Society and its Philosophical Analysis

The Specifics of Social Reality and Its Cognition: Objective and Subjective in the Social Process

Every individual navigating through life encounters the influence of forces that elude direct observation yet play a crucial role in shaping their personal existence and historical fates. A person senses that these invisible forces establish a certain order of existence to which everyone must conform. This order is what we denote by the term "society." In other words, society constitutes a system of forms, connections, and relationships among individuals, created through their collective activities.

Social forms, connections, and relationships are constructed by individuals themselves; society is a product of human interaction. This assertion is axiomatic, yet society also represents a distinct reality, which, on one hand, diverges from natural reality and, on the other, from the reality manifested in human life. Moreover, the study of social reality allows us to speak of the laws governing socio-historical development.

No philosophical school exists whose ideas have not been employed to unveil the mysteries of society. Since antiquity, particularly in Plato's "Republic," efforts have been made to elucidate the essence of society. Aristotle defined society as a collection of individuals united to satisfy their "social instincts."

Generally, there have been two systems of thought regarding society. The first system viewed society as a stable, preordained union of individuals (A. Augustine, T. Aquinas). In contrast, the second system perceives society as a sum of individual entities who consciously unite through personal will, thereby rendering society a result of an implicit or explicit contract among them (Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant). Both perspectives seek to explain society from idealistic positions, ultimately recognizing either the ideas of individual representatives of the spiritual elite or a universal spirit or God as the primary driving force.

In the 19th century, Auguste Comte, with his emphasis on scientific knowledge, contributed to the emergence of sociology as a distinct discipline concerning society. This has been noted previously, but it is worth recalling that he articulated the "law of three stages" in understanding society. According to this law, each scientific field historically undergoes three stages: the theological (fictitious), the metaphysical (abstract), and the scientific (positive). The last stage represents the goal toward which every science aspires. Comte, as the founder of positivism, deemed it essential to base inquiries on facts, experience, and phenomena, rejecting philosophical and theoretical investigations into the essence and causes of these phenomena. Notably, positivism continues to exert significant influence on the theoretical foundations of contemporary societal concepts. Later, based on the tenets developed by proponents of "philosophy of life" (Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson) and phenomenology (Husserl, Schutz), the sociology of everyday life emerged.

This historical overview could be considerably expanded, but we shall refrain from doing so, as the historical-philosophical section has already addressed various societal concepts. Our focus here is on examining the philosophy of society in its contemporary form.

If we were to synthesize the achievements of different philosophical schools, they could be distilled into several generalized concepts: naturalistic, sociopsychological, social action, and materialistic interpretations of society and history.

The naturalistic concept emphasizes the unique roles of geographical (climate, resources) and demographic (population) factors, as well as human biology, as determinants of society. Naturalistic theories strive to explain social regularities through natural phenomena. For instance, sociobiologists view society through a biological lens, although it is clear that social life cannot be reduced solely to biological laws.

Sociopsychology (J.S. Mill) constructs society in the likeness of the individual, treating the individual in isolation from societal conditions, such as material production. Furthermore, sociopsychology construes the mental in a rather narrow sense—primarily as directly dependent on the physiological. It is evident that psychophysiological explanations fall short of accounting for the phenomena of culture and practice.

The most influential school within sociopsychology is Freudianism, which traces the social back to human instincts (instinctivism). According to S. Freud, the two principal instincts are the life instinct—Eros—and the death instinct—Thanatos. The struggle between these instincts against the backdrop of human hypersexuality underlies societal existence. Religion and morality are intended to mitigate excessive instinctual aggression. Socially and morally unacceptable impulses are repressed into the unconscious, where they can later resurface, disrupting the system of norms and prohibitions of civilization—what Freud termed the "superego."

The fundamental tenets of sociopsychology found further development in the concept of social action (M. Weber, T. Parsons). Weber's "understanding sociology" investigates society by focusing on the uniqueness of individual facts. Social action is always personal and meaningful, connecting the acting individual with other subjects. Each subject is partially "programmed" by existing social norms, evaluates alternatives, makes decisions, and seeks to enact them. The entirety of society functions as a system of social actions. Each person plays a specific role—be it that of a doctor, scientist, or student. The "I" is the sum of roles acquired through social experience. The individual is shaped through social interaction, leading to their socialization. The mental becomes social.

The concept of materialist understanding of history (also known as the theory of objective action), as you are already aware, was proposed by K. Marx, who consistently emphasized the distinctiveness and autonomy of society as a network of social relations. The nature of social relations arises from societal production, which cannot be reduced solely to material production. According to Marx, society is the result of human activity, wherein individuals exchange the products of their labor.

From the concise overview of existing approaches to unveiling the essence of society, we can conclude that society is a systemic formation encompassing various levels of organization. At the level of societal elements, we encounter individual persons, their spiritual worlds, various forms of activity, and the products of that activity. When discussing systemic properties as outcomes of human interaction, we address the collective, social group, and society as a whole. In this context, we also refer to social psychology, social consciousness, and social forms of activity. Thus, society is a systemic formation, representing the collective life activities of individuals. The social is a systemic characteristic of society.

As a complex and often contradictory systemic entity, society is studied by various sciences (although representatives of certain philosophical schools have questioned the existence of a science concerning society), which utilize, to varying degrees, explicit or implicit philosophical models. These models provide an overarching picture of society, documenting its lawful and essential relationships and connections. The philosophical model is grounded in specific foundational and methodological principles that enable the systematization of vast empirical material, distinguishing the regular from the incidental, the cause from the effect, thus elucidating the structure of society and revealing the logic of its development.

Methodological principles, in turn, are defined by particular philosophical theories. On this basis, two distinctions can be made: first, materialistic theories, which explain all social phenomena through economic, natural, and other factors independent of human consciousness; and second, idealistic theories, which explain all social phenomena and processes through will, consciousness, and other ideal factors. Additionally, depending on the proposed philosophical model, society may be viewed as developing according to specific laws and interrelated stages—formations (Marxism)—or as a construct opposing nature (philosophy of life), or as closed civilizations (supercultures) that lack unity and continuity in their development.

It is essential to recognize that, in philosophy, there exists no model or principle that holds absolute supremacy or undisputed truth. One must remain aware of the pluralism inherent in philosophical concepts. Each philosophical theory contains both rational kernels and weaknesses. In our exploration of these concepts and theories, we should select those that most adequately explain and resolve contemporary issues.

As previously noted, the question of whether there are regularities in social life and development—and thus, whether there exists a science of society—has been called into question. Such a stance is grounded in the complexities associated with comprehending social processes and phenomena.

Firstly, it is far more challenging to identify regular connections in social processes than in natural ones, for society, as the highest form of the movement of matter, represents one of the most intricate objects of knowledge. When studying social life, it is exceedingly difficult to abstract from the individual and unique characteristics of social phenomena in order to reveal the general, the recurrent, that which is independent of the singular acts of will by specific individuals. In the works of the neo-Kantians Windelband and Rickert (late 19th to early 20th century), a fundamental distinction is made between the knowledge of nature and that of society. They contend that society lacks the regular repetitiveness found in nature; all phenomena of social life are individual and unique, without analogues. Consequently, in contrast to the “generalizing” (generalized) method of the natural sciences, the method of “individualizing” should be employed concerning history.

However, while discussing the specificity of social knowledge, one must avoid extremes. One such extreme is the complete transference of the natural sciences’ approach to the study of social phenomena, which is linked to the growing authority of the natural sciences. Yet, on the other hand, it would be erroneous to fall into the opposite extreme of asserting that there exists nothing in common between the natural and social sciences. For instance, Marxism emphasizes that objective laws and tendencies operate within society. Countless individuals live their own lives and pursue their own goals, yet from their interactions emerges a certain objective resultant—a set of objective social-historical relationships among people, a specific objective order of their lives to which all are subject. Examples include private property, market laws, alienation, and exploitation—objective characteristics of the bourgeois order, which historically exhausts itself at a certain stage, making way for a new order that becomes historically necessary. Recognizing this objective tendency, people must use their knowledge to organize and facilitate its more rapid realization. Thus, according to Marxism, in society, objective laws are realized only through the conscious actions of individuals, and social knowledge serves as both an instrument and an element of reality transformation. The latter half of the 19th century in Europe unfolded under the banner of socio-historical rationalism—an unwavering confidence that historical laws are realities that can be known (and have already been known) and that actions should be taken based on this knowledge.

Secondly, it is important to note that the difficulties in social understanding are tied to the fact that society simultaneously serves as both the object and the subject of knowledge. Individuals create their own history, and they also seek to understand it, introducing a significant element of subjectivism into this knowledge. In this context, the 20th-century English philosopher Karl Popper, in his work "The Poverty of Historicism" (where he critiques the Marxist theory of the materialist interpretation of history), expressed the view that predicting the future development of society is impossible. He argued that the belief in objective tendencies that allow for the determination of the future is not knowledge but prophecy, characteristic of researchers consumed by activism, who strive for revolutionary transformations. Predictions, according to Popper, are logically contradictory: they either create the future they forecast or, through their very existence, give rise to forces that counter the forecast. No law governs the future; it is inherently unpredictable. What are called historical laws are constructs projected onto the future, which life is attempted to be adjusted to; one should not turn the world to conform to a “historical law.” According to Popper, the less people intervene in the natural course of history, the better. It is preferable to gradually improve the current state of society, ensuring that social technologies are cautious and deliberate; revolutions should not disrupt the integrity of the social organism.

Thirdly, the study of society is further complicated by its continual state of historical change, making it difficult to identify stable, recurrent elements within it.

Finally, the essence of social phenomena and processes, as well as the regular connections between them, are significantly harder to discern than in the study of nature. This difficulty arises from the fact that in society, we deal with the collective behavior of human beings—entities endowed with consciousness and the freedom of will. This aspect generates the problem of the relationship between the objective and the subjective in social processes.

By objective conditions (or factors), we mean all circumstances that do not depend on the subject—namely, the consciousness, will, and desires of individual people, social groups, parties, and humanity as a whole. Objective conditions determine human activity. Outside of their connections with objective conditions, human activity can only exist as a possibility. This means that human activity—understood in the broadest sense—is conducted not merely according to individual desires, but on the basis of conditions that initially arise naturally and subsequently develop throughout historical processes. Objective conditions are categorized into two groups: natural and historical. Natural conditions reveal the connection between human activity and the external natural environment; they are sources of the natural wealth of means of life and means of labor. By transforming objects and forces of nature according to their needs, humans create the material goods they require. Historical conditions are products of the activities of all generations—both those who have lived and those who live now. They encompass elements common to all societies, as well as those elements characteristic of specific types of social organization. Historical conditions change from era to era; each new generation does not create history anew but continues the inherited activities, introducing changes in response to new needs.

Subjective factors comprise the deliberate activities of subjects—masses, social groups, parties, states, and individual persons—along with their consciousness, will, and capacity for action.

Both objective and subjective factors do not stand as self-sufficient entities; rather, they constitute the components of a unified whole, interacting closely within social life, with a constant tension existing between them. Objective circumstances influence the subjective factor, shaping it, yet the latter actively impacts the objective circumstances, possessing the power to transform them. Each new generation entering life forms its subjectivity in accordance with the established social realities. However, it does not simply replicate what its predecessors have done; instead, it realizes its own new needs, interests, and goals. This dynamic is particularly pronounced during transformative periods of societal development.

The absolutization of either the subjective or the objective factor leads to corresponding tendencies of voluntarism and fatalism. Voluntarism (from the Latin voluntas, meaning "will") exaggerates the significance of the subject’s will and freedom, asserting caprice while ignoring necessity, objective circumstances, and the laws of social development. Fatalism (from the Latin fatum, meaning "fate") absolutizes objective regularities, emphasizing the role of circumstances while dismissing the possibility of human free choice and freedom. The interaction between objective conditions and the subjective factor is expressed in the notion that history is created by people, yet it is not created capriciously; rather, it unfolds under specific objective circumstances, obeying certain objective laws of social development.

The recognition of the importance and relevance of the subjective factor in the historical process provides grounds for formulating the law or tendency of the increasing role of the subjective factor within society. Philosophers have noted that as humanity progresses, its influence over surrounding conditions, society, and humanity itself grows stronger. We may recall V. Vernadsky's idea of the noosphere, which posits that human intelligent activity (the subjective factor) becomes the determining factor in the historical development of humanity.