On the Knowability of the World: Types of Cognitive Activity - Cognition as Spiritual Activity: Scientific Cognition - The Spirit in Man and Society
A systematic review of the main blocks of philosophical knowledge - 2024 Inhalt

The Spirit in Man and Society

Cognition as Spiritual Activity: Scientific Cognition

On the Knowability of the World: Types of Cognitive Activity

From a substantive perspective, consciousness can be represented as knowledge, while the process of acquiring knowledge constitutes cognition. The branch of philosophy that investigates the cognitive relationship between humans and the world, along with the conditions, types, and forms of knowledge, is commonly referred to as epistemology (from the Greek gnōsis - knowledge + logos - teaching). The primary approaches to elucidating the cognitive process are determined by the direction of responses to several fundamental questions:

  1. Are we capable of knowing the world, that is, can we adequately reproduce the real world within our consciousness?
  2. What underlies cognition, or, in other words, what is the motivating cause of cognition?
  3. What characterizes the cognitive process?

Let us consider the responses to these questions in the following sequence.

In answer to the first question, most philosophers affirmatively asserted that humans are indeed capable of knowing the world, believing that their knowledge can accurately reflect the surrounding reality of things and processes. However, there were those who found arguments that enabled them to question human confidence regarding the knowability of the world. For instance, David Hume argued that no evidence could demonstrate the causes of perceptions in our minds; it could be that they arise from external objects or perhaps from the very energy of our minds, or some other reason altogether. Thus, what is called cognition pertains only to the investigation of the relationships between our impressions, and we cannot transcend their limits. Relying on instinct, individuals merely believe in the reality of the external world and are guided by this belief in their daily lives. Consequently, it is impossible to clarify exactly what we are knowing (the external world or our impressions, whose causes remain unknown).

As is well known, Immanuel Kant maintained the view that things are given to humans solely through sensations. Through the a priori forms of sensibility and understanding, humans construct a world from sensory materials, yet our minds are unable to grasp certain essential aspects of things due to their natural limitations. Things conceal their essence from us, remaining as "things in themselves." "...What things are in themselves (independent of the representations through which they affect us) - Kant wrote - is entirely beyond our knowledge." Nevertheless, Humean skepticism and Kantian agnosticism have long sharpened epistemological issues, raising questions about the limits of human knowledge; moreover, Kant, like all German philosophy after him, emphasized the activity of the cognitive subject.

As previously mentioned, the majority of philosophers remained confident in humanity's ability to uncover the secrets of the world through knowledge. At the same time, it was necessary to respond substantively to the doubts raised by skeptically inclined thinkers. A particularly strong argument was presented by Karl Marx in 1845, though it was not published until 1888. Marx stated: "The question of whether objective truth is inherent in human thought is not a theoretical question but a practical one. In practice, it must be demonstrated that the truth, that is, the reality and power, the externality of one’s thought, is indeed valid. The debate about the reality or unreality of thought, isolated from practice, is purely a scholastic question." Marx rightly pointed out that within the confines of epistemology and through its own means, one cannot definitively refute the arguments of agnosticism or prove the knowability of the world. The final argument in favor of a positive answer can only be a practical conviction in the correspondence of our knowledge to reality.

The second fundamental question of epistemology is: what underlies cognition? This concerns the motives for cognitive activity and the motivating cause of cognition. In this regard, Aristotle wrote: "All men by nature desire to know. The proof of this is the pleasure derived from the senses; for even apart from their utility, they are valued for their own sake." Among all forms of knowledge, Aristotle valued philosophy the most. Wonder is what drives people towards philosophy. Moreover, he continued, humans sought knowledge for the sake of understanding, rather than for some utilitarian purpose. These statements do not imply that Aristotle did not see value in other forms of knowledge; rather, he regarded philosophical knowledge as the noblest, being wholly disinterested.

This approach to the foundations of cognition persists to this day with various nuances. Indeed, one can find numerous testimonies of such disinterested drives toward knowledge. However, when we address the motivating basis of cognition concerning all of humanity, which is increasingly expending greater resources on scientific research, it is perhaps necessary to seek a more down-to-earth reason, namely to turn to practical engagement. The impetus for cognition has always arisen from real problems stemming from genuine interactions between humans and the world. Once again, Marx was likely correct in stating that initially, cognition was organically integrated into everyday practical activities, and only later, due to the division of labor, did categories of individuals emerge for whom cognitive activity became a separate profession.

The third question of epistemology concerns the nature of the cognitive process. Until the eighteenth century, cognition was understood as a passive process of reflecting reality in the human mind—cognition as contemplation. "The image," notes Richard Rorty, "which traditional philosophy is imprisoned by, represents the mind as a vast mirror containing various representations, some of which are accurate, while others are not." Contemporary epistemology rejects such an understanding. Cognition is a creative act of interaction between the subject and the object. Humans reproduce not only what exists but also realize new needs, interests, and goals that emerge from their life activity and practice (not from mere curiosity or a naked thirst for knowledge). They exhibit agency in selecting the subject and means of cognition and in the directedness of their cognitive activity and its projective nature.

Cognitive activity unfolds in various directions, which can be termed types of cognition. In distinguishing these types, several characteristics are considered: the object-oriented focus of cognition, the form of knowledge, and others.

  1. Everyday Cognition: Theories concerning the surrounding world are created by individuals, yet cognition pertains to all; everyone is directly and routinely engaged in knowledge acquisition. Everyday cognition involves the procurement of knowledge in and about the world of daily life, knowledge that shapes individual behavior in their quotidian existence, which is their closest reality. Through interaction with the world from the moment of birth, an individual, through upbringing and the acquisition of language, perceives the social environment as organized. By mastering language and the norms, rules, and practices expressed through it, individuals grasp the order of the world, comparing their learned experiences with those of others and learning to live within society. In the process of everyday cognition and related activities, people utilize typification and objectification schemes (which take the form of signs and systems of signs), as well as recipes. This is followed by habituation (the transformation into customs), the gradual institutionalization of learned behavior, and finally, legitimization.
  2. Scientific Cognition: The outcome of cognitive activity in the realm of science is scientific knowledge. Thus, the question of the specificity of scientific cognition is closely linked to the essence and emergence of science. Specialists in the history of science provide varied responses to these questions. Let us explore some of the available options.

According to one perspective, scientific knowledge is that which enables the transformation of nature and the world. In this light, science would have emerged around 10,000 years ago, during the "Neolithic Revolution," a period marked by the transition from an economy based on the appropriation of ready-made natural products to one that produces goods (such as agriculture and animal husbandry), where elements of scientific knowledge were already requisite. However, this notion is contested by the argument that craftsmanship and agricultural production can be conducted on the basis of common, spontaneously formed knowledge.

From a second viewpoint, scientific knowledge, in contrast to everyday knowledge, is theoretical. This means that it is systematic (where one proposition is linked to another) and logically substantiated; in it, judgments rely not on authority or tradition, but on logical deduction. Such a form of knowledge first arose in ancient Greece, predominantly in the realm of mathematics, which was fostered by philosophy—also a manifestation of rational, ordered knowledge. If we accept this version, then in the context of antiquity, mathematics would be synonymous with science. And what of philosophy? Was it, in this sense, a science or not? According to the definition of scientificity, both mathematics and philosophy represent two variants of science in antiquity. Yet, when considering the relationship between ancient mathematics and philosophy with reality, it becomes evident that philosophy was closer to life. The historian of science, the Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), reflected on the trajectory of ancient thought concerning mathematics: “The everyday reality in which we live and act is neither mathematical nor amenable to mathematical treatment. It is a domain of the fluid, the imprecise, where the terms 'more or less,' 'almost,' 'close enough,' and 'approximately' reign supreme... Hence, the desire to apply mathematics to the study of nature is misguided and contrary to common sense. Nature contains neither circles, nor ellipses, nor straight lines.”

According to a third perspective, scientific knowledge is not merely theoretical but also mathematical and, crucially, based on experimentation. In this case, science in the modern sense arose no earlier than the 17th century, with Galileo Galilei regarded as its progenitor.

The fourth perspective posits that science emerged in the mid-19th century. In this context, the primary characteristic of science is not the specificity of scientific knowledge but rather changes in the organization of scholarly activities: science becomes a profession (one earns a salary for engaging in it, and the training of scientific personnel is organized in higher educational institutions) and a direct productive force.

Among these four presented perspectives on the essence and emergence of science, the third is the most widespread and acceptable. In contemporary science studies, science is understood as a unity of two characteristics: as systematic, theoretical knowledge that is developing, and as a certain type of intellectual activity oriented toward acquiring new knowledge. The theoretical knowledge produced by science becomes the foundation of any other human endeavor.

  1. Religious Knowledge. A persistent stereotype has emerged in public consciousness that juxtaposes religion and science, positing that religion is grounded in faith while science rests on knowledge. This contrast was famously articulated by A. P. Chekhov in one of his notebooks: “When one feels thirsty, it seems one could drink an entire ocean—that is faith; but when one begins to drink, one may only consume a couple of glasses—that is science.” However, can we assert so unambiguously the distinction between religion and science on the principle of “either faith or knowledge”? If this is the framing of the question, then religion must be denied any place within the system of human knowledge, and we cannot speak of any specific religious knowledge. Let us examine how valid such reasoning is.

The religious worldview predates the philosophical and, to a greater extent, the scientific knowledge. Religion remains extraordinarily prevalent in the world today, and all predictions from ancient and recent politicians regarding the swift overcoming of religiously tinted consciousness seem utterly illusory. Consequently, recognizing the resilience of religion, many researchers have turned to investigating the roots of its entrenchment and, concurrently, the specifics of religious knowledge.

In the consciousness of the religious, there exists a significant conviction in the existence of a special supernatural reality, a higher essence, the knowledge of which is acquired differently from knowledge about the physical world. This may manifest as a revelation from the Lord, recorded in special (sacred) texts, or as “sensory” testimonies of personal encounters with supernatural forces. The American philosopher and psychologist William James, in exploring the nature of religious thought, gathered numerous insights into the psychological sources of individuals' initial religious experiences. Here is one example he provided concerning a person's experience of contact with a “spirit”: “Once, I suddenly woke up, as if someone had roused me. It seemed to me that I had been intentionally awakened, and my first thought was that intruders had entered the house. Then, turning onto my side and trying to fall back asleep, I suddenly sensed someone’s presence in the room. Strangely, I felt I knew that this was not a living person but rather a spirit.” Similar sensory experiences often befall individuals encountering difficulties in life, emotionally grappling with them, and for the interpretation of their visions, they already possess prior knowledge of supernatural forces from religious texts or stories. If we inquire how information about the divine entered those texts and what guarantees exist for the veracity of that textual knowledge, the response will likely be that we should accept the texts as direct and immediate truth and simply believe. Thus, we arrive at faith as the foundation upon which religious knowledge and cognition are established.

The term “faith” is conventionally associated with religion; however, as a philosophical concept, “faith” characterizes certain general traits of human consciousness, both religious and non-religious. The phenomenon of faith correlates with beliefs that are formed either spontaneously or consciously. The former arise based on faith, while the latter are grounded in reasoned knowledge. Here, faith and knowledge are set in opposition to one another. It seems that those who emphasize that faith is the internal acceptance of something as true, an agreement with it, while knowledge and argumentation—regardless of their nature regarding truth—play a secondary role, are correct. It is said that one can only persuade someone of something if they already possess a certain degree of prior conviction in it. The same applies to faith. From a broad perspective, one must consider the various aspects of faith: worldview, notions of the meaning of life, value orientations, and ideals. Faith is an expression of the unique spiritual “self” of an individual, a component of the structure of human subjectivity. Drawing upon discussions developed in specialized literature regarding faith, one can indicate certain general features: faith is always faith in something, that is, there is a content, an object of faith; faith possesses a value dimension, often recognized as a higher value; faith entails a directedness of activity, associated with purposeful intention. When it comes to genuine religious faith of a high degree of intensity, it could be termed unwavering faith, following L. Wittgenstein, who noted, “And this shows itself—not through reasoning or recourse to ordinary principles of faith—but rather through the fact that the bearer of faith determines all of their life based on it.” For instance, one might say they believe in the Last Judgment, relying on relevant biblical texts, and being well-informed, they may additionally reference the arguments of preachers. However, this does not necessarily imply that this individual will derive principles of behavior for their entire life from their faith, subjugating themselves to them. Clearly, not all so-called believers possess unwavering faith; under normal life conditions, such faith may not be demanded of anyone. Nevertheless, it is evident that the demand for such a measure of faith particularly increases during certain periods of societal and individual life and may have deeper underpinnings. Thus, in exploring the sources of religion, the French philosopher Henri Bergson leaned toward the notion that religion serves a protective function in people's lives against the dangers posed by the intellect, which is inherently egoistic. Religion, he pointed out, “is nature's defensive reaction against that which may be oppressive for the individual and disintegrating for society in the activity of reason.”

Undoubtedly, within brief remarks concerning the specifics of religious knowledge, one cannot touch upon all aspects of this extensive topic; however, there is yet another significant dimension that should not be overlooked. This pertains to the fact that developed religions embody notions of the all-encompassing perfect and the rightful, concerning the first cause of all existence. This transcendent entity (God, the Absolute, etc.) is characterized as such because it cannot be comprehended in its essence by scientific or theoretical reasoning. At the same time, this transcendent aspect serves, as it were, as a pair of glasses through which a religious person perceives phenomena, knows, and interprets them in a manner suggesting that this higher essence indeed exists.

  1. Artistic-aesthetic knowledge is directed towards uncovering the measure, harmony, and beauty in the relationship between humanity and the world. While science seeks to comprehend the world in the form of laws, striving to maximize the exclusion of subjectivity from the results of cognition, art understands the world through the artistic image, which is sensibly perceived and measured through aesthetic categories (the sublime, the tragic and the comic, the beautiful and the grotesque, etc.). Through artistic works, as well as aesthetically shaped and adorned objects and spaces, individuals unveil "laws" by which the world today appears to them as beautiful, harmonious, and conducive to life.




Über den Autor

Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.

Quellen und Methodik

Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.

Zuletzt geändert: 12/01/2025