Philosophical Content of the Problem of Being: The Dialectic of Being

Categories of Causality and Wholeness

The examination of categories that elucidate the mechanisms of causality among phenomena, processes, and objects of existence in the world begins with the categorical relationship of "cause and effect."

Everything in the world is interconnected and mutually conditioned. Events and processes, various occurrences in nature and society, are determined by other events and processes, that is, by specific causes. The notion that all phenomena in the world are causally conditioned is revealed by the law of causality. Philosophers who accept this law extend its applicability to all phenomena, referring to themselves as determinists, while those who deny it are called indeterminists. Determinism is a philosophical doctrine regarding the objective and lawful interconnection and mutual conditioning of things, processes, and phenomena in the real world.

The phenomena of causality have been considered by thinkers since antiquity. The atomists, for instance, first proposed the principle of causality (Leucippus-Democritus), while Aristotle identified four types of causes—formal, material, efficient, and final—that account for the existence of the world. At that time, they understood a cause to be a phenomenon whose action invokes or generates another phenomenon—the effect. Thus, the concept of cause is traditionally regarded as one of the fundamental categories of science and philosophy. It is widely utilized in our everyday reasoning; we refer to a cause when we seek to explain why something occurs or comes into existence, and what the source or motivation of our actions is.

However, the historical reception of this category in philosophy has varied. Representatives of the subjective-idealist trend (David Hume, Ernst Mach) concluded that the concept of cause possesses a purely subjective character and reflects a habit of human thought that organizes perceptions in a certain order and sequence. In the 18th century, the French scholar Laplace introduced the classical form of mechanistic determinism—a worldview devoid of randomness. In such a world, all things and events consist of causal connections. Laplace posited that if an omniscient observer knew the positions of all particles at a given moment and all the laws governing their motion, he could predict all future events in the Universe with precision, as well as reconstruct its entire past history. In other words, he believed that a cause produces an effect that can be unequivocally predicted (this type of cause is also referred to as dynamic). This emphasis on unambiguity spawned a series of determinist doctrines. For instance, theological determinism posits that the development of the world is conditioned by God, cosmological determinism asserts the unequivocal nature of natural development, and anthropological determinism denies human freedom, asserting the fatalism of destiny.

It is clear that no one can provide a detailed description of a world completely permeated by causal links. Strict determinism is associated with mechanism, which views the world as a vast machine comprising countless smaller mechanisms. The influence of such an approach persists today. However, contemporary science indicates that there are not as many mechanisms in nature as once thought. Only a few natural systems resemble mechanisms—for instance, our Solar System. The planets indeed move "like clockwork," repeating the same cycles of motion. Yet hurricanes or volcanic eruptions, which also obey physical laws, bear little resemblance to the operation of machines.

In addressing the problem of determinism, Karl Popper proposed an intriguing image contrasting such disparate objects as clouds and clocks. The clock symbolizes physical systems whose behavior is regularly and precisely predictable. But can we predict with such precision the appearance and disappearance of clouds or other "whims of nature"? Strict Laplacian determinism asserts that all "clouds" are, in fact, "clocks." Modern science, however, does not endorse this perspective. The natural world is governed not only by strict mechanical laws but also by the regularities of chance and the emergence of order from chaos, as characterized by synergetics, which will be discussed later. We may assert that existence in the world is an interconnected whole comprising both "clouds" and "clocks."

The prevalence of determinism has given rise to its antithesis—indeterminism, which rejects the acknowledgment of objective causal relationships. This methodological stance negates the value of causal explanations in science. It is noteworthy that from the perspective of the German philosopher Heinrich Rickert, causal explanation is appropriate in the natural sciences but is excluded in the social sciences, where randomness prevails. Human will, as the driving force of human activity—and thus societal development—does not depend in its manifestations on any necessity and, all the more, on causality. Indeterminism thus asserts that there are states and events for which a cause either does not exist or cannot be identified.

Consequently, determinism and indeterminism represent extremes. In the world, both dynamic (unambiguous) and probabilistic causal relationships and interactions coexist. The categories of "cause" and "effect," like all other categories of philosophy, possess an objective content; the chain of causal connections is objectively necessary and universal. It has neither beginning nor end and is uninterrupted both in space and time. Such a position is encapsulated in the law (or principle) of causality. Those who acknowledge the objectivity of causality must also recognize its universality. If we assume phenomena devoid of their causes, we are compelled to admit the existence of a supernatural force. The law of causality knows no exceptions.

Causal relationships exist in all forms of existence in the world. Between cause and effect, there exists a rather intricate mechanism of interaction. There is a proposition that the cause precedes the effect. However, this should not be understood literally, as the cause may, in certain cases, manifest concurrently with its effect. The interaction of cause and effect can also be characterized by the principle of feedback, which operates in all self-organizing systems. Feedback entails the possibility that cause and effect may swap places, with the cause becoming the effect and the effect becoming the cause, while still maintaining the temporal direction of the developmental process.

Causes can be characterized as: objective—existing independently of human will; subjective—manifesting in purposeful human actions; external—defining the interaction of systems; internal—operating within a given system; complete—representing the totality of all events that must occur for an effect to arise; principal—those that play a decisive role; specific—a collection of circumstances whose interaction elicits a particular effect. We can also distinguish between simple and complex, direct and indirect causes, among others.

Considering the content of the mechanism of causality—that is, the transfer of matter, energy, or information—it is necessary to highlight material and ideal, energetic and informational causes. A clear delineation of the mechanism of causality enables us to distinguish between a cause and the conditions necessary for its realization. If a cause is that which embodies real potential in the form of matter, energy, or information, then its condition is the set of circumstances under which a possible effect becomes a reality. For a given event to occur, necessary conditions must be present—phenomena that are requisite for the realization of that event but do not, by themselves, cause it. By altering the conditions, one can change the action of the cause and the nature of the effect.

An event can also occur under the influence of a trigger—an external impetus that facilitates the manifestation of the cause. A trigger is an event that directly precedes another event, enabling its occurrence, but does not produce or determine it. A textbook example of using a trigger as a cause is the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in the Serbian city of Sarajevo in June 1914, which led to the outbreak of World War I. It is not for nothing that it is said: if there is a cause, a trigger will be found.

The manifestation of a cause may be connected with the presence of random factors, but this does not imply that chance governs the situation, and thus there is no need to seek a cause. It is essential to remember that a cause manifests itself directly or indirectly through the cumulative action of random occurrences. Understanding this underlies modern scientific forecasting in the study of complex patterns in the behavior of, for instance, elementary particles, biological phenomena, mental activity, and social life.

With the advancement of science, our understanding of statistical regularities and the probabilistic nature of causal relationships continues to evolve. Synergetics—the study of self-organization in complex systems—has refined our comprehension of determinism. In exploring the categories of cause and effect, it is essential to emphasize several key points. A multitude of scientific observations has led scholars to conclude that all natural processes possess a stochastic component and unfold under conditions of varying uncertainty. For complex systems, there are typically multiple alternative paths of development. Synergetics elucidates the nuances of causal relationships within nonequilibrium systems. Their evolution is multifaceted; not every form of evolution is possible, but rather a specific spectrum of pathways. Nonequilibrium systems are highly sensitive to external influences, meaning even minor perturbations can lead to significant consequences, including catastrophic outcomes. The potential for unexpected turns in development arises from the randomness inherent in these connections.

Thus, the process of development must be viewed through the lens of the categories of "necessity" and "contingency." These philosophical categories signify two opposing forms of connection among phenomena in reality. Necessity reflects the internal regularity in the relations among phenomena; it denotes what must inevitably occur under specific conditions and in a particular manner. This signifies a stable, essential connection among phenomena, processes, and objects, rooted in their prior developmental trajectories. The necessary emanates from the essence of things, capturing the general, typical, and intrinsic; it derives predominantly from deep, essential, and recurring connections and phenomena in reality.

Contingency, conversely, represents a type of connection between certain phenomena and the surrounding world conditioned by external causes. It signifies that which may or may not happen, occurring in one way or another. The category of contingency reflects superficial, unstable connections, revealing, above all, the singular, which is insignificant for the particular phenomenon at hand.

Throughout the development of philosophical thought, various perspectives have emerged regarding the relationship between the categories of "necessity" and "contingency." Primarily, there has been a tendency to absolutize necessity while denying contingency, which was defined as necessity whose cause is unknown. This perspective was characteristic of both the ancient philosopher Democritus and thinkers of the Modern era—such as the Dutch philosopher Spinoza and the materialists of the Enlightenment. Holbach, for instance, asserted that life is a line we must trace across the surface of the earth under the dictates of nature. Consequently, contingency was excluded from scientific theories, regarded as a secondary factor devoid of fundamental significance. The denial of contingency implied that everything in the world is necessary; even minor events are deemed inevitable. This viewpoint leads to fatalism—the notion that only necessity prevails in the world. Such a philosophical approach converges with a religious worldview, positing that everything in the world, in the life of society, and of individuals is predetermined by God.

Only in the early 19th century did Hegel, followed by Marx, analyze the dialectics of necessity and contingency. They revealed that contingency serves as a form of manifestation of necessity and as its complement. The demarcation between necessity and contingency is not absolute. Just as essence reveals itself through phenomena, and the general through the particular—thus in the singular—necessity expresses itself through the contingent, in the contingent. In this context, Hegel referred to the logic of social development as the "cunning of historical reason," alluding to its unpredictability and the random forms of its expression. Were the history of human development devoid of this contingency, it would exude a mystical, fatalistic inevitability. However, this does not imply that chance and arbitrariness govern history. A correct understanding of the relationship between necessity and contingency helps avoid both fatalism and voluntarism.

Necessity carves its path through a multitude of contingencies. Contingency can accelerate the realization of the necessary or, conversely, hinder it. The dialectical interaction between necessity and contingency is also evident in the fact that, during development, contingency can transform into necessity. For example, a random influence on an organism can provoke a mutation (a chance deviation), but once new hereditary traits emerge and are solidified, they can lead to species change, forming the necessary qualities of a living organism.

Dynamic and statistical regularities are distinguished. Dynamic regularities represent a form of necessary connection wherein the relationships between cause and effect are unequivocal. In other words, by knowing the initial state of a particular system, we can accurately predict its subsequent development. For instance, the predictions of solar and lunar eclipses are based on the dynamic regularities of celestial movements.

In contrast, statistical regularity embodies a dialectical unity of necessary and contingent characteristics. For instance, purchasing a lottery ticket does not guarantee a win. A defining feature of statistical laws is that they are based on a stability of randomness. This means they pertain only to large aggregates of phenomena, each of which possesses a contingent nature.

In the 20th century, contingency is regarded as one of the most significant factors in the evolution of systems. Any natural process has a stochastic component and transpires under conditions of varying uncertainty. Studies of complex open systems with nonlinear development reveal that their evolution occurs through the randomness of path selection at moments of bifurcation. In synergetics, it is established that randomness exerts a sustained influence on the system. Previously, chaos was understood as an alternative to organization and order, seen merely as an accumulation of random events; in synergetics, chaos is perceived as a creative principle and a constructive mechanism of evolution.

A general tendency can be noted: the more complex the form of matter's movement, the relatively greater role randomness plays in the functioning of systems. The role of randomness in social life is significantly linked to the role of the individual.

The primary aim of scientific knowledge is to reveal the regular and the necessary, moving through the analysis of various random, singular facts toward a certain necessity.

To fully elucidate the relationship between necessity and contingency, regularity and freedom, we should employ another pair of philosophical categories: "possibility" and "reality."

Possibility signifies an objectively existing tendency toward the emergence of an object, determined by a specific regularity; it is "potential being" that reveals the direction of transformation of the object. When realized, it transforms into actuality. The possible is that which exists, albeit in embryo, potentially, as prerequisites. For instance, the possibility of talent and genius in an individual is represented in the form of innate abilities as the prerequisites for those capacities. The possibility of revolutions and reforms always exists in the form of certain social contradictions. For example, the French bourgeois revolution of the late 18th century swept away the political and legal dominance of the feudal lords, thus clearing the path for the full realization of the already existing capitalist production relations. However, a similar situation can be resolved not through social revolutions but through reforms: the reform in Russia in 1861 abolished serfdom, which hindered the development of capitalist relations and wage labor.

Reality is the realized possibility, encompassing everything that possesses actual existence. In a broad sense, reality refers to all that exists presently—whether in a nascent, mature, or waning state. Every reality is a result of established preconditions. It encompasses the possibilities of development in various directions, thus one might assert that any individual in their youth faces numerous options for life paths, yet reality is singular and unique.

The process of development constitutes a dialectical unity of possibility and reality. Possibility is organically linked to reality; they permeate each other, for possibility represents one of the forms of reality in its broadest sense—an internal, potential reality. Possibility itself is merely one aspect of that which already exists as real reality. Throughout millennia, products of human labor were consumed within the households that produced them, thereby not becoming commodities. Consequently, labor products transform into commodities under certain socio-economic conditions. A labor product becomes a commodity when it is designated for sale, that is, for market exchange.

Within the framework of commodity production, products were created by isolated producers, each specializing in a particular type of production. Possibilities may be real (concrete) or formal (abstract). We term a possibility as real when it reveals a regular, essential tendency in the development of an object, and necessary conditions for its realization exist in reality. Formal possibility exhibits a non-essential tendency for the development of an object, where the conditions necessary for its realization are absent in reality. Formal possibility does not inherently contradict objective laws and is thus fundamentally different from impossibility—i.e., from that which cannot be realized under any circumstances. Formal possibility can transform into real possibility, significantly depending on certain conditions. For instance, the ambition of the mythical Icarus to fly in ancient times was deemed unattainable; yet, for a contemporary individual, this is not an overly complex issue. Similarly, the possibility of human flight into outer space was once only formal but later became real.

The quantitative measure of the realization of possibility is termed probability. If impossibility can be denoted as zero and reality as one, then all intermediate values from zero to one will characterize the degree of probability.

In time, possibility precedes reality. However, reality, being the result of prior development, simultaneously serves as the starting point for subsequent development. Possibility arises within a specific reality and is realized in a new reality. For example, with the advancement of production, science, and technology, ever-new properties of labor objects are uncovered and actualized in human practice. Copper, known to humanity since ancient times (the Bronze Age preceding the Iron Age), was once fashioned into household utensils and weapons. Yet it was only millennia later that it was discovered that copper is an excellent conductor of electric current, leading to its use in the production of electric wires and cables.

A significant distinction exists in the process of transforming possibility into reality between nature and human society: in nature, this transformation occurs largely spontaneously; however, history is created by humans, and the realization of potentials embedded in societal development hinges on their will, consciousness, and activity.

For complex systems, there are typically multiple alternative paths of development. In the same environment, diverse structures may arise, and the process of development can unfold variably, allowing for unexpected turns in progression. Therefore, predictions—extrapolations from the present—may prove unreliable or simply erroneous, as development occurs non-linearly. The quantitative ratio among alternative possibilities can be mathematically expressed as the degree of probability of the occurrence of a certain possible event. In their endeavors, humans consider real possibilities and create conditions for their transformation into reality.

Having examined the categories of definiteness and conditionality of existence in the world, we shall briefly address the categories that characterize the wholeness of being. This concerns the philosophical categories of "whole" and "part." Generally speaking, the issue of the relationship between the whole and its parts traditionally involves resolving several questions: does the whole represent merely the sum of its constituent parts, or does it possess a distinct qualitative definiteness? Which is derivative—does the part precede the whole, or does the whole precede the part? What is the connection between the whole and its components, and does it possess a causal nature? Is the whole comprehended through its parts, or can the parts only be understood based on knowledge of the whole?

Prior to the development of a systematic approach, these questions were analyzed either from the perspective of empiricism or from that of extreme rationalism. Empiricism, which oriented itself toward classical mechanics, regarded the whole as a simple sum of its components; knowledge of the whole was extrapolated onto its parts. It was assumed that the part precedes the whole, and the whole was understood as something causally determined by its parts. Extreme rationalism, beginning with Plato, favored the whole. From this perspective, the whole is not merely the sum of parts but a unique unity that precedes the parts and is not causally dependent on them; to resolve the problem of understanding the parts, one must possess knowledge of the whole, which serves as the primary reality.

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, a systematic approach emerged, overcoming the extremes of empiricism and rationalism, offering its resolution to the aforementioned questions, expressed in a series of subsequent propositions.

Firstly, the whole consists of parts, yet it is a unity that possesses a new quality that does not emerge from its components. For instance, hydrogen alone burns, and oxygen enhances this process; however, two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen form a system of a different quality—water.

Secondly, in the relationship between the whole and its parts, the whole serves as a peculiar framework for the parts. The alteration of any individual part does not automatically trigger a change in the whole. The whole exhibits relative autonomy and stability in comparison to its parts.

Thirdly, the parts of the whole are structurally organized. They are interconnected through both coordination and subordination. This interrelationship imparts a systemic character to the whole. However, having formed as a system, the whole maintains the subordination of its parts and ensures the relationships of coordination. Through correlational links, the whole is present within its parts in terms of substance, energy, and information.

Fourthly, the whole emerges, develops, and acquires new qualities in which an individual part behaves according to the essence of the whole.

Fifthly, it is unproductive to determine whether the part precedes the whole or the whole precedes the part; parts do not exist prior to or outside the whole, just as the whole does not exist prior to or outside the parts. All this indicates that the categories of whole and part are interrelated, and this relationship is characterized by simultaneity.

Sixthly, the simultaneity of the whole and its parts negates the problem of epistemological priorities. The understanding of parts occurs not in their isolation but in their correlation with the whole, for without the parts there is no whole, and without the whole, there are no parts. In other words, a fully-fledged object of knowledge is not the part in isolation but the part as a concrete whole.

Thus, philosophical categories represent a system of knowledge, a sum and synthesis of humanity's understanding and practical transformation of the surrounding world. Without mastery of these categories, philosophical thought—namely, reflection on the world and inquiry about it—becomes impossible. Philosophical categories are fundamental scientific concepts, as the entire cognitive process relies upon them. Reflecting the most essential properties and regular connections of the surrounding world, they are actively utilized across all domains of scientific inquiry. The categories of philosophy constitute a complex synthesis of knowledge about the world, as philosophy is rooted in humanity's cognitive experience and its long and contradictory history.