Aristotle's Metaphysics - Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle - Ancient Philosophy
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Ancient Philosophy

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle

Aristotle's Metaphysics

When studying any major philosopher, particularly Aristotle, one must view his work from two perspectives: in relation to his predecessors and in relation to his successors. In the first instance, his contributions are immense; in the second, his shortcomings are equally significant. Yet, these limitations are more the responsibility of his successors than of Aristotle himself. He lived at the close of a creative epoch in Greek thought, and nearly two thousand years passed before the world produced a thinker who could be considered his peer. By the end of that long period, Aristotle’s authority had become nearly as absolute as that of the Church, posing a formidable obstacle to progress in both science and philosophy. Since the early seventeenth century, almost every significant intellectual advancement has begun by challenging an Aristotelian doctrine—a trend that persists even today in the field of logic. Nevertheless, it would have been equally detrimental had any of his predecessors, perhaps with the exception of Democritus, attained such comparable authority. To judge him fairly, we must first set aside both his excessive posthumous fame and the equally excessive condemnation it eventually provoked.

Aristotle was born around 384 B.C. in Stagira, Thrace, to a father who served as a hereditary physician at the Macedonian court. At eighteen, he arrived in Athens to study under Plato, remaining at the Academy for roughly twenty years until Plato’s death in 347 B.C. Following this, he traveled and married a relative of the tyrant Hermias—though rumors claimed she was Hermias’s daughter or concubine, both versions are contradicted by the fact that Hermias was a eunuch. In 343 B.C., Aristotle became tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander, a position he held until the boy was declared of age by his father at sixteen and appointed regent during Philip’s absence. The nature of the relationship between Aristotle and Alexander remains elusive, obscured by legends and correspondence now generally regarded as forgeries. While admirers of both men suggest that the teacher influenced the student, Hegel argued that Alexander’s career demonstrated the practical value of philosophy. On this point, A. W. Benn remarked: “It would be unfortunate if philosophy had no better testimony in its favor than Alexander’s character… Proud, drunken, cruel, vindictive, and exceedingly superstitious, he embodied the vices of a tribal chieftain with the frenzy of an eastern despot.”

While I agree with Benn regarding Alexander’s character, I believe the young king’s actions were significant and beneficial; without him, the entire tradition of Hellenic civilization might have perished. As for Aristotle’s influence, I suspect it was minimal. Alexander was an ambitious, passionate youth with a strained relationship with his father, who likely viewed the philosopher as little more than a tedious pedant assigned to keep him from mischief. Aristotle preached a theory of the golden mean and believed a state should not contain one hundred thousand citizens; such ideas would have held little appeal for a future conqueror. While Alexander maintained a snobbish respect for Athenian culture, this was standard for his dynasty—much like the nineteenth-century Russian aristocracy’s regard for Paris—and cannot be attributed to Aristotle’s tutelage. I see nothing in Alexander that can be traced back to his teacher.

More surprising is the fact that Alexander had so little influence on Aristotle, who, in his political theories, ignored the shift from the era of city-states to that of empires. I suspect that until the end of his life, Aristotle viewed Alexander as a “lazy and headstrong youth who could never comprehend anything about philosophy.” The interactions between these two great men appear as barren as if they had inhabited entirely different worlds.

From 335 to 323 B.C.—the year of Alexander’s death—Aristotle resided in Athens. During these twelve years, he established his school and composed the majority of his works. Immediately following Alexander’s death, the Athenians revolted against his associates, including Aristotle, who was charged with impiety. Unlike Socrates, he chose to flee, and he died the following year, in 322 B.C.

As a philosopher, Aristotle differed markedly from his predecessors. He was the first to write as a professor; his treatises are systematic, his arguments categorized, and he functions as a professional teacher rather than an inspired prophet. His work is defined by a critical, meticulous nature and a prose style entirely devoid of Bacchic enthusiasm. The Orphic elements of Plato are diluted in Aristotle and tempered by a substantial dose of common sense. Where Aristotle appears as a Platonist, his natural temperament is clearly subordinate to the doctrine he is studying. He lacks passion and deep religious feeling. The errors of his predecessors were the noble mistakes of youth, characterized by attempts to reach the impossible. His own errors are the mistakes of maturity, born of habitual prejudices from which one can no longer break free. His greatest strengths lie in detailed description and critique, while he struggles with grand constructs due to a lack of fundamental clarity and titanic fervor.

Universals and the Critique of Platonic Ideas

Determining where to begin an explanation of Aristotle’s metaphysics is difficult, yet his critique of the theory of ideas and his own alternative doctrine of universals provide the most logical starting point. Against the ideas, he presents a series of compelling arguments, most of which appear in Plato’s “Parmenides.” The strongest of these is the “third man” argument: if a man is a man because he resembles an ideal man, there must be a further, more ideal man of whom both the ordinary man and the first ideal man are reflections. Socrates is simultaneously a man and an animal, which raises the question of whether the ideal man is also an ideal animal; if so, there must be as many ideal animals as there are species of animals.

There is no need to continue this line of reasoning. Aristotle clearly demonstrated that when a series of individuals share a common predicate, this cannot stem from their relation to something of the same kind as themselves, but must instead relate to something of a different order. While this point is largely proven, Aristotle’s own theory remains far from clear. It is this very lack of clarity that fueled the subsequent medieval debate between nominalists and realists.

Aristotle’s metaphysics can be described, in broad strokes, as a tempered, common-sense version of Platonism. He is difficult to interpret because reconciling Plato’s vision with common sense is no simple task. At times, Aristotle seems to express the ordinary views of a person unversed in philosophy. At others, he appears to be presenting Platonism under a new vocabulary. One cannot overemphasize any single passage, as it may be corrected or qualified in a later excerpt. Generally, the most accessible way to approach his theory of universals and his theory of form and matter is to outline the common-sense perspective. This constitutes half of his thought, and we must then consider the Platonic modifications to which he subjects it.

To a certain extent, the theory of universals is straightforward. Language consists of proper names and adjectives. Proper names refer to ‘things’ or ‘persons’, each a unique entity to which the name applies. The Sun, the Moon, France, and Napoleon are singular in their kind; there are no other instances to which these names apply. Conversely, words like ‘cat’, ‘dog’, and ‘human’ apply to many different things. The problem of universals concerns the meaning of such terms, as well as adjectives like ‘white’, ‘hard’, and ‘round’. Aristotle states: “I call that common which can by nature be said of many, and that singular which cannot.”

What is designated by a proper name is termed substance, while what is indicated by an adjective or class name, such as ‘mortal’ or ‘human’, is referred to as a universal. Substance is ‘this’. A universal, however, is ‘such’—it points to a kind of thing rather than a specific individual. A universal is not a substance because it is not ‘this’. (Plato’s heavenly bed would be ‘this’ for those capable of perceiving it; this is a point on which Aristotle disagrees with Plato.) “It seems impossible,” Aristotle states, “that any universal term can be the name of a substance. For… the substance of each thing is what is unique to it, which does not belong to anything else; yet a universal is common, as it is said to pertain to more than one thing.” The essence of the matter is that a universal cannot exist by itself but only within individual things.

At first glance, Aristotle’s theory appears simple. If I say, “There exists such a thing as football,” most people would consider it a truism. Yet, if I were to conclude that football could exist without individuals playing it, people would rightly deem the statement nonsensical. Similarly, it is acknowledged that there is such a thing as fatherhood, but only because there are fathers. Sweetness exists, but only insofar as there are sweet things; redness is recognized, but solely because there are red things. This dependency is non-reciprocal. The individuals playing football would exist even if they never played; things that are usually sweet can turn bitter; and my face, which is generally red, can become pale without ceasing to be my face. We conclude that what is implied by an adjective relies for its existence on what is implied by a proper name, but not vice versa. I believe this is what Aristotle intended. His theory on this matter, like many others, is a pedantically expressed prejudice of common sense.

Imparting precision to this theory, however, is no easy task. It is taken for granted that football could not exist without players, yet football can certainly exist independently of any particular player. It is also assumed without proof that a person may exist without playing football, yet they cannot exist without doing something. The quality of redness cannot exist without some subject, but it can exist without any particular subject; similarly, any subject cannot exist without some quality, yet can exist without any specific quality. Thus, the supposed foundation for distinguishing between things and qualities appears illusory.

The true basis for such a distinction is linguistic, as it derives from syntax. We use proper names, adjectives, and relational words. We can say, “John is wise, James is foolish, John surpasses James.” Here, “John” and “James” are proper names, “wise” and “foolish” are adjectives, and “surpasses” is a relational word. Since the time of Aristotle, metaphysicians have interpreted these syntactic differences as metaphysical ones: John and James are substances, while wisdom and foolishness are universals. Relational words have often been ignored or misinterpreted. With sufficient effort, one might discern that metaphysical differences correspond to these syntactic ones. However, reaching such a conclusion would require a lengthy process, including the creation of an artificial philosophical language. This language would not contain names like “John” or “James,” nor adjectives like “wise” or “foolish.” All terms from ordinary language would be subjected to analysis and replaced with words bearing less complex meanings. Until this work is accomplished, the question of particulars and universals cannot be adequately addressed. When we finally reach a level where discussion becomes possible, we shall find that the issue we are contemplating is entirely different from the one we initially envisioned.

If, therefore, I have not succeeded in clarifying Aristotle’s theory of universals, it is because the theory itself—as I contend—is not clear. Nevertheless, it marks a significant advance over the theory of ideas and is connected to a genuine and vital problem.

Another term that plays a significant role for Aristotle and his scholastic successors is “essence.” It is by no means synonymous with “universals.” Your essence is what you are “by virtue of your nature.” One might say that these are the properties you cannot lose without ceasing to be yourself. Not only individual things but also kinds possess essence, and the definition of a kind must specify it. I shall return to the concept of essence in relation to Aristotle’s logic. For now, I will simply note that “essence” seems to me a vague and imprecise concept.

Matter and Form

The next point in Aristotle’s metaphysics is the distinction between “form” and “matter.” We must recognize that “matter,” when opposed to “form,” is distinct from “matter” as it is opposed to “mind.”

Once again, there is a sound basis for Aristotle’s theory, yet here, more than in the case of universals, significant modifications in the Platonic spirit come into play. We may start with a marble statue: the marble is the matter, while the outline imparted to it by the sculptor is the form. Or let us take the examples provided by Aristotle. If a man makes a bronze ball, bronze is the matter and sphericity is the form; in the case of a still sea, water is the matter and smoothness is the form. Thus far, everything is straightforward.

Aristotle further states that through form, matter becomes a particular thing, and this is the substance of that thing. Apparently, Aristotle relies on simple common sense: a thing must be limited, and its boundary constitutes its form. For example, consider a quantity of water; one can separate a part of it from the rest by enclosing it in a vessel, and then that part becomes a “thing.” Until that part is separated from the remaining homogeneous mass, however, it is not a “thing.” A statue is a “thing,” yet the marble from which it is made has, in some sense, not changed since it was part of a block or the quarry. Naturally, we should not say that it is the form that imparts substantiality, but this is only because the atomic hypothesis has taken root in our imagination. Each atom, however, if it is a “thing,” is so by virtue of being distinguished from other atoms and having, in some sense, a “form.”

Now we come to a new assertion, which at first glance seems difficult to comprehend: the soul is the form of the body. It is clear that here “form” does not refer to an outline. I shall return to this meaning later. For now, I will merely note that within Aristotle’s system, the soul is that which makes the body one thing, possessing a unity of purpose and the characteristic features we associate with an organism. The purpose of the eye is to see, but it cannot see if it is detached from its body. In truth, it is the soul that sees.

It seems evident, then, that “form” is that which imparts unity to some part of matter, and that this unity is usually, if not always, teleological. Yet “form” proves to be significantly more than this, and this greater aspect is quite challenging to comprehend.

The form of any thing, we are told, is its essence and primary substance. Forms are substantial, although universals are not. When a man crafts a bronze sphere, both the matter and the form already exist, and all he does is unite them. The man does not create the form, just as he does not create the bronze. Not everything possesses matter; there exist eternal things that have no matter, except for those that move through space. Things accrue reality by acquiring form; matter without form is merely potentiality.

The view that forms are substances existing independently of the matter they inform seems to render Aristotle vulnerable to his own critique of Platonic Ideas. He understands form as something entirely distinct from universals, yet it shares many of their characteristics. We are told that form is more real than matter; it serves as a recollection of the singular reality of ideas. The shift Aristotle introduces into Plato’s metaphysics seems, in fact, less radical than he intends. This perspective is adopted by Zeller, who remarks on the tension between substance and form: “The ultimate explanation for the lack of clarity on this issue in Aristotle should, however, be sought in the fact that he himself has only partially, as we shall see later, liberated himself from the Platonic tendency to hypostatize ideas. Just as ’Ideas’ for Plato, so too ’Forms’ for Aristotle had their own metaphysical existence, which conditions all particular things. And although Aristotle astutely traced the development of ideas from experience, it is equally true that these ideas, especially where they are furthest removed from experience and immediate perception, ultimately transform from a logical product of human thought into a direct premonition of a supersensible world and into an object, in this sense, of intellectual intuition.”

I do not know what response Aristotle might offer to this critique. The only reply I can conceive would be to assert that two things cannot share the same form. If a person makes two copper spheres, for example, each sphere has its own particular sphericality, which is substantial and distinct. It represents an instance of the universal “sphericality” but is not identical to it. I do not believe the language of the passages I have quoted fully supports such an interpretation. Moreover, it is open to the objection that this singular sphericality, according to Aristotle’s views, would be unknowable. This contradicts the essence of his metaphysics, which holds that the more forms a thing possesses and the less matter it contains, the more knowable it becomes. This aligns with his other views, since a single form can be embodied in many particular things. Were he to claim that there are as many forms of sphericality as there are spherical things, he would effectuate a radical change in his philosophy. His view that form is identical to its essence is incompatible with this proposed solution.

Potentiality and Actuality

Aristotle’s doctrine of form and matter is inextricably linked to the distinction between potentiality and actuality. Bare matter is conceived as the potentiality of form; every change consists in what we might call “evolution,” in the sense that after the change, a thing possesses more form than before. The thing that has more form is considered to be more “actual.” God is pure form and pure actuality; hence, in Him, no change can occur. It becomes evident that this theory is optimistic and teleological: the universe and all it contains continually develop toward a state superior to their previous condition.

The notion of potentiality is useful in certain respects, provided it is employed in a way that allows us to translate our assertions into a form where this notion is absent. To say “a block of marble is a potential statue” means that “from the block of marble, a statue is created through appropriate actions.” However, when potentiality is used as a fundamental and irreducible concept, it invariably conceals a confusion in thought. The use of this notion by Aristotle represents one of the negative aspects of his system.

Theology and the Unmoved Mover

Aristotle’s theology is intriguing and closely intertwined with his broader metaphysics; in fact, “theology” is one of the names Aristotle applies to what we call “metaphysics” (the book we know by this title was not named as such by him).

Aristotle states that there are three kinds of substances: those that are perceived by the senses and are transient, those that are sensory but eternal, and finally, those that are neither sensory nor transient. The first class includes plants and animals; the second comprises celestial bodies, which Aristotle believed undergo no changes other than local movement; and the third encompasses the rational soul in humans, as well as God.

The fundamental argument for God is the “First Cause”: there must be something that initiates motion, and this something must itself be unmoving, eternal, substance, and actuality. However, as Aristotle posits, desires and thoughts can cause motion; they initiate movement while themselves remaining unmoved. Thus, God produces movement by being loved, whereas every other cause of motion acts while itself in motion. God is pure thought because thought is the highest activity. “And indeed life is truly inherent in Him, for the activity of the mind is life, and God is activity; and His activity, as it is in itself, is the best and eternal life. We therefore say that God is the eternal, best living being, so that He possesses life and continuous and eternal existence, and this is indeed God.”

“Thus, from what has been said, it is clear that there exists an eternal, unmoving substance distinct from perceptible things; it is also shown that this substance cannot possess any magnitude, for it is devoid of parts and indivisible… on the other hand, it is also shown that this substance is not subject to anything and is immutable, for all other movements are subsequent to spatial movement.”

God lacks the attributes of Christian Providence, for His perfection would be diminished were He to think of anything other than what is perfect—that is, of Himself. “Therefore, the mind thinks itself, if only it is superior, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking.” We must conclude that God is unaware of the existence of our sublunary world. Aristotle, like Spinoza, asserts that while humans must love God, it is impossible for God to love humans.

God cannot be defined simply as the “unmoved mover.” Astronomical considerations lead to the conclusion that there are 47 or 55 such movers. There is no ambiguity in their relationship to God; indeed, a natural interpretation suggests that there are 47 or 55 gods. Following one of his passages concerning God, Aristotle states: “But whether there is one such substance or more, and how many precisely, this question should not be passed over in silence…” He then immediately proceeds to the argument leading to the existence of 47 or 55 unmoved movers.

The notion of the unmoved mover is difficult to grasp. The modern mind tends to assume that a cause of change must itself be preceded by a change, and that if the universe had always been perfectly immobile, it must remain so eternally. To understand Aristotle’s intention, we must consider his classification of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Consider a sculptor creating a statue.

  • The material cause is the marble;
  • the formal cause is the essence of the statue to be produced;
  • the efficient cause is the contact of the chisel with the marble;
  • and the final cause is the goal the sculptor envisions.

In modern terminology, the word “cause” is generally restricted to the efficient cause. The unmoved mover, however, functions as the final cause: it provides the purpose for change, which essentially embodies an evolution toward achieving a resemblance to God.

The claim that Aristotle lacked a religious temperament is only partially accurate. One might reasonably interpret his religion as follows: God exists eternally as pure thought, happiness, and complete self-fulfillment, entirely free of unrealized goals. The sensory world, in contrast, is imperfect, yet it possesses life, desire, imperfect thought, and striving. All living beings, to a greater or lesser extent, are aware of God and are drawn to action by their admiration and love for Him. Thus, God serves as the final cause of all activity. While change consists in imparting form to matter, sensory things always retain a substrate of matter. God alone consists of form without matter. The world continuously evolves toward a higher degree of form, gradually becoming more like God, yet this process can never be completed because it is impossible to eliminate matter entirely. This is a religion of progress and evolution, where the unmoved perfection of God influences the world solely through the love that finite beings experience for Him. Plato exhibited a propensity for mathematics, while Aristotle favored biology; this accounts for the differences in their religious outlooks. However, it would be overly simplistic to view Aristotle’s religion from this one-sided perspective, as he shared the Greeks’ admiration for unmoved perfection and preferred contemplation to action. Aristotle’s theory of the soul illustrates this aspect of his philosophy.

The Nature of the Soul and the Intellect

The question of whether Aristotle taught any form of the immortality of the soul has been hotly debated by his commentators. Averroes, who answered this question in the negative, had followers in Christian lands—the most extreme of whom were labeled Epicureans and encountered by Dante in hell. In reality, Aristotle’s theory is complex and easily misinterpreted. In his work “On the Soul,” he treats the soul as intimately linked to the body and ridicules the Pythagorean theory of the transmigration of souls. The soul appears to perish along with the body: “Thus, the soul is inseparable from the body…” Yet he immediately adds: “It is also clear that no part of it is separable…” Body and soul are related as matter and form; the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of the material body, which possesses potential life within it. Because substance is actuality, the soul is the actuality of the body. It is substance in the sense that it corresponds to a specific description of the essence of a thing, acting as the “true essence” of the body. The soul represents the first degree of actuality of an organized natural body that has potential life within it. To ask whether the soul and body are one is as senseless as asking whether wax and the image on it are one. The only psychic capacity that plants possess is nutrition. The soul is the final cause of the body.

In this book, Aristotle distinguishes between “soul” and “intellect,” placing the latter above the former and considering it less connected to the body. After discussing the relationship between soul and body, he states: “As for the intellect, being a certain substance, it seems to arise within [the soul] and is not destroyed.” He further notes: “Regarding the intellect and the capacity for understanding, there is still no obviousness, but it seems that they are of a different kind of soul, and that only these capacities can exist separately, as the eternal exists separately from the transient.” He concludes that the other parts of the soul cannot be separated from each other, contrary to the assertions of some. The intellect comprises that part of man which understands mathematics and philosophy; its objects are timeless, and thus it is regarded as timeless itself. While the soul moves the body and perceives sensory objects through nutritive, perceptive, rational, and appetitive powers, the intellect possesses a higher function of thought unrelated to the body or the organs of sense. Hence, the intellect may be immortal, even if the rest of the soul cannot.

To grasp Aristotle’s theory of the soul, we must recall that the soul is the ‘form’ of the body, and that spatial contour is one kind of ‘form’. What do the soul and contour have in common? Their commonality lies in their ability to impart unity to a quantity of matter. A part of a block of marble that will later become a statue is not yet separated from the rest of the marble; it is not yet a ‘thing’ and lacks any unity. Once the sculptor has crafted the statue, it possesses the unity derived from its contour. The essential characteristic of the soul, which qualifies it as the ‘form’ of the body, is that it renders the body an organic whole, functioning as a unity. An individual organ has goals that lie outside itself; a detached eye cannot see. Thus, many things can be attributed to an animal or plant as a whole that cannot be said of any of their parts. In this sense, organization or form grants substantiality. It is precisely what bestows substantiality upon a plant or animal that Aristotle refers to as its ‘soul’. However, ‘intellect’ is something else, less closely associated with the body; it may be a part of the soul, but it is possessed by only a small minority of living beings. The intellect, as contemplation, cannot be the cause of motion, for it never thinks of what is possible and never articulates what must be avoided or what should be pursued.

A similar theory, albeit with slightly altered terminology, is articulated in the “Nicomachean Ethics.” One part of the soul is irrational, while the other is rational. The irrational part is itself dual:

  • the vegetative, which exists in all living things, including plants
  • the appetitive, which exists in all animals.

The life of the rational soul consists in contemplation, which represents the fullest happiness of man, even if that state is not entirely attainable. As Aristotle writes: “Such a life would be, perhaps, superior to that which is appropriate to man, for thus he would live not by virtue of being man, but because there is something divine within him; and as this divine part differs from man, composed of different parts, so the activity associated with it differs from the activity associated with any other virtue.” He continues: “And if the intellect is divine in relation to man, then the life that is subordinate to the intellect is divine in comparison to human life.”

One need not heed the admonitions to ‘man, understand the human’ and ‘mortal, the mortal’. Instead, one must elevate oneself to the divine as much as possible, striving to live a life that aligns with the highest aspect of one’s being. Indeed, if this part is small in volume, its power and value far surpass all else.

From these excerpts, it appears that individuality—the very essence that distinguishes one person from another—is bound to the body and the irrational soul, while the rational soul, or intellect, is divine and impersonal. One person may have a fondness for oysters, while another prefers pineapples; such preferences create distinctions among them. However, when they contemplate the multiplication table, provided they are thinking correctly, there is no difference between them. The irrational divides us, while the rational unites. Thus, the immortality of the mind, or reason, does not signify the personal immortality of individuals but rather their participation in the immortality of God. There is no reason to believe that Aristotle held a view of personal immortality akin to that taught by Plato and later by Christianity. Aristotle believed merely that, in virtue of their rationality, humans partake of the divine, which is immortal. A person may enhance the divine element within their nature, and this pursuit is the greatest virtue. Yet, if one were to achieve complete success in this endeavor, they would cease to exist as a distinct individual. This is likely the only possible understanding of Aristotle’s words and, I believe, the most natural interpretation of them.





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