Main Philosophical Directions

Directions of Epistemological Theory

Positive Criticism or Criticism in the Proper Sense of the Word

Criticism, like any fundamental direction of philosophical thought, does not arise suddenly; its emergence cannot be exclusively linked to a philosophy specifically named critical, that is, to Kantian philosophy. On the contrary, Kant's criticism serves both as the culmination of a movement that began long before him and as the starting point for a development that belongs in part to the present rather than history, and in part to the future. In a certain sense, every theory of knowledge is critical; otherwise, it would not be a rational science, which, as such, must strive to distinguish between truth and error. The viewpoint of positive criticism was primarily prepared by the one-sided skepticism found in the forms presented by the new philosophy since Descartes. Nevertheless, Kant deserves credit for consciously recognizing the significance of this movement and clearly formulating the problems that constitute the critical task of the theory of knowledge.

These problems of critical theory arise directly from an impartial position, free from preconceived notions, which it strives to occupy in relation to the claims of both empiricism and rationalism. These issues can be reduced to three fundamental questions: 1) What in our knowledge is given empirically, and what arises from our a priori functions of knowledge? 2) How do the functions of knowledge relate to the empirically given material in each actual act of knowing? 3) What are the limits of our knowledge in accordance with the general conditions of knowledge that lie both within us and outside us?

Kant resolves the first of these questions by asserting that the matter of sensation is given, and therefore contingent for our knowledge, being empirically conditioned; while the general forms of intuition and concepts that provide order to sensations are a priori functions, thus necessarily applied in every particular act of knowledge, or "transcendental" (that is, extending beyond the empirical content of knowledge). According to Kant, the forms of intuition include space and time, the latter of which bears broader significance as it serves as the form of "inner" sense, encompassing the entirety of our conscious content; while space is the form in which order is provided only to sensations of external sense. The forms of concepts—fundamental concepts of our understanding, or categories—such as quantity, quality, substance, and causality, must also be applied to everything conceivable, and thus we must recognize them as a priori transcendental functions of our knowledge.

Kant addresses the second question by asserting that the activity of the functions of knowledge always requires the presence of knowledge content, the material of sensations. Therefore, there are no empty forms of knowledge, just as there is no formless material; sensations cannot exist without being subsumed under some form of intuition or concept. Consequently, each actual act of knowledge requires both material and form: the former must be given to us empirically, while the latter constitutes its forming a priori transcendental function of knowledge. This function, in turn, is of two kinds: intuitive, which must always be in the form of time as the more general form of intuition, and logical, which consists of subsuming the content of knowledge under the categories activated under objectively given conditions. For instance, we subsume the perceived object under the concept of reality, as we perceive it as actually existing; under substance, as we perceive it as relatively stable; and depending on the circumstances, under causality or interaction, as we relate it to other objects, and so on. However, in all these cases, subsuming under the category occurs only under the condition that the object is also understood in a specific temporal form. Thus, we can comprehend the object as real only on the condition that it represents a specific content in time; as a substance only when it remains stable over time; as a cause of other phenomena only if they temporally follow it; as being in interaction with other objects only when they simultaneously exist with it, and so forth. Therefore, every individual act of knowledge consists of the activity of two functions, the intuitive and the logical; aside from the material of sensation, it presupposes certain categories under which it is subsumed and specific forms of time, the temporal schemes corresponding to the categories.

The resolution of the third question of critical theory of knowledge from a purely theoretical standpoint directly follows from the answer given to the second question. If our knowledge consisted solely of concepts, rather than of concepts and intuitions together, it would be quite permissible for the categories under which we subsume the content of experience to provide knowledge that extends beyond experience, and thus is non-empirical and transcendental. However, thinking in concepts is always, at the same time, intuitive, as it presupposes the intuitive form of time, in which the categories and their corresponding fundamental laws of knowledge must reside; therefore, all knowledge is limited to experience. Consequently, transcendental ideas concerning the soul, the world, and God are unknowable; theoretical arguments for the immortality of the soul, for and against the infinitude of the world, for and against the beginning of the world from free causation, and for the existence of God are unfounded. It should be noted that our reason, as a faculty of inference, does not merely derive the conditioned from certain conditions, but also attempts to ascend from the given conditioned to its conditions; due to this nature, in all areas of knowledge, it strives toward the idea of the ultimate condition or simply the unconditional. This unconditional, however, is a postulate devoid of any actual content: it is the idea of reason, rather than a conceptual understanding, provided we, following Kant, distinguish the reason as the capacity for inference from the understanding, as the ability to create concepts, and see the essence of ideas in establishing such postulates as ultimate conditions. In this case, indeed, ideas may exist in three forms: firstly, as the ultimate condition of the unity of internal experience; secondly, as the condition of the unity of external experience or the causal series of events; and thirdly, as the condition of the ultimate foundation of being and thought in general. These three ideas—the soul, the universe or its causal emergence, and God—are erroneously made the objects of three fields of knowledge: rational psychology, cosmology, and theology, whereas in reality they lie beyond experience and therefore do not admit of theoretical knowledge.

Since the aforementioned ideas are postulates of reason, it is evident that in the practical realm, they again acquire the significance that they lose in the theoretical. The theoretical indication of the ultimate conditions that precede experience is also seen by Kant in that the material of sensation provides us with the material of experience, which presupposes the existence of "things-in-themselves," that is, once again the ultimate postulates of the unconditional, which must be associated with experience in thought, even though their content is inaccessible to our knowledge. However, as practical postulates, such ideas attain their truth through our will, which, as a pure volitional capacity, is not subject to the forms of intuition and concept, and through the moral law, which is significant in human conscience, embodies free, and thus unconditional, causality. This postulated freedom of will also affirms the reality of the other two ideas of reason: the soul, as an immutable substance, and God, as the moral legislator; for the moral law demands, firstly, an unlimited scope for human self-perfection, necessary for the complete fulfillment of this law, and secondly, a personal legislator. Thus, Kant's theory of knowledge is supplemented by his ethics, which posits demands for freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. However, theoretical knowledge, according to Kant, only indicates these ideas, on the one hand, through the "thing-in-itself" that is presumed for every empirical object, and on the other hand, through the ideas that necessarily arise from the activity of reason. Morality provides proof of their reality.

Kant's great merit lies in his clear articulation of the fundamental problems of critical theory of knowledge; however, his resolutions of these issues cannot be deemed final. No matter how fruitless the attempts of the subsequent panlogical systems to construct a foundational theory of knowledge may be, they were undoubtedly justified in reproaching Kant for fragmenting the inseparable functions of knowledge into numerous distinct activities, derived not from the nature of thought and its laws, but arbitrarily extracted from experience. They were also right to point out that he permitted a dissonance with the indivisible nature of the spirit by erecting a sharp boundary between theoretical and practical philosophy, between the domains of knowledge and will.

In reality, regardless of the angle from which Kant's critical philosophy is subjected to scrutiny, his teachings provoke serious objections, and in certain instances, the arbitrariness of his assertions becomes glaringly apparent. A more rigorous examination of the psychological nature of representational processes precludes us from understanding space and time as originally distinct or, in fact, as having once existed in isolation from the material forms that organize sensations and that enter the latter from without. We demand to see the mutual relations of these forms with one another and with the content of sensations. Certainly, one cannot also expect that time retains the same exclusive appearance as a general scheme of categories. Furthermore, the external architecture through which the categories are arranged and related to the logical forms of judgment provides only an illusion of a systematic derivation of categories from the laws of thought. The absence of such derivation becomes apparent in the incorrect transitions between the main categories and in the trivial value of secondary categories, a value bordering on complete insignificance. Similarly, the inference from sensation to the "thing in itself" and the connection in which this "thing in itself" is placed with the postulates of the unconditional, derived through an entirely different path, provoke the gravest doubts. It is incomprehensible how the fact that sensations are given to us should testify to the existence of a reality independent of us, unless we presuppose in advance that sensations are given to us through some object lying outside our consciousness, and thus we assume what we intend to prove. Even less can we discern any relationship between this illusory requirement for a thing in itself and the postulates established in the transcendental ideas if we do not see a basis for this in the use of both for a common purpose, namely, to distinguish the realm of being from the realm of phenomena. This distinction in Kant’s theory of knowledge is accepted without sufficient grounds, as it bears no relation to the difference between the form and the material of knowledge. In employing this distinction in the indicated sense, it is evident that Kant was motivated solely by a desire to prepare for the transition to practical philosophy already within the theoretical realm. However, he ultimately achieved the connection between both domains, theoretical and practical, only by reversing the very transition he made from phenomenon to being. In transitioning from phenomenon to being, sensation provides grounds for inferring from the world of phenomena to transcendent being; here, conversely, the will, being itself a transcendent being, enters the world of phenomena in a volitional act. In this context, the "thing in itself" transforms from an arbitrary concept into a mystical idea, which not only evokes Plato's ideas but also approaches Neoplatonic notions of emanation.

Criticism stands as the youngest among epistemological directions. The form it assumes in Kantian philosophy cannot be definitive; this is all the more understandable given that Kantian philosophy represents the first systematically executed attempt of this kind and is evidently influenced by currents that are foreign to the theory of knowledge: these influences partly stem from earlier rationalism and partly directly from the theology of the time.