Worlds of Social Reality

Norms

The term "norm" is understood in at least a dual sense. In one interpretation, it refers to a certain "normality" of things or behaviors of individuals, while deviations from the accepted standard are perceived as anomalies, or "abnormalities." Often, the discourse surrounding "norm" and "normality" in this context is purely a matter of values, having a relative character with respect to specific individuals, cultures, and historical periods, concerning the evaluation of actions, conditions, and stereotypes of perception within the surrounding social environment. Here, we can observe assessments such as "it is accepted this way," "it is proper," or "as people do." When acquaintances greet each other upon meeting, it is a norm; it is normal for children to obey their parents, and for parents to care for their children; behavior considered normal aligns with the accepted cultural standards appropriate to one’s age. Not only communities but even individual persons possess a set of such norms for all aspects of life, often employing them unconsciously and without explicit verbalization or full reflection.

However, as we delve into the realm of norms, we shall focus more on the concept of norm as a social norm, which pertains to the regulation of individuals’ activities within society. As previously mentioned, social relations constitute forms, or boundaries, of human activity and interaction. The means through which social relations are presented to individuals in the realm of their behavior is the social norm. Thus, in their daily interactions, social relations manifest as a collection of norms. In the practice of daily life, each individual perceives social norms as rules and standards of behavior that prescribe permissible boundaries of action, with violations leading to anticipated sanctions. Therefore, social norms serve as prescriptions and requirements imposed by society on individual actions in the name of social solidarity.

Within society, there exists a complex and intricate system of norms, reflecting divisions of social life, social structure, and historical dynamics. This complexity complicates the study of the normative system. Additionally, the multidimensionality of normative prescriptions precludes a comprehensive classification of norms. Nonetheless, we can outline some established approaches to such classification. For instance, norms can be categorized as "rigid" and "flexible," depending on the strictness of the requirements for adherence and the nature of the sanctions involved. Rigid norms demand literal compliance, with strict punishment for violations. In contrast, flexible norms allow for some degree of freedom in interpreting their requirements, with penalties for breaches being less severe. There is also a distinction between "rules" and "expectations." The former are crucial for society, as their violation undermines social stability and leads to social disintegration. Typically, breaking rules results in harsh penalties. From this perspective, expectations are considered less significant and thus do not manifest as written laws. Furthermore, one can differentiate between "goals" and "frameworks." The former are directive, indicating values that society or a group encourages striving towards, while the latter delineate the boundaries of human activity.

In relation to norms, individuals often employ notions of the "ought" and relate it to the "is," what exists in reality. The normative, or deontic, encompasses rights and duties that ought to be present, even if they are absent. Deontic notions are spontaneously generated by specific social groups in accordance with their value horizons, ideals, and models of justice and goodness. Two scenarios may arise: a) when the is and the ought coincide, and b) when they are in opposition (for instance, in cases of biculturalism, when an individual chooses norms deemed appropriate that do not align with the prevailing culture but correspond to their cultural identity). Hence, considering social norms from the perspective of their deontic nature, we can distinguish between two such types. Based on the degree of fixation and formalization of norms, we also categorize them as explicit (clearly formulated) and latent (hidden), meaning they are assumed to be self-evident or implied. In terms of fixation form, we can identify norms codified in compendiums, codes, statutes, and rules.

In specialized literature, approaches have also been proposed for classifying norms that allow for the integration of various dimensions of their measurement. One type encompasses norms that are highly formalized, controlled, and maintained by specific authorities and means. These include legal laws and administrative or organizational rules. A different type consists of norms that are not formalized (for example, widely accepted requirements, rules, and customs). Moral norms, etiquette norms, and fashion norms occupy an intermediate position in various classifications. While they are well understood by public consciousness, they lack a clear formulation and a singular instance of codification.

The existence of norms enables us to describe human behavior concerning its relationship to the prevailing system of norms. According to American sociologist Robert K. Merton, a typology of individual adaptation to norms, values, goals, and means of achieving them can be established:

Forms of Adaptation	Culturally Defined Goals	Institutionalized Means
Conformity	+	+
Innovation	+	—
Ritualism	—	+
Retreatism	—	—
Rebellion	+—	+—

In this table, "+" denotes "acceptance"; "−" denotes "rejection"; "+—" indicates "rejection of prevailing norms and substitution with new ones."

Conformity. This type generally encompasses law-abiding, respectable individuals. The higher the stability of society, the more prevalent this type of adaptation becomes. In fact, the continued existence of humanity and society is largely owed to the majority of people of this sort.

Innovation. This form of adaptation involves the use of institutionally prohibited yet effective means to achieve certain goals. "Innovation" arises when an individual has internalized culturally defined values and goals but has not managed to assimilate the accepted norms regulating the paths and means of achieving those goals. Examples include fraud and various forms of illegal money-making. Thus, the "innovative" type includes individuals who share socially positive objectives but resort to new, often socially disapproved means (criminal paths) to achieve them.

Ritualism. This type encompasses fanatics of formalism and staunch bureaucrats. They distance themselves from lofty cultural goals or downplay their significance, focusing instead on an almost unconditional adherence to institutional norms. Merton posits that this type of adaptation may be prevalent in societies where individuals’ social status is largely determined by their achievements. Continuous competitive struggle engenders anxiety regarding one's status, and one way to alleviate such anxiety is through the constant lowering of ambitions. The mental formulas guiding individuals of this type are well-known: "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," and "don’t aim too high, or the fall will hurt." Such expressions convey the idea that high aspirations lead to disappointment and danger.

Retreatism (from Latin retro - backward, reverse). This form of adaptation groups together those who are "cast out" from society (vagrants, alcoholics, drug addicts, and some suffering from psychoses who have become absorbed in their morbid world, distant from reality). "Retreatists" are often those who constantly face defeat in their attempts to achieve cultural objectives (even lofty ones) through legitimate means and cannot resort to illegal methods due to their internal moral prohibitions. Staunch "retreatists" pay little heed to established orders, are characterized by individualism, have grown accustomed to their alienation, and seldom fall into despair over their continuous disappointments and failures.

Rebellion. This type of adaptation bears some resemblance to the previous one. "Rebels" also reject the widely accepted social goals and the positive means of achieving them, viewing the accepted standards as arbitrary and lacking any legitimate basis. However, unlike retreatists, rebels propose their own norms. They often become victims of various political intrigues and may form ranks of insurgents or simply groups or crowds that shock the populace with their audacious behavior.

Types of adaptation from two to five are commonly referred to as deviant (from Latin deviatio - deviation). Deviance in behavior and activity arises from a rupture between goals and socially sanctioned means of their achievement. According to American sociologist Albert Cohen, deviance encompasses not only crime and offenses but also any behavior that violates accepted norms. This definition includes various forms of unlawful use of force against individuals, acts of individuals mired in depravity, and the "business operations" of those who cater to others' vices. It also encompasses all forms of corruption and improper conduct (either illegal or merely unethical) by public officials, tax evasion, and even deceit in taking exams.

In general, deviance is a phenomenon characteristic of periods of social stability, when universally acknowledged norms of behavior prevail. Times of social disorganization, when one social order collapses and a new one is only beginning to take shape, cannot be indicative when discussing the causes of deviant actions. This is primarily because the coordinate system relative to which deviant behavior is defined dissolves. However, this is only partly true, since in public consciousness, in the historical memory of a people, even in crisis periods, notions of deviance and conformity persist, reflecting the retention of certain invariants of behavior concerning some foundational norms that touch upon the very essence of social and personal life. What basic norms do social expectations rely on during times of destruction of customary behavioral patterns? Given that such periods can be quite protracted, the question "What should one rely on?" does not seem rhetorical for each individual. It appears that in crisis periods, in times of ruin, consensus regarding universal human values and the norms that derive from them takes on particular significance for the survival of society. Time-tested universal values provide individuals with a foundation for evaluating actions, for forming a hierarchy of personal value perceptions, and for choosing a line of behavior amid the chaos of transitional norms. However, the transformation of universal values and norms into a true support for individual behavior is both a lengthy and complex process.

For example, in societies with long-standing traditions of liberal democracy, wealth occupies one of the highest positions on the scale of values, and culturally, only legal means and paths to its achievement are encouraged. Conversely, during the "Soviet society" era, wealth did not carry such a positive value connotation, nor were there any institutionally defined forms of behavior for achieving wealth as a goal. Accordingly, the negative assessment of wealth was associated with the belief that it is acquired solely through illegal and criminal means. A society striving to move away from this and intending to embark on a path of liberal-democratic foundations still harbors contradictory value settings during complex transformational times, namely: a positive assessment of personal wealth as a goal of life activity, coupled with the public opinion that wealth is gained only through illegal means.

Another example revolves around the issue of individualism and collectivism. In liberal democracy, the absolute value of the individual is acknowledged, prioritizing the freedom and interests of the individual over those of society. Yet, individualism is not equated with egoism, and the willingness to help others is not nullified by an individualistic orientation. In the official "Soviet" value system, individualism was viewed negatively, unequivocally identified with egoism, while, conversely, collectivism was inseparably linked with altruism. Thus, in the transitional period, there exists a real threat of forming an internally contradictory value orientation, where the newly rehabilitated individualism is once again equated with egoism. The general danger of such internally contradictory value orientations lies in their ability to provoke behavior that deviates from universal human values while simultaneously being justified by an immature public opinion as a line of behavior that ostensibly aligns with progress and the needs of the time.

A society in which deviant behavior encompasses a significant portion of the population may, at certain periods, approach a state of anomie (from French anomie - lawlessness, normlessness). According to the concept of anomie proposed by the aforementioned French sociologist Émile Durkheim, it refers to a state of society when a considerable portion of its members holds negative or indifferent attitudes toward the norms directed at them. "At the moment of social disorganization," Durkheim wrote, "whether it occurs through a painful crisis or, on the contrary, during favorable but overly sudden social transformations, society temporarily appears incapable of exerting the necessary influence on individuals... The overall state of disorganization, or anomie, is exacerbated by the fact that passions are least subject to discipline precisely when it is most needed." In Durkheim's teaching about mechanical and organic solidarity within society, anomie is associated with the period of humanity's transition from traditional to modern industrial society. The preceding society produced a corresponding system of moral norms that does not function in the industrial age, and the creation of adequate moral norms lags significantly behind the pace of progress. Durkheim envisioned a way out of the state of anomie through accelerating the transition to organic solidarity among individuals through forms of mutual communication and activity that are closest to individuals and capable of integrating them into a new collectivity. This is neither the family, as its economic function diminishes over time, nor the state, which is too distant from the individual, and not religion, which has now taken on an abstract and intellectual form. Durkheim relies on the leading role of professional groups or corporations, which are the only social entities capable of reproducing collectivity on a new technical basis. Let us leave the history of these specific thoughts of the great French sociologist aside and note only the general utility of the idea regarding periods when the crisis of the old system of norms and the slow formulation of a new one long disorient individuals, imparting a stamp of silent tragedy and patience upon those with a high sense of conscience, while easily resolving the issue of moral anguish for those who have never known other means of adhering to norms than through feelings of fear or servile obedience.

Let us finally pause to consider some theoretical possibilities inherent in the philosophy's engagement with normative themes. The well-known American scholar T. Parsons, as he consistently unfolds his general social theory, analyzes the structure of social systems and applies four types of independent variables: values, norms, collectives, and roles. The primary function of norms is the integration of social systems, although norms, as we have previously discussed, possess other functions as well (for instance, regulatory). The normative aspect of Parsons's system, in accordance with Weber, is referred to as the legitimate order and encompasses both law and morality, linking them together. For instance, if legal systems are constructed based on constitutional provisions, the foundation of the constitution rests upon the general moral values and norms that citizens agree upon. Thus, the integration and cohesion of society is greater the more legitimate the normative system is. But how can people attain the desired legitimacy? This question evidently holds such vital importance for contemporary societies and bears significant theoretical weight that it warrants further discussion.

Externally, norms appear as certain expressions. People evaluate these expressions from various perspectives: they consider their expressive power, emotional coloration, the coherence of elements within a single expression, and the consistency among a series of expressions, among other factors. A crucial characteristic of many expressions is their truthfulness. However, as the renowned Finnish logician and philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright emphasizes, there is a widely held belief among philosophers that "norms do not possess truth-value, nor can they be true or false." If this is indeed the case, as it likely is, then there is no basis to assert that within the system of normative expressions one can identify some original, initially true premise from which all other norms can be deduced, to be universally acknowledged as laws of reason. It would be naïve to hope that people, even if norms had a truth dimension, would adopt their prescriptions for their actions in the same way they do regarding technological requirements and safety regulations. That would be insufficient. Therefore, for the fundamental moral demands underpinning the normative system of society, there exist other characteristics that are not truth-related, yet provide people with the means to acknowledge them, as well as mechanisms and pathways that lead to the legitimization of the system of norms. To clarify this issue, let us again turn to the reflections of J. Habermas.

All meaningful expressions are oriented toward the perceptions of individuals and contain a claim to significance (regarding truth, normative correctness, and veracity), which is assessed by interpreters, namely, those to whom the expressions are addressed. "Interpreters," Habermas points out, "understand the meaning of a text only to the extent that they succeed in grasping why the author had the right to assert certain statements as true, to recognize certain values and norms as correct, and to express certain experiences as truthful, or to attribute them to others." Since we are discussing norms, particularly moral norms, we can speak of the significance of normative expressions from the standpoint of their correctness (where correctness implies a moral goodness, as in the expression "To lie to someone under such circumstances would be correct"). To apply the criterion of correctness to normative expressions, we must attempt to identify some general, universal foundations of correctness (acceptable to all participants in moral relationships). Although in everyday life individuals believe themselves capable of distinguishing correct norms and prescriptions from incorrect ones, philosophers since ancient times have sought to find the ultimate bases for the correctness of general moral judgments. These have either been moral sentiments inherent to human nature or, as in Kant's view, the law of practical reason. Critiques of such approaches in the history of philosophy have centered on the notion that their proponents did not account for social and historical factors, attempting instead to justify some abstract (and therefore utopian) normative order purely a priori, or to rationalize an existing one.

Habermas argues that the affirmation of norms and the formation of a certain belief in their legitimacy can rely on both conviction and sanctions, or on a blend of the threat of force and promises of material benefits. However, in contemporary societies, such means cannot ensure legitimacy for long. One cannot simply expect that, from above, norms can be introduced into action and afterward anticipate the unconditional reverence of citizens. It can be said of today's societies: if there is no genuine legitimacy, there is no loyalty from the masses. According to the "ethics of discourse" developed by Habermas, "any given norm can only claim significance if all those it pertains to achieve (or could achieve) consensus that this norm is valid." What is required is not a hypothetical, imaginary, or conditional discourse, but a real and broad discussion involving all stakeholders in the norm, so that ultimately it proves to be equally beneficial for each of those it affects, and only then can it be deemed justified. We will not delve into all the conditions and principles of real ethical discourse here; the German philosopher has provided ample arguments and well-considered pathways on this matter, which anyone can explore. It is important to emphasize the main achievement: in contemporary society, one can achieve genuine legitimacy of the normative order, and it will be founded on the justification not only of the basic norms but also of the entire normative system that flows from them.