Social Reality as History

History. Philosophy of History

The unfolding of societal life in space and time presents itself as history. The existence of historical memory and historical consciousness constitutes a significant heritage of humanity and a considerable value. Through these elements, the mechanism of self-identification for a people, an ethnic group, a nation, and even individual persons comes into play. Furthermore, history is always perceived by us as an independent world, captivating us with its events while simultaneously offering lessons.

The term "history" in contemporary usage encompasses various meanings: as the science of societal development; as reality in its evolution; as the process of movement and development of something; as the past preserved in memory; as a narrative or account; and as an event tinged with unpleasantness. For the ancient Greeks, who coined the term, ἱστορία (historía) denoted "inquiry" or "study," referring to the reproduction of human actions from recent pasts, which remained in the memories of living witnesses or in their accounts. While the term ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē) indicated knowledge that was unquestionably scientific, pertaining to the immutable, and δόξα (dóxa) signified an opinion about the transient, ἱστορία occupied an intermediate position, closely aligned with scientificity. At least for Herodotus and Thucydides, history undoubtedly possessed scientific value. From the perspective of classical antiquity's historical thought, the scientific nature of historical knowledge is secured by the enduring types of human character or the unchanging essence of the city-state that underlie the mutable and fleeting events (which they can only be within society), as exemplified by Rome in the works of Livy. In the actions of individuals and states, human nature is discerned, along with the limits of human capability to alter circumstances; all of this is beneficial to know, as the rhythms of historical events, composed of human actions, possess the tendency to repeat.

During the Middle Ages, within the framework of the Christian worldview, history was understood as the unfolding of divine intention in space and time. As Augustine of Hippo reminds us, historicity pertains solely to humanity's earthly sojourn. In earthly life, all people, irrespective of their ethnic origins, are divided into two types of community, which Augustine termed the two Cities. The first consists of those who wish to live according to the dictates of the sinful flesh: "The works of the flesh are evident: sexual immorality, impurity, sensuality, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, fits of anger, rivalries, dissensions, divisions, envy, drunkenness, orgies, and things like these" (Galatians 5:19-21). The "City of God" is comprised of individuals who aspire to live by the fruits of the Spirit, that is, "in accordance with God": "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control" (Galatians 5:22-23). In our times, these two Cities are intertwined and mixed, yet the "earthly city" predominates. Citizens of the "City of God" on this earth are travelers, pilgrims. However, both Cities are destined for an end, as they are shaped by two kinds of love—earthly love of self, which leads to contempt for God, and heavenly love of God, which results in contempt for oneself. The earthly trial for the citizens of the "City of God" will conclude with the advent of the Day of Judgment. Humanity's time on earth constitutes history, which is bounded by two catastrophic events—the Fall and the Last Judgment. Beyond these milestones lies eternity. Thereafter, the City of God shall endure eternally, where no one will be born, for no one will die. Even within historical time, all unfolds according to the divine plan, whose goal is a return to God. This path is lengthy. Throughout it, people must learn to live as they were destined to live since creation; they must learn to love humanity and detest vices.

The first philosopher of the New Age, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), confidently integrated history into the realm of scientific knowledge. It relies on memory as one of the attributes of the "rational soul that concentrates knowledge within itself." He divided all history into natural and civil history, distinguishing ecclesiastical history, the history of sciences, and civil history itself, the significance and authority of which surpass all other human achievements. Alongside this, Bacon highlighted the significant difficulties encountered in the pursuit of truth within history: "For in any case, immense effort and wisdom are required to immerse one's thought in the past when crafting history, to become imbued with its spirit, to diligently study the changes of epochs, the character of historical personalities, the evolution of intentions, the pathways of actions, the true meaning of deeds, the mysteries of governance, and then freely and truthfully recount all this as if presenting it before the reader's eyes and illuminating it with the rays of vivid narrative." Bacon sought to demonstrate that genuine historical knowledge cannot be distinguished from other forms of scientific knowledge; they are united by objectivity, grounded in true facts. The standards of quality that natural sciences established in the New Age also influenced history, although its true golden age did not arrive until later, in the 19th century, when great historical schools with significant achievements emerged in Germany, France, and other countries.

Philosophical reflection on the issues of history developed almost in parallel with the evolution of historical knowledge, intensifying as the density and depth of connections among populations in different regions of the Earth increased, culminating in the emergence of a specialized branch of philosophical knowledge known as the philosophy of history. The very term "philosophy of history" was introduced by Voltaire, yet it was the German Enlightenment philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder who first recognized the philosophy of history as an independent discipline. In the preface to his work "Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity," Herder speaks of the necessity for "a philosophy of the entire history of humanity," a comprehensive science built around a certain guiding principle. This principle (idea) that would endow the new discipline with a sense of philosophical nature is the principle of development. From the very beginning of his scholarly journey, Herder was inspired by the idea of creating a philosophy that would interpret all of humanity's history as a cohesive whole. After all, humanity must know the plan, the intention behind its own history; for it cannot be that all of God's creations have their purpose, while humanity is devoid of divine oversight.

A significant role in the establishment of the philosophy of history belongs to the remarkable Italian thinker Giambattista Vico, who was previously mentioned.

From the late 18th to the 19th century, the philosophy of history solidified as a relatively distinct branch of philosophy, with its own subject matter and thematic specificity. Here, we shall focus on only a few of the most important questions that are frequently discussed in philosophical-historical research.

What is "history" in the philosophy of history?

Sometimes, it appears that the broader circles of professional historians are less concerned with debates regarding what history is than philosophers are. For everyday research involving documents, artifacts, establishing the authenticity of facts, and employing established methods of historical analysis and synthesis, it often suffices to understand history as a specialized cognitive activity aimed at reproducing past events, or as the finished result of such knowledge. However, what may be intuitively clear to a novice historian is far from trivial for an experienced scholar who seeks a panoramic depiction of historical reality. Such a scholar, sooner or later, turns to the large-scale methodological questions of their science and approaches the level of the philosophy of history. Conversely, the philosopher, whose professional interest encompasses all forms of human cognitive activity, seeks to construct a conceptual model of social reality in its temporal dimension. At the confluence of the thoughts of eminent historians and philosophers, an intriguing and mutually beneficial exchange of ideas regarding the essence of history arises, deepening philosophical-historical knowledge. To illustrate how the path to a coherent understanding of the very term "history" is not simply straightforward, let us turn to some examples.

The renowned English historian and philosopher of history Robin Collingwood (1889-1943) maintained that history is a specific form of thought, the subject of which is the actions of people in the past, and, to be more precise, the historian, unlike the natural scientist, does not engage with events as such; he is only interested in those events that represent an external expression of thought and only to the extent that they convey thoughts.

The historian can never forecast the future; he always concludes with the present, as he only deals with what has occurred. From Collingwood's understanding of history, it follows that history and philosophy converge in certain respects, for the current state of thoughts—which perpetually intrigues the philosopher—is the ultimate result of the movement of prior thoughts that served as the foundation for human actions that have already taken place (a matter that consistently captivates the historian). In his conclusions, Collingwood aligns closely with Hegel, for in both cases, history culminates in the present.

Collingwood’s position suggests a compelling analogy. Consider that each of us, at any point in our lives, may ponder the question, “Who am I?” This inquiry pertains to the “I” of the present, at a particular age, in a specific profession, accompanied by a distinct complex of thoughts, knowledge, and emotions. Clearly, the present “I” is a product of experiences, reflections, and learnings from the past. It encapsulates all that is “in me,” compressing all my years into my contemporary self; behind each of my past actions stand my rational goals, which are grounded in reasoned aspirations. As the historian of my own self, I assume the role of an autobiographer, the author of my life story, which reconstructs my existence as a result of my own creation. Thus, it follows that there exists no consciousness apart from historical consciousness, neither in the life of an individual nor in that of society. A forgetful individual is inconceivable as a rational being, and memory, as a condensation of past experiences, fundamentally constitutes my present “I.” A society is historical to the extent that it is conscious of its past. In this context, the words of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) resonate: “We live in a great tradition of historical knowledge.” This line of thought coincides with the reflections of X. Ortega y Gasset, who asserts that a person is what has occurred to them, what they have done; the past is not situated elsewhere in its own time but exists here, within me; the past is I, my life, while history represents a systematic science concerning the radical reality that is my (and, we may add, society’s—O.K.) life.

However, as with any analogy, our comparison between the individual and society is limited, particularly in its predictive aspect, for regarding one’s own life path, forecasts tend to be more plausible than those concerning societal development. The “uncle of the most honorable rules” from Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin spent “forty years in his estate, quarreling with the housekeeper, gazing out the window and swatting flies.” In a traditional arrangement, it is not difficult to predict the lifestyle of such an “uncle” up until the moment of his death. The history of society is more complex: there are more determinants and greater uncertainties over the same forty years.

Thus, to summarize the above, there exists a conviction that history represents a certain form of thought regarding the ideas of previous generations, which have found external expression in events, that is, have been objectified. In this way, history enriches the experience of humanity and remains ever relevant, living within us. “Even without knowing who we are to become,” X. Ortega y Gasset observed, “we know who we are not going to be. We live looking back to the past.” Under this perspective, history is not merely a science, nor is it so much a science as a form of humanity’s self-awareness within the context of its existence in time, while individuals (historian-scholars) can only assist humanity, more or less successfully, in reflecting upon its own historical self-consciousness.

Of course, the aforementioned considerations do not exhaust the avenues of thought regarding “history” in the philosophy of history and in philosophy as a whole. Numerous historical and philosophical schools present varying arguments in support of their beliefs. The substantive aspect of “history” constructed by them consists not only of well-known or novel facts but also of the manner in which they are organized and interpreted. Philosophy of history is more concerned with the ways of knowing the past, the categorical means of depicting the flowing social reality. A productive approach to enhancing the effectiveness of philosophical-historical studies is to align them with socio-philosophical ideas that establish fundamental models for analyzing society. From this perspective, we may observe that the content of history comprises a line of facts pertaining to changes in types of sociality, alterations in kinds and forms (referring to social relations) of human activity, in other words, the substantial elements of social reality. Without such a crucial methodological principle, historical science, in the words of the German philosopher and historian Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), “as knowledge of past events is of no use to anyone.”