Social Reality as History

The Direction of History

The contemporary global nature of interconnections among states and individual societies has particularly brought to the forefront the issue of history as a world historical process, raising questions about the possible direction (vector) of societal development. However, this does not imply that discussions about the direction of historical development have only recently emerged. Philosophical and historical ideas regarding this matter stretch back through the ages. Over long periods, concepts have developed that either deny a general direction to history or affirm it.

Among the former are the concepts of local cultures and civilizations. Oswald Spengler, in his work The Decline of the West, argued that there is no linear history; rather, there exists a multitude of cultures, each with its own fate, all of which are closed and impermeable to others. The lifespan of cultures is approximately a thousand years. He identified several that once existed or currently exist, including the Egyptian, Indian, Babylonian, Chinese, Greco-Roman, Byzantine-Arab, Western European, Mayan, and Russo-Siberian cultures. The character of each of these cultures is defined by a collective soul, which can only be understood from within, remaining inaccessible from the outside. In the life of each culture, Spengler identified two stages: the creative stage and the stage of civilization, with the latter marking the decline and demise of the culture.

Arnold Toynbee, in his twelve-volume A Study of History, held a somewhat similar view, distinguishing thirteen civilizations. For him, the notion of civilization holds the same significance as "culture" does for Spengler, and both terms denote a society of a particular type existing at a specific time and place, characterized by unique religious beliefs, lifestyles, worldviews, and so forth. Of the types of civilizations Toynbee identified, he paid particular attention to five: Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Russian, and Western. He noted that each civilization undergoes four stages of development: emergence, growth, breakdown, and disintegration.

The examples presented here belong to a broader class of theoretical constructions — those of the cyclical theory of history, which posits that development can only be discussed within the confines of local societies, while asserting that no overarching direction exists for humanity as a whole; each specific society merely repeats an eternal cycle of movement from an initial state to a final one. The roots of such a worldview can be traced back to ancient times. Is it not skepticism regarding the creation of something new that permeates the following lines from the biblical Ecclesiastes: "What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun!... Is there anything of which one can say, 'Look! This is new!'? It was here already, long ago! ... I have seen all the things that are done under the sun; all of them are meaningless, a chasing after the wind!"

The history of philosophy provides numerous examples illustrating the prevalence of skeptical conclusions regarding the forging of new paths in historical progress. In the modern era, the most significant representative of the cyclical theory of history was the aforementioned Giambattista Vico, who argued that each nation, throughout its history, passes through three stages: the "Age of Gods," the "Age of Heroes," and the "Age of Men." The first phase corresponds to the patriarchal family as a specific form of sociability, the second phase to the aristocratic republic, and the third to monarchy. Following this, due to the contempt of monarchs for the law and the corruption of people, a decline occurs in the life of each nation, and through a period of tribulation, it begins to traverse the eternal stages of movement once more.

Yet, other perspectives on the course of history are also prevalent. These can be unified by the common idea of acknowledging the direction of universal human history. However, this idea is divided into those that recognize only regression in history and those that affirm progressive development. The former has quite ancient roots. Hesiod, for instance, believed that humanity's best times lay in the past, and as time progresses, people drift further from the era of complete happiness, the "Golden Age." According to Hesiod, human history represents a successive change of five generations: golden, silver, bronze, heroic, and iron. This variability among generations is linked to a continuous deterioration of life and an intensification of evil; after a temporary improvement in the age of heroes, whom Hesiod refers to as the "divine race," which was destroyed by "terrible war and dreadful battle," the final, fifth age — the iron age — emerges, characterized by violence and falsehood. This is the age when "the truth will be replaced by the fist... where there is force, there will be truth... shame will vanish. People will be left with only the most cruel and harsh misfortunes, and there will be no escape from evil." Despite the pessimistic tone of many of his statements, Hesiod nonetheless finds a foundation for belief in a high ideal of Justice (Δίκη). This foundation primarily rests on labor, which people are fated to undertake by the will of the gods. Though happiness may be absent among people in the final age, the path to it remains open: where persistent labor reigns and social justice is realized, a return to happiness is possible — such is the ultimate thought of the ancient Greek poet-thinker.

The second position is most clearly represented by the Enlightenment. The first to be named here is Johann Gottfried Herder, who undoubtedly acknowledged the laws governing the development of history, viewing history as a school of improvement along the path of progressive humanity. The conviction in the progressive direction of history is accompanied by a desire to reinforce it with evidence of the phases and stages through which humanity reaches the heights of progress. Hegel, who also shared the view of a directional societal development, posited that reason governs the world; thus, the universal historical process has proceeded rationally up to this point. "The rationality of history" is not alien to humanity, for "only through the study of universal history can it be clarified that its course has been rational." He seeks to demonstrate that universal history occurs, in essence, within the purely spiritual sphere. The substance, the essence of spirit, is freedom, and universal history consists of the gradual unfolding of the essence of spirit until complete self-awareness in its essence is achieved. The vicissitudes of history inexorably guide nations along the path of realizing the freedom of spirit in their actions. Hegel viewed the stages of history as the Eastern world, the ancient world, and the Germanic world. The Eastern peoples do not yet understand that spirit, or each person as such, possesses freedom; they know only that one (the ruler) has freedom. However, such freedom degenerates into tyranny, barbarism, and the dullness of passion. The Greeks and Romans progressed further; they recognized that some possess freedom (though still not every person). Only the Germanic peoples, through Christianity, came to the consciousness that humanity, as such, is free. Gradually, though with considerable difficulty and contradiction, this awareness was realized in the secular realm, requiring prolonged and intense cultural efforts. The stage of complete self-awareness of the spirit of freedom reaches its culmination when the secular life of people and its organization coincides with achievements in the realm of spiritual endeavor. The very logic of Hegel's thoughts necessitated the conclusion of historical progress. The attainment of the third stage of freedom also marks the conclusion of history; the spirit has nothing more to accomplish with regard to humanity. Naturally, time will continue to pass, humanity will endure, expanding itself in space and technologically advancing; however, nothing historically new will emerge in this excessively simplistic "history."

Hegel's vision of history effectively limits its course: on the one hand, the inevitability of progress is acknowledged, while on the other, there is talk of the completion of history, its end. The notion of the impending exhaustion of the content of history also has ancient origins (let us recall Aurelius Augustine and his thesis regarding two catastrophic events in the fate of humanity, beyond which there was and will be no history). This idea is intrinsic to all Christian eschatology (from Greek, έσχατος — last, extreme; λόγος — teaching). From a purely external perspective, the position of classical Marxism bears some resemblance to this. In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Karl Marx wrote: "In broad strokes, the Asian, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be marked as progressive epochs in the economic societal formation... The bourgeois societal formation completes the prehistory of human society." The term "prehistory" should not mislead us; it fundamentally refers to the end of history, clearly not the end of humanity and the destruction of society, but rather to the conclusion of history marked by the transition from one economic societal formation to another, more progressive one.

The enduring vitality of the idea of the end of history is affirmed by the stance of contemporary American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama, articulated in his provocative 1989 article "The End of History?" and further developed in his book "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992).

He correlates the events marking the conclusion of the Cold War and the futility of efforts to construct a communist society with the culmination of humanity's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of governance. This leads Fukuyama to pose the question of history's end. He argues that nothing fundamentally new in the realm of ideas can emerge after the triumph of liberalism; humanity has, through thought, reached the pinnacle of conceivable perfection. While the material world remains far from this conclusion, Fukuyama insists that this is a matter of time, noting that "there are serious grounds to believe that this ideal world will ultimately define the material world." He acknowledges that he is operating from idealistic premises, thus he need only identify those ideological alternatives to liberalism that have been tested by history and have failed. Such attempts, he identifies, are limited to two—fascism and communism. While these ideologies were championed by significant global powers (the USSR, China, Germany, Italy, Japan), history had its course. The defeat of fascism and communism, coupled with the progress in realizing liberal ideals, has relegated these powers to the realm of "post-history." Conflicts may still persist, particularly on ethnic and nationalist grounds, but historically significant conflicts require substantial states, which have now receded from the stage of history. For Fukuyama, the end of history is a melancholic affair; the exhilarating rise of inspiring ideas will give way to mundane daily concerns regarding endless technical improvements, the preservation of nature, and the satisfaction of consumer demands. In this "post-historical" era, there will be neither art nor philosophy, leaving only a meticulously guarded museum of human history.

In response to Fukuyama's concerns, another prominent American political scientist and sociologist, Samuel Huntington, soon articulated his views. His 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations?" garnered significant attention. He defines civilization as the highest cultural formation, characterized by objective elements (language, common history, religion, customs, social institutions) and the subjective self-identification of people. Huntington posits that civilizational identity will play an increasingly crucial role in the future, and the world will be shaped significantly by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, and possibly African). Whereas Fukuyama saw the end of history as a trend towards the cessation of conflict based on political and ideological discrepancies, Huntington warns that it is premature to declare an end to significant historical shifts. Now, conflicts that simmer beneath deeper contradictions—those of a civilizational order—may ascend to the forefront.

Thematically aligned with his aforementioned article is Huntington's book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order," published in 1996, as well as an excerpt from this book published in a well-known American journal. He critiques the thesis that "modern society necessarily converges towards a single type, the Western type, asserting that modern civilization is Western civilization, and Western civilization is modern civilization." The Western civilization possesses several defining characteristics that render it unique and therefore irreplaceable. Non-Western societies, at best, adopt only superficial traits of modernity (science, technology) and either reject or consciously dismiss the deeper attributes of "Western-ness," which Huntington attributes to the distinct separation of secular and spiritual authority, the rule of law, social pluralism, civil society, the existence of representative institutions, individualism, and the tradition of individual rights and freedoms. Recent practices of modernization and economic development in non-Western countries demonstrate that they are not drawing closer to the West; rather, they often intensively revive their cultural traditions, leading to "powerful trends of returning to tradition undermining the belief that Western culture will become the world's culture." Thus, for the West, it is time to abandon the illusions of universalism and to foster the strengthening, cohesion, and vitality of its own civilization amidst a world of other civilizations.

Consequently, throughout history, conflicting approaches regarding the direction of history have prevailed: arguments accumulate both in favor of recognizing a universal "logic" of the historical process and in favor of its refutation, as numerous facts from the past and present of humanity and specific societies are gathered, compared, and interpreted accordingly, given the rich tapestry of events in history that offers boundless possibilities. In such circumstances, it would be prudent to adopt a measured and temperate stance—critically yet attentively examining and evaluating each argument, understanding the vital significance of the issue of historical destiny for humanity, and, for the time being, contenting oneself with that, for only subsequent events will clarify the trajectory of history in greater alignment with one approach or another. Even then, conclusions may possess a purely prognostic character, thus remaining problematic. The issue of the direction of history belongs to the realm of eternal, transcendent questions, particularly concerning the search for pathways from what is in the present or the past to what ought to be in the future.