Philosophical Content of the Problem of Being: The Dialectic of Being

Categories of Dialectics

The categories of dialectics can be classified based on the definiteness, conditioning, and wholeness of being.

Categories reflecting the definiteness of being include: the singular, the particular, the universal, and the all-universal; content and form; element and structure; essence and phenomenon.

The Singular, the Particular, the Universal, and the All-Universal

In the world, there exists an infinite variety of phenomena, yet all are singular in their being. As Heraclitus remarked, everything in the world is "once and never again." The existence of objects manifests in their inherent differences, both within themselves and among one another. There is nothing that is absolutely identical to another, nor even to itself. Pure identity can only exist in thought, in abstraction, as something formal (and therefore unreal). The real existence of objects presupposes a concrete identity that encompasses difference. This implies that things, objects, and events can be similar and alike, but never absolutely identical. The singular is a category that expresses the distinctiveness of objects from one another in time and space, characterized by their unique quantitative and qualitative determinateness. In other words, the singular refers to an individual object, thing, phenomenon, event, or fact.

However, diversity in the world represents merely one aspect of the problem. Being in the world consists of this very diversity of singular phenomena, each possessing particular and general characteristics. Even basic practice indicates that there are signs among various objects that allow for their classification into certain categories. Therefore, the universal refers to what is inherent in phenomena of a given class; it represents the commonality that pertains to a multitude of singular, separate objects.

The singular and the universal exist in unity. The universal exists within the singular as a moment of it. For instance, when we say, "Ivan is a human," there is already a dialectic at play between the singular and the universal. "Ivan" represents the singular, while "human" denotes the universal. Ivan possesses the traits that are characteristic of all humans; thus, he embodies the universal. Any universal is a fragment, an element, a facet of the particular, as it reflects the latter only partially, not wholly. The singular, in its content and manifestation, is richer than the universal, which is abstract. However, the universal more deeply reveals the content and essence of the thing.

The category of the "particular" serves as an intermediary between the singular and the universal; it is universal with respect to the singular and singular in relation to the universal. For example, wheat is singular, a cereal plant is particular, and a plant in general is universal. The general traits applicable to all objects and processes of a certain class are considered the all-universal.

In defining various properties, it is crucial to understand that there are no general and particular properties in an absolute sense; rather, there are always concrete properties that manifest in specific relations. The process of cognition is not a mere reflective mirroring of the singular. It is a complex and prolonged endeavor of dissecting the concrete into its components, determining each property individually.

The singular, the particular, and the universal are relational categories that express the mutual transition of processes and phenomena of being. To comprehend the dialectic of the development of being, one must recognize that anything new initially manifests as a singular exception to the general rule. The singular, initially contingent, gradually becomes universal, acquiring the force of law. Conversely, the universal also transitions into the singular. For instance, social consciousness influences the individual, shaping them; thus, the universal transitions into the individual, the particular. The dialectic between the universal and the singular can be illustrated through the development of social production, which evolves through the integration of lived, immediate labor with objectified labor. Lived labor represents the individual activity of the worker, while objectified labor is the outcome of collective productive activity. Consequently, the individual, the singular, is constantly transforming into the universal. On the other hand, the process of consuming the products of labor is inherently individual, contingent on the quantity and quality of an individual's labor, their profession, qualifications, and so forth. This indicates that objectified labor transitions from the universal level to the individual, singular, and particular level.

Understanding the interconnection between the universal and the singular is a necessary condition for both theoretical and practical endeavors. For instance, the entire system of economic categories is constructed upon the correlation of the singular, the particular, and the universal in economic theory. If the singular participates in the formation of the universal, then the accounting and analysis of singular economic phenomena can yield a deeper understanding of the essence of economic processes, uncovering new insights and clarifying known patterns of their development. If the universal reflects the regularities in the development of individual economic phenomena, it follows that economic theory must enrich its ideas, doctrines, and theories. Given that the boundaries between the universal, the particular, and the singular are not absolute, this compels a precise delineation of the direction of each investigation within the realm of economic theory, necessitating a careful examination of the connections and relationships between economic phenomena and other aspects of social reality.

It is unwise to juxtapose the knowledge of the singular against the knowledge of the universal, as this inevitably leads to errors. The absolutization of the singular leads to empiricism, to the accumulation of facts based on the principle of "bad infinity"—no matter how many we accumulate, we cannot grasp their essence without generalization. At the same time, one must not overemphasize the role of the universal, for this leads to a detachment from reality, from the study of the specific multiplicity of facts, objects, and phenomena, resulting in subjectivism.

If the categories of the singular, the universal, and the particular represent, as it were, the first step toward establishing the definiteness of the subject, then the categories of "content" and "form" represent the next step along this path.

Being in the world manifests in the fact that each object is in some way shaped, structurally organized, and substantive. Content and form convey information about the internal and external characteristics of the object. Content, first and foremost, consists of the aggregate of elements, connections, and relations that constitute the given object, phenomenon, or process. By "form," one should understand the organization of the content, the manner in which the parts and elements that compose the given object or phenomenon are interconnected, as well as the mode of their existence. This is the external manifestation of the content.

Like other philosophical categories, the categories of "content" and "form" possess a general character. This means that there are no objects (things, entities) in the world devoid of content and form: everything that exists contains certain processes and tendencies, all of which are shaped and structurally organized in specific ways. For instance, the content of the mode of production of material goods comprises its interacting elements—the productive forces and the relations of production—which, in their unity, determine the social, political, and spiritual life of individuals. The form of the mode of production of material goods manifests as the system of relations among its elements, that is, the connection that is evident in the law of correspondence between the relations of production and the productive forces. Another example: thought, as a result of generalizing a particular aspect of human life, serves as content concerning the language through which this thought is expressed, objectified, and thereby becomes a reality for others. Or consider: the content of a literary work, for example, revolves around a socially significant problem, conceptualized as a theme, a specific sphere of vital aspects of human activity, which takes shape in the mind of the writer as a "poetic idea." For its organic integration, the author selects words, colors, materials, and employs various specific techniques, which together constitute the form and structure of the literary work.

Content and form exist in a state of unity and mutual conditioning. This signifies that content requires its form; however, form is not merely an addition to content but, above all, a mode of its existence and manifestation. In our historical discussion, we have already noted that in antiquity, Aristotle examined the interrelationship between form and matter: in this unity of matter and form, the former accounts for potential existence, while the latter pertains to possible existence; together, they ensure actual existence. Aristotle prioritizes form over matter, asserting that the form of all forms is God, the foundation of the world, its prime mover. Later, Francis Bacon proposes the idea of the primacy of content over form, emphasizing their interconnection. Immanuel Kant substantiates the thesis that form is a means of organizing content, ensuring its synthesis. Hegel advances this discourse further, considering the connection between form and content as a relationship of opposites, involving their mutual transformation.

Within the interrelation of content and form, content, as the leading aspect of the whole, represents the unity of all the constituent elements of the object, its properties, internal processes, connections, contradictions, and tendencies. Form, on the other hand, serves as the means of existence and expression of content. The inseparable unity of these categories manifests in the fact that a specific content is embodied in a specific form. The primary aspect is content, while the form of organization is contingent upon what is being organized.

The subsequent development of philosophy further contributed to resolving the issue of the relationship between these categories. Primarily, a distinction is made between internal and external forms. The internal form of content is perceived as a means of linking the elements of the whole, while the external form is indifferent to content, though only to a certain extent. Under conditions of normal unity, content determines form, and a change in content consequently leads to a change in form. There exists a relative independence and autonomy of form in relation to content. For instance, a change in the form of production relations in a given society does not occur automatically following changes in individual elements of the productive forces but arises from a certain level of development of the productive forces as a whole. The relative autonomy of form is evident, firstly, in that it may lag behind the development of content; secondly, the same content may take on different forms, and the same form may be filled with varying content. For example, productive forces (content) may advance in their development ahead of production relations as their form, as noted by Karl Marx. Due to the relative autonomy of form, it may either promote the development of content or impede it. In this case, a contradiction arises between the new content and the old form. The condition for resolving such a contradiction is the necessity of replacing the old form with a new one that corresponds to the new content.

The absolutization of form, a situation in which precedence is given to form over content in various spheres of human activity, leads to formalism. For instance, in the realm of human relationships, formalism manifests in the unconditional adherence to customs, rules of etiquette, and rituals, even in cases where the life situation renders this absurd; in the sphere of social governance, formalism is evident in bureaucracy; in the history of art, it appears as a disconnection of artistic form from content, thus reducing artistic engagement with the world to abstract form-making.

The application of the categories "content" and "form" holds significant importance across various fields of knowledge, particularly in political economy. For instance, Marx analyzed the process of labor in Capital through the lens of the relationship between these categories. He compared the content of the labor process, which unfolds between humans and nature, with its social form—namely, the production relations and corresponding forms of ownership. Here, content and form delineate two opposing aspects of a unified process. The content of the labor process involves the relationship of people to the natural objects they alter through their labor, creating objects of consumption, while the form consists of the social conditions under which the connection between producers is realized, thereby linking them to the means of production. The concepts of "productive forces" and "production relations" were developed by Marx precisely through the bifurcation of the unified production process into the relationships between humans and nature and among themselves; the former, the primary aspect, is associated with the category of content in the labor process, while the latter, the derivative aspect, aligns with the category of form. This led to the formulation of one of the fundamental concepts of materialist historical understanding—the socio-economic formation.

The next step in establishing the definiteness of various phenomena of existence in the world is closely linked to the categories of "system," "element," and "structure." An element is a category that represents an indivisible component of a system. Regarding structure, it refers to a specific mode of connection among elements within a unified system. A system is a particular unity of structurally organized elements that interact with one another based on principles of coordination and subordination. The concept of a system has an extraordinarily wide range of applications. This includes the paramount achievement of 19th-century chemistry—Dmitri Mendeleev's periodic table of elements. It also encompasses Marx's development of the perspective on capitalist production as a complex system of economic relations endowed with elements and structure.

Systems can be simple or complex. In a complex system, its elements themselves function as systems: a living organism, society, and the universe are all complex systems. Each phenomenon belongs to one system or another, but not every collection of phenomena constitutes a system. For instance, an individual may be considered a system, yet that same individual is also an element of, for example, a family or a larger or smaller social group, which functions as a system. Conversely, a random collection of people (in a queue, at a theater, etc.) does not represent a system, as this collection lacks a structurally organized character; thus, there are no relationships of subordination and coordination among the elements.

The methodological significance of these categories lies in their orientation of research towards the necessity of accounting for the specificity of each element within a system, revealing its functional capabilities, as well as requiring careful attention to the state of correlational connections among the elements of the system as a whole. This demands an analysis of the full depth of the relationships of subordination and coordination that ensure the structural organization and functioning of the system as a whole.

Systematic analysis is widely employed in contemporary scientific inquiry: both inanimate and living, material and spiritual systems, their internal structures, and the processes occurring within them are examined. In modern science, fundamental principles of the systemic approach have been developed: first, the principle of wholeness, which asserts that any system, composed of many elements, cannot be reduced to their sum; second, the hierarchical construction of the system; and third, the elements constituting the system are related to one another in specific ways, among which the most significant are system-forming relationships that endow the system with the property of wholeness.

Another step toward establishing the definiteness of objects of existence in the world is closely associated with the philosophical categories of "essence" and "appearance." These categories reveal different aspects of things, levels of knowledge, and varying degrees of depth in understanding an object.

Essence is a philosophical category that captures the internal content of an object, the stable, profound, necessary connections among the elements of the object as a system. Through essence, the fundamental, primary, and defining attributes of the object emerge—its essential properties, connections, contradictions, and tendencies of development.

Appearance, in contrast, is a category that registers the external aspects of the existence of reality, expressing the form of manifestation of essence. Appearance is richer than essence, for it encompasses not only the revelation of the internal content and essential connections of the object but also any incidental relationships and distinctive traits thereof.

The essence and phenomenon are always inextricably linked: there is no essence that does not manifest in some way, and there are no phenomena that are not connected to essence. Essence presupposes phenomenon, and phenomenon presupposes essence; thus, they are correlating categories. Essence is manifest, while phenomenon is substantial. Our thinking progresses not only from phenomenon to essence, but also from shallower to deeper essence. Closest to the category of essence is the category of law, for understanding essence involves revealing the deep connections and relations that define the essential characteristics and developmental tendencies—that is, the laws. Essence, like law, is universal and necessary, whereas phenomenon is singular and contingent.

Since essence is hidden and does not lie on the surface, science must unveil it within the kaleidoscope of phenomena. Marx noted that “if the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then all science would be superfluous.” On the other hand, if essence did not manifest through phenomenon, science would be impossible. A significant achievement of Marx in understanding the capitalist mode of production is that he saw, behind the phenomena and appearances, the essence, which is reflected in his work "Capital." According to Marx, the fundamental process occurring in capitalist economies is the buying and selling of labor power. On the surface, this appears as an equal agreement, akin to a typical commercial transaction. It is known that the price of any commodity is always determined by fluctuations in supply and demand. In this case, it seems that the worker sells their labor power to the capitalist at a price corresponding to supply and demand. However, in truth, labor power is a peculiar commodity. The worker creates surplus value, which is appropriated by the capitalist. Thus, Marx unveiled the law of surplus value by revealing a commodity that, in the process of its consumption—in other words, within the realm of production—creates value greater than its own, and this commodity is labor power. Surplus value appears as the result of unpaid labor by the worker, which is appropriated without compensation by the entrepreneur; it is the excess value created by the labor of the worker above the value of labor power itself.

Agnosticism breaks the dialectical connection between essence and phenomenon, viewing essence as an unknowable “thing-in-itself” that does not reveal itself in phenomena. Kant, as you may already know, acknowledged the objectivity of essence (“things-in-themselves”) but believed that it could fundamentally not be known by humans. It should be noted that the views of agnostics have a certain foundation, for the essence of bodies and processes is generally concealed, inaccessible to direct observation and live contemplation. Most characteristics and properties of specific objects do not reveal essence; it does not lie on the surface of phenomena. Sometimes, due to the complexity of cognition, a phenomenon such as appearance arises. This moment was brilliantly analyzed by Marx in "Capital."

Thus, the knowledge of essence constitutes a process of infinite deepening from phenomenon to essence, from first-level essence to second-level essence. It represents a qualitative leap from the sensory image of phenomenon to rational knowledge of its essence, from the empirical to the theoretical. The movement of knowledge from phenomenon to essence and from essence to phenomenon complements one another, constituting two inseparable moments of a unified process of cognition.

The theoretical significance of the categories of “essence” and “phenomenon” lies in the fact that this pair of categories allows us to establish certainty regarding the object by eliminating non-essential connections and accidental relationships; it fixes only those essential relations that constitute the law of its development. Knowledge of essence frees us from the necessity of thoroughly analyzing all individual phenomena in which it manifests. Furthermore, knowledge of essence allows us to predict its possible manifestations.

The Categories of Conditionality and Wholeness

An examination of the categories that facilitate the elucidation of the mechanisms of the conditionality of phenomena, processes, and objects of existence in the world should begin with the categorical connection of “cause and effect.”

Everything in the world is interrelated and mutually conditioned. Phenomena and processes, various events in nature and society, are conditioned by other events and processes, that is, by specific causes. The assertion that all phenomena in the world are causally conditioned reveals the law of causality. Philosophers who acknowledge this law extend its applicability to all phenomena and are referred to as determinists. Those who deny this law are termed indeterminists. Determinism is the philosophical doctrine concerning the objective, law-governed interconnection and mutual conditioning of things, processes, and phenomena in the real world.

The phenomena of conditionality were already examined by thinkers in antiquity. We recall that atomists first proposed the principle of causality (Leucippus-Democritus), while Aristotle distinguished four types of causes: formal, material, efficient, and final, which condition the existence of the world. Even then, cause was understood as a phenomenon whose action induces or generates another phenomenon—the effect. Thus, the concept of cause traditionally belongs to the fundamental categories of science and philosophy. It is widely employed in our everyday thinking. We speak of cause when we seek to explain why something occurs or comes into existence, or what the source or motivation of our action is.

However, throughout the history of philosophy, attitudes toward this category have varied. Representatives of the subjective-idealist direction (Hume, Mach) concluded that the concept of cause has a purely subjective character and reflects the human habit of thinking in terms of perceptions in a specific order and sequence. In the 18th century, the French scientist Laplace proposed the classical form of mechanistic determinism—a worldview where there is no place for chance. All things and events in such a world are composed of causal connections. Laplace believed that if an all-knowing observer knew the positions of all particles at a given moment in time, as well as all the laws governing their motion, they could precisely predict all future events in the universe and also recreate its entire past history. Thus, he asserted that a cause produces an effect that can be unambiguously predicted (this type of cause is also referred to as dynamic). The emphasis on unambiguity spawned a series of determinist doctrines. For instance, theological determinism posits that the development of the world is conditioned by God, cosmological determinism asserts the unambiguity of the development of nature, and anthropological determinism denies human freedom, affirming the fatality of destiny.

It is clear that no one can provide a detailed description of a world fully permeated by causal connections. Strict determinism is linked to mechanism, according to which the world is a vast machine comprising countless small mechanisms. The influence of such an approach persists even today. However, contemporary science indicates that there are not so many mechanisms in nature. Only some natural systems resemble mechanisms. For example, our solar system. The planets indeed move “like clockwork,” repeating the same cycles of motion. But hurricanes or volcanic eruptions, which also adhere to physical laws, bear little resemblance to the workings of mechanisms.

In examining the problem of determinism, Karl Popper proposed an intriguing metaphor using such disparate objects as a cloud and a clock. The clock symbolizes physical systems, the behavior of which is regularly and precisely predictable. But can one predict so precisely the emergence and disappearance of clouds or other “whims of nature”? Strict Laplacean determinism asserts that all “clouds” are in fact “clocks.” Modern science, however, does not support this view. The natural world is governed not only by strict laws of mechanics but also by the regularities of chance and the emergence of order from chaos, as defined by synergetics, which will be discussed further. We can say that being in the world is an interconnected totality of “clouds” and “clocks.”

The essence and phenomenon are always inextricably linked: there is no essence that does not manifest in some way, and there are no phenomena that are not connected to essence. Essence presupposes phenomenon, and phenomenon presupposes essence; thus, they are correlating categories. Essence is manifest, while phenomenon is substantial. Our thinking progresses not only from phenomenon to essence, but also from shallower to deeper essence. Closest to the category of essence is the category of law, for understanding essence involves revealing the deep connections and relations that define the essential characteristics and developmental tendencies—that is, the laws. Essence, like law, is universal and necessary, whereas phenomenon is singular and contingent.

Since essence is hidden and does not lie on the surface, science must unveil it within the kaleidoscope of phenomena. Marx noted that “if the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then all science would be superfluous.” On the other hand, if essence did not manifest through phenomenon, science would be impossible. A significant achievement of Marx in understanding the capitalist mode of production is that he saw, behind the phenomena and appearances, the essence, which is reflected in his work "Capital." According to Marx, the fundamental process occurring in capitalist economies is the buying and selling of labor power. On the surface, this appears as an equal agreement, akin to a typical commercial transaction. It is known that the price of any commodity is always determined by fluctuations in supply and demand. In this case, it seems that the worker sells their labor power to the capitalist at a price corresponding to supply and demand. However, in truth, labor power is a peculiar commodity. The worker creates surplus value, which is appropriated by the capitalist. Thus, Marx unveiled the law of surplus value by revealing a commodity that, in the process of its consumption—in other words, within the realm of production—creates value greater than its own, and this commodity is labor power. Surplus value appears as the result of unpaid labor by the worker, which is appropriated without compensation by the entrepreneur; it is the excess value created by the labor of the worker above the value of labor power itself.

Agnosticism breaks the dialectical connection between essence and phenomenon, viewing essence as an unknowable “thing-in-itself” that does not reveal itself in phenomena. Kant, as you may already know, acknowledged the objectivity of essence (“things-in-themselves”) but believed that it could fundamentally not be known by humans. It should be noted that the views of agnostics have a certain foundation, for the essence of bodies and processes is generally concealed, inaccessible to direct observation and live contemplation. Most characteristics and properties of specific objects do not reveal essence; it does not lie on the surface of phenomena. Sometimes, due to the complexity of cognition, a phenomenon such as appearance arises. This moment was brilliantly analyzed by Marx in "Capital."

Thus, the knowledge of essence constitutes a process of infinite deepening from phenomenon to essence, from first-level essence to second-level essence. It represents a qualitative leap from the sensory image of phenomenon to rational knowledge of its essence, from the empirical to the theoretical. The movement of knowledge from phenomenon to essence and from essence to phenomenon complements one another, constituting two inseparable moments of a unified process of cognition.

The theoretical significance of the categories of “essence” and “phenomenon” lies in the fact that this pair of categories allows us to establish certainty regarding the object by eliminating non-essential connections and accidental relationships; it fixes only those essential relations that constitute the law of its development. Knowledge of essence frees us from the necessity of thoroughly analyzing all individual phenomena in which it manifests. Furthermore, knowledge of essence allows us to predict its possible manifestations.