Main Philosophical Directions

Directions of Epistemological Theory

Negative Criticism or Skepticism

Under the term "criticism," we should understand all philosophical directions that, approaching the problems of knowledge with doubt and critically examining attempts to resolve them, strive to avoid presuppositions that cannot be subjected to critical discussion and which are deemed valid solely because they encounter no objections. Thus, the common perspective of criticism is one of investigating the capacity for knowledge and its sources, ideally free from presuppositions. In this quest for complete impartiality and fair weighing of arguments for and against various opinions, criticism maintains a neutral stance toward the two opposing directions of empiricism and rationalism, even though these directions themselves rest upon accepted positions that arise, of course, under the influence of empirical facts. Criticism first considers it essential to investigate the legitimacy of such positions; thereby, it opens the possibility either to simultaneously dismiss the claims of both directions or to reconcile them, leaning toward empiricism on certain issues and toward rationalism on others. In this regard toward other directions, varying from more negative to more positive depending on the circumstances, we can distinguish two forms of criticism: negative criticism, or skepticism, and positive criticism, or criticism in the proper sense of the term.

Among these two directions, negative skepticism is the older. Moreover, among all epistemological directions, skepticism has attained its definitive form earlier: even in ancient philosophy, it reached a perspective beyond which it could not advance, as it embodies a standpoint of absolute doubt regarding all sources of knowledge and all activities of the mind. However, alongside skepticism in its completed form, there emerges a more moderate form of skepticism: modern skepticism, which typically plays into the hands of other specific directions. Thus, modern skepticism manifests either as one-sided empirical or rationalistic skepticism, with the former disputing the reliability of a priori methods of knowledge and the latter contesting the reliability of experience, or in the form of critical skepticism, whose negation does not unilaterally target any particular positive arguments. This historical observation, indicating that skepticism to a certain degree develops in a direction opposite to that of other currents, merely serves to demonstrate that a certain empirical law—namely, that it is easier to contest than to prove—also holds significance for the general history of the development of philosophical problems. However, it is worth noting that the wit with which ancient skeptics expressed their doubts not only ranks among the most remarkable manifestations of human thought but also serves as a powerful auxiliary means of philosophical understanding by providing resistance against other directions.

The initial seeds of skepticism, which led to the development of an adequate method, can be found among the Eleatics and within the school of Heraclitus. By identifying the Eleatic Zeno as the inventor of dialectics, Aristotle simultaneously highlighted the high significance of the skeptical direction for the methodical logical cultivation of thought. It is indeed crucial that skepticism introduces for the first time a sharply defined logical method. Both Zeno and Cratylus, who developed skepticism that was nascent in Heraclitean philosophy, essentially focus on the dissection of concepts into contradictory attributes, from which conclusions are drawn about the untenability of the concepts themselves. For instance, Zeno dissects the concept of motion into the geometric locations traversed by a body during its movement and into the time intervals in which the body remains at each point during its continuous motion; Cratylus breaks down the concept of flow into the flow as a whole, conceived as immutable, and the continuously changing particles of water. From the contradiction between these two factors of the concept, a conclusion is drawn about the unsoundness of the latter; the concept of motion destroys itself because the moving body does not remain at any of the traversed points for a notable interval of time; the concept of flow fails because, with the continuous change of all its parts, it never remains the same.

Thus, this earliest skeptical movement consists in the dialectics of concepts, which acts in favor of the aprioristic direction, opposing concepts derived from experience; conversely, skepticism, which emerged in sophistry and was directed against the constructions of preceding natural philosophy, has an empirical character. Protagoras and Gorgias, disputing the possibility of universally valid concepts, primarily reference the variability of sensory perception and the subjective differences in human representations and opinions. Both tendencies subsequently converge in the later skepticism of Pyrrho and his followers. According to the arguments of these skeptics, compiled by a later follower of their teachings, Sextus Empiricus (in the third century after Christ), their main arguments in favor of skepticism are, on one hand, the contradictory testimonies of different senses and, on the other hand, the inapplicability of the most general concept of natural scientific explanation, causality. "If honey appears yellow to the eye and sweet to the taste, which of these properties should be considered the actual property of the thing itself?" Furthermore: "If two things, A and B, where A occurs before B, how can A be the cause of B, since a cause cannot exist without its action? If A and B occur simultaneously, by what criterion can I decide that A is the cause of B rather than vice versa? Thus, regardless of how one might conceive the relationship between A and B, it cannot in any case be thought necessary or causal." Therefore, this early skepticism already targets a concept that, in modern times, has predominantly become a target for empirical critique. Yet, Pyrrho's doubt simultaneously pertains to sensory experience, leading to a result that annihilates truth altogether. However, for the Pyrrhonians—serving in this respect as a model for later skeptical directions—this theoretical doubt often merely serves as a means to highlight the practical necessity of faith. For example, Pyrrho advised his students to revere the gods; Timon is attributed with the view that, wherever practical matters are concerned, it is beneficial to follow the common opinion.

Pyrrhonian skepticism stands as the zenith in the development of this philosophical trend; thereafter, it was rarely ascended to again. The radical doubt, directed equally against experience and thought, akin to that espoused by Pyrrho and his school, is subsequently encountered only as a complement to mystical-religious orientations. On one hand, these orientations seek to demonstrate the necessity of faith by asserting the deceptive nature of knowledge; on the other, they strive to justify the contradictions inherent in religious dogmas by revealing the contradictory nature of knowledge itself. In this sense, skepticism has historically supported religious mysticism within scholastic nominalism. Likewise, thinkers such as Blaise Pascal and Pierre Bayle (in the 17th century), and later (in the 18th century) I.G. Hamann, have turned to skepticism for similar motives. However, it is noteworthy that only isolated thinkers express doubt directed against both experience and thought; entire schools since the era of Pyrrhonism have ceased to serve as bearers of such radical skepticism, indicating that skepticism has long transcended its pinnacle in antiquity. Therefore, the modern era is unlikely to contribute anything substantively new to the arguments of the ancient skeptics.

In contemporary philosophy, one often encounters one-sided skepticism, yet always manifesting through individual thinkers and in the form of complete systems. This skepticism either, as in the case of Descartes’ doubt, is directed against the immediate certainty of sensory knowledge in the interest of apriorism, or, akin to David Hume’s skepticism, attempts to justify a pure empiricist perspective by reducing known general concepts—such as substance and cause—to their corresponding sensory data. When Hume remarked that Cartesian doubt is swiftly addressed by Cartesian thinkers seeking refuge in the recognition of certain unshakeable concepts, one could assert, mutatis mutandis, the same about his own skepticism and indeed any one-sided skepticism, precisely because such skepticism would not be one-sided if it did not acknowledge certain indisputable presuppositions. For Hume, such presuppositions include, for instance, the constancy of certain associations, which functionally parallels the role played by concepts of substance and causality in the works of others, as well as the "faith" in the existence of an external world—this differs from the acknowledgment of the veracity of that existence in other thinkers only in words, not in application. Consequently, one-sided skepticism no longer constitutes skepticism in the strictest sense; it merely serves as an auxiliary tool for rationalism or empiricism. It is evident that such skepticism is employed more frequently as a given direction endeavors to assert its worldview more consistently, thus dismissing the claims of the opposing viewpoint. Simultaneously, through these positive aims, one-sided skepticism increasingly approaches the affirmative form of criticism.