Philosophy of Being and Knowledge

Semiotics (Theory of Signs)

Mirror

In every philosophical discipline, there are themes that thinkers have invested immense effort into, yet have failed to resolve satisfactorily. For semiotics, one such theme is the problem of the mirror. An axiom of semiotics is the definition of a sign, which is to clarify what a sign is: a sign is something through which something else is revealed, and it is distinct from the object it signifies. While semioticians generally do not struggle with distinguishing between a sign and its object, they face a challenge when attempting to elucidate what is seen in a mirror—whether it is the sign of the object or the object itself. This question has remained relevant to semiotics for two millennia. The Roman philosopher Seneca wrote that there are two views on this problem. According to the first, people see in the mirror signs, reflections, or likenesses of things; thus, the mirror creates something that signifies the object being reflected, and it is this something, rather than the object itself, that people see when they look in the mirror. According to the second theory, the mirror directs the gaze towards the object itself, so the mirror contains nothing that serves as a sign of the reflected object. Plato, among others, adhered to the second theory. Thus, as Seneca asserted, in antiquity there was a lively debate on whether people, when looking in a mirror, see the objects themselves or the signs of the objects.

In the Middle Ages, the problem of the mirror became even more pressing. In the Bible (in the First Epistle to the Corinthians), there is a passage where the Apostle Paul contemplates the human capacity to know God and truth, asserting that "now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face." Thus, the Apostle Paul claimed that after earthly life, people would be able to see God directly (face to face), while during their earthly life, they see God only as if in a mirror. This phrase required interpretation: Can people see God, or merely His reflection? Since this concerns the possibility of knowing God—a fundamental question for theology—much attention was devoted to this issue. The solution to the problem had to be sought in semiotics: if semiotics asserts that people see objects in mirrors, then theology can claim that people can know God during their earthly life; if semiotics asserts that people see only the sign of the object in the mirror—something that signifies the object but is not the object itself—then theology can claim that people know not God Himself but only something that symbolizes or signifies God.

Thomas Aquinas held that in the mirror, people see signs rather than the objects themselves, and thus there is a significant difference between knowing God in earthly life and knowing God in the future. The Coimbrans Jesuits made a significant contribution to this debate. They developed a distinction between formal and instrumental signs. Formal signs are those that indicate an object while remaining unnoticed by people. The Coimbran Jesuits considered the mirror's reflection to be a formal sign, and thus interpreted the biblical phrase by the Apostle Paul as meaning that people in earthly life come to know God indirectly, with the intermediary directing human knowledge towards God while remaining unnoticed.

Nevertheless, the debate over the essence of the mirror’s reflection continued. In the 20th century, in addition to the two positions described by Seneca, a third emerged. Its founder was the Italian philosopher Umberto Eco (1932-2016). To determine what people actually see in the mirror—whether it is the object or its sign—one must first define what a sign is and then ascertain whether the mirror’s reflection meets these criteria. To this end, Eco, synthesizing the advances made in semiotics before him, formulated criteria that a sign must meet. According to Eco's criteria, for something to be a sign, it must signify something else, regardless of whether the signified object is present at the moment of signification. For example, smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke (the sign) can exist even when the fire (the object) is no longer present. Even then, smoke signifies fire. A photograph is a sign that signifies its subject even when that subject has ceased to exist. A sign is something other than the object it signifies. For example, smoke is not like fire, and a photo is not what it depicts.

Based on this definition of a sign, Eco concludes that the mirror’s reflection is not a sign, as it does not meet these criteria. A sign can signify an object even when the object does not exist, whereas a mirror cannot reflect what is not in front of it. A mirror’s reflection is identical to the object it signifies, whereas a sign is something different from the object it signifies. Thus, a mirror’s reflection is not a sign. On the other hand, Eco disagreed with the notion that in a mirror, people see the objects themselves, since the object of reflection is outside the mirror, not within it. Hence, before Eco, there were two views on the essence of the mirror’s reflection: some believed people see signs of objects in the mirror, while others thought they see the objects themselves. Eco, however, argued that a mirror’s reflection is a unique human experience that cannot be reduced to anything else. A mirror’s reflection is neither an object nor its sign but something distinct from both.

Eco’s solution to the problem of the mirror did not satisfy all researchers. Therefore, discussions on this topic continue. However, the problem of the mirror remains the best example of the complexity and significance of research in the field of semiotics. The classification and definition of signs are subjects of debate, some of which have a millennia-long history.