Ancient Philosophy
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
Aristotle's Ethics
Aristotle’s body of work includes three treatises on ethics, though two are now generally regarded as the products of his students. The third, Nicomachean Ethics, largely maintains its authenticity, despite the view of many scholars that certain sections—specifically Books V, VI, and VII—derive from the work of his disciples. I shall not dwell on this contentious issue, however, and will treat the text as a cohesive whole attributed to Aristotle himself.
Aristotle’s ethical views primarily reflect the prevailing opinions of the educated, worldly individuals of his time. They lack the mystical religiosity that permeates Plato’s writings and do not endorse the unorthodox theories regarding family and property found in The Republic. Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent, respectable citizens will find in the Ethics a systematic exposition of the principles that ought to govern behavior. Those seeking something more substantial, however, may find themselves disappointed. The book is directed toward respectable middle-aged individuals and has been employed by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to temper the impulses and enthusiasm of youth. Yet, for anyone with deep feelings, it may serve only to alienate.
The Nature of the Soul and the Definition of Virtue
The good, we are told, is happiness; it is the activity of the soul. Aristotle agrees with Plato in dividing the soul into two parts: the rational and the irrational. He further divides the irrational part into the vegetative, which even plants possess, and the appetitive, which is found in all animals. The appetitive part can be somewhat rational when the goods it desires are such that reason approves them. This distinction is crucial for defining virtue, as Aristotle posits that reason, in and of itself, is purely contemplative and cannot lead to practical action without the assistance of desire.
There are two kinds of virtues: intellectual virtues and moral virtues, corresponding to the two parts of the soul. Intellectual virtues are the result of teaching, while moral virtues consist of habits. The legislator’s task is to cultivate virtue among citizens by fostering good habits. We become just by performing acts of justice, and the same applies to all other virtues. By being compelled to acquire good habits, we gradually learn to find pleasure in good deeds, as Aristotle believed. This recalls Hamlet’s words to his mother:
“Assume a virtue, if you have it not. / That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat, / Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, / That to the use of actions fair and good / He likewise gives a frock or livery / That aptly is put on.”
The Doctrine of the Golden Mean
We now turn to the famous doctrine of the golden mean. Every virtue is a mean between two extremes, each of which is a vice. This is demonstrated through an examination of various virtues. Courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness; generosity lies between prodigality and stinginess; true pride exists between vanity and humility; wit balances between buffoonery and boorishness; modesty finds its place between shyness and shamelessness. Some virtues seem to resist this schema, such as truthfulness. Aristotle claims it is the mean between boastfulness and false modesty, yet this applies only to self-referential truthfulness. I struggle to see how truthfulness in a broader sense can fit into this framework.
There was a mayor who grasped Aristotle’s doctrine; when his term ended, he stated in his speech that he sought to avoid, on one hand, bias, and on the other, impartiality. The notion of truthfulness as something median appears scarcely less absurd.
Justice, Inequality, and Social Hierarchy
Aristotle’s moral views align closely with those accepted in his time, though they differ from contemporary perspectives regarding the nature of aristocracy. We believe that all human beings, at least in ethical theory, possess equal rights and that justice demands equality. Aristotle, however, maintained that justice involves not equality, but a correct proportion, which is only occasionally equal.
The justice of a master or father is different from that of a citizen, for a son or slave is property, and with respect to one’s property, there can be no injustice. However, concerning slaves, this doctrine shifts slightly when considering whether a person can be a friend to their slave. Aristotle notes: “For [here] there can be nothing in common, because a slave is an animated tool… thus friendship with a slave is impossible, yet it is possible with a man.” It seems that every person possesses a right over every person who is capable of entering into relationships based on law and contract. Therefore, friendship is possible to the extent that a slave is a person.
A father may disown a son if he is immoral, but a son cannot disown a father, as he owes him more than he could ever repay. He is especially indebted to him for his very existence. This holds true: in unequal relationships, since each should love in proportion to their worth, the inferior ought to love the superior more than the superior loves the inferior. Thus, wives, children, and subjects should love their husbands, parents, and monarchs more than the latter love them. In a good marriage, “the husband has authority according to his worth and in matters appropriate for a husband, while what is fitting for a wife he grants to her.” He ought not to govern by intruding upon her domain. Even less should she interfere in his affairs, as sometimes occurs when a wife is wealthy.
Magnanimity and the Contrast With Christian Ethics
The ideal individual, as envisioned by Aristotle, stands in stark contrast to the Christian saint. He must possess genuine pride and refrain from belittling his own merits. He ought to scorn anyone who deserves contempt. Aristotle’s depiction of the proud or magnanimous person is particularly fascinating, as it highlights the difference between pagan and Christian ethics and elucidates Nietzsche’s justification for viewing Christianity as a form of slave morality.
“The magnificent man, insofar as he is worthy of the greatest, will perhaps also be the most virtuous: indeed, the greater one is, the more virtuous one is entitled to be, and the most virtuous is truly the greatest.” Therefore, the truly magnificent must be virtuous, and greatness in every virtue can be regarded as a sign of magnificence. Of course, the magnificent must in no way flee in fear or act against justice. What shameful acts would one commit for whom there is nothing great? Magnificence appears to be a kind of adornment of virtues, for it imparts grandeur to them and cannot exist without them. Consequently, it is difficult to be truly magnificent, as this is impossible without moral perfection.
The magnificent person primarily reveals himself in relation to honor. At the same time, he behaves moderately concerning wealth, the power of rulers, and indeed every fortune and misfortune. He will neither rejoice excessively in success nor suffer unduly from failure, since even honor is not regarded by him as something of the utmost importance. Meanwhile, both the power of rulers and wealth are sought for the sake of honor, and in any case, possessing them leads one to desire to be honored. But for one who considers even honor trifling, everything else is inconsequential. This is why the magnificent are often perceived as proud. Moreover, he who is magnificent does not expose himself to danger for trifles and does not relish danger for its own sake, for he esteems very little. Yet for the sake of the great, he willingly faces danger and does not fear for his life in decisive moments, believing it unworthy to cling to life at any cost.
He is capable of bestowing benefits but is ashamed to accept them. The former signifies his superiority, while the latter indicates the superiority of another. For a benefit received, he repays with a greater benefit, for then the one who rendered the service will still owe him and will be further blessed. A hallmark of the magnificent is a disinclination to need anything at all, or only rarely, yet he is always eager to render assistance. Moreover, he behaves majestically with the high-ranking and fortunate, while moderately with the average. Superiority over the former is fitting and creates an impression, whereas over the latter it poses no challenge. If to rise above the former is not so lowly, to do so over the wretched is base, just as it is to exhibit strength against the weak.
His hatred and friendship must be manifest, because both hiding and paying less heed to truth than to rumor are characteristic of the cowardly, and he speaks and acts openly. He is free in speech, for he despises the timid, and he is always truthful, save for feigning before the crowd. It is difficult to astonish him, for nothing seems great to him. He does not discuss people, for he will not speak of himself nor of another. Indeed, he cares not for praise of himself nor for condemnation of others, and in turn, he is sparing in commendations. For this reason, he does not slander even enemies unless, in his contempt for them, he seeks to insult. He who is magnificent tends to possess beautiful and unprofitable things rather than useful ones that serve some purpose, as self-sufficiency is more characteristic of the former. It is commonly believed that the movements of the magnificent are slow, his voice deep, and his speech assured. Thus, this is the nature of the magnificent individual, and deviations toward deficiency yield the abased, while those toward excess produce the haughty.
One shudders at the thought of what the haughty individual might resemble.
Whatever opinions one might hold regarding the magnanimous man, one truth remains clear. Such individuals cannot abound in society. This is not merely because there are few virtuous people, as virtue is not easily attained. Rather, it is because the virtues of the magnanimous person are significantly contingent upon his occupying a unique social position. Aristotle views ethics as an offshoot of politics. It is no surprise that following such praise of pride, we discover that he regards monarchy as the finest form of governance, with aristocracy following closely behind. Monarchs and aristocrats may be ‘magnanimous,’ but ordinary citizens would be ridiculed if they attempted to emulate such a model.
This raises a question that is half ethical and half political. Can we morally justify a society that, in keeping with the essence of its structure, bestows all that is best upon the few? It requires the majority to settle for the secondary. Plato and Aristotle would answer ‘yes,’ and Nietzsche concurs. The Stoics, Christians, and democrats respond ‘no,’ but this ‘no’ resonates very differently among them. The Stoics and early Christians assert that the greatest good is virtue and that external circumstances cannot prevent a person from being virtuous. Thus, there is no need to strive for a just social system, as social injustice may only influence inconsequential matters. Conversely, the democrat typically maintains, at least where politics is concerned, that the most vital goods are power and property. He therefore cannot reconcile himself with a social system that is unjust in this regard.
The Stoic-Christian viewpoint presupposes a conception of virtue that is markedly distinct from Aristotle’s, as it must assert that virtue is equally attainable for the slave as for his master. Christian ethics disapproves of the pride that Aristotle deems a virtue and extols humility, which he sees as a vice. The intellectual virtues that Plato and Aristotle hold in the highest esteem must be entirely excised from consideration to allow the poor and humble to be virtuous, just like everyone else. Pope Gregory the Great, with great seriousness, once reproached a bishop for teaching grammar.
Aristotle’s view that the highest virtue is reserved for the few is logically linked to his subordination of ethics to politics. If the aim is a flourishing society rather than a flourishing individual, then a society built on subordination may be perfectly valid. In an orchestra, the first violin carries more weight than the oboe, yet both are essential to the ensemble’s excellence. It would be impossible to organize an orchestra on the principle of providing each player with what is best for them as an individual. The same logic applies to the governance of a large modern state, regardless of its democratic character. Modern democracy, unlike its ancient counterpart, confers immense power upon a select few—presidents or prime ministers—and expects from them achievements that cannot be anticipated from ordinary citizens. When people set aside religious or partisan biases, they generally agree that a president should command more respect than a skilled mason. Within a democratic framework, while the president is not quite Aristotle’s magnanimous man, there is a clear expectation that they will differ significantly from the average citizen and possess merits specific to their office. These merits may not be termed “ethical,” but that is only because we use the adjective in a narrower sense than Aristotle intended.
As a consequence of Christian dogma, the distinction between morality and other virtues has become far sharper than it was in ancient Greece. To be a great poet, composer, or artist is a virtue, yet it does not constitute a moral merit. We do not consider a person more virtuous or more likely to attain paradise simply because they possess such talents. Moral virtues are tied exclusively to acts of will—to the ability to choose the right course of action from among all possibilities. I cannot be blamed for failing to compose an opera, as I do not know how it is done. The orthodox view holds that whenever two courses of action are possible, conscience dictates the correct path, and to choose otherwise is a sin. Virtue lies more in avoiding sin than in any positive achievement. There is no basis for expecting an educated person to be morally superior to an uneducated one, or a wise individual to be better than a fool. In this way, a host of virtues with significant social value are excluded from the domain of ethics. In contemporary usage, “unethical” carries a much narrower meaning than “undesirable.” To be simple-minded is undesirable, yet it is hardly “unethical.”
Many contemporary philosophers, however, reject this definition of ethics. They argue that one must first define what the good is and then determine the actions directed toward achieving it. This perspective aligns more closely with Aristotelian thought, which asserts that happiness is the highest good. True, the highest happiness is accessible only to the philosopher, but for Aristotle, this is not a valid objection to his theory.
Virtue as a Means to Happiness
Ethical theories can be divided into two classes: those that regard virtue as an end and those that regard it as a means. Aristotle generally agrees that virtues serve as means to attain a specific end, namely happiness. “Thus, if the end is the object of desire, and the means to the end are subjects of deliberation and conscious choice, then the actions related to the means will be consciously chosen and voluntary. Meanwhile, the activities of virtues are related to the means…” Yet there exists another dimension to virtue, through which it becomes integrated into the goal of action: “The human good consists in the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue… Let us add to this: throughout a complete life.” He would suggest, I believe, that intellectual virtues are ends in themselves, while moral virtues are merely means. Although Christian moralists assert that the consequences of virtuous actions collectively comprise the good, they are not as valuable as the virtuous actions themselves. These actions ought to be valued for their own sake rather than assessed by their outcomes. Conversely, those who regard pleasure as the good view virtues solely as a means. Any definition of the good, other than defining it as virtue itself, leads to the same result. Virtues are understood as means to achieve the good, rather than being the good. As noted, in this matter, Aristotle largely agrees—though not entirely—with those who believe that the primary task of ethics is to define the good and that virtue should be defined as an action aimed at producing it.
From the relationship of ethics to politics arises another significant question. If we concede that the good toward which just actions should be directed is the good of the entire society, or ultimately of the human race, does the public good represent the sum of the goods enjoyed by individuals? Or is it something that belongs essentially to the whole rather than to its parts? We can illustrate this problem with an analogy to the human body. Pleasures are primarily associated with various parts of the body, yet we consider them intrinsic to the person as a whole. We may relish a pleasant scent, but we understand that a single nose could not enjoy it in isolation.
Some argue that in a tightly knit community, high qualities are inherent to the whole rather than to any individual part. If these thinkers are metaphysicians, they might argue—as Hegel did—that whatever goodness exists is an attribute of the Universe as a whole. Typically, they add that it is less erroneous to ascribe such goodness to the state than to the individual. Logically, this view holds that we can ascribe predicates to the state that cannot be attributed to its members individually, such as having a large population, extensive territory, or being powerful. The position we are considering assigns ethical predicates in this same way, positing that they are merely derivatively inherent to individuals. One may belong to a state with a populous citizenry or to a ‘good’ state. Yet, they assert, one is neither ‘good’ nor ‘populated’ in and of oneself. This perspective, while common among German philosophers, is not characteristic of Aristotle, except perhaps to a certain degree in his conception of justice.
The Role of Friendship in Human Relations
A significant portion of the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to the discussion of friendship, encompassing all relationships that arise from a sense of attachment. Perfect friendship is possible only among the worthy, and one cannot have many such friends. One should not enter into friendships with someone of higher status unless they also excel in virtue, which justifies the respect accorded to them. We have observed that in unequal relationships—such as those between husband and wife or father and son—the superior party should be loved more. It is inconceivable to be friends with God, as He cannot love us as an equal. Aristotle contemplates whether a person can be a friend to themselves, concluding that this is possible only if the person is virtuous; he asserts that bad people often hate themselves. A good person should love themselves, but nobly. Friends provide solace in misfortune, yet one should not make them unhappy by seeking their sympathy, as women and effeminate men might do. It is well to have friends not only in hardship; the happy person requires friends to share their happiness. “No one would agree to possess all the goods of the world if they had no one with whom to share them. Man is a social animal and is by nature made for companionship with others.” All that has been said regarding friendship is sensible, yet it rarely exceeds ordinary common sense.
The Philosophical Evaluation of Pleasure
Aristotle displays his characteristic wisdom when deliberating on pleasure, a subject Plato approached with a certain asceticism. Pleasure, as Aristotle defines it, remains distinct from happiness, though the latter cannot exist without the former. He outlines three competing views on the nature of pleasure: 1) that it is never good; 2) that some pleasures are good, while most are bad; and 3) that pleasure is good, yet not the highest good. He dismisses the first position by observing that because pain is unequivocally bad, its opposite, pleasure, must be good. As he rightly states, it would be nonsensical to claim that a person could be happy while on the rack; some degree of external well-being is clearly necessary for happiness. He further refutes the notion that all pleasures are merely corporeal. In all things, he suggests, there exists something divine, which accounts for the capacity for higher pleasures. Thus, good people experience pleasure, provided they are not engulfed by misfortune, while God alone enjoys a singular and simple state of bliss.
In the subsequent part of the book, there is another discourse on happiness that is not entirely congruent with what has been stated above. Here, it is asserted that there are bad pleasures, which do not count as pleasures for good people. This suggests that pleasures come in various kinds and are good or bad depending on whether they are associated with virtuous or vicious activities. There are things more valuable than pleasure; no one would be content to live a life possessing the intellect of a child, even if that life were pleasant. Every animal has its own inherent pleasure, and the pleasure intrinsic to man is connected with reason.
Contemplation as the Highest Form of Happiness
This leads to the sole doctrine in the work that constitutes more than an expression of common sense. Happiness lies in benevolent activity, and perfect bliss resides in the highest activity: contemplation. Contemplation is preferable to war, politics, or any other practical career, as it provides the leisure fundamentally necessary for happiness. Practical virtue yields only a secondary form of happiness; the highest happiness consists in the application of reason, as reason is, more than anything else, the essence of man. A person cannot wholly dedicate themselves to contemplation, yet, as they are, they partake in the life of the gods. “The activity of divinity, being the most blissful, is contemplative activity.” Among all human beings, the philosopher is closest to the divine in their activity, and thus they are the happiest and the best.
“Whoever manifests themselves in the activity of the mind and honors the intellect is evidently arranged in the best possible manner and is most pleasing to the gods.” Aristotle argues this from the premise that if the gods pay any attention to human affairs, it is reasonable to assume they delight in that which is highest and most kin to them—the intellect. They would naturally bestow favor upon those who cherish this faculty, as these individuals attend to what is dear to the divine while acting rightly and beautifully.
There is no doubt that this excellence is found primarily in the sage. Consequently, the sage is most dear to the gods and, in this sense, stands as the foremost among the happy.
This excerpt effectively serves as the concluding part of the Nicomachean Ethics; the subsequent paragraphs act as a transition to politics.
Critical Assessment of the Nicomachean Ethics
We must now assess the merits and shortcomings of the Nicomachean Ethics. Unlike many subjects explored by Greek philosophers, ethics has made no significant strides toward reliable discovery; in this field, there is no knowledge in the scientific sense. Consequently, there is no reason to view an ancient treatise as inherently inferior to a contemporary one. When Aristotle discusses astronomy, we can confidently declare him mistaken; yet when he engages with ethical questions, we cannot assert with the same certainty whether he is right or wrong. Generally, one may pose three questions regarding the ethics of any philosopher: 1) Is the system internally consistent? 2) Does it derive coherently from the author’s other views? 3) Does it provide answers to ethical dilemmas that resonate with our own moral sentiments? A negative answer to the first or second question indicates a logical flaw. However, a negative answer to the third does not imply the philosopher is mistaken; it merely suggests that we find his views unappealing.
Let us examine these three questions in relation to the ethical theory presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.
- Overall, the work is internally consistent, setting aside a few minor points. The doctrine that the good is happiness and that happiness consists in successful activity is well articulated. The doctrine that each virtue is a golden mean between two extremes is skillfully developed, though less successful in its application to intellectual contemplation, which is claimed to be the highest form of activity. One might argue that the golden mean is intended solely for moral virtues rather than intellectual virtues. Furthermore, the position of the legislator appears somewhat ambiguous. He must encourage children and youth to cultivate the habit of performing good deeds—a habit that will ultimately lead them to find pleasure in virtue and to act virtuously without legal coercion. Clearly, the legislator could just as easily compel the youth to adopt bad habits; to avoid this, he must possess all the wisdom of a Platonic guardian. Should he fail to prevent this, the argument that a virtuous life brings pleasure becomes untenable. However, this issue pertains more to politics than to ethics.
- Aristotle’s ethics align in every respect with his metaphysics. Indeed, his metaphysical theories serve as expressions of ethical optimism. He believes in the scientific significance of ultimate ends, including the conviction that purpose governs the unfolding of the universe. He contends that changes embodying the growth of organization or ‘forms’—and, by extension, virtuous actions—favor this tendency. While much of his practical ethics is not strictly philosophical, emerging instead from observations of human practice, this aspect of his doctrine remains consistent with his broader metaphysical framework.
- When we compare Aristotle’s ethical inclinations with our own, we first observe an acknowledgment of inequality that is unacceptable to contemporary social views. He not only raises no objections to slavery or the dominion of husbands and fathers over wives and children, but he also asserts that the best, in essence, is reserved for the few—those who are magnanimous and philosophical. This implies that the majority of humanity exists merely as a means to produce a handful of rulers and sages. Kant defended the view that every human being is an end in themselves, a perspective influenced by Christianity. Yet, Kant’s view entails a logical difficulty: it provides no means to resolve situations where the interests of two individuals collide. If each represents an end in themselves, how shall we find a principle to determine which should concede? Such a principle must pertain to society rather than the individual. In the broadest sense, it should be a principle of justice. Bentham and the utilitarians interpret justice as equality: when interests clash, the correct solution is that which produces the greatest happiness, regardless of who enjoys it or how it is distributed. If a good person is afforded greater happiness than a bad one, it is because, ultimately, overall happiness has increased through the rewarding of virtue and the punishment of vice, rather than from an ethical doctrine claiming that the good deserve more than the evil. Justice, from this perspective, consists of assessing only the quantity of happiness, without advantage for any specific individual or class. Greek philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, held a different conception of justice that still prevails widely. They believed—initially based on a religious foundation—that each person has their own corresponding sphere, a boundary which, if crossed, is deemed unjust. Some individuals, due to their character and inclinations, possess a wider sphere than others; thus, if they experience a greater share of happiness, there is no injustice in this. Aristotle accepts this perspective as self-evident, but its basis, rooted in primitive religion, is no longer visible in his work.
Aristotle almost entirely lacks what one might term benevolence or philanthropy. The sufferings of humanity, to the extent he acknowledges them, do not emotionally move him. He asserts rationally that they are evil, yet there is no evidence that they make him unhappy, except when his own friends are the ones suffering.
In general, the Nicomachean Ethics is devoid of emotion, a quality not found in the works of his predecessors. Aristotle’s discourse on human affairs feels overly self-satisfied and complacent, as if he has forgotten what incites people to engage passionately with one another. Even his treatment of friendship is tepid. He shows no sign of having experienced those feelings that make it difficult to retain one’s reason; clearly, he remains unaware of the deepest facets of moral life.
One could assert that he overlooks the entire range of human experience associated with religion. All he has to offer might be useful to the well-off whose passions are underdeveloped; however, he has nothing to say to those possessed by God or the devil, or to those whose visible misfortunes lead them to despair. For these reasons, it seems to me that his Nicomachean Ethics, despite its renown, lacks intrinsic significance.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
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