Main Philosophical Directions

Directions of Epistemological Theory

Reasoned Empiricism

Only the new natural science succeeded in definitively eliminating naïve empiricism while simultaneously introducing a further stage of empirical thought known as reasoned empiricism. In this regard, the position proclaimed by Galileo, asserting that the explanation of objective natural processes is possible only through mathematical analysis and must solely consider the mathematical properties of bodies—namely, space, motion, magnitude, and number—was particularly decisive. All that constitutes the qualities of sensory sensations exists solely within the perceiving subject. This philosophical viewpoint found its expression in Locke’s theory of primary and secondary qualities. The basis for acknowledging the objective nature of primary qualities in Locke’s teaching was twofold. Firstly, as Galileo had pointed out, these qualities possess characteristics that allow for their effortless application in the mechanical explanation of natural phenomena; and secondly, their mechanical nature permits the explanation of the interaction between an object and the perceiving subject. Among primary qualities, motion occupies a predominant position; the movements of bodies or particles can elucidate not only the objective physical processes themselves but also the processes of perception, which form the foundation of all experiential knowledge. These perceptual processes are the sole means through which general physical movements are conveyed to the sensory apparatus of the perceiving subject.

The perspective of reasoned empiricism is thus closely intertwined with two metaphysical assumptions that initially paved the way in natural science and subsequently influenced philosophy: firstly, the assumption of a constant matter endowed with unchanging properties and invariant quantity; and secondly, the hypothesis that all natural phenomena must be reduced to the movements of various parts of this matter. The worldview grounded in these metaphysical assumptions is commonly referred to as mechanical worldview. It became dominant in natural science by the end of the seventeenth century and has largely retained this status to this day. Consequently, the perspective of reasoned empiricism reflects both of the aforementioned metaphysical assumptions of the mechanical worldview. Primary qualities—impenetrability, extension, numerical relationships, and relations of magnitude and motion—are posited as objectively given; secondary qualities—color, tone, warmth, coldness, and so forth—do not belong to objective matter but rather are effects of objective motion, arising only in the perceiving subject. Of course, this viewpoint did not prevail immediately; in certain areas, physical research remained entrenched in naïve empiricism for a considerable time. For instance, when it was established that tone is nothing other than oscillatory motions, there were many obstacles to applying this conceptual framework to light and color. The discovery that each luminous object produces an inverted diminished image in the eye was so closely aligned with ancient ideas about the emanation of images that in the domain of vision, particularly significant for explaining cognitive processes, the assumption of the identity of sensations with objects persisted for a long time. This is even reflected in the name "spectrum," meaning "ghost," which Newton used for the colored lines obtained through the dispersion of sunlight. The "theory of emanation," through which he attempted to explain light phenomena, also retained the old notion of particles emanating from objects. Newton sought to reconcile this view with the mechanical worldview by positing that the elements emitted from bodies differ only quantitatively from one another; for instance, red color lines possess the largest magnitude, while violet lines have the smallest, and that light and color sensations arise solely from their effect on the retina. It was only later that the theory of ether vibrations completely dispelled these remnants of ancient naïve conceptions.

Locke’s epistemological justification for the viewpoint of reasoned empiricism, which was effectively embraced by the new natural science, rests on his investigation of the criteria for objective reliability. Acknowledging that reliability can be achieved in three ways—through intuition, or immediate perception; sensation, or the immediate coercive action exerted by objects on our senses; and finally, through proof or inferences prompted by facts obtained through intuition or sensation—Locke contended that intuition itself should be excluded from the realm of objectively reliable knowledge. The content of intuitively perceived experience is entirely subjective; based on immediate perception, we are never justified in considering a sensation as anything other than a modification of our own subjective state. According to Locke, we are only entitled to objectify this subjective state when objects exert a coercive influence upon us, compelling us to regard them as given rather than produced by ourselves. In contrast to intuition, Locke finds this case in a specific kind of sensory impressions—those derived from the sense of touch, which are particularly characterized by objective coercion due to the force with which they act upon us. Thus, the resistance of bodies, their impenetrability, is directly an objective property of the perceived. The other primary qualities—space, magnitude, and motion—derive their reliability from proof: their credibility arises from the consistent testimony of two senses, vision and touch. It is evident that this attempt to logically substantiate the distinction between the value of primary and secondary qualities is inadequate and fails to account for the actual foundations guiding natural science in making this distinction. Firstly, the criteria for objective reliability accepted by Locke—the coercive nature of external perception and its uniform effect on various senses—at best provide probability but never yield objective certainty; secondly, they only confer this probability if the belief in the existence of external objects was already present beforehand; they cannot, in any case, directly transform intuitively perceived subjective sensations into objects related to external impressions.

These unsuccessful attempts at logically justifying the perspective of reasoned empiricism allow us to characterize it as a stage of cautious reflection, at which, in contrast to the preceding stage of naïve empiricism, a clear insight into the problem of knowledge is attained. However, in resolving this problem, arbitrary and hypothetical assumptions of positive natural science are employed, and attempts are made to justify these assumptions with insufficient means. Therefore, while natural science, measuring the adequacy of its assumptions by the results obtained through them, may remain within this mode of inquiry, it proves unsuitable for the theory of knowledge as soon as the weakness of its logical foundations is recognized. This critical rejection of the latter simultaneously provides the basis for various subsequent attempts to transition to the third stage of empirical thought, that of pure empiricism.