Worlds of Social Reality

Power

Social reality is never perceived by us as a distinct and particular whole; thus, our imagination cannot create any separate sensory image of it. The term "social reality," as a theoretical construct, symbolizes numerous societal phenomena that confront the individual in the guise of objective fact. The aggregate of phenomena constituting social reality is something we each encounter as a pre-existing entity, engaging in its creation and subsequent evolution through the process of socialization. The enduring and uniform phenomena that one meets upon entering the world of humanity form relatively distinct worlds. Learning to inhabit the worlds of social reality is not an easy task; nothing can replace personal experience. However, broadening this experience through the achievements of past generations and the theoretical generalizations of leading thinkers, both past and present, proves to be immensely beneficial. Here, we shall focus on only a few "worlds" of social reality that permeate our lives from childhood, sometimes intimidating or astonishing us with their vastness. We can coexist with these worlds, acknowledging their power, and we can learn to act not merely as neighbors or guests, but to feel at home within them.

Power

Power is a social phenomenon that has existed since the inception of society, and with each of us, it confronts us from the moment of our birth. The feeble, unconscious infant, upon entering the world, despite all natural impulses to assume the familiar position of an embryo, is compelled to submit to the maternal force that cares for it and guides it towards the evolution of humanity. Is this not where we gain our first experience of power, which, while modifying itself, expands and never leaves us throughout our lives?

In the social sciences, there are numerous definitions of the concept of power. Many attempts have been made to organize existing definitions and classify them. Let us consider two such attempts.

The French philosopher of Russian descent, Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968), dedicated a specific book to the concept of power, which, although written in 1942, only became widely known in the early 21st century. Adhering to phenomenological methodology, Kojève distinguished four types of theories of power:

1. The theological or theocratic theory, which attributes initial and absolute power to God;
2. Plato's theory, which holds that true power is based not on force but on "justice";
3. Aristotle's theory, in which power is justified by wisdom, knowledge, and the ability to foresee;
4. Hegel's theory, which reduces power relations to a "Master and Slave" dynamic.

All these types of theories of power negate one another, dismissing opposing doctrines due to the conflation of power with force. Kojève proposes a three-tiered analysis for a comprehensive evaluation of the phenomenon of power, examining it from phenomenological, metaphysical, and ontological perspectives. The first perspective will address the question of "what phenomenon power is," while the second perspective will aid in understanding the relationship between the phenomenon of power and the fundamental structure of the real world. The third approach, complementing the metaphysical one, investigates the structure of being, clarifying all the "whys" and "hows" concerning power. Kojève himself leans towards equating power with authority, wherein one person submits to another not through external will or force, but through the authority of the individual or institution.

The renowned Polish scholar Jerzy Wiatra, in his analysis of world literature, presents six varieties of the most general definition of power. These are as follows:

1. Behaviorist definitions, which assert that power is a type of behavior based on the ability to change the behavior of others;
2. Teleological definitions (from the Greek τελέω - end, result), according to which power is the achievement of certain goals and obtaining planned results;
3. Instrumentalist definitions interpret power as the capacity to utilize certain means, particularly violence;
4. Structuralist definitions, where power is defined as a certain type of relationship between the leader and the subordinate in a management situation;
5. Definitions of power as the influence of one person over another;
6. Conflict definitions, where power is reduced to the ability to make decisions that regulate the distribution of goods in conflict situations.

However, it is unlikely that most of the above approaches to defining power can be accepted as sufficiently comprehensive. Perhaps more successful would be those attempts in which the ubiquitous and timeless phenomenon of power is captured in the aspect of domination and submission within human relationships, wherein some individuals, so to speak, "possess" (or "rule over") the behavior of others, compelling them towards specific actions and controlling their conduct. There are numerous such attempts, and since they are similar, we will present only a few examples: "A has power over B if A influences B in a way that is contrary to B's interests"; "Ivan has power over Peter whenever and only if, according to the norms of the society to which both belong, Ivan has the right to give orders to Peter, and Peter is obliged to obey Ivan's commands."

Wherein should we seek the roots of this state of affairs, whereby some people are compelled to submit to the will and force of others? As disheartening as it may be for all freedom-loving individuals, we must acknowledge that this state is embedded in the very nature of human existence, inseparable from it. The German scholar Elias Canetti (1905-1994), who can be considered one of the founders of political anthropology, uncovered and described much of what underlies "power" within human nature in his seminal work "Crowds and Power." Take, for instance, the fear of touch, which may be based on the instinctual drive of any living being to protect its life. Instinctively, every individual fears the touch of something unknown above all else and seeks to avoid any foreign contact in any possible way. In the space surrounding us exists an invisible circle of safety that we vigilantly guard, wishing that no outsider infringes upon its boundaries. We "navigate" through life as if encased in an invisible spacesuit of a void devoid of strangers, erecting various barriers, establishing breaches in the fortifications of our inviolability. Whether people are traveling in public transport or have reached a prestigious position in the social hierarchy, they equally desire to distance themselves from others, complicating access to their sphere of safety and well-being for the rest. Through customary and legal norms, individuals seek to keep at bay all who approach them, and thus they wish to encircle their lives, composed of distances, with normative barriers.

Protection against encroachments upon one's secure space is merely an evasion of another's power over oneself. Yet, within the nature of a living being, there exists a counterpoint: for sustenance and ultimately for survival, it requires power as control over another. Illustrating his thoughts on power and the distinction between power and violence, Canetti provides a vivid example. A cat that catches a mouse will most likely destroy it, committing an act of violence. However, if violence allows itself to delay, it becomes power. By toying with the mouse, the cat grants it the opportunity to struggle, to feel a glimmer of hope for salvation, yet maintains the space of power, the sphere of its meticulous control over the victim's behavior. "All of this," concludes the author, "the space, the hope, the control, and the intention to destroy, can be called the true body of power or simply power." Thus, the power situation, by its very nature, consists of fundamental elements such as concern for personal security and the acquisition of means for sustenance and their consumption, while power embodies the domination and control of some over the consciousness and behavior of others.

Power is often associated with "force," "violence," "coercion," and "domination." In specialized literature and the linguistic practices of various peoples, distinct traditions of terminology have developed around the phenomenon of power. Despite the connection between "power" and "force," these concepts do not overlap entirely. Force pertains to the application of physical influence; however, although power invariably relies on force in certain respects, it can also be exercised without its application.

Based on the foundations upon which power rests, several varieties can be distinguished.

Coercive Power. This form of power is the most significant and prevalent, founded upon the threat of force. It can manifest as either legitimate (from the Latin legitimus, meaning lawful or rightful) or illegitimate. The former encompasses only that power which is voluntarily accepted by the majority of subordinates, without inducing obedience through threats or oppression. Individuals perceive such power as justified, although the avenues and grounds for justification, as well as the motivations for submission to authority, may vary. This criterion is exemplified by state power, which, based on widely recognized legality, may occasionally resort to the use of force. Conversely, the power wielded by an armed robber forcing a victim to surrender their wallet falls under the latter category. In both cases, coercion does not imply that individuals always behave submissively under pressure; indeed, they possess the option to resist the force, even at the risk of losing their freedom or life.

Psychological Power. This occurs where an individual is compelled to act in a predetermined direction under psychological influence, often unrecognized ("the power of suggestion"). For instance, "the power of advertising" influences consumers' choices; "the power of mass media," when monopolized, can program the behavior of the electorate during elections, or foster unanimous approval of the political line of the ruling group, thereby shaping what is termed "public opinion." When "psychological power" functions effectively, individuals can fall under the process of "brainwashing," often lacking any choice in their behavior, akin to coercive power. Naturally, psychological power cannot be accompanied by threats of force or implications of sanctions for disobedience.

Economic Power. This is predicated upon the exchange of goods and services through mutual, meaningful consent. Individuals accept the terms of exchange and submit to them for personal gain. The abstract market dynamic satisfies all with its anonymity and depersonalization. However, it is well known that during exchanges, the initial positions of participants may be significantly unequal, allowing certain groups or individuals to dictate the terms of exchange to others, thereby placing them at a disadvantage and thereby acquiring economic power. Modern states can also significantly influence the economic conditions of societal life, making it inappropriate to view exchange as the sole basis of economic power. Expanding on this thought, one could assert that in contemporary societies, all types of power are interwoven, yet distinguishing them remains useful, at least to account for the significance of various components within the overarching power mechanism.

In the realm of social philosophy, the greatest focus has always been on legitimate coercive power, which the distinguished German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) referred to as "domination" (Herrschaft). "The concept of domination," he wrote, "does not imply that a stronger natural force manifests itself in one way or another; rather, it signifies a rational relationship between the action of one ("command") and the action of another ("execution"), allowing for the expectation of the actions of both parties." Weber famously delineated three types of legitimate domination:

1. Legal Domination. This exists due to established rules. Here, individuals exhibit obedience not to any particular person based on their inherent rights but to the rules that dictate who should govern and to what extent. Weber includes modern governmental structures and local self-governance, management in private capitalist enterprises, and political associations, indicating that, from a technical standpoint, the purest example of legal domination is bureaucracy, a system of contractually appointed and designated officials. Ideally, the "leader" (official), whose right to dominate is legitimized by established rules within their jurisdiction, acts "regardless of individuals," strictly adhering to formal rational rules, and where these do not apply, guided by considerations of practical expediency. This type of power can be defined as rational, as trust in it is founded on a conscious and meaningful collective recognition of the legitimacy of established laws; thus, individuals submit not to the person, regardless of who they are, but to the law.
2. Traditional Domination. This is based on the belief in the sanctity of existing orders and those in power who have been in place for a long time. A pure example might be patriarchal domination (the father of a large family, the head of a clan, the "father of the nation"). The domestic community serves as the fundamental unit of traditional domination, though this model can extend to other associations where such domination occurs: the one who issues commands belongs to the type of "master," the administrative staff consists of "servants," and the subordinates are "subjects." The content of the "master's" orders is determined by tradition, and a gross violation of this by the ruler would undermine the legitimacy of their domination, which rests upon the belief in the sanctity of tradition. Weber distinguishes between two fairly distinct forms of traditional domination: a purely patriarchal structure of authority (the purest examples being sultanate rule and all true despotisms, where domination is viewed as the ruler's natural right) and estate-based (where power is divided between a superior ruler and an appointed, privileged administrative staff). Aristocratic governance during the feudal era exemplifies the estate-based form of traditional domination.
3. Charismatic Domination. This derives from devotion to the personal qualities of the ruler and their charisma (from the Greek χάρις, meaning charm or grace), often stemming from their magical abilities, revelations, heroism, or strength of spirit and word. Weber considers the purest form of such domination to be that of a prophet, military hero, or great demagogue. The one giving commands is the leader, while the subordinate is the "follower." The leader's power wanes as soon as their "extraordinary qualities" cease to be validated, are exhausted, and their charisma dissipates.

Weber aptly termed the types of legitimate domination he identified as "pure," implying that they represent theoretical constructs, idealized representations of reality with varying degrees of correspondence to actual existence. Such constructions are often utilized in Weber's works and are denoted as "ideal types." The significant characteristics of certain objects of reality are reflected, combined into complexes, and gain conceptual formulation, enabling us to grasp the object more clearly and better navigate the vast sea of empirical data. However, as Weber noted, "in real life, such idealized images in their conceptual purity are nowhere empirically found... we must entirely abandon the notion that these 'ideal' constructs in the purely logical sense possess any character of obligation or 'template.'" Thus, from this perspective, the identified "pure" types of legitimate domination represent "ideal-typical" formations of our theoretical thought and likely do not exist in empirical "purity," yet such formations become a crucial methodological tool for approaching the understanding of complex forms of legitimate domination.

One of the principal functions of power as a societal phenomenon is to cultivate a state of unity within groups, communities, and society at large. The expansion of systematic power relations beyond the private sphere into the realm of public life has gradually led to the emergence of a social phenomenon known as politics. Politics is an activity directed towards the attainment and realization of power that extends across the entire society. It is thus evident that, for instance, parental authority within the relatively enclosed patriarchal or modern family was and is not political. Moreover, it is important to note that the sphere of publicity is certainly not limited to political activity and is not subsumed by it.

The emergence and development of politics coincide with the formation of the state. The state is a political organization that governs society. It is customary to identify the following characteristics of the state: 1) the presence of public power, which encompasses the entirety of societal space and is exercised by professionals of governance (politicians, officials) and professionals of coercion (police or militia, army); 2) the taxation of the populace; 3) territorial boundaries of the state's authority in relation to its subjects; 4) law as an officially prescribed system of norms of behavior, obligatory for all citizens. The state can be regarded as the institutional embodiment of political power as public authority. Within its territory, each state maintains a monopoly on violence. Throughout the history of socio-political and philosophical thought, power has often been either equated with violence or regarded as inherently linked to it. A prime example of this approach is the stance of Max Weber, who understood power as a relationship of domination that relies on violence as a means. Over time, the state has monopolized this means, declaring itself the sole source of the "right" to violence. However, Weber emphasized that violence is neither a normal nor the only means at the state's disposal. In conditions of stability within a given political regime, the obedience of individuals to authority is ensured without resorting to overt applications of force. Violence becomes apparent only during a crisis of state power when it loses legitimacy.

The multifaceted questions surrounding the functioning of political power are studied by university students in political science courses, and it would be inappropriate to even list them here, not so much due to a lack of space, but because most of these questions are not strictly philosophical. As has already been seen, among the many issues currently raised by political philosophers regarding power, the problem of its legitimacy appears to be the most significant and complex. In fact, who today serves as the authority that establishes rules of domination that are authoritative for the majority of citizens? How can public peace and constructive harmony between rulers and subjects be achieved in a context where traditional society has exited the historical stage, charismatic forms of rule have discredited themselves, become odious, and are realized only in some exotic religious groups or criminal organizations, or finally, in enclaves of historical stagnation detached from the modern world? Leading thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries operated with the category of the "people," arguing that the reason and will of the people should establish norms for the organization of power that align with human nature. Yet it is well known how often the will of the people (or purportedly on behalf of the people) was exploited by social demagogues or historical adventurers to impose fabricated rules of power relations that subsequently failed to meet the expectations of the majority of the population. Nevertheless, in the 21st century, the global community has entered with significant achievements in the realm of power legitimacy. Among the proven paths and principles developed by modern democratic legal states, one can identify: a) the priority of human rights; b) the principle of popular sovereignty; c) the principle of the separation of powers; d) a developed civil society.

The first and second principles indicate the necessity of combining two opposites: the respect for the individual as a politically autonomous subject and the recognition of the sovereignty of the people, which legitimizes power as the source of law. This combination must occur in such a way that the individuals who constitute the people genuinely participate in the formulation of norms for organizing societal life and accept them as their own. As for the principle of the separation of powers, it primarily concerns the allocation of legislative and executive functions to different state institutions. Otherwise, for instance, the executive power could fabricate laws that primarily benefit itself while neglecting the interests of the majority. Since the 17th century, this principle has been well justified by European philosophers and has since been refined to separate the different branches of power (e.g., judicial). The principle of the separation of powers only operates under conditions of the supremacy of the law. The idea of civil society is an acquisition of 18th- and 19th-century philosophical and economic thought, wherein a theoretical consciousness emerged that distinguished the concepts of state and society. Civil society represents the domain of private interests of ordinary citizens, encompassing the entire spectrum of connections and interactions among individuals engaged in ensuring their own lives in all its manifestations.

Contemporary German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, drawing on these general foundations and based on his developed "theory of communicative action" and the concept of communicative rationality, articulated a model of perfect democratic procedure for achieving power legitimacy in his work "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere." Habermas's model rests on the ideal of a fellowship of free and equal individuals who, through political communication, define the forms of their shared life, wherein the democratic self-organization of citizens appears as an endless process, a constant procedure for forming the opinion and will of the people based on a combination of each individual's political autonomy and the genuine sovereignty of the people.

In conditions of prevailing political power, psychologists often attempt to uncover the roots of human political aspirations, asserting that the desire for power is one of the most significant traits of the human psyche, albeit distributed among individuals in various ways. This has led to the identification of four types of people based on their inclination towards domination: 1) individuals who are inclined solely to dominate and command; 2) individuals who are inclined solely to submit; 3) individuals who possess the ability to dominate or submit depending on the situation; 4) independent individuals, or those who have no inclination towards either domination or submission. Since the advent of the state and political power, criticism and discontent with them have persisted. The most consistent and relentless cohort of professional critics is likely drawn from individuals of the fourth type, and they have existed since the dawn of written history. Such critics have been termed "specialists in discontent" by American researcher Michael Walzer.

One of the renowned contemporary researchers and critics of power was French philosopher Michel Foucault, who, in a series of books, aimed to demonstrate that modern society is characterized by a unique system of power that functions as a mechanism of all-encompassing control, operating continuously and striving for maximum efficiency. New technologies of power gradually emerged across various spheres of societal life, with "disciplinary power," or discipline, being one of the key technologies that Foucault meticulously analyzes in his work "Discipline and Punish." Disciplinary power tends to disaggregate the masses into individuals, classify them based on various attributes, and assign each a specific place within a limited space, where they can always be found and their behavior monitored. Visible embodiments of such power include military barracks, clinics, psychiatric hospitals, prisons for criminals, and the classroom principle for educating children. In all such institutions, individuals are not free; even the architecture of these establishments reflects the necessity for supervision and control. The disciplinary nature of power is typically not confined to these specific institutions; rather, its influence extends beyond purely disciplinary entities and gradually envelops society as a whole, encompassing all forms of interpersonal relations. "There occurs," Foucault writes, "the dissemination of disciplinary procedures, not merely in the form of closed institutions but also as centers of control scattered throughout society."

1. Foucault largely renounces traditional conceptions of power. In one of his interviews, he remarked: “Defining the influence of power as repression stems from a purely legalistic concept of such power, equating power with a law that says ’no’; power is primarily regarded as something that carries the weight of prohibition. Today, I consider this to be a wholly negative, narrow, schematic conception of power, which, surprisingly, is widely disseminated. If power were solely repressive, if it did nothing but say ’no,’ do you really believe that one could compel obedience to it? What enables power to endure, what compels it to be accepted, is not merely that it exerts pressure on us as a force that says ’no,’ but rather that it is productive; it engenders pleasure, shapes knowledge, and produces discourse. It must be viewed more as a productive power that extends throughout the social body than as a negative instance whose function is repression.”

In this understanding, power no longer has a single center; it appears dispersed, existing only when there is a tangible ruler (say, a monarch), and such a figure is absent in modern nations (the "king has been beheaded"). Foucault sidesteps the currently pressing question among political philosophers regarding the "crisis of legitimacy," for in his view, the exercise of power, its acceptance, or its conferral occurs somewhere else. Power is applied and enacted through a networked organization; individuals navigate its threads, simultaneously submitting to and enacting power; they are not merely its inert and obedient subjects but also elements of its articulation. The networked disciplinary society was not deliberately created, nor is it governed by anyone; it has formed through the force of some “invisible hand” in such a way that its parts fit together seamlessly. The task of science is to closely examine power relations in the places where power is actually exercised, where individuals truly suffer from it and resist it.

As for Foucault's resultant political stance concerning his critical analysis of the phenomenon of power, it remains indeterminate. “Foucault,” as Michael Walzer points out, “takes no stance and finds no foundations. He shakes the bars of the iron cage angrily, yet he has no plan or program for making this cage resemble a human dwelling more closely.” Nevertheless, Foucault’s extensive studies of power relations in contemporary society, their genealogies, and specific manifestations are of significant importance for understanding the nature of power.