Philosophy of Being and Knowledge

Philosophy of Consciousness

Main Issues

In the realm of consciousness philosophy, a vigorous debate persists, revolving around a set of questions that researchers devote significant attention to. Each question utilizes some school of consciousness philosophy to argue in favor of its own theory, while others are compelled to refute these arguments to avoid defeat in the discourse. Among these unresolved issues, which continue to attract substantial scholarly effort, is intentionality. This problem is as follows: the actions of human consciousness differ from physical phenomena in that they are always directed towards something. What consciousness’s actions are directed at is called intentionality. The Latin word "intentio" means "intention." In moral philosophy, a distinction is made between two types of human actions: actus humanus, which are actions involving conscious decision-making and are associated with consciousness, and actus hominis, which are actions performed without conscious involvement, free will, or reason (e.g., breathing, reflexes, etc.). In the case of actus humanus, human actions are directed towards something, i.e., performed with a certain intention. For instance, anyone who buys bread intends to eat it or feed others; someone who buys an opera ticket intends to see and hear the opera. Such actions are the subject of moral and legal assessment. No one attempts to give a moral or legal evaluation of someone’s breathing or circulatory functions. However, evaluating actions for which a person makes a conscious decision is normal and, in some cases, even necessary.

Intentionality distinguishes conscious human actions from physical phenomena. Physical phenomena merely occur. They cannot be categorized as good or evil. Adherents of physicalist monism argue that only physical phenomena exist, and consciousness is merely their epiphenomenon. If only physical phenomena exist, it implies that human actions are not characterized by intentionality. In this case, acts of charity, expressions of love, murder, and theft are equivalent physical phenomena, none of which can be morally or legally assessed. Despite denying consciousness, physicalists do not reject morality and law. The problem of intentionality is used as an argument against physicalism by its opponents. This argument still awaits a comprehensive response.

Another prominent issue in the philosophy of consciousness is qualia. The term "qualia" was introduced into philosophical discourse by British philosopher Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964). This Latin word (qualia) means "qualities." However, Lewis used this term in a very narrow sense. Qualia are the characteristics of individual perception experienced by a person. For example, someone eating chocolate experiences a sweet taste; someone looking at an object sees the color red. The sweet taste and the color red, as experienced by an individual, are qualia. The peculiarity of qualia is that they cannot be described. A typical example of this issue is the following: if someone who has once seen red objects tries to describe the color red to another person who has never seen anything red, they face the problem that there are no linguistic means to do so. It is impossible to describe red in a way that others, upon first seeing red, recognize it as the color red. The same applies to sweetness, odor, pain, etc. When we try to explain what red is, we can only point to a red object and hope that the other person experiences the same as we do. However, we can never be sure that other people see the same thing when they look at red as we do. Of course, it is possible to describe the color red by referring to the numerical data of the light spectrum. But this only describes the color itself. Qualia are not the color, taste, or pain stimulus, but the experience and perception of color, taste, pain, etc.

There is lively debate surrounding the problem of qualia. Some scholars assert that qualia exist and elevate them to one of the sharpest problems in the philosophy of consciousness. Others deny the existence of qualia. However, denying their existence is very challenging. The existence of qualia poses a huge problem for the philosophy of consciousness: qualia are radically different from physical phenomena, as physical phenomena can be clearly described, whereas qualia cannot. Height, density, mass, etc., can be described, and this description is understood by others. For instance, when someone hears or reads that an object is two meters tall, they understand precisely what the speaker intended, i.e., they perceive this information through the lens of objective data. If someone hears that an object is red, they understand what is meant only if they have had previous experience with the color red and rely not on objective data but on their own experience. The existence of qualia is a problem for the philosophy of consciousness because, if they exist, it means that besides physical phenomena describable through language, there are also mental data that cannot be described but can only be understood based on previous experience. The argument from qualia demonstrates that knowledge of mental phenomena cannot be reduced to physical ones.

The third central problem in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is the thought experiment known as "the brain in a vat." A thought experiment is one that has never been conducted and is unlikely to be conducted. However, if we assume that such an experiment is feasible, it leads to numerous issues that require resolution. The "brain in a vat" thought experiment was formulated by Hilary Putnam and goes as follows: imagine that a researcher has removed the brain from a subject’s skull, placed it in a vat, and filled the vat with a nutrient solution so that the brain receives everything it needs to function as it did within the human body. The researcher connects electrodes to the brain, which are attached to a computer that sends the brain the same impulses it received while it was in the body. The researcher sends impulses corresponding to sensations such as eating ice cream, feeling pain, or listening to music. In reality, the subject is neither eating ice cream, experiencing pain, nor listening to music. The person does not exist; only the brain does. Nevertheless, the brain will perceive itself as a person engaging in and experiencing these activities. On what grounds can we assert that we are indeed humans reading books, eating, feeling cold, listening to music, etc., and not a brain in a vat, with all that we perceive as reality being mere impulses transmitted by the computer through electrodes? There is no answer to this question. It is impossible to prove that we are human beings with bodies and actions. The "brain in a vat" is one of the most challenging paradoxes in the philosophy of consciousness.

The "brain in a vat" thought experiment is closely related to the problem of solipsism. This term derives from the Latin "solus ipse" (only oneself). Solipsism is the philosophical worldview position held by those who believe that only consciousness exists and the entire world is merely an expression of consciousness. Putnam, who formulated the "brain in a vat" experiment, was not a solipsist, but he presented this experiment to show that the problem of solipsism remains unresolved in the philosophy of consciousness.

The fourth issue actively discussed in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is the thought experiment known as "the Chinese room." It was formulated by American philosopher John Rogers Searle (b. 1932). It seeks to address the question of whether strong artificial intelligence is possible, i.e., whether a computer can possess a mind. Searle defines strong artificial intelligence as a computer programmed to perform the same functions as the human mind. He believed that strong artificial intelligence is impossible, and the "Chinese room" thought experiment is designed to prove Searle’s belief. The "Chinese room" is described as follows: imagine that a subject is placed in a room filled with baskets of Chinese characters, and the subject does not understand Chinese, i.e., does not comprehend any of them. However, they are given a book outlining how to arrange the characters correctly, and they can do so. Outside the room, there are people who know Chinese; they pass questions to the subject, and the subject, using the book, arranges the characters and returns the answers to these people. As a result, the Chinese-speaking individuals receive correct answers from the subject, who, although providing correct answers, does not understand what is happening or what is contained in the questions and answers.

The "Chinese room" thought experiment shows that a well-programmed computer can provide correct answers without being aware of what it is actually doing. In contrast, the people outside the room who understand Chinese grasp both the questions and the answers. Even if they cannot formulate answers as quickly as the subject in the room, they understand what is happening, whereas the subject does not. No matter how well-organized a computer may be, it will not have consciousness because it is not human. Searle demonstrated that consciousness is not produced by a material body. The "Chinese room" argument is actively discussed in the field of philosophy of consciousness.

The fifth problem facing the philosophy of consciousness is personal identity. This term derives from the word "self" and is used to denote what most specifically differentiates a person from all other beings. The question of personal identity concerns whether a person exists as a distinct substance that is not reducible to other types of reality. For Christianity, it is important to believe that a person is a combination of soul and body. Two primary characteristics of the soul are intellect (consciousness) and free will. Thus, in Christianity, the essence of human identity, i.e., the self, is the soul. This belief is also present in other Abrahamic religions (Judaism and Islam) and in ancient philosophy. In the philosophy of consciousness, such a position is termed dualism. In this concept, human identity does not pose a problem.

Problems arise within physicalism, where adherents claim that a person consists solely of physical substance. If a person has no mental substance (soul, consciousness), is it at all permissible to speak of a person as something special? The problem of consciousness as personal identity concerns the status of the human being. If a person is merely a certain arrangement of physical phenomena, then does the person really exist as a distinct individual? If we accept the position of dualism, then a person has a unique essence that can be identified as the self. If a person consists solely of physical phenomena, the concept of personal identity is problematic. Therefore, the philosophy of consciousness is primarily concerned with the concept of personal identity.

These five problems demonstrate that contemporary philosophy of consciousness remains a highly controversial and dynamic field. Each of these problems presents fundamental questions and challenges for our understanding of consciousness, intentionality, qualia, the brain in a vat, strong artificial intelligence, and personal identity.