only be extended to the social sphere if we consider communicative acts as the elements of social systems, rather than individual persons. Society is a system that encompasses all meaningful communicative acts and is itself a closed system. Communications are reproduced solely through communications; everything that is not communication pertains to the environment of society.

Since each system fulfills a specific social function, no system can claim to substitute for another or interfere with the execution of its function. While such attempts are occasionally made, they harm the functional differentiation of society, depriving it of the advantages of such differentiation. Luhmann illustrates this through attempts to politicize the economy under socialism, as well as through efforts by certain countries to "Islamicize" politics, law, or economics.

By selecting information using specific codes and programs, each functional system creates its own image of reality (political, legal, or economic reality, etc.). For each social system, other social systems constitute its environment. This means that the influence of one system on another is perceived as noise by the latter, from which it extracts information according to its specific mode of operation (i.e., its code, programs, and interpretive schemas). Interaction between systems is possible; however, it negates the ability of one social system to directly regulate the operations of another system.

When discussing the interaction of social systems, it is important to note the difficulties in translating one system's code into another's. A positive evaluation in one code does not automatically translate to a positive evaluation in other codes. For instance, what is true for science may not hold legal or economic significance. In politics, it cannot directly influence law. If politicians fail to respect the boundaries of legal self-regulation, a political decision cannot be translated into the language of law. Even if successfully transposed into legislation, this does not guarantee the success of regulating social processes. Legal norms may encounter resistance from self-regulating social systems, as the influences of the legal system represent noise to the regulated system, from which it constructs its own order according to its code and programs. What happens, for instance, when the economy is regulated through law? The law creates its own image of the economy and formulates norms accordingly. At the same time, the economy constructs its own model of reality and conducts payment procedures based on it. Legal norms within the legal system are considered from the perspective of their legal validity. However, the same norms are evaluated by the economic system not in terms of legal validity but as elements to be accounted for in calculating costs and profits. If the violation of a norm proves to be economically rational, it will be violated, which signifies a "failure of regulation." What lawyers might label as evasions and violations of the law will be perceived by the economic system as economically efficient behavior.

Luhmann contends that in today’s highly complex, functionally differentiated society, coordination among various self-regulating systems becomes particularly crucial. The discussion must shift to a redefinition of regulation. It is essential to abandon the notion that law, politics, or any other functional subsystem has a direct impact on various sectors of society. When it comes to law, for example, its regulatory power should be described much more modestly: not as direct regulation following a "command - compliance" model, but rather as a mere initiation, stimulating processes of self-regulation within social institutions. Legal regulation does not directly alter social institutions; it simply poses a new challenge for their autopoietic adaptation.

For the social thought of the 18th and 19th centuries, it was characteristic to consider social groups and individuals in stable relationships with one another as structural elements of society. Luhmann deems this perspective outdated and unreflective of contemporary realities. People operate in numerous contexts simultaneously, acting as agents of communicative chains; therefore, for the theoretical reconstruction of the structure of modern society, it is more appropriate to highlight types of communications rather than groups of people, as these are represented through functional subsystems.

The concepts of social relations and activity also pave the way for understanding the structure of society. By focusing on types of social relations and their corresponding activities, we can identify relatively autonomous spheres of society as its structural subdivisions, such as economic, political, legal, spiritual, and so forth. Each of these spheres also possesses its own structure, with corresponding relations, a distinct form of organized activity, social groups or individuals as agents of activity and parties in relationships, and a constellation of interconnections. Since relations and activity constitute the substantial foundation of society and serve as the basis for the delineation of its separate spheres, it is essential to first examine their structural characteristics.

Economic or, alternatively, productive relations as a form of productive (labor) activity constitute the foundation of the economic sphere. In societies characterized by a developed division of labor, a high level of technical progress, and a commodity-based production system, the economic sphere extends beyond mere production of material goods in the form of tangible objects. It encompasses the production of services, the results of scientific, technical, and artistic creativity, organizational solutions—essentially everything that contributes to production and ultimately takes on the form of a commodity. Within the framework of an extensive division of labor, individual labor acts often do not immediately and directly correspond with social labor activity, necessitating the cooperation of many individuals. The embodiment of the final product (the commodity) becomes the "collective worker." Within cooperative activities, there are processes of interaction (technical and technological relations) that, however, do not pertain to social relations but rather are structural elements of the aggregate activity of individuals. By being a form that defines human activity, productive relations acquire the force of law and an almost autonomous existence, independent of the actions of any single individual. The essence of this autonomy lies in its actual existence prior to the direct acts of human interaction. The external connections they enter into are an objectification (sensibly recorded) of their productive social relations.

Political relations represent a form of political activity, a component of which is the functioning of the state. In a broad sense, political activity encompasses all actions of individuals concerning public authority, which is utilized to satisfy the interests of social groups and, through them, individuals. A common feature of political society (society in which a political sphere has formed) is that nearly any socially significant activity may acquire a political hue. The only realm where activity can be deemed "purely" political may be that of a civil servant or a party functionary, as it is directed solely toward the development and implementation of political measures. Political relations, alongside legal and moral ones, are generally referred to as regulative, implying their expression in norms that govern human life within society.

According to a widely held view in legal literature, legal relations are understood as any societal "connection" mediated by legal rights and obligations. Engagement with legal relations arises when individuals become bearers of subjective rights and obligations. This entails that general legal prescriptions, enshrined in legislative acts, are individualized concerning particular individuals and life situations. In turn, the individualization of general rights and obligations occurs when it is believed that a situation arises in the interactions of subjects, which is anticipated by legal norms and results in legal consequences.

Occasionally, the notion is expressed that legal relations, as a distinct type of social relations, do not exist, nor is there an autonomous, purely legal sector of social life where we could observe legal activity and relations in their purity, in a state of isolation. There is merit to this assertion, yet there are also grounds for objection. Indeed, it is challenging to pinpoint an area of "pure" legal relations that governs any specifically legal activity within social life. Legal relations function more as a legal "covering" for all other relations that fall under the domain of legal regulation. For instance, as a rule, most economic relations (ownership, disposal, possession, use, etc.) are cloaked in legal form and are presented in such a manner to the subjects of economic activity. Nevertheless, the question of the specification of legal relations holds its own significance. If we were to extricate the purely "legal" aspect from the social relations that have acquired legal form, independent of any specific human interaction, we would be left with legal relations in and of themselves. It is evident that, in their actual existence, these relations do not exist separately; they are the result of an autonomous theoretical procedure. However, this procedure is not without justification. It is employed each time legal norms are developed and legislation is formulated. The legal statute is nothing more than the articulation of legal relations as a pure form, a model of potential relationships. This pure form takes on substance, overlaying the concrete relations subject to legal regulation.

A similar approach addresses the question of the autonomy of legal activity. In general, it does not exist in its pure form. Legal relations, through legal norms, regulate a variety of human activities, establishing parameters for their actions and conduct. When we speak of legal activity "as such," we refer to the evaluation of human actions in terms of conformity to legal norms, abstracting somewhat from the substantive specifics of actions. Thus, in this instance, the autonomy of legal activity is also a product of a justified theoretical procedure.

The differentiation of moral relations and the corresponding activities is widely accepted. Yet, once again, the problem of their specification or autonomy arises, as many assert that it is difficult, if not entirely impossible, to isolate any specifically moral relations. Nevertheless, from a scholarly perspective, the autonomy of moral relations and moral activity is possible through theoretical abstraction, whereby the aspect that is identified with the determination of action by moral norms is isolated within the behavior, activities, and actions of individuals. This entails a conscious theoretical procedure on the part of the researcher, who recognizes that, in real life, individuals may not theorize about "morality," yet they successfully navigate such tasks. To facilitate this process, society possesses its mechanisms: a member of the moral world, a moral subject, "recognizes" the facts of moral life, relying on their own moral consciousness and experience. Born into a world saturated with morality, the individual instinctively perceives the "moral" aspect in the actions of others without resorting to theoretical processing of their experience. Moral norms, assimilated through upbringing from childhood, serve as the societal benchmarks by which individuals evaluate actions as moral. Individuals are morally relevant when their actions are assessed against the backdrop of a moral norm, which, in turn, expresses a demand from society directed at the individual.

The spiritual sphere of societal life is always mentioned alongside others, even though theoretical difficulties arise for researchers here as well, particularly the notion that spiritual aspects of activity manifest everywhere—in politics, law, morality, art, and religion. Given this reality, how can one isolate purely spiritual relations and spiritual activity to speak meaningfully of a spiritual sphere? Often, their existence is associated with a specific spiritual production that is believed to take place within society. This notion is questionable, for spiritual production, as a specialized professional endeavor to create spiritual values, is regulated by economic relations. The products of spiritual production, which enter into the system of societal labor distribution, possess commodity characteristics just as any other product does. In defending the rationality of distinguishing spiritual relations, one may offer the following interpretation of their specificity.

The spiritual relations pertain to the intellectual component inherent in any human activity. This component, or simply—intellectual activity—always manifests itself within the confines (shaped) by either ideological or scientific norms. These norms may consist of ideas, principles, laws of science, and specific logical and methodological tools. Thus, spiritual relations are real relations that pertain to the spiritual activities of individuals through the lens of the aforementioned norms. Even if spiritual activity partially enters the economic sphere, it still, as a purely intellectual creative process, is defined by the norms of ideological-theoretical and scientific order. The same aspect that speaks to the commodification of the products of spiritual activity points to the realm of general laws of production.

As one can ascertain, structuring society by spheres and complexes of various types of social relations and activities provides multifaceted analytical dimensions, a sort of anatomical portrait of social life. However, in this scheme, the same subjects (individuals) of diverse relations and activities appear as if fragmented into parts and affixed to separate spheres. Therefore, the depicted picture should be complemented by a synthetic aspect to uncover the functioning of social relations in their real, vibrant interconnections. The circumstance that subjects, in terms of the entirety represented through them of relations and types of activities, are multidimensional is reflected in the concepts of social relations and the social structure of society. In their actual existence, social relations seem to be bundled together and manifest through the interaction of classes, groups, and individuals.

In both theoretical and practical realms, it is vital to understand how these various types of relations and activities are genuinely "practically" interconnected in the subjects, how they are realized by them, including in a spatial-temporal sense, since the carriers of these relations are individuals who shape history within social space and time. It is important not merely to acknowledge that individuals are integrated into a system of various relations and activities, but also to understand how, when, and where they unfold themselves as social subjects. Individuals and social groups serve as points of intersection, substantive units, and ultimately as carriers of all relations in society and agents of numerous types of activity.

The concepts of social relations and the social structure of society aid in not absolutizing the “purity” of individual relations and activities, but in recognizing that the diversity of social relations is nothing but a multitude of aspects reflecting the singular vitality of human existence in its universal interdependence. It is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of social relations. The further development of social knowledge will allow us to see and distinguish some additional relations in the future that are currently unreflected in social consciousness and have not taken root in social institutions. This also pertains to human activities. Sometimes it would be more accurate to speak not of specialized types of activity but of specific aspects of human life (political, legal, moral, aesthetic, etc.). Every individual in a civilized society must be capable of perceiving this wealth of aspects both in their own actions and in the actions of other individuals and groups. This reveals the level of an individual’s social culture.

The approaches presented here regarding the structure of society do not exhaust the topic. Philosophy, as a worldview, prompts us to consider social reality as manifesting before individuals in the form of a conglomeration of distinct “worlds”: norms, power, language, culture, and so forth. These worlds, each of which constitutes a totality of specific kinds of social phenomena, are regarded as important structural elements of society, and we shall examine some of them further.