Philosophy of Being and Knowledge

Philosophy of Science

The Beginnings of Philosophical Reflection on Science

The first philosophical discussions about the nature of science and its development emerged during the Renaissance and matured in the Early Modern period. Already at that time, philosophers began writing about the foundations upon which science is built. One of the first features that intrigued Renaissance philosophers in the study of science was the role of mathematics. It became widely believed that God had written the book of nature in the language of mathematics, and therefore only by mastering this language could one read the book of nature. Renaissance philosophers elevated mathematics to the primary method of scientific inquiry. Today, mathematics is indispensable to fields as diverse as physics, sociology, economics, and nearly every other science.

An important contribution to the development of the theory of science was made by the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561—1626). He argued that the task of science is to comprehend reality. Bacon analyzed the stages science must pass through to achieve this goal. He believed that true knowledge could not be attained until the mind was freed from false beliefs. Thus, science, in his view, must undergo two phases in fulfilling its purpose: a destructive phase and a constructive one. The destructive phase, according to Bacon, involves liberating the mind from deceptive notions, which he identified as four types of illusions or "idols":

• Idols of the tribe (idola tribus): These are the misconceptions inherent to human nature, shaped by the limitations of sensory perception and cognitive abilities. People often believe that what they cannot perceive does not exist. For example, humans did not study bacteria for millennia because the naked eye cannot see them. Only after freeing themselves from these illusions did humans come to understand that things exist even if they are not directly perceived.
• Idols of the cave (idola specus): These are misconceptions imposed by education and upbringing. Most of what a person knows is learned rather than personally verified, and sometimes these teachings are false, leading to erroneous premises for further knowledge.
• Idols of the marketplace (idola fori): These are misconceptions rooted in language. People’s understanding of the world is shaped by the way they can describe it. For instance, colors are perceived in alignment with the words available to describe them. Language not only facilitates the description of reality but also sets limits on possible understanding.
• Idols of the theatre (idola theatri): These refer to misconceptions established by philosophical systems. Everyone views the world through the lens of their philosophical convictions, which frame the boundaries for further knowledge.

Bacon’s great achievement was to demonstrate that between the person seeking to know reality and reality itself stand intermediaries, which he termed "idols," and he called for their removal. Today, it is understood that not only is it impossible to fully eliminate these intermediaries, but doing so is also unnecessary, for without them, knowledge would be unattainable. Nevertheless, Bacon believed that only after purging the mind of these obstacles could one proceed to the constructive stage of knowledge acquisition—through the accumulation of new knowledge. This process, according to Bacon, occurs through two methods:

• Experiment: As an empiricist, Bacon held that experience is the source of knowledge. However, scientists often encounter the problem of the absence of observable phenomena. For instance, one cannot gain knowledge about the conductivity of metal unless someone connects it to an electric current. Thus, for experience to happen, the situation of observation must be provoked, making experimentation the key method

of science.

• Induction: Bacon believed that science accumulates knowledge by gathering data. From particular facts obtained through experiments, scientists derive general conclusions that form the scientific understanding of the world.

The Enlightenment revived the philosophical discourse on scientific methods, during which empiricism gained popularity. Representatives of the English and French Enlightenment asserted that experience is the only source of knowledge. This position clashed with the belief that God had written the book of nature in the language of mathematics, as mathematical categories are not directly accessible through experience. For instance, one can see a rectangular table but cannot see the abstract concept of a rectangle; one can see two chairs but cannot see the number two. Enlightenment empiricists claimed that only what can be observed truly exists, and if pure geometric forms and numbers are not accessible in experience, they do not exist at all. If they do not exist, they cannot be considered in the scientific understanding of the world.

This empirical method impoverished science significantly, as no mere accumulation of facts can give rise to scientific theory. Theories are born from the creative genius of the scientist, and facts either confirm or refute their validity. However, empiricists drew the attention of the philosophical community to the value of experience. Today, it is clear that experience alone cannot produce a scientific worldview without theoretical reason, but theoretical reason, while capable of formulating scientific concepts, cannot verify their truthfulness without experience. Immanuel Kant demonstrated that reason and experience are equally valuable sources of scientific knowledge. Science arises when reason processes and synthesizes the data of experience, transforming the particular into the universal.