Traditional Philosophy of India and China

The Tradition of Philosophy in Ancient India

Theory of Knowledge in Indian Philosophy

Let us now turn to those issues that lie at the core of contemporary philosophical thought, particularly the questions of the certainty of knowledge and the justification of truth in judgments. This domain inherently demands developed critical thinking, as it concerns not only the justification of personal conviction but also the assessment of the evidential strength of arguments and the possibility of grasping the true nature of reality, beyond mere subjective assurance. It is precisely in this respect that myth-making diverges fundamentally from the scientific method. The myth-maker is satisfied with the coherence and explanatory clarity of their narrative; after all, a clever mind can always find a fitting explanation for anything. More so, if one truly believes in something, they will always find a way to justify that belief. However, it is an entirely different matter to justify a verification method that yields an objectively predictable result. Such verification requires the cultivation of doubt, distrust of one's convictions, and, even more so, skepticism toward authorities or widely accepted beliefs, regardless of how many people agree with them. Every philosophical tradition is based on a certain logic of argumentation, a method of presenting evidence that is deemed convincing. This logic, in turn, rests on theoretical considerations concerning human cognitive abilities and the nature of the cognitive process, i.e., the theory of knowledge. Let us examine traditional Indian philosophy from this perspective.

What is absolutely certain, and what aspects of our judgments about the world cannot be doubted? Are there any testimonies that directly reveal reality to us, allowing us to distinguish between fantasies, conjectures, illusions, superstitions, and the true state of affairs? And if a person is mistaken, what is the cause of such errors, why do they occur, and can they be reliably avoided? Ultimately, what is truth?

It is evident, and all philosophers agree, that mere strong belief in something or the widespread acceptance of a particular opinion cannot be a reliable source of truth. People are prone to error and, even more often, are interested in deception, in concealing information, in lying, or in distorting the truth. One cannot take things on mere faith, except, as many believe, in cases where the source of the words holds the authority of sanctity. But does such an authority exist? As mentioned earlier, the proponents of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy were convinced that the sacred texts of the Vedas held this authority. However, the problem lies in the fact that these texts are not always clearly understood. Hence, disputes arise among interpreters of the text, and they must be resolved somehow. Clearly, the only way to expose a deceiver or settle a dispute about which interpretation is closer to the truth is to possess the truth oneself. Only then can one compare the words with the actual state of affairs (which must be known independently of the words).

The representatives of four schools (Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, and Yoga) believed that such a method exists, and in the end, it convinces us that the Vedas do not lie. Thus, there is agreement between the Vedas and independent knowledge. The followers of Purva Mimamsa and Vedanta, however, maintained that what the Vedas testify to in their most esoteric parts cannot be proven otherwise, yet this knowledge is true. But whence such conviction? Essentially, it consists of two aspects: (1) the realization that there are no rational means to prove the fundamental assumptions of knowledge about the world, and (2) that such knowledge can be apprehended through an act of direct insight into consciousness, a transformation of one's own state of mind that imparts the highest degree of certainty. According to these thinkers, those who seek more substantial grounds for certainty merely deceive themselves with illusions.

Without a unique catalyst, which in this case is the Vedas, true knowledge is impossible. The world is structured in such a way that it contains the Vedas, and this is the primary condition for the world being knowable by humanity, to whom the Vedas offer the revelation of truth. This revelation is not given to everyone, but with certain efforts, it can be attained.

Buddhists and Jainas shared a similar view, with the key difference that, in their understanding, the Vedas have no role here. To comprehend truth, there is no need for interpretations of supposedly sacred texts. Truth is revealed to an individual if they follow a particular way of life. Thus, we encounter a very distinctive theory of knowledge, wherein cognitive optimism (the belief that true knowledge can be obtained) is combined with the conviction that such knowledge is impossible without a transformation of the consciousness of the "I-subject." In the modern European tradition of scientific thought, it is believed that acquired knowledge changes consciousness. Indians, however, are more inclined to think that in order to receive knowledge, one must first prepare their consciousness, after which revelation will seemingly pour into this vessel.

This reveals another distinctive feature: the concept of "knowledge" is primarily viewed by Indians in terms of the states of the subject. The Western tradition, by contrast, tends to view knowledge as information contained in statements and correlated with an object. Although these are two sides of the same process, the focus on the self, on one's inner world, transforms knowledge into not so much the collection of facts and the search for patterns within them, but rather a kind of attunement of perception and the recognition of one's own "visions." In the end, as understood by Vedanta, the world itself is a vision within the horizon of the consciousness of the I-subject. The world is what I cannot arbitrarily unsee, what is imposed upon me by some force. But true reality (that which exists not in visions but in itself) is nothing but the capacity to see and generate visions, which merges into the singular Brahman, the absolute reality of God.

However, these visions give rise to the multiplicity of limited I-subjects for whom the world is akin to a dream. No matter how much we study the content of our dreams, we will not gain any knowledge of the true state of affairs. Hence, there is little interest in natural science, for the world of natural givenness is merely one of many forms in which the I-subject's visions manifest. This aspect crystallizes even more distinctly in Buddhism: we cannot comprehend the totality of phenomena, but we need not. The world is structured in such a way that within it, a person can reliably acquire the knowledge they need, while the unnecessary—being neither provable nor worth the trouble—remains irrelevant. We can free ourselves from suffering within the cycle of worldly phenomena, and this is the main source of peace for our anxieties and inquiries. As for the rest, nothing certain can be said: hence, it is better to remain silent.

Jainas are more optimistic on this matter: for them, the world is a real world of actual objects, about which the jiva can obtain exhaustive knowledge, allowing it to predict any outcome under any circumstances. The jiva can attain omniscience if it rids itself of attachments that distort the mind.

At the same time, sensory experience and logical reasoning during reflection also serve as sources of knowledge. However, in the Indian philosophical tradition, these two sources are generally not self-sufficient, with the exception, once again, of the Charvakas. Followers of this tradition believed that any information obtained by indirect means, beyond immediate sensory perception, does not provide full certainty and is subject to doubt. In other words, I can only be certain of what I have directly perceived with my senses.