Society: Fundamental Concepts of Social Philosophy

The Activity of Individuals and Social Relations as Substantial Categories of Social Reality

Society, as a systemic unity of the social outcomes of human activity, lacks a static character; it is a procedural, dynamic, functioning system that inherently contains the determinants of its own dynamics. To discover such determinants, in other words, means to establish what constitutes the substance of social reality—namely, the ultimate foundation (basis, carrier, source, etc.) of all its phenomena, which, at the same level of analysis, is self-sufficient and requires nothing external for its existence.

How free is the researcher in choosing the “substance”? To what extent is this choice arbitrary, and how much is it objective? And how appropriate is it to pose the question of “choice” when scientific rigor demands unequivocal clarity regarding substance? While acknowledging the relevance of such inquiries, it is worth reminding ourselves that researchers build systems of knowledge not on senseless whim but on rules of argumentation and reasoned assumptions validated by the history of science, although a degree of hypothetical speculation will always persist even in the most refined theoretical constructs. With this caveat, let us proceed.

Like any procedural order, social reality can be examined through the lens of content and form. By applying these two categories as a methodological lever at the substantial level of analysis, we can formulate the central thesis: the content of social reality, or, in other words, social life, is represented by human activity, while the form is embodied in social relations. Thus, we possess two interrelated, mutually correlating categories to express the substance of society—human activity and social relations. Can we manage with one category rather than two? In scholarly and even educational literature, examples exist that appeal to a single category. For instance, in a textbook on social philosophy by the well-known Russian expert K. Kh. Momdzhyan, it is stated that the substance of social reality is the purposeful activity of individuals and groups, and any phenomenon attains the status of social if it enters the “force field” of activity. In our view, the very notion of human activity is initially “cursed” to operate within the “force field” of social relations, which impose not natural but social boundaries (forms, frameworks) upon its execution. Not a single atom of societal human activity is devoid of such “oversight” from these relations. At the same time, the dual categorization of social substance does not violate its unity, as it pertains to one instance and evaluates it from two aspects: regarding content and regarding form. Let us explore these aspects in more detail, first separately and then return to their synthetic assessment.

The concept of activity is an abstraction that captures a qualitatively distinct mode of interaction between humans and their environment, differing from processes in the living and inanimate natural worlds. In its universal essential characteristics, activity is defined by intentionality, mediation through artificially created tools, compatibility, and other features. It occasionally occurs in philosophical texts that “human activity” is recognized as a species distinction within a broader class of activity manifestations in the objective world. For instance, one might speak of “volcanic activity,” “the activity of a river,” or “the activity of termites,” placing the concept of activity within a hierarchical sequence of categories: motion ^ activity ^ human activity ^ vital activity ^ human activity. However, it seems that in pursuing a purely technical task—to provide a definition of activity while avoiding tautology—proponents of this approach breach certain permissible boundaries of scholarly discourse; metaphorical or anthropomorphic expressions are presented as norms within organized scientific terminology. Within the context of the perspective articulated here, to say “activity” or “human activity” signifies the same, as the concept of activity is exclusively attributed to humans. This, of course, does not preclude the use of the term “activity” in other senses across different sciences.

Guided by the idea of the connection between activity and social relations, we shall distinguish the actual moments of activity from the myriad expressions of human energy expenditures that are not directly linked to the existence of social relations. This understanding of activity would be aptly supplemented by the term “social” in the sense that it pertains not to individual but to socially significant activity. In this case, “social” activity would only encompass that segment of the entirety of human life manifestations that receives a certain degree of social recognition and is conditioned (from the standpoint of social conditions) by the relations among people. The remaining “activity” manifestations of individuals serve as a peculiar reservoir, from which replenishment may be drawn in the future to expand the sector of socially significant actions; however, for now, they do not qualify as “social facts.” For example, if we take the sphere of economic life, from the very onset of commodity production, an individual’s personal activity possessed a social character to the extent that it materialized in a product recognized by society (demand in the market). In commodity exchange, the social significance of the producer’s activity is determined and verified; elements that lack “outlets” into the system of production relations are filtered out, and only socially necessary labor expenditures are valued from a social perspective. Similar examples can also be drawn from the legal sphere. Which actions of individuals are deemed illegal? Clearly, only those actions whose outcomes contradict existing legislation, that is, the manner of codifying legal relations. Likewise, regarding the moral sphere, morally neutral are those actions that, at the present moment, do not fall under the regulation of moral norms, which embody moral relations between individuals. Thus, limiting the scope of the concept of human activity to actions that have a direct outlet into the system of social relations is one of the necessary conditions for a productive approach to analyzing the essence of activity as a substantial measure of social reality.

Among the general attributes of any activity are the subject and object (the matter) of the activity, its goal, means, and result, as well as the activity itself and its conditions. The subject of activity is its bearer, the agent. Based on the constraints we have established for characterizing activity as social, that is, one that has an “outlet” into the system of social relations, it is evident that the question regarding the subject of activity depends on who is the producer of the final “product” recognized within the realm of social relations. Consequently, it follows that the true, decisive subject of activity is not always the individual. It may be a small or large group in relation to other groups. The object of activity is that to which it is directed. It may pertain to a natural phenomenon, the structure of society, or even the individual in cases of educational or instructional activity. The categories of goal, means, and result can be considered auxiliary and intermediate when examining attributes of activity such as subject, object, and the very process of activity. The goal characterizes the subject in relation to its intentions, motives, needs, and interests. Concerning the activity itself, the goal represents a moment that consolidates all of the subject’s actions into a purposeful activity, thereby imparting to it characteristics of consciousness, organization, and a programmed sequence of stages. Through the result, the goal is also connected to the object of activity, since the object becomes the realized goal in the course of the activity, namely, the outcome. The means is likewise an essential characteristic of human activity, linking the subject, object, and the activity itself. An important common aspect of activity is what might be termed “the activity itself,” signifying its passage as a dynamic process. By emphasizing this moment, we temporarily abstract from other aspects in order to capture the pure expenditure of human efforts, encompassing both psychological and physical potentials, independent of goals, means, or results, when a singular measure for gauging expenditures, specifically time, can be applied. An essential aspect of any activity is its conditions. The conditions of activity are understood as a complex array of phenomena and circumstances that enable the activity and contribute to its successful conclusion. Within this complex of conditions, both natural and historical (social) factors can be distinguished. Some may argue that “conditions” should not be presented as a moment or attribute of activity, as they exist outside of the activity itself and more so accompany it. In response, it should be noted that by identifying fundamental moments of activity, we are not discussing the activity from the standpoint of its structure. We are not addressing elements within the activity or the relationships among them, but rather the completeness of moments and characteristics that are sufficient for presenting activity as a specific mode of human interaction with the environment. In such circumstances, conditions may be regarded in the same light as the moments of activity.

A social philosopher and theoretical sociologist, striving to explain historical phenomena as results of joint human activity, cannot overlook the question of the forces that consolidate individuals into society—those that ensure this compatibility. The foremost social outcome, and at the same time a form of human activity related to the consolidation of individuals into a unity, is social relations. As previously stated, we consider these relations here as a substantial aspect of social reality. Let us pause for a moment to define the concept of social relations and to highlight their most essential features.

A considerable amount of useful insight for resolving the stated task can be derived from an examination of the content of the overarching philosophical category of "relations." This category characterizes the mode of existence of all phenomena and objects, without exception, in their mutual coexistence. "Everything that exists," Hegel remarked, "is in relations, and these relations constitute the truth of any existence." In the history of philosophical thought, the category of "relations" is one of the most ancient. Aristotle already identified at least three meanings of it, which retain their significance to this day. Two of these—“numerical” relations and relations between “knowing and that which is known”—pertain to the activity of the subject, who establishes relations among things within their consciousness. Another meaning of "relations" is associated by Aristotle with the capacity of one body to influence another and with the manifestation of such capacities. He elaborated on this in a somewhat convoluted manner: "...the ability to heat exists in relation to that which can be heated, for it can heat, and in turn, that which heats is in relation to that which is heated; similarly, that which cuts is related to that which is cut, because both occurrences take place in reality."

For a long time, however, the category of "relations" retained its significance more as an epistemological concept, as its emergence was linked to the procedure of comparing bodies. Thus, in the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, "relations" were understood specifically as the result of comparing bodies with one another based on a common foundation. The objectivity of relations could only be understood as the objectivity of this foundation, that is, of the properties considered during the comparison of the related objects. The interpretation of "relations" as a category reflecting certain aspects of the actual interdependence of things fell out of philosophers' sight for a long time, and only comparatively recently has the situation improved. Relying on the results achieved today, we present some of the most general propositions regarding the content of the category of "relations."

1. An important objective precondition for relations among things is the existence of a common basis of relations among them, and only those objects that possess such a basis can be considered truly related. Two related things must be identical in some respect to establish relations based on this identity.
2. Relations do not exist independently, apart from the entities that relate; they lack an entirely autonomous ontological status.
3. Relations exist in reality. However, their reality is specific; they cannot be directly perceived by the senses. The external manifestation of relations is the interaction and connection of things through the mediation of physical, chemical, biological, mechanical processes, and so forth, which can be sensed. Thus, relations imply connection and interaction but cannot be reduced to them. Expanding on this thought, we can state that the category of "relations" encompasses both the real possibility of the connection and interaction of things and their actual presence.
4. The preceding general characteristics of "relations" also dictate the peculiarities of their cognition: relations are understood through the knowledge of the entities that are in connection and interaction. By fixing the influence of one thing on another, we establish causal and other connections by relating one entity to another. Undoubtedly, such relating occurs on the basis of their shared identity. As a result, relations appear to us as a conclusion drawn from the abstraction of the interacting entities.

A conclusive definition of the overarching philosophical category of "relations" might be framed as follows: relations are a category that expresses the mode of interdependent existence of objects of certain identities, the essence of which lies in the real possibility within them to necessarily enter, under appropriate conditions, into actual connection and interaction through the mediation of mechanical, physical, chemical, and other processes.

The task of the subject of cognition, who aims to elucidate and study specific relations, lies in identifying a singular, identical foundation and determining the conditions under which entities necessarily interact and thereby actualize the relations that already exist between them. The definition provided above considers only the ontological aspect of "relations." In the logical-epistemological aspect, each entity can be placed in practically innumerable relations based on the multitude of properties by which they may be compared.

The identified general, essential characteristics of relations are also inherent in social relations. At the same time, they possess a series of specific features that are formed alongside the emergence of social reality (society). Let us focus on some of them.

Among the specific properties of social relations, we must mention their capacity for objectification and personalization. Objectification signifies that individuals interact not through their corporeal nature but through a world of mediating objects created by labor and capable of representing those relations. This pertains primarily to the entire material world produced by humanity. However, the objectification of social relations should not be limited solely to the material world, although it remains predominant in human life. Through the course of historical development, the presence of complex social life and the division of labor gives rise to other non-material forms of "embodiment," such as social norms, values, institutions, and so forth. As for personalization or embodiment, it suggests that individuals present themselves as socially "marked," as somewhat abstract bearers, living representatives of social relations. Although individuals interact with one another as persons, they also possess their "other selves," appearing as typified representatives of certain social communities, as carriers of social roles. The ultimate subjects or parties of social relations often comprise different social communities that represent a trans-individual reality (ethnos, nation, class, stratum, and other groups). In society, individuals most frequently relate to one another through their affiliation with a particular social group.

Several additional features of social relations can also be highlighted. As previously noted, the reality of relations is, in essence, derived from the reality of their foundation; therefore, it is crucial to accurately establish this foundation in the process of cognition. If, in nature, the basis of the related bodies consists of one of their natural qualities, in society, the foundation of relations among individuals is socially-historical in origin. For example, in the case of production relations, individuals are viewed through the lens of their capacity to participate in social production and their actual involvement. Once individuals are previously encompassed under this perspective, they are then differentiated based on their position within the system of social production, according to the presence of various conditions and factors of production; in other words, they are considered as related entities. Like relations in general, social relations are not directly fixed at the level of perception; they are represented at the level of concepts. Their reality possesses a unique nature; we assess it by abstracting from the sensibly perceived interactions of individuals. The cooperative activity of individuals manifests as a display, a materialization of social relations. It is worth emphasizing this, as there exists a tendency to confuse empirically observable communication between individuals during interaction with social relations, which are merely the external manifestation of these relations.

Thus, based on the identified specific traits of social relations, we can formulate a definition: social relations are a category that expresses the mode of the collective interdependent existence of particular groups of people, the essence of which (this mode) is reduced to their real possibility of entering into actual interconnection through activity and its products.

Having examined the content of the categories of activity and social relations in isolation, let us return once more to the peculiarities of their connection. Their relationship reflects an important aspect of the philosophical approach to social life. They constitute the substance of social reality, its scaffolding. This substance is presented to us in a dual expression: as the connection of the formal and the substantive. Form and content are essential interrelated characteristics of objects of any kind. In the broadest sense, form expresses the definiteness of existence, the definiteness of its content. However, it cannot be imagined as something external, imposed upon the content. The interrelationship of form and content is deeper. Form is conditioned by content, while simultaneously being the conditioning principle itself, that is, it acts as the principle, the law that ensures the substantive stability of objects. Based on this, form can be interpreted as essence.

Therefore, the form (essence) of social life, as human activity, is constituted by social relations.

It is precisely because form is as essential to essence as essence is to itself that essence should be understood and expressed not simply as essence, that is, as immediate substance or as pure self-observation of the divine, but equally as form, and in all the richness of its unfolded form; only through this is essence comprehended and expressed as that which is real.

By relating the categories of activity and social relations in terms of the connection between content and form, we gain the opportunity to articulate more precisely the substantial foundation of social reality. To the extent that social relations represent general conditions, forms, and preconditions of activity, they are also, in turn, results, specific products of human activity. The aspects of this unity are not equivalent; they are not "both and." The leading characteristic is the identification of social relations as products of human activity. Lively, material activity is both the producer and the field for demonstrating social relations. For all past generations of people, the system of these relations is a result of their activity, while for each new generation, they constitute a form that currently shapes their own activity. At the same time, new generations, through their activity, initiate new changes within the system of relations. Thus, social reality exists, reproduces, and evolves.