Philosophy of Being and Knowledge

Semiotics (Theory of Signs)

The Emergence of Semiotics

The earliest scholarly inquiries into semiotics began in Antiquity. A central concern for philosophers of the time was the relationship between a sign and the object it denotes—whether signs are in some way connected to things. Plato posited that signs are arbitrary, meaning they bear no intrinsic connection to the things they represent. If signs were inherently linked to objects, all languages would use the same words for the same things, eliminating linguistic diversity. Aristotle argued that there is a mediating element between objects and signs—namely, the concept. People first form concepts about objects and then create signs to denote these concepts. Thus, signs are linked not to the objects themselves, but to the concepts of those objects. Concepts are analogues of objects, meaning they reflect objects as they are, and thus, all people have similar concepts of things. Signs, on the other hand, are arbitrary. Objects determine what concepts should be, but neither objects nor concepts affect the nature of signs. Aristotle was the first to suggest the need for a separate science of signs, though this project would not be realized until two millennia later. The Stoics believed that signs denote the essence of things and are not arbitrary. However, over time, the connection between signs and things became disrupted, leading scholars to seek the true meanings of signs. This line of thought gave rise to etymology, the study of the origins of word meanings, with its name deriving from the Greek "ετυμον" (truth). Similar to Aristotle, the Stoics emphasized that three elements are involved in signification: the sign itself, the concept, and the object of which the concept is a representation. They also noted that two of these elements are material, while only the concept is immaterial.

Semiotics flourished in the Middle Ages. Among its notable scholars was Saint Augustine, who defined a sign as something that reveals another thing to the mind. Signs are categorized into natural and conventional. Natural signs arise from the nature of the object they denote, such as smoke being a natural sign of fire, as fire naturally produces smoke. Conventional signs are created by humans independent of the objects themselves, such as the word "fire," which is a conventional sign because it signifies its object only because people have agreed to use it in that way. Augustine emphasized a crucial distinction between these types of signs: conventional signs are understood only by those who have learned their meaning. For instance, when someone says "I am angry," only those who know the meaning of "angry" will understand, as "angry" is a conventional sign; however, if someone scowls in anger, that expression is understood by everyone, as facial expressions are natural signs. Augustine also distinguished between primary and secondary signs. Primary signs denote objects, while secondary signs denote other signs. For example, spoken words are signs of objects, whereas written words are signs of spoken words, since spoken language originated to signify objects and writing was developed to signify spoken words. Some cultures lack writing, minimizing secondary signs, which is why medieval logic focused more on spoken than written language.

Boethius attempted to systematize the knowledge accumulated by semiotics of his time, asserting that any speech situation contains four elements: the object, the concept, the spoken word, and the written word.

The English philosopher Roger Bacon (1214-1293) dedicated a separate work to semiotics, titled "On Signs." He pointed out that every sign signifies something for someone. For example, the word "fire" is needed for one person to denote fire to another. Thus, for a sign to exist, there must be both an object being signified and a person for whom it is signified. Bacon posed the question of whether a sign would exist without either the object or the person, sparking debates with Bonaventure. Bonaventure believed that a sign requires the object it signifies, meaning without the object, there is no sign. Bacon, on the other hand, argued that a sign requires those for whom it signifies something, and the object itself may not exist. An example is the concept of phlogiston, which once played a significant role in science as a substance of fire. In reality, phlogiston does not exist as an object, but people understood its meaning, allowing the sign to function within its sign system. Bacon also noted that any conventional sign is simultaneously a natural sign. For instance, the spoken word "table" is a conventional sign for the object it denotes (the table), but it is also a natural sign indicating the speaker, as listeners understand that a person (the speaker) uttered the word. All conventional signs are created arbitrarily.

After Bacon, the study of the nature of signs and sign systems continued primarily within logic. In the 14th century, William of Ockham, who paid considerable attention to problems in logic and semiotics, brought these issues to prominence. The result of the connection between logic and semiotics was that philosophers began interpreting concepts as signs. Previously, it was believed that an object was reflected in a concept, and the concept was expressed in a sign, meaning something immaterial (the concept or thought) was situated between two material things (the object and the sign). Now, concepts began to be seen as signs representing the object of the mind. At the same time, interest in written signs grew. Previously, written signs were considered second-order signs, denoting spoken words (first-order signs) and thus did not receive much attention. Researchers now turned their focus to written signs. The category of written signs expanded significantly, encompassing any signs perceived through senses other than hearing. Anything perceived through sight, smell, touch, or taste (but not hearing) was considered a written sign. For instance, a wreath on a tavern door was a written sign indicating the sale of wine. Whereas oral words were once considered the standard for signs, with all others as derivatives, late medieval philosophers came to view no difference between oral, written, or any other signs. Even complex inferences could be expressed using stones and sticks, but words were chosen simply because they were most convenient, not because they were unique. Scholars of this period observed the connection between a sign and its context. For example, a wreath indicates the sale of wine only when it hangs on a tavern door; if it were placed elsewhere, it would not have the same meaning.

In the 16th century, the Jesuit Order, a major center of education in Europe, established universities and colleges on all continents. One of the centers of Jesuit education was the University of Coimbra in Portugal. Coimbra's Jesuits developed scholasticism with a special emphasis on logic, semiotics, and the philosophy of language. They analyzed a vast array of material from the perspective of semiotics, including human languages, gestures, facial expressions, bird songs, natural phenomena, invented symbols (e.g., centaurs), and meaningless words (e.g., abracadabra). All these are symbols, indicating something other than themselves. A significant contribution of the Coimbra scholastics to semiotics was their classification of signs. They adopted Augustine's traditional division of signs into natural and conventional, agreeing with his view that conventional signs are established by humans, vary across cultures, and their meanings become clear only through study.

The Coimbra scholastics further classified signs into formal and instrumental categories. Instrumental signs are those through which people must first learn their meaning to understand the signified objects. For example, words signify objects, but to understand what objects words signify, one must first learn the words; smoke signifies fire, but to infer from smoke that there is a fire, one must first learn that smoke and fire are connected. These signs are termed instrumental because they serve as tools for knowledge. Conversely, formal signs are those through which people recognize signified objects without knowing they are using a formal sign. For instance, people think through forms of thought, such as concepts. Nothing can be understood by the mind without the mediation of a concept. Yet most people, especially those untrained in logic, are unaware that a concept, a formal sign of the object, stands between the object perceived and the knowledge about that object in their minds. Coimbra scholars emphasized that every formal sign is natural because people are usually unaware of its existence and thus could not have established it. However, not all natural signs are formal; for instance, smoke is a natural but instrumental sign of fire.

The impact of the Coimbra Jesuits on the development of semiotics was immense. Few in the history of science have studied the problem of signs without engaging with their contributions. Even Peirce, the founder of semiotics, acknowledged the influence of the Coimbra Jesuits on his work.