Post-Classical Philosophy

Positivism and Analytical Philosophy

These two interrelated currents of contemporary philosophy focus significantly on exploring issues in epistemology. Compared to other philosophical trends, they are most aligned with science.

Positivism emerged in the mid-19th century as an attempt to find an alternative approach to epistemology in contrast to the prevailing German idealism. The founder of positivism was the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857), with notable representatives including British thinkers John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Early positivists criticized German idealism, particularly the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, for its excessive abstraction and the creation of theoretical constructs that did not align with the actual process of knowledge acquisition. The advancement of science did not fit into the methodological frameworks of German idealists, and positivists sought to develop a methodology that would more adequately describe the mechanisms of scientific knowledge.

The key concept of positivism is "positive knowledge," which refers to knowledge grounded in experience and confirmed by facts. In contrast to metaphysical (abstract theoretical constructs), positive knowledge is meant to reflect the real world and, therefore, must primarily be based on facts. Scientific theories should be constructed as generalizations of empirical data. This reliance on facts, along with the possibility of empirical verification of theories (later known as verification), was seen as the defining feature of scientific knowledge. The methodology of the natural sciences served as a model for scientific inquiry, with physics regarded as the exemplary science. Other fields, particularly the social and humanities sciences, were expected to borrow methods from the more developed natural sciences. Comte, recognized as the founder of sociology, notably referred to this new science of society as social physics.

According to Comte, knowledge evolves through three stages: the theological stage (knowledge is accepted predominantly without evidence, and a religious worldview prevails), the metaphysical stage (abstract, speculative explanations dominate), and the positive stage (the scientific stage, where empirical investigations are paramount). This concept is linked to Comte's classification of the sciences. He arranged the sciences in order of decreasing simplicity and abstraction: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. These disciplines investigate specific subject areas, while philosophy is tasked with systematizing the achievements of all sciences.

Overall, early positivists aimed to elucidate the principles of scientific methodology, significantly continuing the tradition of empiricism. Mill, for instance, turned to induction, which played a crucial role in empiricism. However, the conclusions reached through inductive reasoning were not logically certain but merely probable. In an effort to enhance the reliability of inductive conclusions, Mill developed methods known as the methods of scientific induction.

The subsequent stage of positivism is sometimes referred to as empirio-criticism. Key figures in this movement included Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and German thinker Richard Avenarius (1849-1896). They elevated the methodological role of philosophy, seeing its primary task not in synthesizing knowledge (as Comte believed) but in developing a methodology for scientific inquiry. This period was characterized by an emphasis on the relativity of scientific knowledge. Experience is given in sensations; thus, as humans understand the world, they engage not with immediate reality but with its reflection through the prism of their sensory data. Empirio-criticism was largely a response to the crisis in physics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries when an increasing number of scientific discoveries did not fit into the prior mechanistic worldview based on Newtonian concepts.

The third stage of positivism is known as neopositivism. Its core ideas were developed by thinkers of the Vienna Circle, including Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1945), and Carl Hempel (1905-1997).

The philosophy of the Vienna Circle is sometimes referred to as logical positivism or logical atomism. Neopositivists continued the positivist tradition of investigating issues in epistemology, devoting considerable attention to the problem of demarcation—establishing criteria that would allow the distinction of scientific knowledge from non-scientific knowledge. The principal criterion was the principle of verification—testing theories against empirical data. However, this principle, which can also be found in early positivism, gave rise to a number of problems, including the incommensurability of theories and facts. Facts reflect certain singular statements (for instance, data from specific experiments or observations), while a theory comprises general statements that encompass all conceivable instances of a certain type, not merely those recorded in available experience. Therefore, it is typically impossible to completely verify a theory (conduct strong verification), as it is not feasible to test all instances it describes. Limiting oneself to partial confirmation (as weak verification suggests) allows for potentially false theories, as there is no guarantee that a theory previously confirmed will not be refuted by future experiments or observations. These and other issues led to a crisis in neopositivism and its transformation into post-positivism.

The most prominent representatives of post-positivism include Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994), Hungarian-British philosopher Imre Lakatos (1922-1974), and American thinkers Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) and Paul Feyerabend (1924-1996). In post-positivism, several key positivist ideas were reevaluated.

In his well-known concept of critical rationalism, Popper proposed replacing the principle of verification with the principle of falsification (which emphasizes empirical disproof rather than empirical confirmation). It is impossible to confirm a theory reliably through empirical data; however, it is possible to disprove it—if even one fact contradicts the theory, it indicates its fallibility. Thus, while numerous facts that support a theory are insufficient to conclude its truth, a single fact that disproves it is sufficient to conclude its falsity. This leads to the principle of fallibilism—the principle of the inherent error of knowledge. However, while the truth of all theories is not guaranteed, Popper argued that not all theories are equally valid. Preference should be given to theories that provide more accurate explanations, encompass a broader range of phenomena, and withstand more rigorous testing. Although the principle of falsification does not establish the truth of theories, it can serve as a criterion for demarcation—scientific knowledge must allow for the possibility of falsification (disproof), that is, indicate the conditions under which a theory may be found false.

Theories generate consequences that are tested empirically (this is the hypothetico-deductive method), whereby the more precise a theory is, the more accurate its predictions are, and the greater the logical possibility for potential disproof.

Kuhn revised the traditional view of science as a cumulative process in which knowledge is simply accumulated and new discoveries are added to the old body of knowledge. In reality, he argued, there are periods of scientific revolutions in the development of science, during which the very foundations of science are reexamined, leading to a transition to a new worldview.

Kuhn introduced the concept of a paradigm as a foundational methodological framework that dictates the ways of formulating and analyzing problems. For a certain period, scientists operate within the confines of a paradigm, expanding existing knowledge by applying established cognitive procedures to the exploration of new issues. This represents a period of "normal" science, where scientific activity resembles solving problems using commonly accepted methods. However, over time, more anomalies arise—instances that cannot be explained based on the existing paradigm. This compels researchers to seek new methods of investigation, ultimately leading to the emergence of a new paradigm that presents a new worldview and methodological principles, thus culminating in a scientific revolution. Paradigms are incommensurable with one another; a new paradigm does not extend the old but represents a fundamentally different vision of the foundational principles of a particular science. Furthermore, the shift between paradigms is influenced not only by purely intellectual factors but also by social ones, representing a kind of intellectual fashion within the scientific community. In Kuhn's conception, the development of science is driven not solely by the internal logic of knowledge but also by external factors—social, subjective, and so forth.

Perhaps the most controversial concept within post-positivism is Paul Feyerabend's methodological anarchism. He sharpened the idea of the incommensurability of paradigms and the dependence of science on non-logical factors. Science is viewed as a sociocultural practice, determined not by the internal logic of knowledge but by external factors—the opinions of the scientific community, institutions that uphold the authority of science. If social factors play a primary role, then science does not differ fundamentally from other worldviews, such as magic or religion, and thus should not be prioritized. However, this assertion of the equality of different types of knowledge leads to an inability to make a justified choice between theories and opens the door to dubious or even charlatanistic teachings. Overall, Feyerabend's approach tends to exaggerate the role of non-logical factors in the development of science.

Analytical philosophy is closely connected with positivism. It emerged within neopositivism and expressed several key ideas pertinent to this period. One of the most important tasks of neopositivism was the logical analysis of the language of science, aiming to clarify and elucidate the meanings of concepts, and to purify the language of science from the vagueness and ambiguity characteristic of natural language. The most renowned representatives of the early period of analytical philosophy were British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). They employed tools of mathematical logic for the logical analysis of language, striving to cleanse the language of science from metaphysical overlays. Such endeavors manifested in the concept of logical atomism, which posits...