Epistemology: The Essence of Cognitive Activity
Philosophical Theory of Truth: The Dialectic of Absolute and Relative Truth
The question of the nature of the correspondence between knowledge and reality has been a subject of divergence among various philosophical schools from ancient times to the present day. The understanding of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to things traces back to antiquity. The founder of formal logic, Aristotle, established the tradition of defining truth as the alignment of knowledge about the world with the world itself. This classical definition of truth would seemingly satisfy all; it is no coincidence that many prominent philosophers—including F. Bacon, B. Spinoza, D. Diderot, P. Holbach, L. Feuerbach, and K. Marx—agree with this definition. However, the problem of how our knowledge corresponds to reality, that is, the truth of knowledge, necessitates the search for criteria or grounds to distinguish truth from falsehood.
Proponents of subjective-idealist empiricism perceive truth either as the correspondence of thought to the sensations of the subject (D. Hume, B. Russell), as the alignment of ideas with the individual’s aspirations for success (pragmatism), or as a form of psychological state of the individual (existentialism). While one could cite additional examples, it is clear from these that the question of truth primarily revolves around whether we can separate in our knowledge a content that does not depend on us, that is, on the subject. It is no coincidence that Kant regarded the discovery of the objective content of the truth of knowledge as the central task of philosophy. Socrates was the first in philosophy to consciously address this problem, identifying the abstraction and clarity of our thoughts as the main indicators of their truth. Later, R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, and G. Leibniz proposed clarity and distinctness as the criteria for truth. In the 19th century, neo-Kantianism regarded the internal consistency of thought itself as the criterion of truth. In neo-positivism, the criterion of truth was reduced to the formal-logical coherence of scientific judgments with initial agreements (conventions). In Marxism, practice as sensory-objective human activity aimed at transforming material systems was recognized as the criterion.
In contemporary philosophy, three concepts of truth particularly stand out: the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories. The first concept establishes a correspondence between the subjective form of knowledge and a certain objective content. The coherent theory of truth is based on establishing the non-contradiction of statements. The theory where practice serves as the criterion of truth is referred to as the pragmatic theory of truth. American pragmatism (W. James, J. Dewey) understands truth as the utility of thoughts and ideas in the process of achieving desired goals. Marxist pragmatism employs the criterion of practice for further developing the correspondence theory. Practice, in relation to knowledge, plays a threefold role: it serves as the source of knowledge, its goal, and the criterion of truth.
The theory of truth also highlights the problem of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. The essence of this problem lies in the fact that each level of knowledge is constrained by the stage of scientific development; the truth revealed by science at any historical juncture cannot be deemed final. Thus, as F. Bacon metaphorically remarked, it is the "daughter of time." Indeed, the process of scientific inquiry entails a transition from an earlier theory to a new one, connected in such a way that a relatively correct former theory can be interpreted within the new theory as relative truth and as a specific case of a more complete and precise theory (for instance, classical mechanics by I. Newton represents a partial case of relativistic mechanics by A. Einstein). Consequently, the content of scientific knowledge in this process is characterized by probability and incompleteness.
When discussing absolute truth, it is understood as complete, accurate, comprehensive, and exhaustive knowledge about any phenomenon. Clearly, achieving such knowledge is impossible. Rather, absolute truth signifies a boundary, an end, a goal toward which knowledge aspires. The relationship between absolute and relative truth delineates merely different levels and forms of knowledge, which depend on the advancement of science and society. The higher the level of understanding, the closer we approach absolute truth. This process will continue indefinitely since the movement of knowledge from one level to another, deeper and more precise, cannot have a conclusion; hence, Hegel's thesis that truth is a process of the development of knowledge becomes understandable.
It is worth noting that during the scientific pursuit of knowledge, there exist absolutely verifiable facts that remain true regardless of who asserts them or when (for example, the sequence of changing seasons, etc.); such knowledge is not refuted by subsequent advancements in science. Undoubtedly, science deals with absolute facts, but given that the unknown is limitless, we assert that absolute knowledge in the process of inquiry is merely a moment within the content of relative truth. The real process of scientific inquiry involves the replacement of one theory with another, deeper and more refined. After the emergence of each new theory, we must acknowledge that the absolute truth, which seemed to have been attained within the framework of the old theory, has once again proven elusive. Karl Popper, recognizing the complexities of the process of inquiry, argued that theoretical concepts are plausible, meaning they cannot be definitively proven true or false. According to Popper, the growth of knowledge does not allow for the fixation of truth; however, many philosophers disagree, asserting that Popper absolutizes the relative nature of knowledge and, on that basis, unjustifiably dismisses truth.
There is no abstract truth; truth is always concrete. This assertion signifies that the truth of knowledge depends on the connections inherent to particular phenomena, as well as the conditions, place, and time in which they develop. Thus, knowledge claimed to be true may only hold validity under specific conditions. For instance, the statement that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius is true under certain conditions, namely atmospheric pressure.
The dialectic of relative and absolute truth demonstrates that our knowledge, striving for precise and comprehensive grasp of the world surrounding us, increasingly reflects objective reality more fully and deeply.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
Quellen und Methodik
Der Inhalt basiert auf akademischen Quellen in mehreren Sprachen — darunter ukrainische, russische und englische Universitätslehrbücher sowie wissenschaftliche Ausgaben zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Texte wurden aus den Originalquellen ins Deutsche übertragen und redaktionell bearbeitet. Alle Artikel werden vor der Veröffentlichung inhaltlich und didaktisch geprüft.
Zuletzt geändert: 12/01/2025