The Genesis of Social-Philosophical Thought

Social-Philosophical Thought from the 17th to the First Half of the 19th Century

The period between the 17th century and the first half of the 19th century was marked by monumental transformations across all facets of social existence. In the material-productive sphere, it heralded the widespread establishment of capitalism, factory production, national markets, global trade, and colonial systems. In the socio-political realm, a series of revolutions emerged, leading to the establishment of bourgeois-democratic states and civil societies. Spiritually, there was a secularization of consciousness away from religious beliefs, a gradual development of science, particularly the natural sciences (with advancements in physics, astronomy, geography, and more), and a strengthening of epistemological optimism, characterized by a faith in humanity's cognitive and creative capabilities.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that social philosophy underwent a significant transformation, increasingly aligning itself with scientific rigor and aspiring to the ideal of "strict" scientific justification, interpreting the social world through the lens of nature's understanding. Simultaneously, the uncritical extrapolation of natural scientific models onto societal realities led to a mechanistic view within many social-philosophical doctrines, portraying humans and society as complex mechanisms governed not by specific social laws but by general natural laws (such as the physical laws of attraction and repulsion).

This trend is vividly exemplified in the works of Thomas Hobbes (1588—1679), the English philosopher known for his social-philosophical treatises, such as Leviathan and On the Citizen. Taking the principles of true knowledge from mechanics and geometry, Hobbes depicted the universe as a collection of bodies subject to the laws of mechanical motion. A human being is merely one of these bodies integrated into this system, with its life activities representing mere instances of mechanical law at play. The movements of surrounding bodies impact humans, and their nervous systems perceive these influences; if they are adverse, one feels aversion, while favorable influences evoke pleasure. The desire to avoid the former and to prolong the latter drives diverse human actions, compelling them to "move." The uniqueness of human motion lies in the fact that humans possess reason, enabling them to establish and adhere to a natural law—an "overall rule that prohibits individuals from doing what is harmful to their life or what deprives them of means to preserve their existence." In other words, the governing principle of humanity is the law of self-preservation.

In a pre-political, "natural" state, adhering to this law proves exceedingly challenging, for nature has made people equal in physical and intellectual capabilities, thereby granting them equal hopes of achieving their desires. This situation engenders distrust and conflict among them. "In the absence of a civil state, there is always war of all against all." Consequently, alongside the law of self-preservation, there exist eighteen natural laws aimed at ensuring peace, succinctly encapsulated in the moral golden rule: "do not do unto others what you would not wish done unto you." To guarantee the enforcement of these rational precepts, individuals enter into a social contract to establish a state (which Hobbes termed the "Commonwealth" or "Civitas")—a vast artificial entity, a grand Leviathan embodied in the person of the sovereign, the bearer of unlimited power, entitled to employ any means deemed necessary to maintain peace and security, prevent internal conflicts, and safeguard the nation from external threats. Thus, absolute monarchy was substantiated as the optimal form of governance.

Against this conclusion, John Locke (1632—1704), an English philosopher and statesman, emerged as a prominent critic. As the progenitor of liberalism—the ideology defending individual liberty against state encroachments—Locke, like Hobbes, also employed a contractual concept. However, he approached the construction of an ideal political community from a different standpoint, relying on the idea of "self-evident truths"—foundational, axiomatic postulates whose validity arises from experience, akin to geometric axioms. In social existence, this "self-evident truth" was ascribed to the rights to life, liberty, equality, and property, which all individuals possess from birth and cannot be alienated. Individuals inherently held these rights long before the emergence of the state. The natural state is defined as a "state of perfect freedom to order one's actions and dispose of one's possessions and person as one sees fit," as well as a "state of equality, where all power and jurisdiction are reciprocal; no one has more than anyone else." Among the most crucial natural rights is property. To explain its origin, the "labor theory" was proposed: by working on something, an individual invests a part of themselves into their creations, thereby establishing rightful ownership. Besides natural rights, there exist natural laws that govern peace and security. Despite the intrinsic goodness of humanity, the course of development necessitates ensuring the enforcement of these rights through external coercive power. Therefore, individuals agree to establish a community ("commonwealth") governed by state authority, which possesses the right to enact laws, administer justice, and conduct foreign policy, primarily aimed at preserving the natural rights and freedoms of all society members. To prevent the usurpation of power, the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and federative branches is proposed. Thus, the English philosopher closely approached the creation of a model of the rule of law.

It is noteworthy that the social-contractual approach dominated throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Besides Hobbes and Locke, other notable theorists in this tradition included Hugo Grotius, Baruch Spinoza, Christian Wolff, Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, among others. In subsequent centuries, the contractual concept faced criticism primarily for its unfounded and ahistorical interpretation of the formation of socio-political phenomena as instantaneous acts, disregarding any historical process. In this regard, Émile Durkheim pointed out that not only do societies with a contractual origin not exist, but also that no society's structure contains even a trace of contractual organization. "Thus, it is neither a historical fact nor a trend that stands out in social development." Furthermore, the French sociologist noted that throughout the entire course of social evolution, it is difficult to identify any period when individuals genuinely had to decide whether to enter into society. This perspective, it seems, overlooks the projective, normative nature of the contractual concept and fails to explain how many of its tenets were necessitated by the practices of state-building. The epistemological orientation of this perspective is perhaps best articulated by G.M. Shershenevich, who stated that proponents of contractual ideas rarely adopted a viewpoint of historical reality, as the idea of a social contract served merely as a methodological tool for them. "For them, it matters not whether it was so in history; rather, it is crucial to demonstrate what form society ought to take, assuming that its foundation rests on a social contract based on the consent of all, without which no one can consider themselves bound by social ties."

At the same time, it would be a mistake to reduce the core essence of social and philosophical thought in the 17th and 18th centuries solely to the construction of optimal social and political forms. Giovanni Battista Vico (1668—1744), the Italian philosopher and professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples, explored the genuine process of historical development in his treatise "The New Science of the Common Nature of Nations." The foundation of his social-philosophical concept rests on the conviction that only that which is created by the subject of knowledge can be deemed knowable. From this perspective, the claims of natural science to possess scientific, objective truth come into question, since nature is created by God, and therefore only He can fully comprehend it. Believing that divine providence governs the universe, including nations, Vico simultaneously maintained that God does not directly intervene in the historical process but rather establishes the plan of that process, which is realized by individuals endowed with free will who strive to achieve their limited goals. "Philosophers have seriously attempted to study the Science of the Natural World, which was created by God and can therefore only be fully known by Him, while they have neglected reflections on the World of Nations, that is, the World of Civil Society, which was created by humans and of which the Science can thus be accessible to people." In other words, individuals and nations are the direct creators of history and the social world ("civil society"), and therefore they can claim objective knowledge of their actions, making history all the more likely to become a science. For this to happen, one must rid oneself of subjective prejudices, avoid interpreting the past through the lens of contemporary concepts and notions, and strive to reveal the eternal, ideal plan of history. Vico noted that this plan delineates three cyclically recurring epochs: the divine, the heroic, and the human. The internal logic of their transitions is revealed through the idea of the decisive role of the content of a society's spiritual organization. Initially, animal instincts and passions predominated in it, later becoming increasingly humanized, maturing into complex philosophical-theoretical forms of reasoning, thereby facilitating the progressive development of the social, political, and cultural spheres. However, the closer a nation approaches perfection, the more strongly the forces of moral decay manifest themselves; ultimately, they prevail, leading society back to barbarism and returning it to its initial stage of development. Besides the "spiritual" factor, one of the significant sources of societal development was established in the primal and indelible struggle among social groups. Thus, the unity of subjective and objective factors in the historical process, along with the contradictions inherent in societal development, was articulated, later to be explored and developed through the centuries in the teachings of G.W.F. Hegel. Simultaneously, while compromising with Christian doctrine, actively employing theological concepts, and reconstructing mythological images of antiquity, Vico remained in the spirit of the already-past Renaissance.

In this respect, the stance of the Italian thinker markedly diverged from the leading trends in the spiritual life of his contemporaneous epoch, where the tone was set by the Enlightenment movement, epitomized in the works of Voltaire, Denis Diderot, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, Claude Adrien Helvétius, Paul-Henri Thiry d'Holbach, Marquis de Condorcet, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and many others. The principal ideological content of the Enlightenment lay in the critical refutation of religion, the authority of antiquity, feudal orders and traditions, as well as in substantiating faith in social progress, identifying its sources in the advancement of science and the widespread dissemination of knowledge. The realization of this task implied a radical transformation of the overall worldview and the structure of society.

One of the first comprehensive Enlightenment concepts was articulated by Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689—1755), the French philosopher and jurist. Like Vico, he sought to uncover the objective foundations of historical societal development. However, he identified this foundation not in the diverse actions of individuals, which realize a singular objective logic of God, but in the geographical environment of the existence of nations. In his works ("Persian Letters," "Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness and Decline of the Romans," "The Spirit of the Laws"), he posited that societal life is governed not by fortune but by "the spirit of the people," in which the actions of many factors converge: climate, religion, customs, history, and so on. The primary role in shaping this "general spirit" was attributed to climate and soil, which determine people's occupations and political institutions. At the same time, it was acknowledged that as society developed, culture and morality increasingly influenced the content of the "national spirit." Yet, the French thinker did not arrive at an understanding of the active role of society in its dialectical interaction with nature; he notably reduced the causes of the backwardness of Asian countries compared to Europe to climatic differences. Politically, Montesquieu advocated for the rights and freedoms of individuals against the encroachments of despotic power, positioning himself as a follower of John Locke. However, the French philosopher did not employ the idea of the social contract, which did not prevent him from devising a model of the separation of powers into three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial), which was later implemented in the constitutions of many countries.

The works of Voltaire (real name François-Marie Arouet, 1694—1778), the leader of the French Enlightenment and a prominent thinker and writer, significantly influenced his own and subsequent eras. His socio-philosophical views are expounded in such works as "Philosophical Letters," "A Philosophical Dictionary," and "A Treatise on Morals and the Spirit of Nations from Charlemagne to Louis XIII," among others. The thinker began from a deistic standpoint, agreeing with the existence of a rational divine principle as the first mover of the cosmos, yet he also believed that after the act of creation, God does not intervene in the earthly order, which develops autonomously. Accordingly, history is the work of humanity itself, which bears direct responsibility for all that transpires in the social world. References to external geographical determinants of societal development are equally unjustified, as the slow pace of climatic changes clearly "fails to keep up" with the swift flow of historical events. In reality, the progress of society, moving from barbarism to civilization, is a result of human labor, which fosters the growth of knowledge and culture. The principal obstacles to progress were seen in religious prejudices, the anti-social activities of the church, responsible for the deaths of thousands, and the caprice and tyranny of absolute monarchs. In criticizing church and feudal orders, Voltaire, however, was not consistent. He deemed it necessary to preserve religion as a powerful lever for governing the populace, defending the thesis regarding the natural and immutable character of social-political inequality. In the question of the optimal form of social transformation, the philosopher denied revolution and the uprising of the masses, proposing instead the concept of "enlightened governance," envisioned as a union of philosophers (lawgivers) and rulers (executors) who would elevate the culture of the rulers and help them recognize the need for reform.

A notable opponent of Voltaire was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712—1778), a distinguished French philosopher and author of profound socio-philosophical treatises ("Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," "Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men," "The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right," etc.). Rousseau criticized the foundational ideological construct of the Enlightenment—the concept of societal progress resulting from the enhancement of knowledge and culture. In his view, this was entirely erroneous, as throughout all times and in all countries, the advancement of "the arts and sciences" has precipitated a decline in virtue, disrupting the unity between humanity and nature. From this emerged the idea of the necessity of "simplifying" human customs and lifestyles, rejecting luxury and all forms of excess. The emphasis on idealizing the natural state of humanity manifested in the understanding of societal development, depicted as an unceasing process of distorting natural freedom and equality due to the emergence of private property, the division of society into the wealthy and the poor, and the creation of the state. The highest degree of slavery and inequality is entrenched by despotism. The restoration of natural human freedom is conceivable through a return to the articles of the "original social contract," establishing a democratic state founded on the principle of popular sovereignty. The power of the people is unlimited and inalienable, as it expresses the "general will," which is inherently directed toward the welfare of the entire social organism. By distinguishing between "the general will" as an expression of social connection and "the will of all" as the sum of private aspirations, the philosopher approached an understanding of the organic, synthetic character of societal unity in individual diversity. At the same time, he exaggerated the potential of unlimited democracy in establishing and realizing the "general will," neglecting instances of the alienation of social interests from individuals and the dangers of manipulating public opinion for the selfish interests of ruling groups.

Opposing the idealization of the past and the unequivocal conclusion that the development of civilization leads to the degeneration of humanity was Jean Antoine Condorcet (1743—1794) — a French marquis, philosopher, and mathematician. In his work Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, he presented the understanding of societal progress as a complex and contradictory process. The fruits of human intellectual endeavor are not only genuine knowledge but also various errors that, by becoming entrenched stereotypes and prejudices, slow or halt societal development or even provoke regression. Furthermore, the retreat into ignorance and barbarism is precipitated by despotic governance that degrades and dulls the intellect. Yet, the power of despotism and prejudice is not absolute; sooner or later, the human spirit overcomes them, emerging into new, broader cultural horizons. In describing the historical process as a "battle" between reason and superstition, between the free spirit and tyranny, Condorcet delineated ten epochs that succeed one another, governed by a necessary interrelation between material production and spiritual activity. The most recent historical period begins in the 18th century and looks toward the future, imbued with hopes for the abolition of inequality among nations, the establishment of equality among different classes within society, and ultimately the improvement of humanity itself. Indeed, the sole limit of societal progress is proclaimed to be the duration of the planet Earth.

The Enlightenment’s faith in the boundless potential of humanity was shared by Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) — an eminent philosopher, professor at the University of Königsberg, and the progenitor of German classical philosophy. The socio-philosophical ideas of this thinker are primarily articulated in works such as Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Critique of Practical Reason, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, On the Original Evil in Human Nature, and On the Proverb “This may be true in theory, but it does not hold in practice”. His reflections began with human nature, which he assessed pessimistically, identifying an intrinsic propensity within humanity to violate moral norms. In certain respects, he echoed Thomas Hobbes, firmly believing in the inevitability of the "war of all against all" in the absence of a state. At the same time, Kant extolled the antisocial qualities of humans (quarrelsomeness, envy, profligacy, self-interest, lust for power) as they generate conflict and struggle, thereby propelling both humanity and society toward greater perfection. “The means by which nature seeks to develop all of humanity’s potential is their antagonism within society, as it ultimately becomes the cause of their necessary order. By antagonism, I mean the unfriendly camaraderie among people, their tendency to engage in communication, which, however, is accompanied by a general resistance that constantly threatens society with disintegration.” From this, it followed that societal development is governed by an objective logic consisting of the dialectical overcoming of centrifugal tendencies and the restoration of unity between a more moral individual and a more rationally organized society. This unity is subsequently disrupted by the moral imperfection of human beings, and the cycle begins anew, infinitely, as complete human perfection is achieved in the unfathomable future.

Given the prevailing moral standards, it is impossible to preserve peace, goodness, and justice without state authority. However, Kant recognizes that the rulers will be none other than humans themselves, just as prone to transgression as their subjects. Thus, he sets the task of establishing a form of governmental organization that excludes the abuse of power by rulers and paves the way for the moral progress of the individual. To solve this, the philosopher employed the idea of the social contract. It was posited that in a hypothetical situation of the social-contract process, participants would act autonomously, that is, freely, when determining the best socio-political form based not on heteronomous, external, contingent circumstances (for example, their specific social status or personal advantages) but on the universal moral law, the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” By adhering to such a rule, dishonest regulations for organizing power could never be established, as no one would agree to elevate evil and falsehood to the rank of law within the political community. Drawing from these considerations, Kant synthesized the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau regarding the general will and John Locke concerning the limitation of power by individual rights, enabling him to develop an ideal of a legal and democratic state.

The controversial aspect of Kant’s doctrine lies in the desire to shift the study of the driving forces of societal development into the realm of moral and value considerations, the origins of which are reduced to human consciousness. The threat posed by this position is the formulation of abstract, ahistorical prescriptions that are incapable of playing the role of moral and value regulators or means of socio-political design within specific historical conditions.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770—1831) — a prominent figure in German classical philosophy — critiqued Kantian moral-legal formalism in the interpretation of societal development. In a series of works (Phenomenology of Spirit, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Philosophy of Right, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, etc.), he developed a dialectical approach aimed against the metaphysical division of consciousness and matter, moral norms and empirical life. Thus, freedom and morality are not abstract principles but rather a real regulatory force that, through the contradictions between the ideal and the actual, the absolute and the relative, realizes itself at various historical stages in specific forms of the social process. Simultaneously, the dialectic of the universe and the life of society is revealed from the perspective of objective idealism. The foundation of all existence and human history is proclaimed to be the Absolute Spirit, which, unfolding based on contradictions and their resolutions, is embodied in various natural and social forms of being, the highest of which is the philosophical reflection on the essence of the Absolute in all its manifestations. By elucidating the mechanisms of the realization of the spiritual primary source in societal existence, the philosopher pointed to the “cunning of reason,” that is, the ability of the Absolute Spirit to manifest through the spontaneous interactions of individuals pursuing private, sometimes irrational interests, unaware that their actions fulfill a plan ordained by God.

On the scale of universal history, the logic of a higher spiritual design dictates the progressive development of human freedom and rationality. In the first stage, the "Eastern world" prevailed, where only one person — the despot — was free. In the second, the leading role was played by ancient civilization, where more individuals attained freedom — all those who possessed citizenship in a polis. In the third, culminating stage, the German-Christian culture emerges, guaranteeing freedom to all members of society. In the context of a specific social organism, the self-movement of the spirit is objectified in the forms of family, civil society, and the state. The family constitutes an essential whole that unites individuals and serves as the root of morality and state order. Family solidarity is negated by civil society — the aggregate of private individuals, classes, and corporations, the relations among which are built on the predominance of private interests. Thus, the civil sphere is a distinct space where “each is for himself — an end, while the others are for him nothing.” The state — an organization of public authority that synthesizes the universal interest from the clash of private aspirations, thereby ensuring universal freedom — has the capacity to dissolve this explosive, disintegrative potential. The best form of government is represented by the Prussian constitutional monarchy, embodying the ultimate goal of the state-legal development of all humanity. Thus, contrary to the dialectical method, which prompted the acknowledgment of the openness of societal development to the future, an apologia for the current state regime was presented, creating an ideological foundation for the dogmatization of the existing system of moral-legal values and philosophical-theoretical doctrines.

However, not all thinkers were content with the societal order that emerged after political revolutions, which were heralded under the banner of Enlightenment ideals of legal equality, popular sovereignty, and legitimacy. A contrasting aspect of the destruction of feudal privileges was the rampant emergence of capitalist relations, marked by the predominance of selfish interests of bourgeois entrepreneurs—an idea reflected in Hegel’s conception of civil society. In this context, a need arose for a critical reevaluation of both the capitalist reality and its ideological roots. Among the first to respond to this task were Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760—1825), Robert Owen (1771—1858), and Charles Fourier (1772—1837)—the founders of socialist doctrine, which linked the realization of principles of social justice with the organization of social control over the processes of production and distribution of material goods. The genetic roots of this position lay in the utopian thought of previous centuries (Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella, Thomas Müntzer, James Winstanley, Guillaume Mably, and others).

At the same time, unlike their predecessors, the socialists of the first half of the 19th century did not merely advocate for the voluntaristic abolition of private property; they sought to unveil the objective historical laws governing the socialization of the material production sphere. For instance, Saint-Simon depicted the history of European nations as a process of transforming a military society, founded on the labor of slaves and serfs, into an industrial one based on free wage labor. Moreover, this latter form of labor was to be supplanted by communal labor (travail sociétaire). At the core of these transformations lay the comprehensive development of the economy and the emergence of scientific forms of labor organization. In Fourier’s view, future production achievements would lead to the disappearance of distinctions between rural and urban life, the liberation of women, and the provision of free time for cultural development for the working class.

Simultaneously, not content with general forecasts, philosophers contemplated the paths toward realizing the desired future. Saint-Simon advocated for the creation of an "industrial monarchy," where industrialists and scientists would be empowered to initiate and implement necessary social reforms. Fourier proposed a project for a "new social order," wherein the core of social organization would consist of "phalanges"—small social-production associations. Owen put forward a project for "communes," directed against the industrial division of labor that dehumanizes individuals, the bourgeois competition that distorts the soul, and the spontaneous production that leads to unforeseen negative consequences. Attempts to realize these projects, repeatedly undertaken throughout the 19th century, nevertheless revealed their utopian nature, primarily rooted in their aim for an unconditional resolution of the contradiction between the individual and society, which led to the establishment of a uniform social order that severely limited individual freedom and obstructed the path to creative self-development. It became evident that alongside the promised harmony, these ideas "carry with them the spirit of forced sectarianism and stubborn conservatism."

In summary, this era saw the refinement of the categorical apparatus of social philosophy and the identification of general philosophical approaches to addressing pressing social issues and overcoming the alienation of the individual from society. All of this significantly influenced the content of subsequent philosophical and theoretical reflections on the problems of social existence, as well as delineated the general guidelines for practical activity and the contours of future forms of socio-political organization.