The Historical Development of Philosophy
Greek Philosophy
Ethical Directions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics)
The third period of Greek philosophy is characterized externally by the gradual spread of Greek education and science. Philosophy initially emerged in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor and lower Italy before taking root primarily in Athens. Now it expands once more throughout the ancient cultural world that has embraced Greek civilization. Alongside Athens, other cities within the global states of Alexander and later Rome, particularly Alexandria, become influential cultural centers. Together with the Greeks, the inhabitants of Eastern lands and later the Romans begin to actively participate in the development of philosophy. An undeniable new spirit begins to dominate philosophy. This change stems from shifts in the political landscape, the mingling of nations of various origins, the emergence of new cultural needs, shifts in religion and morals, and the motivations that spurred previous systems toward further development and transformation. Having moved externally beyond the confines of the Hellenic world, philosophy also acquires an internally cosmopolitan, universal human tendency. It seeks to satisfy all people regardless of nationality—Greeks as well as Eastern peoples and Romans—while increasingly striving to replace the folk religion that is losing significance for educated individuals and has become an empty external form. Consequently, interest in both political and cosmological questions is relegated once again to the background. The subject of philosophical contemplation becomes predominantly the human being in universal qualities, independent of origin, status, or condition. All other philosophical tasks emerge in light of this anthropological problem in its most general and thus completely individual form.
Thus, the philosophical directions that arose from the end of the fourth century return to Socrates. He is the man who saw the most important task for philosophical reflection primarily in self-knowledge. Correspondingly, regarding the meaning of human life, these directions differ from one another much as the schools that converged in Socrates did. This convergence led his followers to opposing ethical views. The philosophy of the Stoics, named after the painted porch where the school founded by Zeno of Citium regularly met in Athens, aligns with the Cynics. Epicurus, who gathered many disciples in his garden in Athens around the same time, returns to the hedonists, or representatives of the Cyrenaic school. This connection of two newly emerging directions with the two main Socratic schools is historically manifest in a specific way. The remaining representatives of the old sects affiliate themselves with the newly established ones: the Cynics join the Stoics, and the hedonists join Epicurus’s followers.
However, the directly preceding development of philosophy, despite shifting interests, significantly influences these new directions. It leads them to extend well beyond the narrow circle of views of the old Socratics. While the ethical problem could still remain paramount for them—and even ultimately the only valuable one—the new era introduced different conditions for its resolution. The monumental scientific system erected by the greatest of the Socratics and his followers played a significant role here. The diverse scientific needs that emerged from the inquiries of these philosophers and were temporarily satisfied could not disappear without a trace, at least insofar as they could adapt to the newly awakened interest in the anthropological problem. Consequently, the newly birthed philosophical directions strive to establish universal systems that encompass the entirety of issues discussed by preceding philosophy. The branches of philosophy that were largely the focus of specialized studies in the Aristotelian school—epistemology, metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics—reappear in the Stoic and Epicurean systems.
However, corresponding to the particular significance of the ethical-anthropological problem in these systems, the internal relationships among the aforementioned scientific fields change significantly. In Plato and Aristotle, despite the high importance they attributed to ethical and political issues, theoretical interest was so strong that it took precedence over the exploration of epistemological problems, pushing practical scientific domains into the background. In both thinkers, therefore, epistemological problems formed the foundation of all philosophy, and their metaphysical worldview relied chiefly on resolving them. The philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics, and politics emerged later as applied sciences, guided by broader interests rooted in particular conditions of experience or life.
This relationship between theoretical philosophical tasks and practical ones is entirely altered in the newly arisen philosophical directions. Here, the ethical problem is so predominant that not only are all other questions pushed into the background, but their resolution is fundamentally determined by the relationship within it. Therefore, representatives of such directions cannot speak of a research focus aimed solely at satisfying epistemological needs, such as the study of metaphysical questions as it first appeared in Aristotle. Everything is examined from an ethical standpoint, which is predominantly defined by the individual soul and personal relationship to the culture of the time, while theoretical considerations play only a minimal role. Thus, these philosophical directions, seeking to replace religion, resemble it also in that their choices are more a matter of feeling and faith than of knowledge and understanding.
This arrangement matches the weight given to the various components within these systems. In truth, both the Stoics and the Epicureans place ethics at the very center. In this focus, both schools reflect the driving forces of their age—forces foreign to earlier epochs that now crystallized into worldviews destined for enduring influence. The specific motives underlying these ethical systems, particularly their mutual opposition, touch on universal human sentiments and may have existed in Socratic Cynicism and Hedonism. Yet the manner in which Stoicism and Epicureanism developed them was possible only at a more advanced stage of scientific growth and within a cosmopolitan culture equipped with broader needs and resources. Alongside ethics—the domain through which they primarily shaped contemporary life and the future—the other components of these systems hold no such foundational rank. Especially in Stoic metaphysics and natural philosophy, their originality is merely derivative, lying in a successful synthesis of older traditions. The historical significance of this achievement remains undiminished. This synthesis clothed ancient insights in the precise form that made them accessible to posterity and allowed them to exert any influence at all.
From these observations, it follows that a genetic exposition attempting to trace the original motives of these systems and the interrelation of their parts cannot follow the sequential order used for Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Such an order serves well for worldviews built upon a theoretical foundation. The Stoics and Epicureans started from ethical premises. Only later did they gather ideas about the universal essence of things and humanity from their predecessors—ideas at best tied directly to their ethics. Their epistemology and metaphysics are not the foundations of their philosophy, but rather supplements designed to support their ethical systems. Therefore, we must place ethics at the forefront of our exposition. Only then can we demonstrate how their broader philosophical views necessarily emerged from it, drawing upon pre-existing perspectives inherited from the past.
Stoicism
The ethics of the Stoics stands out as the most influential among the philosophical worldviews of this time. From Zeno and Cleanthes, its original founders, to the Stoics of the Roman imperial period—Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—the attention of all deeper minds was strongly drawn to Stoic ethics. These were minds discontented with the noisy and superficial life of the great cities of that era, who sought a return to a simpler way of life, to old customs and piety, in contrast to the decline of morals, the widespread infection of Eastern luxury, and the superstitious mingling of religious cults of all nations. Thus, at the forefront of Stoic ethics from the very beginning lies the demand for a life in accordance with nature. However, such a life is not about enjoying the goods of life, nor about increasing needs and the pursuit of their satisfaction; rather, it fundamentally consists in the absence of needs, independence from external life conditions, and the dominance of those human capabilities that, distinguishing man from animal, constitute his true nature—primarily the mastery of reason over judgment. Therefore, in the activities of these latter traits resides the life in accordance with nature.
Reason and judgment, conditioning freedom from external necessity and the vicissitudes of fate, constitute true human happiness and the only worthy aspiration, in contrast to those apparent goods that reduce man to servitude before external relations and consequently generate much evil. Yet the self-satisfaction derived from this freedom of spirit, rooted in the absence of needs, presupposes the disappearance from the soul of those drives and passions that give rise to external needs—the desire for wealth and, hence, every evil. The true purpose of reason is not to occupy a middle position between opposing passions, for in such a case reason is still possessed by a desire directed outward and thus is itself a passion that disrupts the tranquility of the soul; rather, it resides in freedom from passions, in the annihilation of affects, in a state of indifference (apatheia). Thus, judgment (φρόνησις) or, as later Stoics termed it, wisdom (σοφία), represents the greatest virtue, as it actualizes the dominance of reason over needs and sufferings.
Consequently, a person who pursues external goods is unhappy, for he inflicts suffering upon himself. He is a bad person, as he lives without virtue, and he is foolish, because he acts irrationally. Yet such fools, in the view of the Stoics, comprise the vast majority of mankind. In the few exceptions—such as Socrates and Zeno, the founder of their school—the Stoics see both teachers and exemplars of virtue. The significance of the human person is founded solely upon virtue, since virtue resides in the activity of a capacity uniquely inherent to man, namely reason. Hence, the worth of the individual does not depend on his external social position, rank, office, or lineage. A sage, regardless of whether he is a Greek or a barbarian, a slave or a king, remains a sage; a fool remains a fool. The ethics of the Stoics is both individualistic and cosmopolitan: only the individual can be wise, virtuous, and happy; only the individual possesses ethical significance, and this significance transcends national boundaries. Sages from all nations silently form a union wherein they recognize themselves as brothers. Dismissing all external distinctions among people as trivial, the Stoics are far removed from contesting them, for doing so would grant those distinctions an importance they do not actually possess. For a slave, his subordinate social position should be as indifferent as the splendor and majesty surrounding a king. Thus, the central tenet of practical morality is to submit to fate and to avoid any desires aimed at altering one’s external social position, since such desires transform into passions and disrupt the tranquility and self-control of the soul. Where the inevitable pressure of external conditions, such as physical suffering, nonetheless disturbs the soul’s peace, it is better to depart from life voluntarily than to endure pain. Following the example of their founder, the Stoics therefore regard suicide performed under such conditions not only as permissible, but as a virtuous act. It expresses the consciousness that life in itself is an indifferent fact, an “adiaphoron,” whose preservation holds significance only when it serves as a means to attain true goods—wisdom and virtue—but which becomes an evil if it results in the dominion of suffering over the human soul.
The metaphysics of the Stoics, like their physics and psychology, is a product of this ethical outlook on life. It synthesizes almost all concepts that had gained prominence in previous philosophy, with this synthesis being characterized by a disdain for the world, strict individualism, cosmopolitanism, and the religious orientation of their ethics. Thus, the Stoic metaphysical worldview presents a system wherein the λόγος of Heraclitus, governing the world, the νους of Anaxagoras, the ideas of Plato, and the entelechies of Aristotle coalesce into a single whole. Simultaneously, it submits to a prevailing thought foreign to all preceding systems, as it is merely the product of a new ethical outlook on life that found its expression among the Stoics. This thought is fundamentally more religious than metaphysical. It imparts to the entire Stoic philosophy a distinctive character, grounding their metaphysics, physics, and psychology in a philosophy of religion, which, in turn, is merely a transformation of Stoic ethical ideas into a theosophical form. Since the highest good lies not in external treasures but has its foundation in man himself—in what he has become by nature and through his own strength—then the deity, already recognized by Plato as identical with the idea of the good, cannot exist outside man but must reside within him and in nature: man is the product of nature, and his destiny lies in living in accordance with nature. God and nature are identical, and man, as the highest product of nature, embodies the highest manifestation of divinity, for the sage is a god in visible form. Thus, the Stoic philosophy of religion clearly expresses pantheism, which, under the influence of ethical individualism, aligns with the cult of personality, leading the Stoics toward religious views that correspond to this tendency, namely, the cult of heroes.
Among the preceding philosophical systems, Aristotle’s stands out as particularly suited for the metaphysical foundation of these religious and philosophical ideas. Aristotle himself taught the immanence of the spiritual in matter, while forms reside in substances. Only the ideas of God and the thinking human mind, as purely spiritual forms, lie, according to Aristotle, at the threshold and thus outside the domain of actual substances, which arise through the mutual penetration of both principles. Influenced by the notion that the divine exists not outside the world, but within nature and primarily in humanity, the Stoics elevate Aristotle’s principle of immanence to absolute significance. A transcendent God, like a transcendent human spirit, is eliminated, or more precisely, both are incorporated into nature itself. God as the Prime Mover dwells within the world. Moreover, God is not merely a secondary cause, as in Aristotle’s physics, but the immediate creator and sustainer of cosmic movement. Likewise, the human spirit, being the highest product of nature, also resides within it. Just as human thoughts arise from sensory impressions and cannot exist without sensory form, humanity is not an incorporeal form, but a corporeal essence like all other entities. It is formed from the union of two principles: matter and the spiritual force that animates it.
In this teaching of unity, the Stoics once again perceive themselves as akin to the ancient cosmologists. Therefore, they first incorporate into their system Heraclitus’s concept of the logos, the primary substance of fire, later borrowing his idea of successive cosmic epochs to weave into their doctrine of the continuous and eternal renewal of things. This ancient thought regarding the regularity of cosmic changes draws the Stoics further toward Aristotle’s principle of development. This principle is closely linked to their rigorously articulated principle of immanence. The attempt to connect Aristotle’s ideas with ancient cosmological views is further prompted by a specific historical circumstance. The opposition of matter and form, predominant in Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics, was already encapsulated in the relationship of Heraclitus’s fire to eternally changing things. It was later elaborated in the teachings of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, which also influenced Aristotle. Accordingly, the Stoics teach that the singular logos, the breath, the active fire, relates to the entire world as the soul relates to the human body. It fragments into an infinite multitude of purposeful forms that, corresponding to Aristotle’s entelechies, are characterized as separate logoi and as “rational seeds” (λόγοι σπερματικοί) of things, serving as the embryos of all development in nature. For many Stoics, the connection with Aristotellers cosmology is even closer. They teach that the divine—whether identified as Zeus or logos—has its original seat on the outermost surface of the world, from which it radiates throughout the cosmos. The world, through the connection of all individual purposeful forces in the supreme foundational force, forms a sequential series of goals, over which the human mind, the seat of personality, rises as the highest form. This ultimate link in the hierarchy of goals, according to the doctrine of the majority of Stoics, is as eternal as the deity itself, to which it ultimately returns. However, some hold that such a return is possible only for those souls that have acquired the necessary strength, specifically the souls of the wise.
If the Stoic system is thus pantheistic, this pantheism acquires a distinctive form through its connection to strict individualism, on the one hand, and through its inherent materialistic character, on the other. The individualism associated with pantheism results in the cult of human personality and a religious anthropocentric orientation, in which the ethical worldview of the Stoics is most accurately reflected. Materialism, meanwhile, is the result of their synthesis of immediately preceding Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy with ancient cosmological systems, in which, as in the teachings of Heraclitus, there had not yet been a precise distinction between the spiritual and corporeal principles of things. Thus, the Stoic system is not materialism in our modern sense. Rather, it intentionally returns to the naïve materialism of the ancient cosmologists, who, while distinguishing spirit and body, nonetheless conceived the spiritual in a sensuous, corporeal form. Consequently, it becomes clear that the Stoic system, despite its materialistic character, is entirely theological and serves as a faithful imitation of Aristotelian philosophy, whose principle of development and method of distinguishing between matter and form continue to endure, albeit in the guise of archaic cosmological representations. Conversely, the idea borrowed from Heraclitus regarding the absolute regularity of all that occurs—a notion manifested even in the eternal renewal of things—renders the Stoics, in contrast to Aristotle, heralds of strict determinism. Acting arbitrarily for a human being means acting in accordance with the inclinations inherent in them. However, this inclination is itself a necessary product of the natural process. Therefore, fate determines humanity both in cases where one acts arbitrarily and where one acts involuntarily: “fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.” Determinism aligns naturally with the ethical disposition prevailing among the Stoics: a life in accordance with nature necessitates immersion in nature even where it manifests for humanity in the form of fate. Consequently, humanity is compelled to renounce the self-determination of external fate. This inclination toward renunciation is simultaneously sustained and satisfied by the conviction that one’s own will is ultimately impotent.
Alongside the changes in metaphysical worldviews, the problem of knowledge ultimately undergoes transformation as well. In contrast to the firmly established conviction inherited from Plato and further solidified by Aristotle regarding the value of knowledge that operates within concepts and the independent significance of those concepts, the understanding of how human thought emerges undergoes a regressive metamorphosis under the influence of ancient cosmological perspectives. Since only individual sensory things are truly real, all knowledge depends on the influence of sensory impressions and on experience. Yet a complete revival of the earlier stage of thought could not take place entirely, for what was established by preceding philosophy regarding the nature of concepts, and what was set forth by Aristotelian logic regarding the laws of our thought moving within concepts, could not vanish without a trace. Under the influence of these opposing currents, the Stoics develop a doctrine of the subjectivity of concepts. These concepts correspond not to actual things, but represent subjective images created by the human spirit to unify the diverse content of experience. Thus, teleological pantheism intertwines here with a distinctive contrast that nonetheless corresponds to the internal connection of ideas: a gnoseological empiricism that holds a skeptical stance toward knowledge operating purely within concepts.
In Epicureanism, as in Stoicism, the ethical worldview takes center stage, while the theoretical branches of philosophy form a secondary complement, entirely shaped by ethical demands. Although Stoicism and Epicureanism represent opposing systems that continue to give the terms “Stoic” and “Epicurean” their typical meaning today, we must not overlook the fact that their original directions diverged far less in their views on life than such generalized labels suggest. The early representatives of both schools shared common ground in the spirit of their time. At the same time, they shared a common struggle against the deficiencies of contemporary culture, which they fought through somewhat different means.
The Ethics of Epicurus
Epicurean ethics are, if possible, even more individualistic than those of the Stoics. For Epicurus, the state is a necessary evil. Those who wish to maintain peace of mind must keep their distance from public life and live in solitude (λάθε βιώσας), savoring the happiness of earthly existence within a circle of like-minded friends. Epicurus ignores the boundaries of nationality and social status. Yet his cosmopolitanism—driven by the passive, quiescent mood of his ethics—manifests more as a disdain for existing differences than as a positive proclamation of human equality. In contrast to the thirst for pleasure and the inner coarseness of contemporary culture, Epicurus advocates moderation and the preference of spiritual pleasures over sensory ones. He does this to preserve an unperturbed state of mind, or ataraxia, which he reveres as the highest good. The ataraxia of Epicurus is undoubtedly akin to the apathy of the Stoics. Both stem from the same revulsion against the noise and external demands of existence, leading to a retreat into oneself and a close circle of kindred souls. From this point onward, the divergences between the two worldviews begin to emerge.
If peace of mind—the shared objective of both schools—is achieved by the Stoics through the contempt of all external values, the Epicureans find it in the moderate and lasting enjoyment of them. This opposition arises primarily from their differing strategies in combating the cultural extremes and coarseness of their era. The gaze of the Stoics is directed backward. They desire a restoration of ancient morals and piety, aligning their logos with Zeus and their ideal of personality with the heroes of folk religion to preserve traditional religious notions. The Epicureans, by contrast, are champions of enlightenment. They combat superstition and the widespread, senseless mixing of cults that characterize the return to barbarism in contemporary culture. According to Epicurus, an individual must rely solely on themselves. Humans belong entirely to the sensory world, and the realization that death will free them from worldly vanity and the sufferings of old age offers genuine solace, rendering the notion of immortality a mere illusion. The prevalence of beliefs about the gods provides a basis for assuming that such beings exist somewhere, but we can only conceive of them as perfected, sentient human beings. Their perfection consists solely in their supremely refined enjoyment of the peace of mind that the wise seek, making it contradictory to think that the gods concern themselves with the world. Instead, they serve as ideal archetypes of human action by leading lives free from the cares and sufferings of existence. As ideal prototypes rather than extramundane forces that reward and punish, the gods are to be venerated without fear or dread.
The most characteristic feature of the Epicurean system is its enlightening, anti-religious tendency, taking “religion” in its literal sense as a binding tie. In this respect, Epicurean philosophy embodies widespread spiritual aspirations that stand in opposition to those of Stoicism. While the Stoics aimed to satisfy religious needs through philosophy by adapting traditional Greek notions of the gods, the Epicureans celebrated their teacher as the great benefactor of humanity. They praised him for freeing people from the fear of the divine.
From this relationship to religion arises the further content of Epicurus’s ethics. If a person belongs exclusively to the sensory world, their joys and sufferings are likewise contained within it, making feeling rather than reason the true source of happiness. Every living being strives for pleasure and avoids suffering, yet the greatest pleasure lies simply in the removal of pain. Hence, the most enduring pleasure consists in the prolonged absence of suffering. The primary practical rule for maintaining this state is the moderate enjoyment of life’s gifts, preferring spiritual pleasures to purely sensory ones. Yet there is no real contradiction between the two, for spiritual pleasures are merely the most refined forms of sensory experience, stemming from the most delicate movements of the body.
Here we find a hint of the direction of Epicurus’s metaphysical worldview. It is, if possible, even more defined by ethics than that of the Stoics. This is evidenced by the minor significance attributed to theoretical thinking, as he adopts almost unchanged the system most closely related to his ethics—the atomism of Democritus. The deviations allowed by Epicurus from this are not improvements, as they clearly disrupt the internal coherence of Democritus’s doctrine of nature. The essential deviation lies in his acceptance of Aristotle’s notion of chance and his derivation of the established atomic whirlwinds in the universe from the initial and accidental collision of faster atoms with slower, heavier ones—a cosmological theory he devised primarily to allow for the possibility of a free initiative in human actions that lies outside mechanical causality. Therefore, Epicurus differs from the Stoics, who adhere to strict determinism, in his vigorous defense of free will, a distinction that, in turn, stems from the difference in their ethical worldviews. For Epicurus, in contrast to the Stoics, who proclaim the obligation for individuals to adhere to religious and moral norms, he champions a view of people as complete masters of their actions.
Skepticism
In both of the most influential schools of this era, the Stoic and the Epicurean, ethical interest is evidently so dominant that their theoretical worldviews merely represent a renewal of ancient philosophical doctrines, combined and transformed in accordance with changing ethical needs. The overwhelming superiority of practical ethics is also expressed in a third direction which, though it may take a back seat, is no less characteristic of its time. This direction is skepticism. It began in the 4th century BCE, has since never disappeared, and is primarily associated with the name of Pyrrho of Elis, thus largely referred to as Pyrrhonism.
As can be inferred from the writings of Pyrrho’s followers, especially later skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus in the 3rd century CE, Pyrrhonism represents a theoretical skepticism that far surpasses the relentless consistency of the earlier skepticism of the sophists. It is aimed against both sources of knowledge, sensory experience and conceptual thought, and it teaches a renunciation of knowledge altogether. Sensory perception is deceptive. It not only misleads different people but also the various senses of the same individual, evoking conflicting impressions within them. Concepts are false because their characteristics contradict one another. For example, a cause that cannot coexist with its effect—otherwise, it could not be distinguished from it—cannot precede it either, for then there would be no grounds for placing them in relation to one another.
However radical this later skepticism may be, it differs from the sophistic variety in its unyielding consistency. It is merely theoretical, even contesting the reliability of knowledge, apparently with the aim of placing faith beyond doubt—specifically, the practical fulfillment of religious and moral imperatives. Thus, skepticism fundamentally serves ethical ideals. In striving to sacrifice reason to faith, it is likely the most conservative among the ethical movements of its time. By contrast, both Stoicism and Epicureanism, each in its own way, seek to reform moral and religious life.
Über den Autor
Dieser Artikel wurde von Sykalo Yevhen zusammengestellt und redigiert — Bildungsplattform-Manager mit über 12 Jahren Erfahrung in der Entwicklung methodischer Online-Projekte im Bereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften.
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Zuletzt geändert: 15/11/2026