The Spirit in Man and Society

Cognition as Spiritual Activity: Scientific Cognition

The Problem of Truth in Philosophy and Science

Truth is the central category of epistemology, serving as a focal point for all issues within this field. Moreover, truth possesses a valuable aspect, which is why Hegel was correct in stating, “For the unbiased person, 'truth' will always remain a great word that makes the heart beat stronger.” What, then, is truth? How is the attainment of true knowledge possible? Philosophers have sought to answer these questions since ancient times, leading to the development of several concepts of truth over the long history of philosophy.

The classical (or correspondence) concept of truth was articulated in antiquity and can be found in various formulations by Plato and Aristotle. In the dialogue "Cratylus," Plato, through Socrates, inquires: “Is it not true that one who speaks about things as they are speaks the truth, while one who speaks otherwise errs?” “Indeed,” replies Socrates' interlocutor, Hermogenes. A similar assertion can be found in the words of the English philosopher and logician Peter Strawson: “One expresses a true proposition when and only when the state of affairs corresponds to what is asserted in the proposition.” In both instances, truth is defined as the correspondence of thoughts to reality. Here, reality should be understood not only as the external world with its objects, properties, and processes but also as anything that genuinely exists or has indeed occurred, including psychological processes. At first glance, the correspondence theory of truth appears entirely acceptable; however, this understanding of truth is fraught with certain challenges. In the practical realm of life, individuals are perpetually surrounded by elements of knowledge and rarely engage with a purely objective world; the “world” of their perception is invariably somewhat distorted by prior beliefs and cultured sensations. There are also some logical contradictions associated with this concept of truth, particularly when dealing with self-referential statements. One notable example of such a contradiction is the "liar paradox," known since the 6th century BCE. As presented by Aristotle, it takes the form: “Is the one who claims to lie lying?” If we anchor the liar’s statement, “I am lying,” to a specific moment in time when this assertion is made, we encounter a paradox, merely by questioning the truthfulness of the liar’s claim.

The coherentist theory, attributed to Immanuel Kant, reduces the question of truth to the issue of coherence (from Latin cohaerentia - mutual entanglement), meaning the consistency and non-contradiction of knowledge. It is believed that in all specific sciences, some statements are compared with others, leading to a mutual agreement, while the general questions regarding their relationship to reality are resolved not by specialized sciences but by metaphysics (that is, philosophy). In the 20th century, the coherentist theory was revived by neopositivism in response to the challenges faced by the classical theory during the turbulent development of the sciences and the intensification of the problem concerning the criterion of truth (from Greek κριτέριον - distinguishing mark, measure).

The pragmatic theory also emerged in the past century. One of the founders of pragmatism, William James, elucidated his view of truth as follows. He initially states that pragmatism formally accepts the correspondence theory of truth as the alignment of knowledge with reality. Differences begin to emerge when the question is raised: what do the terms “correspondence” and “reality” truly signify when reality is understood as that to which our ideas must conform? James condemns the traditional view of truth for portraying it as a passive, static relationship. In reality, existence is not static; processes and events continuously transform one another, leading to new states in the future. Humanity is perpetually engaged in these events and states, and knowledge must serve us. This indicates that ideas and theories must act as intermediaries between all previous truths and some new experiences. “True ideas,” writes James, “are those that we can assimilate, confirm, support, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot do this with. This is the practical difference between true and false concepts. Thus, this is the essence of truth, for it encompasses everything we recognize as true.” Expounding upon this definition, James places particular emphasis on the process of verifying knowledge in terms of assessing its utility as instruments of practical action. We live, he asserts, in a world of realities that can be infinitely beneficial or infinitely harmful. Ideas that reveal what we can anticipate from these realities are evaluated at the first stage of verification as true. However, this is not the endpoint or an end in itself; it is merely a preliminary means for other needs and goals. For instance, when I become lost in a forest and am starving, should I come across something resembling a path, it becomes crucial for me to envision a dwelling at its end. If I do this and follow the path, I will find salvation. The true thought here is useful because its object—the dwelling at the path’s end—is beneficial. This example illustrates that, at the appropriate time, we select one idea from a reservoir of numerous abstract truths and utilize it under specific circumstances. We can then assert about it that “it is useful because it is true” or that “it is true because it is useful,” and these expressions will be equivalent. James adds that the phrase “to correspond to reality” can only mean that with our knowledge, we are led to such an active engagement with reality that we can influence it better than we could without such correspondence.

Pragmatism, in the form initiated by its founders, has already receded into the past; however, the experience of pragmatic interpretations of truth has retained its significance for a long time. This is especially true in instances where, in the development of science, scholars focus not so much on the question of a term's correspondence to a specific referent (be it a thing or its properties) as on the effectiveness of its use in particular epistemic situations.

The semantic concept was proposed by the American logician of Polish descent, Alfred Tarski, as an enhancement to the classical understanding of truth. To provide an adequate and precise definition of the concept of truth, Tarski first advises distinguishing between a sentence that asserts something and the very "something" expressed in that sentence. If we apply the classical definition of truth to a specific case, such as the statement "The sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white," we observe that in the left part of the expression, the phrase "Snow is white" is enclosed in quotation marks, while in the right part, it appears without them. The right side presents the sentence itself, whereas the left side refers to its name.

Tarski categorizes the notion of truth among semantic concepts, implying that semantics investigates the relationships between linguistic expressions and the objects (or "states of affairs") to which these expressions pertain. Typical examples of semantic concepts include designation, executability, and definition. While the words "designates," "executes," and "defines" express relations, the word "true" possesses a different logical nature; it expresses a property of certain expressions, specifically sentences. It is crucial to remember that statements in the form of sentences not only speak about the sentences themselves but also simultaneously about the objects (or states of affairs) to which these sentences refer. Tarski believes that the best way to construct an accurate definition of truth is to rely on the use of semantic concepts, particularly the concept of executability (this concept is implied, for instance, when we say that a particular word performs a certain function in a specific sentence).

Summarizing all the procedures for defining the concept of truth, Tarski concludes that the refinement of the classical concept of truth, and thus the avoidance of possible paradoxes, can occur through a transition from natural language to a formalized language, which does not contain, in a mixed form (unlike natural language), linguistic objects for designating subjects, the names of these linguistic objects, or semantic relations, including the term "truth." Once such a formalized language has been created, the next step involves the use of a special metalanguage. Tarski describes the relationship between the formalized language and the metalanguage as follows: "The first is a language that 'speaks about something'... The second is the language in which we 'speak about' the first language and in terms of which we aim, in particular, to formulate a definition of truth for the first language. We shall call the first language 'object language' and the second 'metalanguage.'” Through the metalanguage, which Tarski refers to as the semantic metalanguage, the concept of truth for the object language can be articulated. Thus, the problem of truth can only be correctly posed and resolved through the means of the metalanguage.

Tarski's proposed semantic concept of truth has been widely discussed among philosophers and logicians, with many considering it a significant enhancement of the classical concept, although some have argued against its universality, noting certain shortcomings and limitations.

In light of the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that the coherent, pragmatic, and semantic concepts of truth do not formally contradict the correspondence (classical) concept in its most abstract formulation; rather, they have taken it into account and have always sought to improve upon it. These aspirations have been driven by the difficulties inherent in its application (open logical paradoxes and antinomies), the desire to better consider the activity of the subject of knowledge, and the practical orientation of human understanding, while also addressing the demands for scientific accuracy and rigor in expressions.