The Historical Development of Philosophy

Greek Philosophy

Ethical Directions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics)

The third period of Greek philosophy is characterized externally by the gradual spread of Greek education and science. Philosophy, which initially emerged in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor and lower Italy and subsequently took root, primarily in Athens, now expands again throughout the ancient cultural world that has embraced Greek civilization. Alongside Athens, other cities within the global states of Alexander and later Rome, particularly Alexandria, become influential cultural centers. Together with the Greeks, the inhabitants of Eastern lands, and later the Romans, begin to actively participate in the development of philosophy. An undeniable new spirit begins to dominate philosophy under the influence of changes in the political landscape, the mingling of nations of various origins, the emergence of new cultural needs, shifts in religion and morals, and, in part, due to the motivations that spurred the previous systems toward their further development and transformation. Having moved externally beyond the confines of the Hellenic world, philosophy also acquires an internally cosmopolitan, universal human tendency. It seeks to satisfy all people regardless of nationality: Greeks as well as Eastern peoples and Romans; at the same time, it increasingly strives to replace the folk religion that is losing significance for educated individuals and has become an empty external form. Consequently, interest in both political and cosmological questions is relegated once again to the background. The subject of philosophical contemplation becomes predominantly the human being in his universal qualities, independent of origin, status, or condition. All other philosophical tasks emerge in light of this anthropological problem in its most general and thus completely individual form.

Thus, the philosophical directions that arose from the end of the fourth century return to Socrates, to the man who saw the most important task for philosophical reflection primarily in self-knowledge. Correspondingly, according to the resolution of the question regarding the meaning of human life, these directions differ from one another much as the schools that converged in Socrates, leading his followers to opposing ethical views. The philosophy of the Stoics, named after the painted porch where the school founded by Zeno of Citium regularly met in Athens, aligns with the Cynics. Epicurus, who gathered many disciples in his garden in Athens around the same time, returns to the hedonists, or representatives of the Cyrenaic school. This connection of two newly emerging directions with the two main Socratic schools is historically manifest in the fact that the remaining representatives of the old sects affiliate themselves with the newly established ones: the Cynics join the Stoics, and the hedonists join Epicurus's followers. However, the directly preceding development of philosophy, despite the changes in interests, significantly influences these new directions, leading them to extend well beyond the narrow circle of views of the old Socratics. While the ethical problem could still remain paramount for them, even ultimately the only valuable one, the new era introduced different conditions for its resolution, and the monumental scientific system erected by the greatest of the Socratics and his followers played a significant role. The diverse scientific needs that emerged from the inquiries of these philosophers and were temporarily satisfied could not disappear without a trace; at the very least, they could adapt to the newly awakened interest in the anthropological problem. Consequently, the newly birthed philosophical directions strive to establish universal systems that encompass the entirety of issues discussed by preceding philosophy. The branches of philosophy that were largely the focus of specialized studies in the Aristotelian school—epistemology, metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics—reappear in the Stoic and Epicurean systems. However, corresponding to the particular significance of the ethical-anthropological problem in these systems, the internal relationships among the aforementioned various scientific fields change significantly. In Plato and Aristotle, despite the high importance they attributed to ethical and political issues, theoretical interest was so strong that it took precedence over the exploration of epistemological problems, pushing practical scientific domains into the background. In both, therefore, epistemological problems formed the foundation of all philosophy: the metaphysical worldview of these thinkers relied chiefly on resolving them; philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics, and politics emerged later as applied sciences, guided by broader interests rooted in particular conditions of experience or life.

This relationship between theoretical philosophical tasks and practical ones is entirely altered in the newly arisen philosophical directions. Here, the ethical problem is so predominant that not only are all other questions pushed into the background, but their resolution is fundamentally determined by the relationship within it. Therefore, representatives of such directions cannot speak of a research focus aimed solely at satisfying epistemological needs, such as the study of metaphysical questions, as it first appeared in Aristotle. Everything is examined from an ethical standpoint, which is predominantly defined by the individual’s soul and personal relationship to the culture of their time, while theoretical considerations play only a minimal role. Thus, these philosophical directions, seeking to replace religion, resemble it also in that their choices are more a matter of feeling and faith than of knowledge and understanding.

This relationship corresponds to the significance attributed to various components within the systems we are discussing. In truth, both the Stoics and the Epicureans position ethics in an original place: in it, both directions reflect the new motives driving their time, which, in this form, were foreign to preceding eras and manifest here in unique worldviews that would exert influence for a long time. Specific motives underlying these ethical systems—specifically the opposition they hold to one another—correspond to general human sentiments, and they may have also existed within the systems of Socratic Cynics and Hedonists. However, the manner in which Stoicism and Epicureanism developed these motives was possible only at a higher stage of scientific development and within a culture that had become cosmopolitan, with broader needs and means to satisfy them. Alongside ethics, which these systems emphasized and through which they primarily influenced their contemporary reality and the subsequent era, other components of these systems scarcely hold an original position, or—particularly applicable to the metaphysics and natural philosophy of the Stoics—its originality is, so to speak, merely derivative: their originality lies in their successful synthesis of older systems. The situation fundamentally does not change in that only this synthesis has clothed the thoughts of earlier times in a form through which they were passed on to posterity and in which, perhaps, they could influence them at all.

From what has been said, it follows that for a genetic exposition of systems attempting to unveil their original motivating causes and, at the same time, the interrelations of their individual components, the sequential order applied to the exposition of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy is hardly suitable. This order is generally convenient for depicting worldviews that rest upon a theoretical foundation. Since the Stoics and Epicureans directly stemmed from ethical worldviews and subsequently drew ideas about the universal essence of things and humanity from the works of their predecessors—ideas that at best were directly associated with the ethical worldview—it becomes evident that their theory of knowledge and metaphysics are not the foundations of philosophy but rather supplements to the ethical systems that essentially define them. Therefore, it is expedient for us to allocate the primary place in the exposition to ethics, so we can later demonstrate how further philosophical views necessarily emanated from it, based on already existing perspectives that have transitioned from earlier times.

Stoicism

The ethics of the Stoics stands out as the most influential among the philosophical worldviews of this time. From Zeno and Cleanthes, its original founders, to the Stoics of the Roman imperial period—Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—the attention of all deeper minds, discontented with the noisy and superficial life of the great cities of that era, particularly those who, in contrast to the decline of morals, the widespread infection of Eastern luxury, and the superstitious mingling of religious cults of all nations, sought a return to a simpler way of life, to old customs and piety, was strongly drawn to Stoic ethics. Thus, at the forefront of Stoic ethics from the very beginning lies the demand for a “life in accordance with nature.” However, such a life is not about enjoying the goods of life, nor about increasing needs and the pursuit of their satisfaction; rather, it fundamentally consists in the absence of needs, independence from external life conditions, and the dominance of those human capabilities that, distinguishing man from animal, constitute his true nature—primarily the mastery of reason over judgment. Therefore, in the activities of these latter traits resides the “life in accordance with nature.” Reason and judgment, conditioning freedom from external necessity and the vicissitudes of fate, constitute true human happiness and the only worthy aspiration, in contrast to those apparent goods that reduce man to servitude before external relations and consequently generate much evil. Yet the self-satisfaction derived from this freedom of spirit, rooted in the absence of needs, presupposes the disappearance from the soul of those drives and passions that give rise to external needs—the desire for wealth and, hence, every evil. The true purpose of reason is not to occupy a middle position between opposing passions, for in such a case reason is still possessed by a desire directed outward and thus is itself a passion that disrupts the tranquility of the soul; rather, it resides in freedom from passions, in the annihilation of affects, in a state of indifference (apatheia). Thus, judgment (φρόνησις) or, as later Stoics termed it, wisdom (σοφία), represents the greatest virtue, as it actualizes the dominance of reason over needs and sufferings.

Consequently, a person who pursues external goods is unhappy, as he inflicts suffering upon himself; he is a bad person, as he lives without virtue; he is foolish, for he acts irrationally. But such fools, in the view of the Stoics, comprise the majority of people, with few exceptions; and in these few—Socrates, Zeno, the founder of their school—the Stoics see simultaneously teachers and exemplars of virtue. The significance of human personality is founded solely upon virtue, as virtue resides in the activity of a capacity uniquely inherent to man—in the activity of reason. Hence, the worth of the individual does not depend on his external social position, rank, office, or lineage. A sage, regardless of whether he is a Greek or a barbarian, a slave or a king, remains a sage; a fool remains a fool. The ethics of the Stoics is both individualistic and cosmopolitan: only the individual can be wise, virtuous, and happy; only the individual possesses ethical significance, and this significance does not depend on national boundaries. In contrast, sages from all nations silently form a union wherein they recognize themselves as brothers. Dismissing all external distinctions among people as trivial, the Stoics are far removed from contesting them; to do so would grant them an importance that they, in reality, do not possess. For a slave, his subordinate external social position should be as indifferent as the splendor and majesty surrounding a king. Thus, the central tenet of practical morality is to submit to fate and to avoid any desires aimed at altering one’s external social position: desires transform into passions and disrupt the tranquility and self-control of the soul. Where, despite this, the inevitable action of external relations—such as physical suffering—disturbs the soul’s peace, it is better to depart from life voluntarily than to endure pain. Hence, the Stoics, following the example of their founder, regard suicide, performed under such conditions, not only as permissible but as a virtuous act; it expresses the consciousness that life, in itself, is an indifferent fact, an “adiaphoron,” whose preservation holds significance only when it serves as a means to attain true goods—wisdom and virtue—but which becomes an evil if it results in the dominion of suffering over the human soul.

The metaphysics of the Stoics, like their physics and psychology, is a product of this ethical outlook on life: it synthesizes almost all concepts that had gained prominence in previous philosophy, with this synthesis being characterized by a disdain for the world, a strict individualism, cosmopolitanism, and the religious orientation of their ethics. Thus, the Stoic metaphysical worldview presents a system wherein the λόγος of Heraclitus, governing the world, the νους of Anaxagoras, the ideas of Plato, and the entelechies of Aristotle coalesce into a single whole, while simultaneously submitting to a prevailing thought that was foreign to all preceding systems, as it is merely the product of a new ethical outlook on life that found its expression among the Stoics. This thought is fundamentally more religious than metaphysical; it imparts to the entire Stoic philosophy a distinctive character, grounding their metaphysics, physics, and psychology in a philosophy of religion, which, in turn, is merely a transformation of Stoic ethical ideas into a theosophical form. Since the highest good lies not in external treasures but has its foundation in man himself—in what he has become by nature and through his own strength—then the deity, already recognized by Plato as identical with the idea of the good, cannot exist outside man but must reside within him and in nature: man is the product of nature, and his destiny lies in living in accordance with nature. God and nature are identical, and man, as the highest product of nature, embodies the highest manifestation of divinity: foremost, the sage is a god in visible form. Thus, the Stoic philosophy of religion clearly expresses pantheism, which, under the influence of ethical individualism, aligns with the cult of personality, leading the Stoics toward religious views that correspond to this tendency, namely, the cult of heroes.

Between the preceding philosophical systems, Aristotle's stands out as particularly suited for the metaphysical foundation of these religious and philosophical ideas. Aristotle himself taught the immanence of the spiritual in matter, while forms reside in substances. Only the ideas of God and the thinking human mind, as purely spiritual forms, lie, according to Aristotle, at the threshold and thus outside the realm of actual substances, which arise through the mutual penetration of both principles. Influenced by the notion that the divine exists not outside the world but within nature and primarily in humanity, the Stoics elevate Aristotle's principle of immanence to an absolute significance: a transcendent God, like a transcendent human spirit, is eliminated or, more precisely, both are incorporated into nature itself. God, as the Prime Mover, dwells within the world and, moreover, is not merely a secondary cause, as in Aristotle's physics, but the immediate creator and sustainer of cosmic movement; likewise, the human spirit, being the highest product of nature, also resides within it. Just as human thoughts arise from sensory impressions and cannot exist without sensory form, so too, humanity is not an incorporeal form but a corporeal essence, like all other entities, formed from the union of the two principles: matter and the spiritual force that animates it.

In this teaching of unity, the Stoics again perceive themselves as akin to the ancient cosmologists. Therefore, they first incorporate into their system Heraclitus's concept of the logos, the primary substance of fire, later borrowing Heraclitus's idea of successive cosmic epochs, which they weave into their doctrine of the continuous and eternal renewal of things. This ancient thought regarding the regularity of cosmic changes then draws the Stoics further toward Aristotle's principle of development, which is closely linked to their rigorously articulated principle of immanence. The attempt to connect Aristotle's ideas with ancient cosmological views is further prompted by the fact that the opposition of matter and form, predominant in Aristotle's metaphysics and physics, was already encapsulated in the relationship of Heraclitus's fire to the eternally changing things, and was later predominantly elaborated in the teachings about the elements by Empedocles and Anaxagoras, which also influenced Aristotle. Accordingly, the Stoics teach that the singular logos, the breath, the active fire, relates to the entire world as the soul relates to the human body, fragmenting into an infinite multitude of purposeful forms that, seemingly corresponding to Aristotle's entelechies, are characterized as separate logoi and as "rational seeds" (λόγοι σπερματικοί) of things, as they are the embryos of all development in nature. For many of the Stoics, the connection with Aristotelian cosmology is even closer, as they teach that the divine, whether identified as Zeus or logos, has its original seat on the outermost surface of the world, from which it then radiates throughout the cosmos. The world, through the connection of all individual purposeful forces in the supreme foundational force, forms a sequential series of goals, over which the human mind, the seat of personality, rises as the highest form. This ultimate link in the hierarchy of goals, according to the doctrine of the majority of Stoics, is as eternal as the deity itself, to which it ultimately returns. However, some hold that such a return is possible only for those souls that have acquired the necessary strength, specifically for the souls of the wise.

If thus the Stoic system is pantheistic, then this pantheism, on one hand, acquires a distinctive form through its connection to strict individualism and, on the other, through its inherent materialistic character. The individualism associated with pantheism results in the cult of human personality and a religious anthropocentric orientation, in which the ethical worldview of the Stoics is most accurately reflected. On the other hand, materialism is the result of the synthesis produced by them from the immediately preceding Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy with ancient cosmological systems, in which, as in the teachings of Heraclitus, there had not yet been a precise distinction between the spiritual and corporeal principles of things. Thus, the Stoic system is not materialism in our sense; rather, it intentionally returns to the naïve materialism of the ancient cosmologists, who, while distinguishing spirit and body from one another, nonetheless conceive the spiritual in a sensuous, corporeal form. Consequently, it becomes clear that the Stoic system, despite its materialistic character, is entirely theological and serves as a faithful imitation of Aristotelian philosophy, the principle of development of which and the method of distinguishing between matter and form continue to endure, albeit in the guise of archaic cosmological representations. Conversely, the idea borrowed from Heraclitus regarding the absolute regularity of all that occurs, a notion manifested even in the idea of the eternal renewal of things, renders the Stoics, in contrast to Aristotle, heralds of strict determinism. Acting arbitrarily for a human being means acting in accordance with the inclinations inherent in them; however, this inclination is itself a necessary product of the natural process. Therefore, fate determines humanity both in cases where one acts arbitrarily and where one acts involuntarily: “fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.” Determinism, evidently, aligns with the ethical disposition prevailing among the Stoics: "a life in accordance with nature" necessitates immersion in nature even where it manifests for humanity in the form of fate. Consequently, humanity is compelled to renounce self-determination of their external fate, and such an inclination towards renunciation is simultaneously sustained and satisfied by the conviction of the impotence of one's own will.

Alongside the changes in metaphysical worldviews, the problem of knowledge ultimately undergoes transformation as well. In contrast to the firmly established conviction inherited from Plato and further solidified by Aristotle regarding the value of knowledge that operates within concepts and the independent significance of these latter, conceptions of the emergence of human thought also undergo a sort of regressive metamorphosis through the influence of ancient cosmological perspectives. Since only individual sensory things are truly real, all knowledge depends on the influence of sensory impressions, on experience. However, it must be noted that a complete revival of the earlier stage of thought could not take place; what was established by the immediately preceding philosophy regarding the nature of concepts, and what was set forth by Aristotelian logic regarding the laws of our thought moving within concepts could not vanish without a trace. Under the influence of these opposing currents, the Stoics develop a doctrine of the subjectivity of concepts. These concepts correspond not to actual things but represent subjective images created by the human spirit for the purpose of unifying the diverse content of experiences. Thus, here, a teleological pantheism intertwines with a distinctive contrast, yet one that fully corresponds to the internal connection of ideas: a gnoseological empiricism that holds a skeptical stance toward knowledge within concepts.

In Epicureanism, as in Stoicism, the ethical worldview takes center stage, while the theoretical realms of philosophy here, to a greater extent than there, form a complement to it, fully defined by ethical demands. But while Stoicism and Epicureanism represent opposing systems in general, reflecting the significant subjective dispositions for which the designations "Stoic" and "Epicurean" continue to bear typical meaning even today, we must not lose sight of the fact that their original directions diverged much less in their views on life than such generalized concepts would suggest. The early representatives of the Stoics and Epicureans share common points of intersection, on one hand, in the spirit of the time, of which they are products, and on the other, in their struggle against the deficiencies of the contemporary culture, which they wage only in somewhat different directions.

The Ethics of Epicurus

The ethics of Epicurus, if possible, are even more individualistic than those of the Stoics. For him, the state is a necessary evil. Those who wish to maintain peace of mind must keep their distance from public life and live in solitude (λάθε βιώσας): in relationships with like-minded friends, they may fully savor the happiness that earthly life can offer. Epicurus does not acknowledge the boundaries imposed by nationality or social status; however, his cosmopolitanism, due to the passive, quiescent mood prevailing in his ethics, manifests more as disdain for existing differences than as a positive proclamation of human equality. In contrast to the thirst for pleasure and the inner coarseness of contemporary culture, Epicurus advocates for moderation and the preference of spiritual pleasures over sensory ones, as a means of preserving an unperturbed state of mind, or ataraxia, which he reveres as the highest good. The ataraxia of Epicurus is undoubtedly akin to the apathy of the Stoics: both are products of the same disposition, a revulsion against the noisy life and external demands of existence, leading to a retreat into oneself and a close circle of kindred souls. From this point onward, the divergences between these two worldviews begin to emerge.

If peace of mind—the objective sought by both—is achieved by the Stoics through contempt for all external values, while the Epicureans find it in moderate and therefore lasting enjoyment of them, this opposition primarily arises from their differing stances in the struggle against the extremes of their cultural era and its coarseness. The gaze of the Stoics is directed backward; they desire a restoration of ancient purity of morals and piety, thus striving to align their “logos” with Zeus, their ideal of the human personality with the heroes of folk religion, and to preserve ancient religious notions as much as possible. In contrast, the Epicureans are champions of enlightenment. They primarily combat superstition and the increasingly widespread senseless mixing of cults—phenomena that strongly characterize the return to barbarism in the contemporary cultural reality. Thus, according to Epicurus, a person must rely solely on themselves. They are entirely belonging to the sensory world, and the knowledge that death will free them from worldly vanity and the sufferings of old age is a source of solace. Hence, the notion of immortality is a mere illusion. The prevalence of beliefs about the gods provides a basis for assuming that such beings exist somewhere. However, we can only conceive of them as perfected human beings, that is, sentient beings. The perfection attributed to them may consist solely in their supremely refined enjoyment of the peace of mind that the wise seek. Therefore, it is contradictory to think that the gods concern themselves with the world. Rather, they are ideal prototypes of human action precisely in that they lead lives free from the cares and sufferings of existence. As ideal archetypes of the world, rather than as extramundane forces rewarding and punishing, and thus instilling fear and dread, the gods can be venerated and receive sacrifices.

Thus, the most characteristic feature of the Epicurean system is its enlightening, anti-religious tendency, taking the term "religion" in its literal sense—as a connection. In this sense, Epicurean philosophy, much like Stoicism, embodies widespread spiritual aspirations, with their opposition rooted in the divergent directions of these latter. While the Stoics aimed to satisfy religious needs with their philosophy and, therefore, to adapt the ancient Greek notions of the gods as much as possible, the Epicureans celebrated their teacher as the great benefactor of humanity for freeing it from the fear of the gods.

From this relationship to religion arises the further content of Epicurus's ethics. If a person belongs exclusively to the sensory world, their joys and sufferings are likewise contained within it. It is not reason in itself, but feeling, that is the source of our happiness. Every living being strives for pleasure and avoids suffering; however, the greatest pleasure lies in the removal of suffering. Hence, the most enduring pleasure, which is at least a source of future suffering, consists in the prolonged absence of suffering. The first practical life principle for maintaining such a state is moderate enjoyment of life’s gifts, preferring spiritual pleasures to purely sensory ones. Yet there is no contradiction between the two; spiritual pleasures, due to human sensory nature, are merely the most refined forms of sensory experiences, stemming from the most delicate movements of the body.

Here we find a hint of the direction of Epicurus's metaphysical worldview. It is, if possible, even more defined by ethics than that of the Stoics. This is evidenced by the minor significance attributed to theoretical thinking, as he adopts almost unchanged the system most closely related to his ethics—the atomism of Democritus. The deviations allowed by Epicurus from this are not improvements, as they clearly disrupt the internal coherence of Democritus's doctrine of nature. The essential deviation lies in his acceptance of Aristotle's notion of chance and his derivation of the established atomic whirlwinds in the universe from the initial and accidental collision of faster atoms with slower, heavier ones—a cosmological theory he devised primarily to allow for the possibility of a free initiative in human actions that lies outside mechanical causality. Therefore, Epicurus differs from the Stoics, who adhere to strict determinism, in his vigorous defense of free will, a distinction that, in turn, stems from the difference in their ethical worldviews. For Epicurus, in contrast to the Stoics, who proclaim the obligation for individuals to adhere to religious and moral norms, he champions a view of people as complete masters of their actions.

Skepticism

In both of the most influential schools of this era—the Stoic and the Epicurean—the ethical interest is evidently so dominant that their theoretical worldviews merely represent a renewal of ancient philosophical doctrines, combined and transformed in accordance with changing ethical needs. The overwhelming superiority of the latter is also expressed in a third direction, which, though it may take a back seat, is no less characteristic of its time—skepticism, which began in the 4th century BCE and has since not disappeared, is primarily associated with the name of Pyrrho of Elis and is thus largely referred to as "Pyrrhonism." The latter, as can be inferred from the writings of Pyrrho’s followers, especially later skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus (in the 3rd century CE), represents theoretical skepticism that far surpasses the relentless consistency of the earlier skepticism of the sophists. Aimed against both sources of knowledge—sensory experience and conceptual thought—it teaches a renunciation of knowledge altogether. Sensory perception is deceptive, for it not only misleads different people but also the various senses of the same individual, evoking conflicting impressions within them. Concepts are false, as their characteristics contradict one another; for example, a cause that cannot coexist with its effect—otherwise, it could not be distinguished from it—cannot precede it either, for then there would be no grounds for placing them in relation to one another.

However radical this later skepticism may be, it differs from the sophistic variety not only in its unyielding consistency but also in that it is merely theoretical, even contesting the reliability of knowledge, apparently with the aim of placing faith beyond doubt—specifically, the practical fulfillment of religious and moral imperatives. Thus, skepticism fundamentally serves ethical ideals. In striving to sacrifice reason to faith, it is likely the most conservative among the ethical movements of its time, whereas both Stoicism and Epicureanism, each in its own way, seek to reform moral and religious life.