Society: Fundamental Concepts of Social Philosophy

The Concept of Society: The Social and Social Reality

In the preceding chapter, we turned our attention to that aspect of the world which is extrinsically necessary for humanity, namely nature. Now, our focus shifts to society, which, though created by humans, presents itself to each individual as a reality that must be acknowledged and to which one must determine their stance.

Since ancient times, the ultimate direction of philosophical teachings has been the affairs of the public, as the overarching philosophical doctrines have not served as ends in themselves for any of the thinkers but have provided the foundation for constructing a conceptual model of social life. Consequently, in all philosophical systems of the past, social issues emerge as a recurring or, at the very least, concluding theme. Gradually, but also within philosophy, the so-called philosophy of history gained a relatively independent significance, its primary task being the search for the hidden meaning of history, the essence, and logic of the historical process. Later, the term "social philosophy" was developed to denote that branch of philosophical knowledge which specifically and from the most general perspectives investigates the qualitative uniqueness of society, its structure, and the interrelations of its various components. Starting from the 1930s, the term "social philosophy," thanks to the works of the so-called neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt School (FRG), was primarily employed in the West, but recently it has become widely used among specialists in our country as well. Since the mid-19th century, alongside social philosophy, another discipline examining society—sociology—has emerged. The term "sociology" was first introduced in 1824 by Auguste Comte, who is later recognized as the founder of sociology as a science. He used it in the sense of "social physics" as a new positive social science, a science of the communal life of people. However, for a long time, the subject of this new science remained vague. Although there is still no universally accepted understanding of the subject of sociology, this does not imply that scholars lack somewhat aligned views on the specificity of sociology. Most commonly, in defining this science, its subject is reduced to the interaction of people. Here are a few examples.

The Russian scholar, a respected figure in Western sociology, who was forced to leave Russia in 1922, Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), defined sociology as follows: "Sociology studies the phenomena of interaction among people on one side, and the phenomena arising from this process of interaction on the other." The German sociologist Leopold von Wiese (1876-1969) also stated: "Sociology is the study of the social, that is, of the actions (Einwirkungen) of people upon one another," and further specified that the social encompasses "expressions and manifestations of interpersonal life, which are studied in the form of social processes, social relations, and social formations." A group of authors from a typical American sociology textbook describes sociology as "the scientific study of types of human interaction."

Today, this discipline, regarding which sociologists have somewhat come to an understanding, has become highly diverse; however, one can still discern two poles to which sociological knowledge gravitates: theoretical (general) sociology and specialized sociological disciplines. The discussions that may still arise pertain to the relationship between social philosophy and theoretical sociology. There is a viewpoint that, unlike philosophy, sociology is an empirical science, as it possesses its own empirical foundation for generalizations, and its propositions can always be verified through experience. However, this criterion cannot establish a clear boundary between philosophy and sociology, since, as contemporary studies of science indicate, none of the so-called empirical sciences is constructed solely on the basis of experience from the outset; the initial selection of "facts of life" already presupposes some foundational theoretical or worldview position. Moreover, one can add the existence of preconditional, tacit knowledge that shapes a researcher's predisposition towards selecting "relevant" facts, training them to perceive in the events of the world what aligns with their established stance. Furthermore, philosophy itself is not entirely devoid of empirical influences; its generalizations invariably have wholly earthly roots. Thus, one could argue that in their foundational assertions, theoretical sociology and social philosophy converge, making it challenging to distinguish in the works of leading thinkers where precisely the foundations of sociology lie and where social-philosophical ideas begin. In instances where a sociologist-theoretician poses fundamental questions such as "What is society?", "What are the foundations of its existence?", "How does social life differ from natural processes?", "What is 'sociality?'" and similar inquiries, without answers to which they cannot commence their "purely sociological" research, such a sociologist undoubtedly rises to the level of social-philosophical reflection. Ultimately, theoretical sociology and social philosophy nourish each other, sharing similar interests in both the search for answers to fundamental questions and enriching the empirical basis for generalizations. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in each specific field of knowledge, after establishing its relative autonomy, a distinct terminology evolves, along with specific methods and a continuity in the subject of study. Social philosophy retains all its inherently philosophical approaches and means of examining reality. Without disregarding these traditions, let us turn to the most principled propositions concerning society.

It is only natural for the reader to expect a definition of the concept of society at this juncture. To not deprive the impatient reader of such expectations, we may resort to a ready-made tool from the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883): "What, then, is society, whatever its form? The product of the interaction of people." Marx offers other, deeper, and more elaborate versions of this answer; however, the one presented, being the most straightforward in its simplicity, is unlikely to satisfy a discerning reader due to its excessive abstractness, lacking any mention of the specificity of the "product" of interaction, nor does it unveil the substantial aspects of "interaction," or its nature. Nevertheless, Marx's response does underscore something significant: society is not, say, a divine gift; from the definition, it is not clearly evident that it is the result of conscious human creation. From a blatantly self-evident perspective, one might argue that there is no need to contrive any issues here, merely emphasizing that any society—whether that of a specific country, a certain era, or a theoretically generalized type—is a sum of human individuals who presently live and interact. Yet, let us take note of a simple detail: people are born, grow, develop, live, and gradually depart from life, while certain forms of their interaction persist, and society does not disintegrate with each generational change. This implies that the forms of interaction are more stable, and should we not include them, perhaps primarily, in the meaning of the concept of society? Most likely. However, we shall pause here and return to the definition of society after discussing an auxiliary concept—the "social."

Even a non-specialist in the humanities cannot help but notice the impressive breadth of usage of the terminological addition "social" in various phrases: "social state," "social structure," "social group," "social work," "social insurance," "social policy," "social justice," and so forth. There are countless such combinations, and most of them carry significance only at the level of fashionable packaging, bearing little semantic weight, or their meaning is so meager that it becomes synonymous with the word "public." Given that everything in our social life is undoubtedly social in origin and consequences, such an addition seems superfluous. However, when "social" is imbued with a particular, exceptional meaning that aids in defining the concept of society, then there is reason to discuss it.

Over many years, a colossal amount of specialized scientific literature has accumulated concerning the peculiar meaning of the term "social," with debates spanning decades and continuing to this day. Yet, the eminent Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883—1955) had every reason to lament: “I shall never forget how surprised and embarrassed I felt many years ago when, aware of my ignorance, I eagerly plunged into the open sea of sociological literature and confronted the incredible fact that in sociology books, there is nothing certain about what society is, what the social really means. Moreover, having read these books, you will not only fail to find a precise definition of the social but will also discover that their authors, the gentlemen sociologists, have not even managed to seriously clarify the nature of the elementary phenomena that constitute the facts of social life.” And indeed, this is largely true.

However, we shall not delve into the various shades of the discussion surrounding the "social." It is prudent and justifiable from the outset to agree on the meaning of the term we will use in defining the concept of society. We will understand "social" (unless otherwise specified) as follows: social signifies that which is communal, shared, or aggregate, which also implies an indication of types of aggregation concerning the subjects of collective activity, types of interaction, results of activities, and the reflection of the said aggregate in the consciousness of individuals.

Based on this, we can adopt the following definition of society: society is a systemic unity of the social outcomes of human activity. This definition possesses, at least, the merit of being succinct. Yet, the conciseness often carries with it a certain lack of clarity, stemming from the unexplained meanings of the employed terms and phrases. Thus, we shall add the necessary supplementary explanations.

Human beings differ from other natural entities notably through their possession of consciousness. This means that human actions are undertaken consciously. However, this does not imply that all actual results and consequences of actions are predetermined by individuals. Social outcomes are, as a rule, mediated, secondary “products” of human activity, which is primarily directed towards entirely different ends—namely, the sustenance of life and the reproduction of its conditions. Individuals act, preoccupied first and foremost with satisfying their material needs. In the pursuit of their satisfaction, they are least inclined to ponder the nature of their sociality (or societal nature), its maintenance, its types and forms, and how it is constituted or transformed under various influences. It is precisely such often secondary outcomes of human activity that concern social philosophy. A proximate social outcome may indeed be premeditated and consciously achieved; however, most outcomes (especially distant ones), in the forms and types of sociality and the mechanisms of their functioning, are formed and continue to be formed as side effects of human existence.

The expression "systemic unity" requires clarification, as it arises from the notion of "system" (from the Greek σύστημα, meaning connection). A significant contribution to the general theory of systems was made by the Canadian-American scholar of Austrian descent, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901—1972), who noted: “System analysts agree that the concept of a system is not limited to material phenomena and can be applied to any ’whole’ composed of ’components’ that interact.” Here, characteristics of a system such as the elements (components) of an object, their interactions, and the resultant effect of that interaction—the integrity of the object—are mentioned. Additionally, we can add another classical understanding of the system as articulated by another American scholar, Russell Ackoff: “The term ’system’ is used to denote a broad class of phenomena. We talk, for example, about philosophical systems, systems of numbers, communication systems, management systems, educational systems, and systems of weaponry. Some of these are conceptual constructs, while others are physical entities. Originally, in a broad and not very precise sense, a system can be defined as any entity, whether conceptual or physical, that consists of interdependent parts.”

Drawing on the generalizations achieved in the realm of systemic research, previously articulated by Blauberg I.V. and Yudin E.G., we can identify characteristics that distinguish objects of systemic quality:

1. Integrity. This characteristic indicates that the system stands in opposition to its environment and that the properties and functions of the system's elements are defined by their place within the whole.
2. Connections. Integrity is ensured through systemic ties; therefore, systematic analysis prioritizes the extraction of such connections.
3. Structure and Organization. These concepts express the orderliness of the system and its directedness, which is secured by the stability of connections.
4. Management—various forms and "rigidities" of connections among the levels of the system that ensure normal functioning and development.
5. Purpose (the goal-directed nature of behavior). This is inherent to systems that possess their own “management” organs.
6. Self-organization. This is characteristic of systems with a goal-directed nature of behavior.

In summary, systemic objects exhibit integrity, organization, and the presence of informational flows; their connections are integral to the formation of the system. Systems maintain a degree of autonomy from their environment but exchange matter and energy with it. There are no absolutely closed systems. The approach to society as a specific systemic formation with the aforementioned general characteristics has become increasingly prevalent in social philosophy.

In light of defining society through the concept of a system composed of interconnected elements, there arises a need to elaborate on the elements of the society-system. The initial inclination is to identify individual humans as the foremost constituent elements. Ultimately, in a substantial sense, this is true, for it is absurd to speak of the existence of society without people. However, at the same time, individuals themselves represent a certain “social outcome,” functioning as operational units of the whole (society). Here, we must concur with Karl Marx, who wrote: “Society does not consist of individuals but expresses the sum of those ties and relationships in which these individuals stand with one another.” Marx was not naïve; he understood that without individuals there can be no society. Yet the essence lies in the emphasis: in defining society, one must first underscore what transforms a mere conglomerate of individuals into a systemic unity. Only when discussing the enumeration of the elements of the society-system will we include not only functionally defined individuals but also many other functional units, including the world of artifacts—namely, the objects created by humans.

The complex challenge of the initial approach to society and its elements has revealed itself as contradictory in theoretical sociology through the divergences between “individualistic” and “collectivist” methodological stances. The former, associated with the German sociologist Max Weber (1864—1920), tends to explain the facts of social life based on knowledge of individuals, their consciousness, actions, and decisions. The latter stance finds a clear manifestation in the position of the classic of modern Western sociology, Émile Durkheim (1858—1917), who favored concepts such as “collective consciousness” and “organic solidarity,” indicating the supra-individual character of many social phenomena and their precedence over individuals.

There exists a myriad of social products stemming from human activity, which define and ensure the compatibility of human life or simply testify to their unnatural origin. In a broad sense, the quality of what is termed "social" encompasses all that is entwined within the tumult of communal human existence. This overarching outcome of human endeavor, alongside the endeavors themselves, constitutes what can be referred to as social reality. Here, we transition to this concept, solely to momentarily distance ourselves from the more burdensome notion of society, in order to focus on elucidating the substance of that reality which we, by the manner of its existence, designate as society.

In conclusion, let us point out a prevalent error that has been costly both to science and practice. This concerns the long-standing conflation, on one hand, of nature and society, and on the other, of society and the state. Regarding the former, there have been—and continue to be—philosophers who equate human social life with natural processes, failing to discern any specificity of the social realm, deriving human characteristics from the modes of interaction among "social" animals. This refers to various naturalistic currents, such as social Darwinism. It is worth noting that opposing doctrines have also existed, which speak of a fundamental, radical distinction of society, wherein a purely spiritual essence prevails.

Conversely, thinkers long conflated society with the state, thus society was "discovered" only relatively recently. Aristotle came close to recognizing society as a distinct entity, yet he did not develop this idea further and ultimately aligned with the views of his teacher, Plato, for whom the state and society were undoubtedly one and the same. It was only through the works of economists in the eighteenth century, who recognized the separateness of "civil society" as the domain wherein the fabric of "compatibility" is woven, that scholarly thought finally acknowledged the non-identity of the concepts of "society" and "state."