Worlds of Social Reality

Language

Every individual's relationship with the world and with others is expressed not only through action but also articulated through linguistic means. Language, in turn, presents itself as a genuine and profoundly significant realm; it is intricately linked to our daily lives, employed in both mundane and formal communication, and resonates within our consciousness during silent contemplation. For each person, language is also a reality that commands respect, necessitating an awareness of its rules and requirements. It facilitates the generalization and transmission of experiences among groups, generations, and communities. Through language, we engage with the socio-historical experience of humanity, acquire frameworks for interpreting the world, and internalize the tools for organizing knowledge.

The most comprehensive insights into language can be derived from courses in linguistics, where philosophy, as in other domains, does not seek to replace specialized sciences. However, the theme of language has long been a part of philosophical inquiry, with many philosophers significantly contributing to the development of linguistics. This begins, for instance, with the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras, who first emphasized the significance of tense in expressions and introduced the concept of the verb. Language organically entered the realm of study for modern European philosophers as their interests shifted towards epistemology, marked by what is often referred to as the "epistemological turn." Acknowledging the crucial role of language in knowledge, philosophers since the 17th century have noted the difficulties arising from the misuse of words (the "idols of the marketplace" according to F. Bacon), have characterized the word as a sign (T. Hobbes), have examined the formation of concepts (J. Locke), and have analyzed the role of words in theories of abstraction (D. Hume). Yet, the true "linguistic turn" in philosophy occurred in the 20th century. Evaluating its significance, American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007) observed: "The picture of ancient and medieval philosophy, concerned with things, the picture of philosophy from the 17th to the 19th century, focused on ideas, and the picture of contemporary philosophy, which engages with words, is entirely plausible."

The first to indicate this turn was analytic philosophy, which became dominant in 20th-century Anglophone philosophy, particularly after the Second World War, although the roots of this analytical tradition can be traced back to ancient times. The essence of this style lies in a particular focus on the analytical method aimed at transforming philosophical knowledge into something sufficiently substantiated, thus "rigorous," coupled with an acute awareness of the issue of "meaning," and the translation of fundamental philosophical problems into the domain of language. "How does analytic philosophy, in its various aspects, differ from other philosophical currents?" asks British philosopher Michael Dummett (born 1925), who answers: "Firstly, it holds the conviction that philosophical analysis of language can lead to philosophical clarification of thought; secondly, it asserts that this is the only way to achieve comprehensive clarity."

With its primary focus on language, analytic philosophy aligns itself with a broader philosophical-linguistic movement that can be termed the philosophy of language. In an anthology of Western philosophy of language, which assembles works from some of the most notable contemporary philosophers, logicians, and linguists, it is noted that philosophers distinguish three areas of language study, gravitating towards one based on their academic preferences: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax is the study of the rules that, in purely formal terms, describe well-formed sentences. In these descriptions, the concept of "meaning" is intentionally absent to illustrate what a grammatical sentence represents in terms of meaning. Semantics examines the meanings of words and sentences, seeking to explain what constitutes a so-called "meaningful expression," that is, one that holds some significance. Pragmatics studies the actions undertaken with language by its users, as they often do more than merely speak; they may linguistically promise, marry someone, accuse or insult someone, or apologize to someone, among other actions.

The development of contemporary philosophy of language can be divided into three stages. There was a time when philosophers primarily engaged with syntax, considering it the sole justifiable study of language. This period extended approximately from 1921, with the publication of Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," to 1935, with the release of the work by Polish-American logician and mathematician Alfred Tarski (1902-1983), titled "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages." Today, most philosophers no longer focus on syntax, leaving that to linguists. The second generation of philosophers leaned more towards the pragmatic aspects of language, while the third turned their attention to semantics. The former includes representatives of neopositivism from the Vienna Circle (late 1920s to mid-1930s), who prioritized logic and were less concerned with issues of natural human language. The latter includes the philosophers of the Oxford School, which formed in Britain after 1951 and focused on everyday language. The third group is best represented by American philosopher and logician Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000), whose primary creative period spanned the 1950s to the 1980s.

The philosophy of language, much like analytic philosophy as a whole, cannot avoid engaging with other contemporary movements that raise questions about consciousness, understanding, the nature of confusion, and the role of language in culture. Among these are hermeneutics, structuralism, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, pragmatism, and others. The relationships among the philosophy of language, linguistics, and logic boast a rich history. Given the scope within which we explore language, we shall focus on the significant contributions of three scholars who, in our view, made the most substantial impacts on the study of language and its philosophical implications.

First, we must mention the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. In "Course in General Linguistics," first published in 1916 based on student notes, de Saussure articulated several fundamental ideas that fundamentally reformed all previous approaches to language and without which contemporary philosophy of language could not have emerged.

Initially, Saussure demonstrated the necessity of distinguishing between language and speech, asserting that linguistic activity encompasses two dimensions: the individual and the social. The former is represented by speech, while the latter is represented by language; this distinction holds true because the execution of a speech act is never collective but always individual, thus qualifying it as speech. Simultaneously, language is not an activity of the speaker; rather, it is a ready-made social product, a compilation of necessary conventions accepted by the community to facilitate the realization of the capacity for linguistic activity inherent in each language user. The language system, in relation to individual speech, can be likened to a symphony, whose reality does not depend on the manner of its performance; any errors made by performing musicians do not detract from that reality. However, the distinction between language and speech is not absolute; their existence is mutually dependent: language is necessary for speech to be understood and, therefore, effective, while speech is requisite for the formation of language, meaning that the fact of speech historically precedes language. By establishing the interdependence of language and speech, Saussure concludes that language serves as both a tool and a product of speech.

He further articulates another significant proposition: language is a system of signs that express concepts. If one were to imagine a science studying the life of signs in society, it could be called semiology (from the Greek σημεῖον — sign), with linguistics being a part of this broader science. The linguistic sign connects not a thing to its name but rather a concept to an acoustic image, which Saussure refers to as the signified (the concept) and the signifier (the acoustic image). Thus, he considers the linguistic sign to be the unity of the signified and the signifier. Based on these foundations, Saussure formulates two principles: the arbitrariness of the sign and the linearity of the signifier. The linguistic sign is arbitrary, but this does not imply that the signifier can be freely chosen by the speaker; it only indicates that the acoustic image is arbitrary in relation to the signified, with which it shares no natural connection. The principle of arbitrariness allows for a clarification of the distinctions between the terms "sign" and "symbol." A symbol is characterized by not always being entirely arbitrary; it retains a remnant of a natural connection between the signified and the signifier. For example, the scales as a symbol of justice cannot be arbitrarily replaced by anything else. Saussure articulates the essence of his second principle as follows: the signifier, being perceived through hearing, unfolds only in time and possesses two characteristics: a) it has extension; b) this extension has one dimension—namely, it forms a line (whence arises writing).

Since words are organically embedded within the linguistic system, they possess not only meaning but also significance, which depends on their verbal context. "By becoming part of the system, a word is endowed not only with meaning but also, primarily, with significance, and this is something entirely different," notes F. de Saussure.

The life of language in time, as defined by Saussure, is characterized by a second dichotomy he termed synchronicity and diachrony. In linguistics, these terms refer to the coexistence of linguistic phenomena within a single epoch (synchronicity) and the historical progression of linguistic phenomena (diachrony). This distinction gives rise to a division within linguistics into two branches: synchronic and diachronic. The former reveals the principles underlying language as a systemic entity, while the latter examines the relationships between elements of language in their temporal movement.

Saussure's assertions regarding the connection between language and thought are particularly significant. He states, "Language can be likened to a sheet of paper. Thought represents its obverse side, while sound is its reverse; one cannot separate the obverse without also cutting the reverse. Similarly, in language, one cannot isolate thought from sound, nor sound from thought; this can only be achieved through abstraction."

From the mid-20th century onward, Saussure's fundamental ideas found their moment. They were thoroughly reinterpreted by proponents of structuralism and adapted to the study of numerous cultural phenomena in mythology, literary studies, ethnology, sociology, and beyond. This adaptation necessitated an expansion of the application of concepts such as "language" and "speech," "signified" and "signifier," "significance," and others beyond mere linguistic phenomena, or conversely, an interpretation of "extralinguistic" relationships as "linguistic."

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is now regarded as one of the most significant, original, and profound thinkers, whose sparse yet richly conceived works had a substantial impact on the philosophy of the latter half of the 20th century. Unlike Saussure, who approached language from a linguistic perspective, Wittgenstein approached linguistic issues philosophically, contemplating roughly as follows: All our knowledge about the world and our relation to it is expressed through language. One might posit a univocal correspondence between the state of reality and some form of its expression in language. Thus, it becomes essential to clarify the rules governing the construction of meaningful sentences—those that correspond to the actual state of affairs. A philosopher can, through logical means, illuminate language, isolating what encapsulates the correspondence between utterance and reality and what lacks such transparency. In the preface to his first book, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," Wittgenstein notes: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Initially, Wittgenstein concentrated more on the first part of this conclusion, investigating the conditions for the logical clarification of thought, believing that this constituted the task of philosophy, with sentences resulting from such efforts "showing the logical form of reality."

In his subsequent work, "Philosophical Investigations," Wittgenstein drew attention to the overly idealized notions of the correspondence between a correct sentence and reality. In truth, our capacity to achieve clarity of expression, and thereby convey it to reality, is limited. This limitation arises from the considerably more complex nature of language and the diverse practices of its usage. Nevertheless, the author does not renounce the exploration of language, for the boundary of possible expression can only be drawn within language itself. At this juncture, he perceived the task of philosophy as delineating the boundaries of language within which meaningful utterances can be constructed. To understand an utterance is to grasp the language, and to understand that language entails mastering a certain "technique," a set of rules governing the game. Wittgenstein likened the use of language to a form of play. He referred to "language games" not as mere amusements but as serious life actions interwoven with language. "The term 'language game,'" he asserts, "is meant to emphasize that speaking a language is a component of activity or a form of life."

Language encompasses an innumerable array of sentence types. This multiplicity is not a fixed entity, established once and for all; on the contrary, new types of language emerge while others become obsolete and forgotten. Formally, the same words can acquire different meanings across different times and contexts, and the meaning of a word is its use in language, encapsulating the entirety of the life context familiar to language users at a particular time and in a specific situation. Consider the expression "I am afraid." What does "I am afraid" signify? In what context do these words arise? In our exploration, we might spend considerable time refining the meaning: is the expression a cry of terror? Is it a report on one's current emotional state or the general backdrop of life? Or perhaps it pertains to the posturing of some mannerism? No one can provide us with a singularly correct guide to the use of language and the understanding of meanings. Philosophy cannot encroach upon the actual use of language; it can only describe it, leaving everything as it is. What philosophy can offer to an individual is the clarification of certain rules governing "language games," as they form entire complexes akin to "family resemblance." As for philosophical phrases, they are essentially "nonsensical utterances" (or "pseudostatements"); however, they cannot be extricated from language, as the workings of human intellect periodically generate a need to make philosophical claims, to express something significant.

The English philosopher John Austin (1911-1960) was a representative of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy and one of the founders of speech act theory. Like other proponents of this school, he advocated for a deeper understanding of the meaning and significance of linguistic expressions, as well as the boundaries between meaningful and nonsensical expressions. The focus of research in speech act theory is the act of language, where a speaker presents their sentences in a situation of direct communication with a listener. It is here that we often encounter instances where a sentence is not descriptive (i.e., it describes or states something) but performative (from the English "perform"—to execute, to effectuate, to act). To the first type of utterances, we can confidently apply the criterion of truth; to the latter, we cannot. Although from this perspective they may appear nonsensical, they hold immense significance in human life. Performative utterances execute an action alongside simple expression, such as: "I hereby accuse you...," "I promise that...," "I appoint you...," "I declare the meeting open (closed)," and after such proclamations, something indeed changes within and around us. To such expressions, we can apply not the criterion of truth but rather criteria of validity (invalidity), sincerity (insincerity), realizability (unrealizability), and so forth.

Austin was particularly interested in examining the relationships between the language user and the linguistic expression. To better understand the specifics of these relationships, he distinguished between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts. The act of "speaking" (as such, in itself) is proposed to be called the execution of a locutionary act (from Latin locutio—conversation, speech; enunciation). In performing a locutionary act, we primarily utilize language simply. Yet how do we employ it in a specific case? There are numerous functions or modes of using language. We may inquire and respond; inform, assure, and warn; announce decisions or intentions; render judgments; appoint, beg, or criticize. It is crucial for us to discern whether a given instance of language communication concerns advice, a mere proposal, or a direct command; it is significant whether there was a firm promise made or merely a declaration of an indefinite intention. The aspect concerning the execution of some act during "speaking" is proposed to be termed an illocutionary act. However, Austin emphasizes yet another aspect. The utterance of certain words often, and even typically, produces subsequent effects on the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, and this effect can be intentional, deliberate, and goal-directed. The execution of such an act may be termed a perlocutionary act or perlocution. The following examples illustrate the specificity of each act in the process of speaking and its reception:

1. "He said to me, 'Help her!'" - locution.
2. "He insisted (or advised, commanded, etc.) that I help her." - illocution.
3. "He persuaded me to help her." - perlocution.

Thus, Austin concludes that when we say something during a language communication, we simultaneously perform a set of actions: first, we simply utter a sentence with a certain meaning (locutionary act); second, we inform, command, warn, or initiate something (illocutionary act); third, we may elicit something or achieve something, such as persuading, compelling, frightening, surprising, or misleading (perlocutionary act). The latter act differs from the preceding one by its success, the presence of consequences.

The theory of speech acts was further developed by other representatives of the Oxford school, such as Paul Grice (1913-1988), Peter Strawson (1919-2006), and the American philosopher John Searle (b. 1932), who deepened the understanding of the nature of illocutionary acts, recognizing them as the fundamental units of linguistic communication and exploring the rules for the successful execution of speech acts.

In summary, one could assert that the philosophical interest in language was not only prompted by the awareness that language serves as a crucial instrument for grasping reality and is the principal means of human communication but also by a shift from the confidence in the hidden structures of reality that lie beneath the structures of language to a somewhat skeptical attitude towards the traditional quest for a fundamental ontology through language. This has led to an elevation of the significance of everyday language as an intrinsic value.

The linguistic themes and language issues present in society are certainly not exhausted by the philosophical aspects mentioned here. At certain times, debates surrounding language take on a political hue, even escalating into conflict. Considering that there are currently over 2,000 ethnic groups with their own languages on Earth, and approximately two hundred states, most countries are multiethnic and, consequently, multilingual. In times of heightened political tension, especially against the backdrop of economic difficulties, the linguistic facets of life for various ethnic groups may be exploited by certain forces in political struggles. Some may extol the advantages and merits of one language over another, cynically disregarding the fact that a mother tongue, regardless of the number of its speakers, is woven into the very fabric of each living human being. Nevertheless, from a broader humanistic and democratic perspective, it is evident that we must diligently foster the conditions for the development of all languages, bearing in mind that the ability to use one's native language daily fosters a sense of wholeness and joy in life, contributes to an individual's mental well-being, and normalizes their worldview. Moreover, each language constitutes a great value, contributing to the collective cultural genome of humanity.