Main Philosophical Directions

Directions of Epistemological Theory

Metaphysical Directions

Three main metaphysical directions exist. The epistemological and metaphysical directions do not stand in such a direct relationship that a specific theory of knowledge corresponds to a particular worldview. However, the general character of a metaphysical system is usually preordained by the epistemological views of its author. Thus, there are epistemological directions that altogether exclude even the posing of metaphysical questions, such as skepticism and pure empiricism—the latter only if it remains entirely true to itself. There are also other directions that have an internal kinship with specific metaphysical systems; for example, sensualism with materialism, and subjectivism with idealism. In other cases, while the nature of a theory of knowledge determines metaphysical views, the theory of knowledge is frequently influenced by the very metaphysical perspectives that serve as its foundation. Finally, sometimes there is such a close correlation between the two fields that it is scarcely possible to determine where the starting point of a whole direction lies. It remains undeniable that the epistemological direction contributes to the development of a particular metaphysical worldview, and vice versa.

Due to the negative stance taken by certain directions—skepticism and pure empiricism—toward metaphysical problems, metaphysics undoubtedly occupies a secondary position compared to the theory of knowledge because there is no philosophical system that does not encompass some theory of knowledge. Conversely, there are philosophical systems that intentionally exclude metaphysics. However, influenced by two factors, metaphysics continuously attempts to emerge anew. The first factor lies in the general philosophical striving for a comprehensive worldview; the second resides in the diverse hypothetical constructions undertaken within specific empirical disciplines to understand facts as fully as possible. These two roots of metaphysics, philosophical and empirical, are generally so intricately intertwined that they are difficult to separate from one another, especially since philosophy and particular empirical disciplines were initially still merged. Therefore, by adopting certain metaphysical views from the outset, individual empirical sciences reintegrate them into philosophy. Thus, the interaction between science and philosophy primarily plays a role in shaping overarching worldviews, making metaphysical systems a faithful reflection of the scientific movement of thought, even though what often develops into clear distinctions or even oppositions in other sciences is partially merged. To assess the significance of metaphysical views in the overall development of scientific thought, it is important to note that anti-metaphysical directions, either outright denying the possibility of theoretical knowledge or at least rejecting all principles that extend beyond the realm of specific disciplines, originated only in philosophy and have exerted a certain influence on individual sciences, never achieving lasting dominance within them. Therefore, even if metaphysics were to disappear from philosophy, it would likely reemerge through the positive sciences. This phenomenon indicates that science cannot do without certain fundamental principles under which it categorizes the factual material of its research, and that such principles always contain hypothetical and, consequently, metaphysical elements.

In reality, the fundamental concepts over which metaphysics has labored since ancient times originated within ordinary life experience, first permeating philosophy and then individual scientific disciplines. There are three such fundamental concepts; they play a prominent role because all other general principles depend on them in some way, thus predominantly shaping the overarching worldview. These concepts are substance, matter, and soul. While their names partly arose within science, the concepts themselves emerged prior to the advent of science. Already, mythological thought, having transcended the primitive stage at which it grasped only isolated phenomena, reached the idea of the unity of the world, a principle expressing the connection of phenomena, though this principle was still represented here in some sensory-contemplative form. Philosophy subsequently transforms this idea into the concept of the substantial foundation of things, guided in this transformation by both general intellectual and ethical demands and empirical foundations. Similarly, the concepts of matter and soul were also prepared by pre-scientific and mythological thought. They were then transferred into science, where they are usually related to the independently arisen concept of substance. Since that time, the metaphysical construction of concepts in both philosophy and individual sciences revolves, in essential aspects, around these three fundamental concepts, which express three of the most general ideas put forth by the study of the world of phenomena: the idea of universal unity of the world, the idea of the substrate of the physical world, and the idea of the ultimate foundation of spiritual processes, which humanity partially finds within itself and partially discovers in the actions of other similar beings. These three fundamental concepts inherently possess a hypothetical and, therefore, exceedingly mutable nature. At the mythological stage of thought, the nature of these concepts can be observed in the ever-changing fantastic representations in which they are embodied. In scientific thought, such instability predominantly manifests in the changing relationships among the three indicated concepts. However, since these concepts, in the strictest sense, are metaphysical—they directly arise from the desire to understand the world in its unity and impart direction to all other constructions serving that same tendency—every metaphysics is necessarily hypothetical. Conversely, every explanatory hypothesis, i.e., a hypothesis that is not merely a presumption of a fact that can be proven empirically, is metaphysical and ultimately leads to one of the three fundamental hypothetical concepts: substance, matter, or soul.

The distinction among the basic metaphysical directions from the very birth of philosophy is determined by the relationship in which the two more specific of the indicated concepts, directly related to experience—matter and soul—stand to the more general concept of substance. From the three possible basic relationships, thus, arise three of the most general worldviews, between which transitions are also possible. If matter, conceived as the foundation of the physical world, is simultaneously accepted as the general substance, materialism arises. Conversely, if the spiritual—whether in the form of the individual soul or as a general spiritual principle, thought of analogously to mental activities—becomes the substance, idealism emerges. Finally, in the attempt to satisfy the diverse aspects of reality evenly, a direction generally termed realism arises. In this context, it should be noted that these terms primarily acquired their meanings as applied in the definitions provided above, especially in modern philosophy; this particularly applies to realism. When this term was first used to refer to a specific direction in medieval scholasticism, it was employed in a sense that diverged in essential features from its current application, namely, judging by the expression "universalia sunt realia," it characterized a distinctive form of idealism.

Like epistemological directions, metaphysical directions have developed gradually, a fact particularly evident from the sequence in which they emerged in ancient philosophy. Materialist worldviews first appeared on the stage. Subsequently, idealism developed, first manifesting in a sharply outlined form in Platonic philosophy after a series of preparatory attempts, giving its name to later directions of a similar nature. Realism, in significant aspects, aligns with idealism through the Aristotelian system. Later, these directions frequently replaced one another, often emerging simultaneously and in conflict with one another, as manifestations of warring contemporary scientific currents.